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In	order	to	develop	a	theorization	of	the	textual	forces	at	work	in	the	formation	of	the	cultural	concepts	of	First	and	Third	World,	this	dissertation	examines	the	work	of	Cuban	revolutionary	filmmaker	Santiago	Álvarez	in	dialogue	with	an	update	of	Guy	Debord’s	theories	on	the	spectacle,	the	dérive,	and	psychogeography.	Together	with	critical	considerations	of	theories	of	space-time,	modernity	and	postmodernity,	as	well	as	of	the	nation-state	epistemological	order,	it	formulates	a	reading	of	the	development	discourses,	called	here	“demarcational	critique.”	This	model	is	also	put	into	conversation	with	a	key	theoretical	work	on	the	topic	(John	P.	Leary’s	A	Cultural	
History	of	Underdevelopment),	a	fictional	film	(Gregory	Nava’s	El	Norte),	and	an	experimental	montage	of	crucial	meta-reflective	value	(Arthur	Tuoto’s	Não	Me	Fale	
Sobre	Recomeços).			Through	an	exploration	that	seeks	to	blur	the	line	between	theoretical	and	fictional	texts,	this	dissertation	concludes	that	development	discourses,	and	their	main	subsidiary	notions	of	First	and	Third	World,	generally	studied	as	purely	economic	categories,	possess	a	spectacular	dimension,	and	that	the	analysis	of	this	dimension	must	involve	cultural	studies.	It	further	highlights	the	problematic	nature	of	those	notions	in	relation	to	a	postcolonial	project	by	examining	their	Eurocentric,	moralizing,	and	racialized	nature.	Finally,	this	dissertation	proposes	and	demonstrates	an	alternative,	non-national	model	for	postcolonial	discourse.				
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con	su	esperanza	dura	
el	sur	también	existe	-	Mario	Benedetti,	“El	Sur	también	existe”	
	 1	
	
	
	
	
	
	
INTRODUCTION	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 2	
The	history	of	United	States	–	Latin	American	relations	has	been	dominated	by	the	discourse	of	development/underdevelopment	since	the	earliest	stages	of	independent	nationhood.	In	the	twentieth	century,	that	discourse	found	a	strong	anchoring	in	the	concepts	of	First	and	Third	World	well	beyond	the	Cold	War	Era,	as	well	as	in	the	notions	of	Empire	and	Neo-Colony	in	more	recent	postcolonial	studies.	This	dissertation	argues	that	this	discourse	has	often	assumed	the	concepts	of	First	and	Third	World,	and	Empire	and	Neo-Colony,	as	geopolitical	givens	without	first	submitting	those	categories	to	sufficient	critical	scrutiny.	In	this	sense,	it	is	the	primary	aim	of	the	following	essays	to	examine	the	degree	to	which	these	concepts,	which	organize	our	understanding	of	(under)development,	may	constitute	compromised	epistemological	dogmas	firmly	regulated	by	the	very	capitalist	status	quo	that	they	attempt	to	counter.		This	dissertation	departs	from	the	hypothesis	that	one	key	epistemological	organizer	of	knowledge	(and	ideology)	that	underlies	the	thought	and	practices	of	postcolonialism,	namely	the	“First	World	–	Empire	/	Third	World	–	Neo-Colony”	binary,	may	itself	be,	to	some	degree,	a	colonized	epistemology	that	perpetuates	the	subjugation	it	seeks	to	expose.	Furthermore,	it	will	argue	that	the	spectacle	plays	a	crucial	role	in	the	construction	and	management	of	orders	of	knowledge	amenable	to	the	needs	of	capitalist	production.	In	this	sense,	I	will	propose	that	the	notion	of	developed	First	and	underdeveloped	Third	worlds	can	be	studied	as	a	function	of	capitalist	spectacular	media.	With	this	assertion,	I	do	not	intend	to	deny	the	economic	basis	of	the	concept,	but	rather	to	point	out	that	those	notions,	as	cultural	
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concepts,	operate	in	excess	of	their	material	substrate	and	that,	before	they	are	assumed	into	the	political	discourse,	the	cultural	and	literary	studies	must	be	summoned	to	inquire	into	their	textual	mechanics.		The	argument	that	this	dissertation	seeks	to	put	forward	can	be	summarized	as	follows.	The	project	of	modernity,	of	which	capitalism	is	a	central	pillar,	requires	its	own	cooperative	epistemological	orders	to	validate	and	justify	its	means	and	ends.	Capitalism,	in	particular,	additionally	requires	a	method	for	disciplining	workers	and	consumers	under	the	demands	of	the	commodity	economy.	The	spectacle	has	been	the	chief	disseminator	of	that	epistemological	and	behavioral	discipline	since	the	early	twentieth	century.	The	(under)development	discourse,	with	its	annexed	notions	of	First	World	and	Third	World,	thus	possesses	a	cultural	dimension	that	is	so	deeply	intersected	by	the	spectacle	at	the	service	of	the	capitalist	mode	of	production	that	the	use	of	those	notions	as	critical	tools	is	problematic	at	best.	Patrick	Leary	addresses	the	compromised	nature	of	the	(under)development	discourse	very	energetically	in	A	Cultural	History	of	
Underdevelopment,	but	he	does	so	in	the	manner	of	an	archival	examination	of	select	historical	evidence	from	nineteenth-	and	twentieth-century	Cuba	and	Mexico,	without	offering	a	more	general	theorization	on	the	discourse	or	a	model	for	its	subversion.	Indeed,	I	have	not	found	in	my	research	a	comprehensive	cultural	theory	of	the	(under)development	discourse	as	a	function	of	spectacular	media.	This	dissertation	seeks	to	address	this	void	by	proposing	an	initial	model	towards	a	critical	cultural	theory	of	the	discourses	in	question	in	the	post-Cold	War	era.		
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A	theoretical	model	of	the	kind	intended	in	this	dissertation	must	depart	from	a	solid	theory	of	the	spectacle.	I	find	this	theoretical	foundation	in	the	combination	of	Guy	Debord’s	theories,	particularly	his	1967	Theory	of	the	Spectacle,	and	Santiago	Álvarez’s	1965	film	Now.	Debord’s	texts	are	written	as	purely	theoretical	treatises;	Álvarez’s	is	a	documentary	in	the	form	of	a	musical	montage.	By	blurring	the	line	between	“theoretical	text”	and	“fictional	or	documentary	text,”	I	hope	to	underscore	from	the	beginning	the	degree	to	which	theory	contains	a	fictional	dimension	and	fiction	may	elaborate	a	theoretical	argument,	a	condition	central	to	my	subsequent	discussion.		Debord’s	theories	offer	the	most	adequate	foundation	for	my	endeavor	for	a	number	of	reasons,	chief	among	them	the	current	validity	of	his	central	concepts	of	the	spectacle	and	of	détournement.	However,	his	work	has	been	repeatedly	criticized	for	its	extreme	measure	of	abstraction	and	for	its	lack	of	applied	vision.	I	find	that	Álvarez’s	Now	constitutes	a	very	precise	praxis	of	Debord’s	principles	three	years	before	the	publication	of	Debord’s	book.	Chapter	1	thus	begins	by	examining	the	related	concepts	of	the	spectacle	and	of	détournement	as	presented	in	both	texts.	I	will	note	that	the	theory	of	the	spectacle,	as	laid	out	in	Debord’s	text	and	anticipatedly	practiced	in	Álvarez’s	film,	necessitates	one	important	update,	which	I	incorporate	in	my	derivative	“theory	of	the	show.”	That	update	defines	a	particular	form	of	“active	passiveness”	required	of	the	public	in	the	dissemination	of	the	spectacle,	which	will	be	key	to	further	considerations	in	terms	of	the	(under)development	discourse.	Finally,	this	chapter	typifies	a	number	of	important	
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forms	of	détournement	observable	in	Now.	The	“theory	of	the	show,”	as	developed	in	Chapter	1	from	Debord’s	and	Álvarez’s	works,	will	remain	at	the	foundation	of	the	entire	dissertation,	and	each	subsequent	chapter	will	deepen	its	interpretative	and	emancipatory	model	towards	a	form	of	epistemological	critique	I	will	call	“demarcational	critique	of	ideology.”	Two	epistemological	categories	are	of	particular	importance	to	an	understanding	of	the	condition(s)	of	modernity	and	postmodernity:	time	and	space.	Here	too,	Debord’s	theory,	in	conjunction	with	Álvarez’s	film,	provides	a	sound	theoretical	foundation.	Chapter	2	reviews	Debord’s	elaborate	considerations	on	time	in	relation	to	the	spectacle	in	The	Society	of	the	Spectacle,	from	cyclical	and	irreversible	to	pseudo-cyclical	time,	and	connects	those	concepts	to	the	notions	of	time	present	in	Álvarez’s	documentary	(what	is	the	“now”	of	Now?).	These	elucidations	on	time,	and	of	the	spectacular	manipulations	of	understandings	of	time,	are	a	prerequisite	to	my	main	argument	about	the	epistemologies	that	sustain	the	cultural	construction	of	modernity	and	postmodernity	and	its	main	product:	the	two-worlds	discourse.	That	argument	hinges	on	the	assertion	that,	as	discussed	in	Chapter	2,	the	appropriation	of	historical	time	is	key	to	any	form	of	subversion	against	capitalist	oppression,	but	that	the	spectacle	serves	capitalism	by	invading	and	manipulating	understandings	of	time	into	a	frozen	popular	epistemology	that	blocks	action,	which	Debord	calls	“pseudo-cyclical	time.”		An	emancipatory	enterprise	will	thus	need	to	recapture	a	certain	form	of	the	ancient	cyclic	time	in	the	manner	of	what	I	call	“anti-cyclonic	time,”	whereby	an	
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organization	of	perceptions	of	time	driven	by	the	cycles	of	nature,	as	opposed	to	its	governance	by	commodities,	is	restituted	post-Revolution.	In	addition	to	the	spectacular	manipulations	of	time	discussed	in	Chapter	2,	one	other	epistemological	problem,	not	exclusive	to	the	modern	condition	but	deeply	exacerbated	in	advanced	modernity,	lies	with	a	fundamental	linguistic	difficulty	to	talk	about	time	that	is	quite	remarkable,	at	least,	in	western	European	languages.	Indeed,	there	are	very	few,	if	any,	terms	that	refer	specifically	and	exclusively	to	time,	which	is	normally	metaphorized	as	(or	in)	space:	indeed,	expressions	like	“time	moves,”	“runs,”	“is	ahead	or	behind,”	are	all	spatial	metaphors.	Chapter	3	focuses	on	this	matter	and	observes	three	key	elements	at	play,	namely:	that	the	falsification	of	understandings	of	time	proposed	by	Debord	is	deeply	compounded	by	this	epistemological	impossibility	to	deal	with	time	in	its	own	terms	(i.e.,	independently	from	space),	which	in	turn	further	compromises	the	possibility	of	appropriation	of	historical	time	by	the	general	public;	that	the	acceleration	of	time	and	space	that	characterizes	late	modernity	must	thus	be	understood	as	one	in	which	this	acceleration	involves	the	subsuming	of	time	into	space	(indeed,	the	emptying	of	understandings	of	time	into	spatial	metaphors)	so	that	time	is	often	confused	(co-fused)	with	space;	and	that	this	confusion	of	time	and	space	is	a	powerful	organizer	of	psychogeographies	(“this	continent	is	the	past,”	“the	future	equals	this	nation-state”)	of	which	the	concepts	of	First	and	Third	worlds	are	prime	examples.		In	Chapter	3,	I	am	careful	to	observe	that,	in	all	truthfulness,	the	rendering	of	categories	of	knowledge	by	means	of	metaphors	of	space	is	not	the	exclusive	case	of	
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time	but	of	all	knowledge:	we	speak	of	“areas”	and	“fields”	of	studies,	of	“violent	or	productive	countries,”	and	so	forth,	so	that	spatial	relations	dominate	imaginations	and	experiences	of	non-spatial	knowledge.	Whoever	gains	control	of	territorialized	projections	of	knowledge	will	consequently	possess	control	of	the	matrixes	of	knowledge,	with	all	that	those	matrixes	expose	and	conceal.	By	“territorialization”	and	“geographization”	I	refer	to	this	dominance	of	orders	of	knowledge	by	their	projection	on	land,	and	I	examine	the	mechanics	by	which	knowledge	and	experience	can	be	manipulated	by	operating	the	psychogeographies	onto	which	they	are	projected.	I	will	assert	that	the	spatial	manipulation	of	the	epistemological	order	is	a	key	function	of	the	spectacle	at	the	service	of	the	capitalist	mode	of	production.	Time	is	of	particular	importance	among	the	many	epistemological	matrixes	projected	onto	spatial	imaginaries	simply	because	of	its	relevance	to	any	revolutionary	protagonism	of	history	by	the	general	public:	this	possibility	of	appropriation	of	time	can	be	locked	when	the	psychogeographies	onto	which	time	is	emptied	are	locked.		At	this	point	in	Chapter	3,	I	turn	to	a	talk	given	by	Susan	Buck-Morss	at	the	London	School	of	Economics	in	2017,	in	which	she	discusses	the	dangers	and	limitations	of	the	nation-state	order	as	an	epistemological	category.	This	is	certainly	not	a	novelty	for	Buck-Morss,	who	has	warned	about	the	risks	and	hindrances	involved	in	epistemological	orders	throughout	her	career.	What	is	of	enormous	importance	in	this	talk	is	the	striking	object	on	which	she	founds	her	discussion:	Rand	McNally’s	Histomap.	This	“map	of	time”	indeed	constitutes	the	explicit	epitome	
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of	territorialization:	the	expression	of	four	thousand	years	of	world	history	as	a	map,	whereby	historical	power	is	rendered	as	share	of	politically	charged	space	on	a	map	of	history.	I	will	argue	that,	in	this	talk,	Buck-Morss	stops	just	shy	of	stating	what	I	will	then	point	out	as	a	key	task	of	a	demarcational	critique	of	ideology:	that	the	nation-state	epistemological	order	that	equals	state	boundaries	to	national	identities	and	sociopolitical	conditions,	of	common	use	in	the	social	sciences	and	in	postcolonial	discourses,	and	of	which	the	(under)development	discourse	is	a	subsidiary,	may	reveal	certain	realities	while	hiding	many	others,	and	that	it	may	be	useful	to	conceive	of	an	alternative	order	that	is	not	just	transnational,	but	non-national.	In	other	words,	the	essential	question	is:	how	could	we	talk	about	postcolonial	oppression	without	using	national	or	continental	demarcations,	all	of	which	carry	spectacular	epistemological	projections?	The	problem	with	the	nation-state	order	is	not	just	that	it	creates	the	fictions	of	even	development,	as	John	Leary	observes,	but	that	it	locks	fluid	and	unstable	non-national	and	transnational	realities	and	conditions	onto	fictionally	(and	forcibly)	stabilized	land	demarcations.	Here	I	propose	a	model	of	non-national	“solidarities”	and	“consortiums”	to	replace	the	nation-state	order	and	demonstrate	that	the	importance	of	Santiago	Álvarez’s	Now	lies	precisely	with	its	ability	to	cast	this	exact	type	of	non-national	solidarity	by	directing	to	U.S.	citizens	the	same	call	to	emancipation	the	Cuban	revolution	had	dedicated	to	Latin	America.		In	other	words,	Álvarez’s	Now	once	again	constitutes	the	praxis	of	important	theoretical	considerations	avant	la	lettre	by	creating	a	solidarity	that	transverses	
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(de-marcates)	the	“First”	and	the	“Third”	worlds.	It	is	at	this	point	in	Chapter	3	that	I	articulate	my	proposal	for	a	“demarcational	critique	of	ideology.”	It	is	also	at	this	point	that	Buck-Morss‘s	theoretical	considerations	and	Leary’s	assertions	and	historical	investigations	begin	to	amalgamate	firmly	with	Debord’s	theory	of	the	spectacle	and	my	own	derivative	theory	of	the	show	to	provide	a	possible	understanding	of	the	textual	mechanics	at	play	in	the	construction	of	the	notions	of	First	and	Third	worlds,	of	the	implications	and	dangers	of	these	notions,	and	of	the	possibility	of	emancipatory	praxis.	Indeed,	I	will	claim	that	Now	is	effective	precisely	because	it	is	able	to	tackle	time	as	projected	onto	space	when	it	broadcasts	a	call	of	historical	protagonism	for	the	liberation	of	an	underdeveloped	society	in	the	United	States	against	established	psychogeographies	of	development	and	underdevelopment.	If	Now	looks	very	much	like	the	praxis	of	a	demarcational	subversion	of	spectacular	epistemologies,	the	theoretical	underpinnings	of	this	demarcational	critique	lie	at	the	intersection	of	the	Debordian	notions	of	
détournement,	as	the	appropriation	of	the	images	spread	by	the	spectacle	turned	against	themselves,	and	the	combined	concepts	of	psychogeography	and	dérive,	as	the	challenging	of	established	psychopatterns	of	spatial	circulation.	My	adaptation	of	the	latter	concepts	into	a	demarcational	critique	extrapolates	Debord’s	initial	urban,	flâneuristic	and	Euro-centered	conception	onto	a	world	scale.		This	dissertation	is	composed	of	six	chapters	of	which	the	first	half	are	devoted	to	the	development	and	formulation	of	a	“demarcational	critique”	from	the	theories	of	the	spectacle/shows,	spectacular	time,	psychogeographies	and	dérive.	By	
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the	end	of	Chapter	3,	the	main	postulates	of	the	proposed	critical	model	have	been	laid	down.	The	second	half	(chapters	4	–	6)	put	this	demarcational	theorization	in	conversation	with	three	main	relevant	types	of	text:	one	a	historical	essay	(Leary’s	A	
Cultural	History	of	Underdevelopment),	one	fictional	film	(Nava’s	El	Norte),	and	one	highly	experimental	montage	(Tuoto’s	Não	Me	Fale	Sobre	Recomeços).	While	the	basics	of	a	demarcational	critique	have	been	developed	in	the	first	three	chapters,	some	additional	concepts	are	developed	in	conversation	with	the	aforementioned	texts	in	keeping	with	the	conviction	that	the	boundaries	between	fiction	and	theory,	primary	and	secondary	text,	are	best	considered	unstable.		Only	once	the	demarcational	critical	model	has	been	developed	am	I	able	to	enter	in	conversation	with	perhaps	my	main	interlocutor	in	the	field	of	“(under)development	discourse	studies”	in	Chapter	4.	Leary’s	vast	and	thorough	historical	archive	acquires	a	novel	significance	when	considered	in	light	of	the	theories	developed.	Chapter	5	is	an	important	section	of	this	dissertation,	for	it	tests	the	demarcational	critical	model	as	a	method	of	textual	analysis.	Chapter	6	examines	a	recent	film	by	Brazilian	director	Arthur	Tuoto	which	bears	a	striking	resemblance	to	both	Álvarez’s	documentary	and	Debord’s	film	version	of	his	Theory	of	the	
Spectacle,	but	which	raises	important	corollary	considerations	as	the	spectacle	enters	the	age	of	digital	information,	the	internet,	and	social	media.	Through	these	chapters,	some	additional	important	demarcational	concepts	are	developed.	As	an	extension	to	the	discussion	about	the	blurred	boundaries	between	fiction	and	theory,	the	notions	of	“pop	ethnographic	text”	are	developed	to	describe	the	
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condition	of	fictional	texts	about	“the	foreign”	by	which	spectacular	texts	not	explicitly	intended	as	ethnographic	and	not	created	by	professionally	trained	ethnographers	may	still	convey	information	that	is	interpreted	ethnographically	by	audiences.	Perhaps	the	most	important	demarcational	device	is	that	of	artemization-actaeonization,	which	can	be	summarized	as	the	established	spectacular	narrative	whereby	the	indiscreet	eye	of	the	imaginary	First	World	forces	the	imaginary	Third	World	to	pose	in	disgrace	in	order	to	create	the	spectacular	dimension	of	the	(under)development	discourse.	The	main	reason	that	I	devoted	Chapter	1	to	updating	Debord’s	theory	of	the	spectacle	into	my	theory	of	the	show	relates	to	the	essential	characteristic	of	the	show	as	defined	in	that	chapter:	self-reproducing	and	assumed	by	the	public	in	somnambular	passivity.	This	is	a	fundamental	component	of	the	notion	of	artemization:	the	imaginary	Third	World’s	obedient	willingness	to	submit	to	the	pathetizing	eye	of	Actaeon,	defend	it,	and	reproduce	it.			Most	of	the	argumentative	points	of	this	dissertation	can	be	reduced	to	very	simple	assertions:	that	stereotypes	applied	to	geographical	entities	are	dangerous	and	risk	professing	stigmatization	and	racism;	that	all	critical	discourses	must	check	themselves	for	the	possibility	that	they	might	inadvertently	help	perpetuating,	validating	or	reinforcing	what	they	claim	to	be	merely	exposing;	that	there	must	be	a	field	dedicated	to	the	study	of	how	the	alleged	“Third	World”	and	“First	World”	imagine	each	other,	of	how	those	imaginations	operate,	and	of	what	political	use	is	made	of	those	mutual	imaginations;	that,	in	a	globalized	world	where	the	fate	of	
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citizens	is	determined	by	transnational	forces,	epistemological	and	political	systems	like	the	nation-state	order	only	afford	inadequately	national	responses;	that	in	the	age	of	advanced	capitalism,	political	subjects	are	workers,	consumers	and	
spectators,	that	those	three	conditions	cannot	be	separated,	and	that	the	shows	those	spectators	consume	and	replay	require,	like	all	shows,	a	physical	(geographical)	stage.	Most	often,	these	essays	are	an	attempt	to	deepen,	examine	and	theorize	on	those	simple	assertions.		Likewise,	some	seemingly	flashy	terms	introduced	in	these	essays	are	merely	an	attempt	to	confer	a	handle	onto	simple	conditions.	The	concept	of	“sensuous	ideological	being”	may	sound	ostentatious,	but	it	merely	seeks	to	capture	the	not-very-novel	fact	that	political	subjects,	governments	and	societies	act	much	less	logically	and	reasonably	than	their	claims	to	modernity	care	to	admit,	and	that	often	crucial	political	decisions	are	motivated	by	emotion	and	aesthetics,	which	I	will	argue	are	profoundly	dominated	by	the	spectacle.	Readers	may	find	the	abundance	and	frequency	of	neologisms	in	this	dissertation	annoying	or	unjustifiably	pretentious.	However,	it	was	my	intention	that	those	neologisms	simply	accomplish	two	tasks:	to	generate	a	battery	of	critical	terms	in	support	for	the	demarcational	model	proposed,	and	to	model	in	the	text	of	this	dissertation	the	degree	to	which	theory	is	a	powerful	genre	of	fiction	and	words	often	invent	the	very	realities	they	claim	to	merely	reference	to	the	convenience	of	those	in	discursive	power,	which	is	precisely	the	case	of	the	psychogeographic	terms	of	First	and	Third	worlds.	In	light	of	the	number	of	neologisms	utilized	in	this	dissertation,	I	have	created	a	non-
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essential	glossary	of	theoretical	terms	composed	mostly	of	new	concepts	introduced	here,	to	which	readers	can	return	if	needed.												
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PART	I:	
THEORETICAL	FOUNDATIONS:	
FROM	THE	SPECTACLE	TO	THE	SHOW	
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Part	I	develops	the	theoretical	foundations	for	a	critique	of	the	political	discourse	of	“First	World	and	Third	World”	in	the	context	of	mutual	U.S.	–	Latin	American	imagination.	It	updates	and	expands	Guy	Debord’s	Theory	of	the	Spectacle	by	proposing	a	new	derivative	concept:	“the	show.”	Ultimately,	this	section	argues	that	political	maps	of	development	and	underdevelopment	are,	to	some	degree,	a	function	of	spectacular	media,	and	examines	how	those	spectacular	discourses	are	subverted	in	Santiago	Álvarez’s	1965	documentary	Now.						Chapter	1	begins	by	reviewing	Debord’s	theory	of	the	spectacle	as	laid	out	in	1967	and	examining	Debord’s	proposed	subversive	practice	of	détournement.	It	then	introduces	the	subsidiary	notion	of	“the	show”	and	considers	the	particular	functioning	of	détournement	in	relation	to	this	concept.	To	this	end,	the	chapter	conducts	a	close	analysis	of	Santiago	Álvarez’s	documentary	in	order	to	observe	and	index	the	particular	mechanics	of	the	détournement	of	“shows.”							Chapter	2	considers	the	specific	issue	of	time	in	relation	to	understandings	of	development,	dependence	and	revolution.	It	emphasizes	the	centrality	of	a	certain	conception	of	time	in	the	documentary	Now,	from	which	the	theory	of	“the	show”	and	its	subversion	are	being	developed.	It	then	examines	Debord’s	ideas	on	time	in	the	age	of	the	spectacle,	as	well	as	key	stages	in	the	history	of	epistemological	metaphors	for	the	concept	of	revolution.	The	chapter	finally	proposes	the	notion	of	
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“anti-cyclonic	time”	to	define	one	of	the	meanings	embedded	in	Now	and	in	the	Cuban	revolutionary	project,	one	that	will	be	key	to	a	counter-spectacular	project.		
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To	rob	a	thief:		
Santiago	Álvarez’s	Now	and	the	détournement	of	the	show			
So	[Guy	Debord]’s	decrying	the	way	in	which	exchange	value	has	controlled	the	use	
value	and	the	idea	is	just	that	it…	if	it’s	just	supply	and	demand	that	regulates	the	
value	of	something,	then	we	can	be	driven	to	want	valueless	things	[…]	you	get,	you	
know,	the	advertising	industry,	and	all	the	rest	of	it,	you	multiply	all	of	these	pseudo-
needs	and	that’s	one	of	the	mechanisms	by	which	he	prevents	technological	
advancement	from	reducing	the	need	for	people	to	work.	Let’s	stop	for	just	a	second	
and	talk	about	our	sponsor!	…		
-	The	Partially	Examined	Life,	“#170:	Guy	Debord’s	Society	of	the	Spectacle.”										
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1.1	The	First	World	is	a	show.	So	are	the	Third	World	and	their	interdependent	play.	I	will	define	the	concept	of	the	show	from	Guy	Debord’s	theory	of	the	spectacle	but	will	retain	the	distinctive	label	of	“show”	to	accommodate	my	own	elaboration	on	the	notion	of	the	spectacle.		In	his	1992	preface	to	the	third	French	edition	of	The	Society	of	the	Spectacle,	Debord	notes	that	“[a]	critical	history	of	the	kind	presented	here	needed	no	changing	–	not	as	long,	at	any	rate,	as	the	general	conditions	of	the	long	historical	period	that	it	was	the	first	to	describe	accurately	were	still	intact.	The	continued	unfolding	of	our	epoch	has	merely	confirmed	and	further	illustrated	the	theory	of	the	spectacle”	(7)	and,	as	he	had	already	pointed	out	in	his	1988	Comments	on	the	
Society	of	the	Spectacle,	the	spectacle	had	by	then	only	gathered	strength	“to	spread	to	the	furthest	limits	on	all	sides,	while	increasing	its	density	at	the	center”	(3).		The	following	pages	will	inquire	into	the	many	decisive	ways	in	which	Debord’s	theories	have	been	confirmed	through	the	years	and	have	even	predicted	the	development	of	the	spectacle	over	the	two	decades	that	have	passed	since	his	death1,	while	examining	Cuban	director	Santiago	Álvarez’s	documentary	Now	(1965),	which	I	will	postulate	as	a	most	sophisticated	subversion	of	the	spectacle,	executed	two	years	
before	the	publication	of	Debord’s	theory.		
																																																								1	“It	would	be	of	no	use	to	praise	[Guy	Debord’s]	books’	independence	of	judgment	and	prophetic	clairvoyance	...	There	are	no	authors	today	who	could	console	themselves	by	thinking	that	their	work	will	be	read	in	a	century	(by	what	kind	of	human	beings?)…”	(Giorgio	Agamben	in	“Marginal	Notes	on	
Commentaries	on	the	Society	of	the	Spectacle”).	
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Debord	traced	the	beginning	of	what	he	calls	the	spectacular	stage	of	advanced	capitalism	to	the	early	decades	of	the	twentieth	century.	Almost	one	century	later,	the	phenomena	described	in	his	book	has	only	deepened	and	accelerated,	branching	out	into	realms	Debord	could	not	have	imagined2.	The	concept	of	the	show	that	I	will	elaborate	here	seeks	to	update	the	notion	of	the	spectacle	in	light	of	recent	mutations,	as	well	as	contribute	some	complementary	theorizations	on	its	genesis	and	workings.	Last	but	certainly	not	least,	these	pages	will	ultimately	focus	on	one	particular	type	of	spectacle	as	show:	First	and	Third	
Worlds,	development	and	underdevelopment,	South	and	North.	Álvarez	stands	as	one	of	the	most	unproblematic	Cuban	revolutionary	intellectuals	–	unproblematic	in	the	sense	that	his	allegiance	to	the	regime	was	never	questioned	and	his	work	remained	unambiguously	“within	the	Revolution”3	throughout	his	filmmaking	career.	As	the	founder	and	longtime	director	of	the	
Noticiero	ICAIC	Latinoamericano	(The	Cuban	Film	Institute’s	Latin	American	Newsreel),	Álvarez’s	work	was	firmly	rooted	in	journalism.	The	ICAIC’s	biographic	entry	for	Álvarez	emphasizes	his	defense	of	the	importance	of	cinematographic	
																																																								2	“With	the	presidency	of	Donald	Trump,	the	Debordian	analysis	of	modern	life	resonates	more	deeply	and	darkly	than	perhaps	even	its	creator	thought	possible,	anticipating,	in	so	many	ways,	the	frantic	and	fantastical,	nihilistic	and	numbing	nature	of	our	newly	installed	government.	In	Debord’s	notions	of	“unanswerable	lies,”	when	“truth	has	almost	everywhere	ceased	to	exist	or,	at	best,	has	been	reduced	to	pure	hypothesis,”	and	the	“outlawing	of	history,”	when	knowledge	of	the	past	has	been	submerged	under	“the	ceaseless	circulation	of	information,	always	returning	to	the	same	list	of	trivialities,”	we	find	keys	to	the	rise	of	trutherism	as	well	as	Trumpism”	(Zaretsky).	3	“…	dentro	de	la	Revolución,	todo;	contra	la	Revolución,	nada”	(“within	the	Revolution,	anything;	against	the	Revolution,	nothing”)	was	the	famous	line	pronounced	by	Fidel	Castro	during	his	talk	to	the	Cuban	intellectuals	in	the	National	Library	in	Havana	on	June	30,	1961	(Portal	Cuba	Discuros).		
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journalism	as	one	that	enriched	documentary	(Cubacine	ICAIC,	Santiago	Álvarez	
Román)	and	highlights	his	documentary	Now,	which	it	summarizes	as	a	novel	(original)	montage	of	newsreels	and	photographs	about	the	struggle	of	African	Americans	against	racial	discrimination4,	noting	that	the	film	utilizes	the	song	Now	sung	by	Lena	Horne	and	is	considered	the	first	cinematographic	video	clip	(Cubacine	ICAIC,	Now).	From	this	brief	synopsis,	two	aspects	of	Now	quickly	become	evident:	that	the	Cuban	film	is	about	the	United	States,	not	Cuba,	and	that	it	is	labeled	“a	montage.”	The	film	being	a	montage	will	assist	me	in	the	elaboration	of	my	concept	of	spectacular	show	as	well	as	in	my	considerations	of	Debord’s	strategies	for	countering	the	spectacle.	It	being	a	penetration	of	a	Cuban	journalistic	filmmaker	into	U.S.	social	issues	will	allow	me	to	ground	(quite	literally)	the	notion	of	show	in	relation	to	the	categories	of	First	and	Third	Worlds.				1.2	Published	in	1967,	Guy	Debord’s	La	societé	du	spectacle	in	many	ways	constitutes	the	culmination	of	fifteen	years	of	Lettriste	and	Situationist	thinking.	As	a	matter	of	fact,	for	the	Lettriste	International	(LI),	The	Society	of	the	Spectacle	amounted	to	the	posthumous	codification	(a	term	they	would	have	fiercely	resisted)	of	their	incipient	thinking	and	practices,	chiefly	among	them	détournement	and	
																																																								4	Guy	Debord	would	not	agree	with	this	categorization	as	a	mere	race	struggle.	In	“The	Decline	and	Fall	of	the	Spectacle-Commodity	Economy,”	which	focuses	on	the	1965	Watts	riots	in	Los	Angeles,	California,	Debord	asserts	that	the	riots	were	“not	a	racial	conflict:	the	rioters	left	alone	the	whites	that	were	in	their	path,	attacking	only	the	white	policemen,	while	on	the	other	hand	black	solidarity	did	not	extend	to	black	store-owners	or	even	to	black	car-drivers.	Martin	Luther	King	himself	had	to	admit	that	the	revolt	went	beyond	the	limits	of	his	specialty.	Speaking	in	Paris	last	October,	he	said:	This	was	not	a	race	riot.	It	was	a	class	riot”	(my	emphasis).	
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psychogeography	(Ford	9).	When	the	book	was	published	ten	years	after	the	LI	had	dispersed	into	the	Situationist	International,	its	main	function	was	rather	that	of	a	war	cry	and	strategic	manual	as	France’s	intellectuals	marched	into	May	19685.		Through	a	series	of	mostly	paragraph-length	theses	(two	hundred	and	twenty-one,	to	be	exact)	the	French	philosopher6	develops	the	notion	of	the	spectacle	as	a	tool	of	Marxist	critical	theory.	The	spectacle	is	the	central	condition	of	late	capitalism	as	“capital	accumulated	to	the	point	where	it	becomes	image”	(Debord,	Society	24).	The	spectacle	is	thus	the	image	of	representation	of	what	was	once	directly	lived,	before	social	relations	degraded	from	being	into	having	with	the	advent	of	early	capitalism,	and	finally	from	having	into	appearing	in	late	capitalism.	Commodity	has	taken	over	society,	supplanting	direct	and	authentic7	relations	with	passive	identification	with	the	spectacle,	so	that,	if	in	early	capitalism	the	only	effective	way	to	be	was	to	have,	in	advanced	capitalism	the	only	effective	way	to	have	is	to	appear	(16).	Social	
																																																								5	For	Debord,	the	book	remained	a	manual	for	battle	even	after	the	disenchantment	of	May	1968,	as	evinced	by	the	war	strategist	tone	of	his	1988	Comments:	“I	obviously	cannot	speak	with	complete	freedom	[and]	must	take	care	not	to	give	too	much	information	to	just	anybody	(…).	Some	elements	will	be	intentionally	omitted;	and	the	plan	will	have	to	remain	rather	unclear”	(1).	In	a	way,	this	should	not	surprise	us,	as	the	idea	of	theory	in	praxis	lies	at	the	foundation	of	his	1967	call	to	arms,	but	what	is	of	note	is	his	sustained	determination	in	spite	of	the	“disturbances	of	1968	…	having	nowhere	overthrown	the	existing	organization	of	the	society”	(2).	In	any	case,	it	will	be	useful	to	retain	in	our	imagination	this	portrait	of	Debord	as	a	war	strategist,	perhaps	bent	over	a	map	while	laying	out	his	attack	plan,	as	we	craft	our	update	of	his	spectacle	as	show.		6	“Once,	when	I	was	tempted	(as	I	still	am)	to	consider	Guy	Debord	a	philosopher,	he	told	me:	‘I’m	not	a	philosopher,	I’m	a	strategist’…”	(Agamben,	“Difference”	313).	I	will	not	abstain	from	calling	Debord	a	philosopher	because,	as	we	will	see	over	these	pages,	it	can	be	crucially	useful	to	mirror	and	connect	intellectual	and	ground	(field)	battle:	“[Debord’s	books]	should	be	used	…	as	manuals,	[or]	rather	they	should	be	used	as	the	work	of	a	peculiar	strategist	…	whose	field	of	operation	is	not	so	much	a	battle	in	which	to	marshal	troops	but	the	pure	power	of	the	intellect”	(Agamben,	“Marginal	Notes	on	Comments	on	the	Society	of	the	Spectacle”).		7	The	matter	of	what	would	have	constituted	“authentic	and	direct”	social	relations	and	desires	is	by	no	means	unproblematic	and	will	be	inquired	into	further	ahead	in	this	study.		
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relations	are	thus	fully	mediated	by	commodities	amassed	to	such	a	degree	that	they	become	autonomous	image	for	contemplation:	“[t]he	spectacle	corresponds	to	the	historical	moment	at	which	the	commodity	completes	its	colonization	of	social	life”	(Debord,	Society	29).		Debord’s	spectacle	is	not	to	be	understood	as	the	flow	and	collection	of	images	generated	by	capitalist	media,	but	as	“a	social	relationship	between	people	that	is	mediated	by	images”	(12).	It	is	not	a	fully	external	repository	of	media	images,	such	as	news,	propaganda,	advertising	or	entertainment	(13)	but	rather	the	very	substitute	and	mediator	of	social	interactions:	as	such,	the	spectacle	is	simultaneously	external	and	internal	to	society.	The	spectacle	is	thus	the	defining	condition	of	current	consumer	culture:	it	disciplines	workers/consumers	as	it	mesmerizes	them	into	uncritical	passivity,	obedient	mass	uniformity	and	unintelligible	alienation.	However,	one	of	the	first	and	most	fundamental	aspects	of	the	spectacle	I	will	be	addressing	is	the	need	for	some	degree	of	“directed	action”	on	the	part	of	these	workers/consumers	as	part	of	their	passivity,	indeed	as	a	form	of	active	passivity	we	can	define	as	a	mimetic	assumption	of	the	spectacle.			The	technique	of	détournement8,	first	laid	out	by	the	Letterist	International,	constitutes	a	central	counter-spectacular	resistance	strategy	that	was	later	adopted	by	the	Situationist	International.	As	defined	in	the	“Definitions”	section	of	Virginia	Tech’s	Situationist	International	Online	archives,	détournement	is	“short	for	
																																																								8	Détournement	(French):	diversion,	hijacking,	misappropriation	(Larousse).	
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‘détournement	of	preexisting	aesthetic	elements.”	The	integration	of	present	or	past	artistic	productions	into	a	superior	construction	of	a	milieu.	In	this	sense	there	can	be	no	situationist	painting	or	music,	but	only	a	situationist	use	of	those	means.”	This	1958	definition	preserves	the	focus	on	the	appropriation	of	bits	and	pieces	of	art,	as	opposed	to	the	hijacking	of	non-explicitly-artistic	materials	such	as	advertisement	or	journalism,	and	its	reintegration	into	new	systems	of	signification,	that	permeated	A	User’s	Guide	to	Détournement	(Mode	d’emploi	du	détournement,	in	its	original	French),	published	two	years	before	(still	in	the	Letterist	era)	in	No.	5	of	Les	
Lèvres	Nues.	That	definition	also	fails	to	capture	the	contempt	with	which	Debord	regarded	the	notions	of	“original”	and	“citation”	as	evinced	in	the	following	passage	from	A	User’s	Guide	to	Détournement:	It	is	in	fact	necessary	to	eliminate	all	remnants	of	the	notion	of	personal	property…	Any	elements,	no	matter	where	they	are	taken	from,	can	serve	in	making	new	combinations…	[W]hen	two	objects	are	brought	together,	no	matter	how	far	apart	their	original	contexts	may	be,	a	relationship	is	always	formed…	Anything	can	be	used.		It	goes	without	saying	that	one	is	not	limited	to	correcting	a	work	or	to	integrating	diverse	fragments	of	out-of-date	works	into	a	new	one;	one	can	also	alter	the	meaning	of	those	fragments	in	any	appropriate	way,	leaving	the	imbeciles	to	their	slavish	preservation	of	“citations.”	
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…	[T]he	accumulation	of	detoured	elements,	far	from	aiming	to	arouse	indignation	or	laughter	by	alluding	to	some	original	work,	will	express	our	indifference	toward	a	meaningless	and	forgotten	original…		(Debord	&	Wolman	1-2).		Álvarez’s	Now	uses	“a	song	which	was	banned	in	the	United	Sates	…	[and]	found	materials,	included	pirated	newsreel”	in	a	montage	that	accomplishes	a	“tone	of	ironic	skepticism”	through	the	juxtaposition	of	“racist	incidents	in	California	in	August	19659	followed	by	a	photograph	of	President	Johnson	meeting	a	group	of	blacks	under	the	leadership	of	Martin	Luther	King”	(Chanan	33).	The	composition	of	Álvarez’s	documentary	aligns	tightly	with	the	principles	of	détournement.	In	his	
User’s	Guide,	Debord	&	Wolman	place	a	clear	emphasis	on	forms	of	explicit	art,	which	they	classify	into	the	category	of	deceptive	détournement,	where	the	element	
détourned	carries	a	strong	intrinsic	significance	(like	an	Eisenstein	film,	for	instance),	and	minor	détournement,	where	the	element	détourned	has	no	importance	by	itself	and	will	thus	draw	its	full	meaning	from	its	new	context	(or	re-appropriation).	There	is,	however,	a	problem	here,	as	minor	détournement	would	include	press	clippings	together	with	common-place	photographs	and	neutral	phrases.	When	classifying	press	clippings	in	this	way,	I	do	not	think	Debord	was	able	to	visualize	the	intrinsic	meaning	that	news	segments,	whether	in	video	or	print,	carry	with	them	into	the	contexts	of	re-appropriation.	I	attribute	this	to	the	fact	that	
																																																								9	These	were	the	Watts	riots,	which	Debord	analyzes	in	“The	Decline	and	Fall	of	the	Spectacle-Commodity	Economy.”	
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Debord	was	simply	not	a	journalist	or	a	newsreel	maker.	Sanatiago	Álvarez	was,	and	he	was	able	to	visualize	this	potential	in	a	way	the	Situationists	perhaps	didn’t.		A	close	analysis	of	Debord	and	Wolman’s	1956	User’s	Guide	to	Détournement	provides	reasonable	grounds	for	the	hypothesis	that	Álvarez	might	have	been	aware	of	détournement	before	he	produced	Now,	but	anticipated	Debord	in	terms	of	both	his	1967	Theory	of	the	Spectacle	and	the	practice	of	détournement	in	the	1973	film	of	the	same	name.	After	establishing	a	number	of	“laws	of	détournement”	and	examining	several	possible	projects	and	fields	of	action,	Debord	&	Wolman	assert	that	“[i]t	is	obviously	in	the	realm	of	cinema	that	détournement	can	attain	its	greatest	effectiveness”	(4).	Although	the	examples	they	go	on	to	explore,	such	as	detourning	Griffith’s	Birth	of	a	Nation,	suggest	that	Debord	was	unable	to	visualize	a	project	quite	like	Álvarez’s	film,	a	detailed	account	of	the	specific	ideas	proposed	for	cinematographic	détournement	reveals	what	is	almost	a	verbatim	recipe	for	Now:		[Birth	of	a	Nation]	is	a	racist	film	and	therefore	absolutely	does	not	merit	being	shown	in	its	present	form	…	It	would	be	better	to	detour	it	as	a	whole	by	adding	a	soundtrack	that	that	made	a	powerful	denunciation	of	the	horrors	of	the	imperialist	war	and	of	the	activities	of	the	Ku	Klux	Klan,	which	are	continuing	in	the	United	States	even	now…	This	reconversion	of	preexisting	sequences	will	obviously	be	accompanied	by	other	elements,	pictorial	as	well	as	historical	(4).		This	1956	recipe	by	Debord	and	Wolman	is	almost	too	exactly	like	what	Álvarez	would	do	less	than	a	decade	later.	The	crucial	sequential	postulate	to	extract	from	
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these	observations	is	that,	in	Now,	Álvarez	seems	to	have	realized	the	ideas	and	intentions	expounded	in	a	User’s	Guide	to	Détournement	before	Debord	did	in	his	1973	film.	It	is	important,	however,	to	emphasize	that	the	assertion	of	Alvarez’s	realization	of	the	program	of	détournement	can	only	be	stated	in	coincidental	terms	for	lack	of	definitive	proof	of	Álvarez’s	knowledge	of	the	programmatic	texts	examined	above.	That	said,	one	assertion	I	will	attempt	to	justify	in	the	course	of	this	dissertation,	with	additional	proof,	is	that	Álvarez	actualized	Debord’s	
détournement	more	effectively	than	its	co-founder	himself	eight	years	earlier,	regardless	of	conscious	authorial	intention.	Furthermore,	I	will	propose	that	Álvarez’s	ability	to	concretize	the	ideas	of	détournement	sooner	and	more	lucidly	than	Debord	derives	from	three	main	situations,	namely:	a. For	all	his	awareness	of	psychogeographical10	matters,	Debord’s	consideration	seems	to	lack	the	experience	of	inter-worlds	détournement,	that	is,	one	that	traverses	and	questions	the	borders	of	the	imaginary	First	
and	Third	Worlds.	Debord’s	position	remains	mostly	North-centered;	Álvarez	seems	able	to	operate	détournement	on	a	larger,	worldwide	scale	that	involves	psychogeographical	play;	
																																																								10	Psychogeography	was,	together	with	détournement	and	unitary	urbanism,	one	of	the	definitional	practices	associated	with	the	Situationist	International	but	were	initially	developed	by	the	Letterist	International	(Ford	9).	I	will	return	to	this	concept	on	a	world-scale	further	on	in	this	dissertation,	but	the	practice	can	be	initially	defined	as	“[t]he	study	of	the	specific	effects	of	the	geographical	environment,	consciously	organised	or	not,	on	the	emotions	and	behaviour	of	individuals”	(Ford	34,	first	published	in	Internationale	situationniste,	no.	1,	June	1958).		
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b. The	appropriation	of	media	pieces	and	found	material	in	Debord	lacks	the	dramatic	urgency	of	the	U.S.	embargo	on	Cuba	and	the	imposed	realities	of	an	aesthetics	of	hunger,	as	put	forward	by	Glauber	Rocha11,	which	forced	the	Cuban	filmmaker	to	be	a	“detouring	thief”	(of	a	country	that	itself	was	a	thief,	an	idea	to	which	I	will	return	further	on	in	more	detail);	c. The	détournement	of	media	pieces	from	the	imaginary	First	World	into	the	
imaginary	Third	World	as	seen	on	Now	exposes	the	functioning	mechanics	of	the	spectacle	in	a	way	that	is	not	so	developed	in	Debord’s	theory	of	the	spectacle,	and	which	should	become	more	accessible	through	the	introduction	and	elaboration	of	the	concept	of	“the	show,”	which	I	will	be	undertaking	over	the	next	few	pages,	beginning	in	the	next	section.				1.3	I	will	define	“the	show”	as	a	derivation	-	a	spinoff,	to	use	the	show	business	parlance	-	of	Debord’s	notion	of	the	spectacle.	However,	the	show	is	different	from	the	spectacle	in	many	important	ways	that	reflect	in	the	fact	the	term	“show”	is	a	grammatically	countable	noun	that	can	be	used	in	the	plural	(“shows”),	as	opposed	
																																																								11	In	his	1965	essay	and	Cinema	Novo	manifesto,	Glauber	Rocha	introduces	the	concept	of	the	“aesthetics	of	hunger,”	positing	that	“hunger	in	Latin	America	is	not	simply	an	alarming	symptom;	it	is	the	essence	of	our	society”	(219).	His	assertion	is	central	to	my	analysis,	as	it	underscores	European	cultivation	of	the	Other’s	misery	as	a	merely	formal	element	and	out	of	nostalgia	for	primitivism:	“We	[Cinema	Novo	filmmakers]	understand	the	hunger	that	Europeans	and	the	majority	of	Brazilians	have	failed	to	understand.	For	the	European,	it	is	a	strange	tropical	surrealism.	For	the	Brazilian,	it	is	a	national	shame”	(219).			
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to	an	uncountable	mass	noun,	as	is	generally	the	case	for	“spectacle”	in	English12.	As	such,	the	show	designates	not	the	entire	mass	of	images	that	mediate	human	relations,	as	would	the	spectacle,	but	each	concrete	(re)enactment	of	the	spectacle	
as	an	instituted	social	script:	the	spectacle	manifests	itself	and	colonizes	social	relations	as	shows.			Thus,	the	show	designates	the	stage	and	condition	of	spectacular	capitalism	at	which	the	spectacle	is	neither	merely	contemplated	nor	an	impersonal	filler	for	social	relations,	but	instead	a	giant	display	of	imitable	behaviors	that	realizes	itself	in	the	adoption	and	reenactment	of	these	behaviors	by	the	public.	The	show	is	“spectacle	adopted”	and	creates	the	fiction	of	a	choice	“already	made	in	the	sphere	of	production”	(Debord,	Spectacle	13)	among	spectacular	roles,	all	of	which,	however,	invariably	point	towards	the	same	disciplinary	demands	of	the	dominant	forms	of	production.	The	show	is	the	spectacle	making	humans	obedient	actors	that	perform	instituted	social	scripts	with	their	own	active	bodies.	In	the	context	of	the	show,	the	spectator’s	alienation	is	thus	active	in	a	most	cynical	manner:	authentic	active	living	is	replaced	not	by	strictly	passive	contemplation	but	by	induced	action,	an	active	way	of	being	passive.	Even	for	their	own	passivity,	humans	must	put	their	bodies	to	
																																																								12	It	must	be	noted	that,	unlike	its	English	translation,	the	French	word	spectacle	does	feature	the	common	use	of	both	singular	and	plural	forms	(le	spectacle,	les	spectacles).	That	said,	Debord	utilizes	the	term	as	a	singular	mass	noun	even	in	French	for	his	critical	concept,	as	this	mass	quality	is	intrinsic	to	its	meaning:	“…	as	the	advanced	economic	sector	directly	responsible	for	the	manufacture	of	an	ever-growing	mass	of	image-objects,	the	spectacle	is	the	chief	product	of	present-day	society.”	(Debord,	Society	16,	his	emphasis).	Since	we	will	be	developing	the	concept	of	the	show	in	English,	we	will	assume	the	common	non-count	use	of	the	spectacle	as	opposed	to	the	pluralizable	“show(s).”	However,	I	will	seize	the	opportunity	to	explore	the	meaning	of	“spectacle”	as	plural	in	English	(=	reading	glasses)	further	on,	when	I	discuss	the	role	of	ideology	in	spectacular	politics.				
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work.	If	the	spectacle	“is	the	bad	dream	of	modern	society	in	chains,	expressing	nothing	more	than	its	wish	for	sleep	…	[and	is	also]	the	guardian	of	that	sleep”	(Debord,	Spectacle	18),	then	the	show	must	be	understood	as	sleepwalking,	as	the	somnambular	spread	of	the	spectacle	throughout	society13.		As	a	somnambular	process	that	imposes	action	from	unthinking	contemplation,	the	concept	of	the	show	seeks	to	complicate	the	distinctions	between	subject	and	object,	active	and	passive,	and	internal	and	external.	That	said,	it	is	important	to	understand	that	the	transition	from	the	spectacle	to	the	show	involves	two	processes:	
• a	conceptual	(or	synchronic)	process	that	recognizes	that	the	show	as	assumed	and	acted-out	spectacle	has	always,	at	any	given	time,	been	a	part	of	the	concept	of	spectacle,	and	one	which	Debord	did	point	out	at	times	in	his	book,	however	sporadically;	
• a	historical	(or	diachronic)	process	that	understands	that,	while	the	“show”	component	of	the	spectacle	has	always	been	a	part	of	its	processes,	the	
																																																								13	Bassetti	et	al	observe	this	transition	to	a	new	form	of	passivity,	noting	that	“[i]f,	in	Debord’s	age,	the	spectator	was	almost	a	passive	consumer	of	broadcasted	cultural	products,	in	the	interactive	spectacle,	the	subject	appears	as	having	a	wider	capability	of	action”	whereby	human	social	lives	are,	as	Armano	and	Briziarelli	put	it,	“both	the	mediated	objects	and	the	mediating	subjects	of	representation”	(168).	I	believe	this	“action,”	which	is	far	from	spontaneous	or	organic,	is	captured	in	more	appropriately	somber	terms	as	somnambular.	An	extreme	case	of	advanced	spectacular	consumers	being	put	to	work	for	their	own	passivity	is,	as	Johanssen	points	out	in	his	chapter	“Immaterial	Labour	and	Reality	TV:	The	Affective	Surplus	of	Excess,”	reality	TV	shows,	where	participants	“are	exploited	because	they	receive	no	monetary	return	for	their	performances”	(197).	This	is	also	true	of	much	of	social	media,	but	what	this	argument	fails	to	acknowledge	is	the	fact	that	spectacular	subjects	do	not	only	perform	for	the	spectacle	on	television:	they	do	so	in	their	face-to-face	personal	and	social	lives,	and	also	for	free	–	this	is	the	ultimate	meaning	of	the	colonization	of	social	relations	by	the	spectacle.		
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“showification”	of	the	spectacle,	that	is,	the	degree	to	which	the	spectacle	relies	on	the	consumers’	mimetic	reproduction	and	re-enactment	of	its	
social	scripts	has	greatly	accelerated	since	1967.		The	spectacle	takes	over	life	not	only	as	an	external	stream	of	images	that	the	spectator	passively	contemplates	in	silence	but	as	a	flow	of	spectacular	
performances	that	the	spectator-turned-actor	imitates.	Both	the	primary	
performances	staged	on	film	and	television	and	their	exponential	imitations	(dispersive	performances)	by	spectators-turned-actors	constitute	shows.		It	is	important	to	note	that	the	concept	of	the	show	I	elaborate	here	does	not	at	all	contradict	Debord’s	theory	of	the	spectacle	–	if	anything	it	follows	it.	Thesis	4	is	perhaps	one	of	the	most	crucial	clarifications	for	the	theory:	“The	spectacle	is	not	a	collection	of	images;	rather,	it	is	a	social	relationship	between	people	that	is	mediated	by	images”	(12).	With	these	simple	words,	Debord	makes	it	clear	that	the	spectacle	is	not	an	external	mass	but	the	very	happening	of	human	relationships:	its	place	is	at	the	core	of	human	action.	And	yet	the	need	for	a	theory	of	the	show	arises	from	the	lack	of	further	development	and	consideration	of	this	spectacular	condition	beyond	these	punctual	acknowledgments.	Another	hint	to	the	performative	realization	of	spectacle	as	show	appears	in	Thesis	30:	“the	more	[the	spectator]	contemplates,	the	less	he	lives…	The	spectacle’s	externality	with	respect	to	the	acting	subject	is	demonstrated	by	the	fact	that	the	individual’s	own	gestures	are	no	longer	his	own,	but	rather	those	of	someone	who	represents	them	to	him”	(23).	Precisely,	the	problem	is	that	the	more	the	spectator	contemplates,	the	more	
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he	lives	–	in	false	imitation.	Contemplation	does	not	conclude	in	the	public	contemplating	someone	else	representing	their	own	gestures,	falsified14	–	the	public	will	then	assume,	act	out,	and	infect	others	with	those	representations.	The	spectacle	and	the	show	are	thus	not	divergent	concepts	but	complementary	ones	whereby	the	spectacle’s	contemplation	emphasizes	the	non-authorial	and	merely	receptive	condition	of	media	consumption	and	the	show	emphasizes	the	supplantation	of	scripts	of	social	relations	by	product-friendly	imitative	reenactments	of	those	non-authored,	non-original,	merely	receptive	media	images	
as	highly	mimetic	and	rapidly	dispersive	performative	scripts:	“the	more	[the	spectator]	contemplates…	the	more	he	readily	recognizes	his	own	needs	in	the	images	of	need	proposed	by	the	dominant	system	[and]	the	less	he	understands	his	own	existence	and	his	own	desires”	(23).		As	the	spectacle	marks	the	transition	from	a	use	value	that	was	implicit	in	exchange	value	to	exchange	value	detached	from	use	that	therefore	needs	to	make	itself	explicit,	the	show,	as	a	social	script	attached	to	commodities,	justifies	the	need	for	those	commodities:	in	a	condition	of	overdeveloped	commodity	economy,	“a	counterfeit	life	calls	for	a	pseudo-justification”	(32).	The	shows	we	enact	come	with	required	props,	and	those	props	are	commodities	as	image-objects.	The	element	of	falsehood	is	thus	of	particular	importance	not	only	because	lives	and	desires	are	
																																																								14	Rosati	refers	to	Lukács’s	concept	of	“second	nature”	to	point	to	this	subjugation	of	social	consciousness	by	the	commodity,	and	notes	the	centrality	of	this	concept	of	second	nature,	and	“servitude	to	it,”	to	an	understanding	of	the	spectacle	(103).			
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forged	according	to	the	needs	of	the	dominant	form	of	production,	but	also,	and	especially,	because,	in	the	reenactment	of	shows,	spectators-turned-actors	execute	false	conflicts	that	mask	the	real	source	of	oppression.	The	enemy	is	then	portrayed	in	shows	to	be	everywhere:	adversary	nations,	foreigners,	sensationalized	crime,	the	Third	World	and	its	undesirable	underdevelopment,	terrorism.	The	enemy	is	everywhere,	that	is,	except	where	it	realty	is:	at	the	commanding	head	of	the	production	machine	with	its	hand	perpetually	turning	the	wheel	of	the	spectacle.	When	Debord	points	out	that	“[m]edia	stars	are	spectacular	representations	of	living	human	beings”	that	constitute	images	of	possible	roles	as	“the	object	of	identification	with	mere	appearances,”	he	stops	shy	of	considering	the	mimetic	effect	of	this	identification	–	and	the	false	catharsis	the	experience	of	its	fake	conflicts	produces.	This	is	precisely	where	Now	inscribes	itself	thematically:	as	the	spatial	détournement	of	the	shows	of	development	and	underdevelopment	identified	along	national	state	lines.	It	may	not	be	too	early	to	clarify	that	I	will	understand	(under)development	in	the	widest	sociopolitical	sense	to	include:	freedom/oppression,	functioning/failing	democracy,	prosperity/hunger,	etc.		Among	the	many	spectator	triumphs	that	the	spectacle	fakes	by	means	of	its	shows	with	their	counterfeit	conflicts	and	catharses,	none	is	more	politically	paralyzing	than	the	falsification	of	protagonism.	One	of	Debord’s	most	explicit	corrections	on	Marxist	thinking	takes	place	in	Thesis	87	and	relates	to	Marx’s	linear	approach	model	that	“loses	sight	of	[the]	fact	that	the	bourgeoisie	is	the	only	
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revolutionary	class	that	has	ever	been	victorious”15	(56,	his	emphasis).	I	will	return	to	the	matter	of	historical	time	further	on	in	this	dissertation,	but	it	is	important	to	consider	at	this	point	that	the	success	of	the	bourgeoisie	derived	from	the	fact	that	they	already	controlled	the	variable	that	would	become	determinant	to	the	new	order,	namely	the	economy,	as	the	bourgeoisie	had		developed	its	autonomous	economic	power	during	the	medieval	period	when	the	State	had	been	weakened.	The	modern	State…	first	supported	the	developing	bourgeoisie	thanks	to	the	mercantile	system…	then	went	on…	to	become	the	bourgeoisie’s	own	State…	[M]odern	State	bureaucracy	[then	fuses]	capital	and	State	[and]	established	“capital’s	national	power	over	labor	and	public	authority	designed	to	maintain	social	servitude”;	the	bourgeoisie	thus	renounced	any	historical	existence…	and	permitted	to	be	“condemned	along	with	the	other	classes	to	a	like	political	nullity…	Already	discernible	in	outlie	here	are	the	sociopolitical	bases	of	the	modern	spectacle,	which	in	a	negative	way	defines	the	proletariat	as	the	only	pretender	to	historical	
existence”	(Debord,	Spectacle	57,	his	quotations	and	emphasis).			In	the	shows	in	which	the	spectacle	happens,	such	as	film	and	television,	news,	and	ethnographic	documentaries,	the	proletarian	spectator	falsely	confirms	their	false	protagonism	as	the	hero	of	a	conflict	that	displaces	the	enemy	as	the	local																																																									15	“The	plain	facts	of	history,	however,	are	that,	just	as	the	‘Asiatic	mode	of	production’	(as	Marx	himself	observed	in	another	connection)	preserved	its	stasis	in	spite	of	class	conflict,	so	too	no	
jacquerie	of	serfs	ever	overthrew	the	barons	and	no	slave	revolt	in	the	ancient	world	ended	the	rule	of	freemen”	(Debord,	Spectacle	56).	Debord	states	that	no	slave	revolt	was	successful	in	the	ancient	
world,	a	specification	that	allows	him	to	maintain	the	Haitian	Revolution	outside	his	assertion.		
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bourgeoisie	turns	itself	invisible.	This	dislocation	of	the	enemy	takes	the	form	of	either	false	conflicts,	for	instance	against	foreign	powers,	terrorism,	or	immigration,	or	of	false	geographies	that	place	the	distracting	threats	of	invasion	or	underdevelopment	in	stable	external	locations.		The	largest-scale	version	of	this	displacement	of	conflict	is	the	worldwide	division	among	developed	and	underdeveloped,	civilized	and	savage,	modern	and	pre-modern,	central	and	peripheral,	all	of	which	greatly	coincide	with	the	post-Cold	War	usage	of	the	categories	of	First	and	Third	World,	respectively,	while	in	reality	the	owners	of	the	means	and	forms	of	production	–	the	real	enemy	–	hides	internally	on	both	sides	of	the	divide.	The	“First-and-Third-World”	dichotomy	thus	constitutes	the	ultimate	geographical	play	of	differential	opposition	that	sustains	the	meanings	and	validations	of	a	capitalist	system	that	wishes	to	exist	as	if	it	had	always	been	there,	as	if	there	were	no	history.	Indeed,	“the	practice	of	proletariat	as	a	revolutionary	class	cannot	be	less	than	historical	consciousness	applied	to	the	totality	of	this	world”	(Debord,	Spectacle	50).	The	possibility	for	that	revolutionary	consciousness	rests	on	the	workers’	ability	to	awake	from	the	false	consciousness	of	time	that	defines	the	society	of	the	spectacle,	which	is	“the	reigning	social	organization	of	a	paralyzed	history,	of	a	paralyzed	memory,	of	an	abandonment	of	any	history	founded	in	historical	time”	(114).	The	spectacle	enacts,	time	and	again,	the	show	of	a	historical	moment	eternalized.	It	is,	as	a	matter	of	fact,	one	way	in	which	one	world	view	has	been	“transformed	into	an	objective	force,”	a	weltanschauung	that	has	been	absolutized	(Debord,	Spectacle	13).	
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This	eternalization	and	absolutization	of	a	particular	worldview	or	historical	moment	as	a	“weltanschauung	that	has	been	actualized,	translated	into	the	material	realm”	(Debord,	Spectacle	13),	is	best	apprehended	when	we	bring	together	the	concepts	of	psychogeography	and	détournement.	I	will	engage	with	this	combined	play	further	on,	but	as	a	first	mention	I	propose	that	we	begin	to	consider	the	geographical	actualizations	of	shows,	that	is,	the	city	and	world	maps	which	the	shows	create,	inhabit,	and	reinforce.	Indeed,	capitalism	strives	to	stand	in	such	a	way	that,	by	locating	progress	and	backwardness,	modernity	and	pre-modernity,	civilization	and	primitivism,	as	stable	national	categories,	the	spectacle,	by	means	of	its	shows,	operates	a	transfer	of	history	into	geography,	of	time	into	space,	an	operation	related	to,	but	not	identical	to,	the	primacy	of	space	over	time	that	David	Harvey	describes	in	The	Condition	of	Postmodernity	(Dickens	and	Fontana	390)	and	to	which	I	will	return.	Or,	more	precisely:	capitalism	utilizes	shows	as	a	way	of	detaching	itself	from	historical	transience	so	that	it	can	inscribe	itself	as	a	
geographic	stasis	that	contains	all	the	stages	of	the	imagined	(pre-)history	of	capitalism	simultaneously	at	any	given	time,	in	different	locations.	The	most	far-reaching	consequence	of	this	emptying	of	historical	conscience	into	psychogeographic	categories	is	the	loss	of	proletarian	political	(revolutionary)	agency	as	a	consequence	of	the	public’s	inability	to	appropriate	historical	time.	Further	on	I	will	return	to	the	notion	of	time,	both	historical	and	spectacular,	and	what	Álvarez	and	Lena	Horne’s	Now	exhortation	represents	in	relation	to	historical	protagonism.		
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Beyond	the	capture	of	historical	consciousness	to	which	Now	urges,	and	which	I	will	discuss	in	detail	further	down	in	this	study,	Álvarez’s	documentary	finds	itself	in	the	unique	position	of	being	able	to	counter	the	shows	of	the	spectacle	at	the	intersection	of	détournement	and	psychogeography.	Indeed,	the	film	is	able	to	repurpose	material	stolen	from	various	shows	into	a	superior	milieu	while	at	the	same	time	redrawing	the	cartography	of	First	and	Third	worldness	as	it	anchors	its	call	in	a	transnational	community.	The	imagination	of	transnational	fraternities	that	
Now	enables	is	not	commonly	depicted	by	shows	in	the	spectacle.			1.4	It	is	now	necessary	to	devote	some	attention	to	the	presupposition	of	authenticity	that	belies	Debord’s	theory	of	the	spectacle.	When	he	posits	that	“[a]ll	that	once	was	directly	lived	has	become	mere	representation”	(1),	or	examines	the	ever-growing	expansion	of	pseudo-needs	as	opposed	to	authentic	needs	or	desires	(34,	44),	or	when	he	states	that	the	spectacle	represses	“all	directly	lived	truth	beneath	the	real	presence	of	the	falsehood	…	of	appearances”	(153)	–	what	does	he	implicitly	refer	to	in	terms	of	truth,	and	of	direct	or	authentic	experience	of	social	relations?		One	of	the	most	aggressive	critics	of	the	theory	of	the	spectacle,	Frédéric	Schiffter,	does	so	on	the	grounds	that	Debord	fails	to	define	the	“real”	that	preceded	degradation.		Schiffter’s	Contre	Debord,	an	acid	little	book	published	three	years	after	Debord’s	suicide,	and	which	devotes	the	first	pages	of	its	foreword	to	the	third	edition	to	an	account	of	its	several	editorial	rejections,	posits	that,	in	the	history	of	
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ideas,	the	notion	of	the	spectacle	really	dates	back	to	an	antique	metaphysics	and	morality.	He	further	asserts	that		[t]he	notion	of	spectacle	suggests	that	the	“essence”	of	men	has	been	lost	in	the	flux	of	time	since	the	advent	of	the	world	of	production	and	market	exchange.	According	to	Debord,	this	essence	has	been	“estranged	into	a	representation.”	What	was	this	essence,	exactly?	Debord	is	very	careful	not	to	give	even	a	minimal	definition,	as	if	all	that	was	known	of	this	essence	could	only	be	guessed	through	the	various	and	successive	falsifications	it	had	undergone	and	which	he,	Debord,	could	not	cease	to	stigmatize.	To	summarize,	the	spectacle	is	the	kingdom	of	falsehood	so	perfect	that	men	have	forgotten	what	the	true	was	at	the	beginning	(16-17,	my	translation	from	French,	his	emphases16).		Schiffter	will	then	go	on	to	declare	that,	like	Rousseau,	Debord	hides	his	wish	to	stigmatize	and	“teach	lessons	to”	his	contemporaries	under	the	guise	of	his	radical	critique	of	a	world	devoid	of	humanity.	The	first	problem	with	Schiffter’s	critique	is	that	Debord	never	once	uses	the	term	“essence”	in	his	book	in	the	sense	of	“the	essence	of	humanity.”	Debord	is	not	concerned	with	the	“essence	of	man”	as	much	as	with	human	relationships.	What	the	bearing	of	social	relations	would	be	on	the	
																																																								16	[l]a	notion	de	spectacle	suggère	que	l’	«	essence	»	de	l’homme	s’est	perdue	dans	le	flux	du	temps	depuis	l’avènement	du	monde	de	production	et	d’exchange	marchand.	Selon	Debord,	cette	essence	se	serait	«	éloignée	dans	une	représentation	».	Quelle	était-elle	au	juste	?	Debord	se	garda	bien	d’en	donner	la	moindre	définition,	comme	si	tout	ce	qu’on	en	connaissait	ne	pouvait	que	se	laisser	deviner	à	travers	les	diverse	et	successives	falsifications	qu’elle	aurait	subies	et	que	lui,	Debord,	ne	cessa	de	stigmatiser.	En	somme,	le	spectacle	serait	le	règne	si	parfait	du	faux	que	les	hommes	auraient	oublié	ce	qui,	au	commencement,	était	le	vraie.		
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essence	of	humankind	(and	vice	versa)	is	a	related	but	not	equal	matter.	Debord’s	chief	concern	not	with	the	essence	of	humanity	but	with	relations	is	precisely	why	I	believe	my	attached	notion	of	the	show	can	be	useful,	as	it	underscores	the	performative	aspect	of	the	spectacle.	For	Debord,	loss	of	authenticity	is	related	with	the	directness	of	experience	as	opposed	to	its	spectacular	mediation	and	distortion.	As	such,	authenticity	in	Debord	is	to	be	understood	in	very	practical	social	terms	and	refers	to	the	experience	of	work,	both	in	terms	of	experience	of	the	whole	during	production	and	of	experience	of	time	as	workers,	as	I	will	discuss	in	this	and	next	chapter,	as	well	as	to	the	experience	of	needs	in	relation	to	biological	survival	(need	versus	pseudo-need)	and	to	what	he	claims	is	“an	absolute	break		in	the	organic	development	of	social	needs”	(44).	Furthermore,	Schiffter’s	assertion	that	“the	“essence”	of	men	has	been	lost	in	the	flux	of	time	since	the	advent	of	the	world	of	production	and	market	exchange”	(16)	seems	to	ignore	the	complexity	of,	and	the	thorough	attention	Debord	devotes	to,	the	issue	of	time,	both	spectacular	and	pre-spectacular17.	Spectacular	society	is	not	simply	“lost	in	the	flux	of	time”	but	has	lost	control	of	time	and	history	in	exchange	for	paralyzing	“pseudo-cyclical	time,”	a	concept	which	Debord	defines	very	explicitly	and	in	great	detail,	and	to	which	he	arrives	after	carefully	tracing	the	history	of	the	understanding	of	history.		As	a	matter	of	fact,	Debord	is	aware	of	the	difficulties	involved	in	contrasting	spectacular	experience	with	an	alleged	“direct”	or	“real”	version	of	social	relations.	
																																																								17	Although	Schiffter	seems	to	be	very	well	acquainted	with	Debord’s	more	mundane	understanding	of	spectacular	time,	as	best	evinced	in	his	aphorism	no.	16	(63-66).		
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Thesis	25	is	especially	relevant	in	this	regard.	Here,	Debord	acknowledges	that	
contemplation,	the	substance	of	spectacular	mechanics,	is	not	born	with	capitalism	but	pre-dates	it	as	“religious	contemplation.”	He	then	sets	out	to	examine	the	difference	between	religious	and	spectacular	contemplation,	whereby	it	was	the	sacred	that	justified	the	“ordering	of	things	that	best	served	the	interests	of	the	masters”	and	thus	religious	contemplation	referred	to	what	“society	could	not	
deliver”	and	“allegiance	to	frozen	religious	imaginary	was	originally	a	shared	acknowledgement	of	loss”	(20,	his	emphasis).		Modern	spectacular	contemplation,	on	the	other	hand,	constitutes	the	“positive”	view	of	“what	society	can	deliver”	(20,	his	emphasis),	even	if	what	is	permitted	is	still	clearly	marked	off	of	all	that	is	possible.	In	this	manner,	Debord	recognizes	three	important	elements	with	regards	to	pre-spectacular	“authenticity”:	(a)	that	contemplation	of	religious	imagery	was	“a	compensation	for	a	poverty	of	real	social	activity”	(20);	(b)	that	as	pre-spectacular	masters	“expound[ed]	upon	and	embellish[ed]	on	what	society	could	not	deliver,”	it	becomes	evident	that	“power	as	a	separate	realm	has	always	had	a	spectacular	aspect”	(20,	his	emphasis);	and	(c)	that	the	spectacle	“is	a	specious	form	of	the	sacred”	(20).	It	is	an	established	understanding	that	capitalism,	as	cult	and	in	its	reliance	on	fetishism,	simply	appropriates	the	mechanics	of	religion,	so	it	should	not	be	a	novel	idea	that	the	modern	spectacle	builds	on	a	form	of	sacred	spectacle.	Walter	Bejamin	opens	his	1921	fragment	“Capitalism	as	religion”	with	the	straightforward	assertion	that		
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[a]	religion	must	be	discerned	in	capitalism	–	that	is	to	say,	capitalism	serves	essentially	to	allay	the	same	anxieties,	torments,	and	disturbances	to	which	the	so-called	religions	offered	answers.	The	proof	of	the	religious	structure	of	capitalism	–	not	merely,	as	Weber	believes18,	as	a	formation	conditioned	by	religion,	but	as	an	essentially	religious	phenomenon	–	would	still	lead	even	today	to	…	[a]	universal	polemic	(288)					Debord	keeps	this	religious	nature	of	capitalism	clear,	but	his	use	of	the	characterizations	of	“direct,”	“real,”	and	“authentic”	is	problematic	and	should	be	considered	with	care.		“Authentic”	for	Debord	also	relates	to	the	division	of	labor.	In	this	sense,	‘direct’	experience	can	be	understood	as	“experience	of	the	whole”	as	opposed	to	of	one	segment	of	the	production	process.	Indeed,	there	is	no	authentic	experience	of	life	as	defined	by	human	agency	if	one’s	experience	of	the	object	of	creation	is	fragmentary	beyond	recognition	of	the	object	itself.	An	artisan	who	participates	in	the	full	process	of	his	creation,	a	farmer	who	sees	the	seeds	all	the	way	to	harvest,	live	authentic	experiences	in	that	their	actions	are	firmly	tied	and	grounded	onto	a	whole,	and	any	social	relations	resulting	from	this	work	are	thus	“true”	in	this	sense	
																																																								18	With	regards	to	this	fragment,	Michael	Löwy	points	out	in	his	article	“Capitalism	as	Religion:	Walter	Benjamin	and	Max	Weber,”	that	the	title	itself	of	Benjamin’s	fragment	is	lifted	directly	from	Ernst	Bloch’s	Thomas	Münzer	as	Theologian	of	the	Revolution	(also	from	1921),	which	“denounces	Calvinism	for	having	‘completely	destroyed	Christianity’,	replacing	it	with	the	elements	of	a	new	religion,	‘capitalism	as	religion…,”	but	that	Benjamin	did	not	agree	with	the	view	of	a	“Calvinist/Protestant	treason	of	the	true	spirit	of	Christianity.”	The	initial	statement	that	one	must	see	capitalism	as	religion,	Löwy	further	points	out,	is	followed	by	a	critical	reference	to	Max	Weber’s	thesis:	not	a	formation	merely	condition,	but	a	religious	phenomenon	(61).		
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of	holistic	significance.	Broken	into	abstract	partial	acts,	labor	becomes	abstract	and	disconnected	from	purpose,	and	experience	becomes	detached	from	authentic	understanding	of	its	motivations	and	goals:	“the	abstract	nature	of	all	individual	work,	as	of	production	in	general,	finds	perfect	expression	in	the	spectacle,	whose	very	manner	of	being	concrete	is,	precisely,	abstraction…	[and]	this	unites	what	is	separate	…	in	its	separateness”	(Debord,	Spectacle	22,	his	emphases).	Now’s	call	for	a	transnational	revolutionary	fraternity	challenges	an	alienation	that	derives	precisely	from	this	loss	of	the	unity	of	experience.		A	third	aspect	of	the	theory	of	the	spectacle’s	understanding	of	authenticity	is	rooted	in	the	degeneration	of	needs	and	their	relation	to	value.	Debord	points	out	that	pre-spectacular	“economic	necessity	…	was	the	unchanging	basis	of	earlier	societies”	(33).	By	authentic	economic	necessity,	he	refers	to	primary	needs,	which	are	now	“met	in	a	most	summary	manner”	and	are	replaced	by	a	“ceaseless	manufacture	of	pseudo-needs,”	all	of	which	derive	from	the	single	factor	that	is	the	drive	of	an	unrestrained	autonomous	economy	to	develop	endlessly	and	exponentially.	This	in	turn	relates	to	Debord’s	notion	of	augmented	survival	in	which	“daily	lived	experience	embodies	no	free	choices	and	is	subject,	no	longer	to	the	natural	order,	but	to	a	pseudo-nature	constructed	by	means	of	alienated	labor.	Thus,	authenticity	for	Debord	is	rooted	partly	in	a	transfer	from	the	sacred	to	the	spectacular,	and	partly	in	the	loss	of	both	the	authenticity	of	natural	(i.e.,	biological	survival)	needs,	and	of	a	holistic	experience	of	the	labor	carried	out	to	satisfy	those	needs.		
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The	transition	from	necessity	to	pseudo-necessity	correlates	with	the	loss	of	use	value	to	exchange	value.	As	Thesis	48	explains	quite	clearly,	the	logic	of	the	spectacle	is	the	logic	of	making	use	value	explicit	–	authenticity	then	relates	to	the	pre-spectacular	stage	when	use	value	was	implicit.	Thus,	“[t]he	satisfaction	that	the	commodity	in	its	abundance	can	no	longer	supply	by	virtue	of	its	value	is	now	sought	in	an	acknowledgment	of	its	value	qua	commodity”	(43).	But	Debord	understands	that	all	need,	spectacular	and	pre-spectacular,	pseudo-	and	authentic,	is	itself	“determined	by	society	and	its	history”	(44).	I	do	not	believe	Debord	idealizes	a	pre-spectacular	past	of	fully	organic	needs	as	the	mark	of	true,	direct	and	authentic,	but		the	commodity	in	the	stage	of	its	abundance	attests	to	an	absolute	break	in	the	organic	development	of	social	needs.	The	commodity’s	mechanical	accumulation	unleashes	a	limitless	artificiality	in	the	face	of	which	all	living	desire	is	disarmed.	The	cumulative	power	of	this	autonomous	realm	of	artifice	necessarily	everywhere	entails	the	falsification	of	life	(44-45).		This	break	with	the	organic	genesis	of	need,	that	is,	with	the	natural	and	biological	origin	of	human	needs,	is	what	marks	the	loss	if	authenticity	in	social	relations.	It	is	a	qualitative	change	brought	about	by	excessive	quantitative	change:	accumulation	run	amok	with	boundless	expansion.	In	this	sense,	an	act	of	
détournement,	particularly	of	the	kind	executed	by	Álvarez	in	Now,	constitutes	a	major	act	of	rebellion	against	the	spectacle	in	that	it	steals	materials	from	their	exchange	value	in	a	market	governed	by	copyrighted	protections	and	the	exchange	
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value	of	photography	and	footage	in	magazines	and	newsreels.	Furthermore,	this	appropriation,	in	the	consciousness	and	disruptive	nature	of	its	“theft”	and	repurposing,	puts	a	spotlight	on	use,	precisely,	and	creates	a	meta-awareness	on	the	issue	of	value	versus	possibilities	of	use,	as	well	as	a	reflection	on	“liberated	use,”	that	is:	use	detached	from	its	original	economic	intentions.		The	concept	of	authenticity	that	sustains	Debord’s	reflection	can	thus	be	understood	in	terms	of	an	appropriation	of	a	form	of	spectacular	contemplation	characteristic	of	the	sacred	exponentially	accelerated	in	the	context	of	the	modern	autonomous	economy.	The	sense	of	unity	of	labor	has	been	lost,	a	disruption	has	taken	place	in	the	development	of	social	needs	in	relation	to	an	organic	base,	and	exchange	value	has	superseded	any	claim	to	use	value.	In	this	sense,	the	analysis	of	spectacular	occurrences	as	shows	allows	for	the	estimation	of	the	degree	to	which	certain	social	relations	are	mediated	by	commodities	as	image-objects.	This	estimation	should	allow	for	the	understanding	of	social	relations	on	a	continuum,	rather	than	a	yes/no	categorization,	in	terms	of	degrees	of	authenticity	versus	the	“limitless	artificiality”	in	the	face	of	which	the	tie	between	need/desire	and	organic	reference	breaks	(45).					1.5	Now	begins	not	with	the	song	by	Lena	Horne	that	gives	the	film	its	name	but	with	the	Jewish	celebratory	song	Hava	Nagila	during	opening	credits	(0:08	–	1:13).	As	a	matter	of	fact,	the	first	images	appear	before	the	beginning	of	credits,	as	an	instrumental	version	of	Hava	Nagila	begins	to	play	(0:08	–	0:24).	These	opening	
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segments	of	what	appears	to	be	newsreel	footage	are	of	“racist	incidents	in	California	in	August	1965”	(Chanan	33).	These	images	feature	a	shaky	camera	that,	if	used	intentionally	in	documentary	film,	would	constitute	a	classical	resource	applied	in	order	to	confer	journalistic	veracity	on	documentary	films	or	cinéma	
verité.	However,	in	this	case,	because	the	pieces	are	appropriated	from	U.S.	newsreels,	the	shaky	camera	is	not	an	effect.	Indeed,	what	would	need	to	be	an	artifice	that	creates	the	illusion	of	ground-zero	veracity,	i.e.,	a	documentary	pretending	to	be	on-scene	live	news	footage	by	intentionally	maintaining	an	unstable	camera,	is	in	reality	the	result	of	an	actual	handheld	camera	during	the	
actual	unfolding	of	events.	This	pre-title	sequence	constitutes	a	cold	opening.		At	0:24,	the	titles	begin,	still	under	Hava	Nagila.	The	title	sequence	(0:24	–	1:13)	utilizes	one	single	photograph	for	its	whole	length.	It	is	a	photograph	of	a	1965	meeting	between	President	Johnson	and	a	group	of	African	American	men	led	by	Martin	Luther	King	Jr.	The	still	photograph	acquires	an	illusion	of	motion	through	the	rapid	shifting	application	of	a	white	overlay	effect	that	covers	the	entire	photograph	first,	and	then	different	portions	of	it:							
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	 				The	cold	opening	and	title	sequence	are	thus	montaged	around	Hava	Nagila.	It	is	important	to	note	that	Lena	Horne’s	song	was	written	for	her	by	Jewish	multifaceted	Broadway	luminaries	Betty	Comden,	Adolph	Green	and	Jule	Styne,	who	set	the	lyrics	of	the	song	to	Hava	Nagila	(Idelsohn	Society).	But	the	version	of	Hava	that	Álvarez	utilizes	for	the	initial	sequence	is	an	instrumental	stand-alone	version	of	the	song,	separate	(though	immediately	followed	by)	Lena	Horne’s	theme,	as	if	the	director	had	decided	to	extract	a	portion	of	Horne’s	song	to	give	the	audience	a	preview.	In	her	analysis	of	the	film,	Guindi	does	not	for	some	reason	distinguish	between	the	stand-alone	“pure”	version	of	the	song	and	its	subsequent	incorporation	into	Horne’s	song.	As	for	the	significance	of	the	Jewish	song,	she	proposes	three	interpretations	for	Álvarez’s	use	(of	Horne’s	use)	of	Hava:	(a)	that	the	director	establishes	a	parallel	between	the	holocaust	and	the	repression	of	
Fig.	1	Shifting	white	overlay	creates	partial	versions	of	a	single	photographs	(Now,	0:24	–	1:08).			
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African	Americans;	(b)	that	there	is	a	visual	parallelism	between	the	circular	choreography	of	the	Jewish	dance;	and	(c)	that	it	creates	a	dynamics	of	counterpoint	between	the	violence	of	the	images	and	the	“hope-inducing	force”	of	the	song	“that	doesn’t	only	proclaim	that	‘the	time	is	now’,	but	that	it	also	has	in	and	of	itself	an	emancipatory	tone”	(her	italics).	I	am	not	sure	the	first	two	claims	can	be	immediately	sustained	as	posed,	but	I	do	believe	there	is	something	to	the	third	claim,	although	I	wouldn’t	call	it	“hope.”	Guindi	might	be	placing	excessive	emphasis	on	the	title	of	the	song,	 הבה נגילה ונשמחה ,	which	translates	into	English	as	“Let	us	rejoice.”	It	must	be	noted	that	Álvarez	utilizes	the	entire	song,	which	in	its	instrumental	version	covers	what	would	be	the	lyrics	all	the	way	to	the	end19:	
																																																								19	Source	of	this	three-column	lyric	text/transliteration/translation:	“HAVA	NAGILA- הבה נגילה  "by	
The	Israel	Forever	Foundation.		
	 47	
 After	the	initial	“call	to	rejoice,	sing	and	be	happy,”	three	lines	stand	out:	“Awake,	awake,	my	brothers!”		I	will	propose	that	these	climatic	verses	foreshadow	the	urgency	of	the	call	to	historic	action	in	Horne’s	song.	It	is	quite	possible	that	choosing	to	set	the	tone	of	Horne’s	song	to	Hava	is	not	so	“unlikely”	as	the	Idelsohn	Society’s	entry	on	Horne	believes	it	was.	Comden	et	al	may	have	apprehended	this	connection	between	“wake	up,	my	brothers”	and	the	call	of	the	newly	written	lyrics	of	Now,	plus	the	rhythmic	acceleration	of	the	song	around	these	verses,	and	made	their	choice	accordingly.	The	extraction	of	this	possible	historic	antecessor	behind	Horne’s	Now,	and	the	act	of	letting	it	stand	alone	before	the	American	song,	establishes	a	historical	investigation	that,	considering	that	Horne’s	song	too	was	
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used	without	permission,	could	be	regarded	as	a	form	of	“historicized	
détournement.”	By	“historicized	détournement”	I	refer	to	the	double	operation	of	appropriating	material	and	the	subsequent	decomposition	of	such	material	into	its	historical	intertextualities.	Álvarez	appropriates	Horne’s	Now,	which	in	turn	had	appropriated	Hava	Nagila,	and	the	film	exposes	this	by	means	of	its	cold	opening:	the	appropriated	piece	is	immediately	preceded	in	the	new	milieu	of	signification	by	its	own	appropriated	material,	thus	making	the	mechanism	explicit.	This	double-operation	détournement	is	important	for	two	deeply	related	reasons:	(a)	it	puts	on	display	the	fact	that	acts	of	détournement	are	often	“détournements	of	
détournements,”	for	the	pieces	that	are	being	appropriated	into	a	new	milieu	can	themselves	be	the	milieu	of	previous	appropriation;	and	(b)	it	activates	historical	consciousness.	Even	to	an	audience	that	is	not	consciously	aware	of	the	double	play,	the	second	play	of	Hava	(within	Horne’s	Now)	may	create	a	sensitive	echo	of	the	immediately	preceding	original.	It	is	almost	as	if	the	director	were	guiding	the	audience	to	notice	the	occurrence	of	détournement.	And	because	original	and	appropriated	pieces	are	juxtaposed	in	film,	we	could	say	that	Álvarez	is	montaging	the	very	theory	of	détournement.	As	I	will	point	out	in	the	next	chapter,	the	imposition	of	historical	consciousness	of	this	historicized	détournement	is	crucial	to	the	countering	of	spectacular	time.				
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In	addition	to	exposing	the	mechanics	of	détournement,	the	cold	opening	and	title	section	foreshadow	the	main	techniques	that	will	be	utilized	in	the	film	itself.	Indeed,	the	first	minute	encapsulates,	as	a	pre-summary,	the	musical	nature	of	the	montage,	mirroring	its	rhythmic	speeds	and	point	of	climax,	and	present	the	two	main	material	types	and	techniques	that	will	be	utilized	in	the	entire	documentary:	short	newsreel	sequences	and	multiple	framings	on	single	photographs.	The	film	itself	could	be	divided	into	three	main	parts:								
	
Segment	&	
Time	code	
reference	
	
	
Description	
	
Music	
	Title	&	credit	sequence,	cold	opening.			0:00	–	01:13		
	- Main	title	card.	- “Paloma	de	Oro”	award	card.	- Newsreel	footage	are	of	“racist	incidents	in	California.”	- Photograph	of	activists	lead	by	Martin	Luther	King	Jr.	meeting	President	Johnson.	Photo	sections	are	framed	and	reframed	by	white	overlay	as	titles	appear.		
	
Hava	
Nagila.		
	 50	
	Conceptual	claim.			01:14	–	01:57	
	- To	a	comparatively	slower	musical	tempo,	this	section	sets	down	the	historical	and	constitutional	basis	to	the	claims	to	the	end	of	unequal	treatment.	The	song	claims	reference	to	Jefferson,	Washington	and	Lincoln	and	urges	to	“do	what’s	right	/	Constitutionally.”	- Accompanying	these	legal	claims,	montage	includes	only	photographs	put	in	motion	through	quick-shifting	framings	and	reframings	of	field	sections.	The	photos	include	activists,	children	with	American	flags,	mug	shots	of	children	with	policemen,	and	a	photograph	of	the	funeral	of	an	African	American	portrayed	on	the	cover	of	Life	magazine.	Towards	the	end	of	this	section,	a	collage-style	motion	overlays	the	cut-out	photo	of	Lincoln’s	head	emerging	out	of	a	black	man’s	eyes:	these	“head	cut-outs”	then	return	to	the	full	Lincoln	Memorial	statue.				
	
Now!,	by	Lena	Horne,	Part	1	(see	below)	
	Call	to	action.			01:57	–	03:07	
	- The	call	to	action	now,	which	had	been	introduced	in	the	previous	section	in	more	conceptual	terms,	becomes	more	visceral	as	the	musical	tempo	increases.		- Materials	include	photographs	of	police	brutality	against	black	people	during	protests.	The	speed	of	the	shifting	eye	that	frames	different	partial	fields	of	each	photograph	accompanies	the	music.	One	footage	scene	is	included	towards	the	end	at	02:53	(police	officers	leading	dogs	onto	a	protest).			
	
Now!,	by	Lena	Horne,	Part	2	(see	below)	
	Climax.			03:08	–	05:21	
	- With	the	words	“Now,	now,	/	Now,	now,	now,	now,”	the	call	acquires	a	climatic	urgency	as	the	musical	tempo	peaks.	
	
Now!,	by	Lena	Horne,	
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- Photographs	and	footage	increase	in	dramatism	as	police	violence	images	are	now	interspersed	with	images	of	U.S.	Nazi	parades	and	Ku	Klux	Klan	killings.				
Part	3	(see	below)	
	Coda.			05:22	–	05:30.		
	- The	song	ends.	- “Now!”	is	spelled	with	bullets	on	the	screen.	- End	of	film.		
	None.		
	 Below	is	a	breakdown	of	the	three	sections	proposed	for	Horne’s	song	in	relation	to	the	Spanish	subtitles	in	the	available	version	of	Álvarez’s	film	(my	own	transcription	of	the	song):	
	
Segment	&	
Time	code	
reference	in	
the	film	
	
	
English-language	lyrics		
	
In-film	Spanish-language	translation	
(subtitles)	
	
	Part	1.		01:14	–	01:57	
	If	those	historic	gentlemen	came	back	today	Jefferson,	Washington	and	Lincoln		And	Walter	Cronkite	put	them	on	channel	2	To	find	out	what	they	were	thinkin’			I’m	sure	they’d	say		Thanks	for	quoting	us	so	much	But	we	don’t	want	to	take	a	bow		Enough	with	the	quoting		Put	those	words	into	action	And	we	mean	action	now			
	*No	capitalization	used	in	translation		si	esos	históricos	caballeros	jefferson,	washington	y	lincoln		resucitaran	y	fueran	entrevistados		por	la	televisión	estoy	seguro	que	dirían	gracias	por	citarnos	tanto	¡conviertan	sus	palabras	en	acción!	pero	acción	ahora!	¡ahora	mismo!	¡y	no	esperar	más!	
	Part	2.		 	Now	is	the	moment	Now	is	the	moment	 		¡ahora	mismo!	
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01:57	–	03:07	 Come	one,	we’ve	put	it	off	long	enough		Now,	no	more	waitin’	No	hesitatin’	Now,	now	Come	on,	let’s	get	some	of	that	stuff		It’s	there	for	you	and	me	For	every	he	and	she	Just	wanna	do	what’s	right	Constitutionally		I	went	and	took	a	look	In	my	old	history	book	It’s	there	in	black	and	white	For	all	to	see		
no	más	dudas	hagamos	valer	nuestros	derechos	en	mi	viejo	libro	de	historia		allí	está	todo	escrito	en	blanco	y	negro	para	que	todos	lo	lean	
	Part	3.	 	Now,	now,	Now,	now,	now,	now		Everyone	should	love	his	brother	People	all	should	love	each	other	Just	don’t	take	it	literal,	mister	No	one	wants	to	grab	your	sister		Now	is	the	time	Now	is	the	time		Now	is	the	moment	Now	is	the	moment	Come	on,	we’ve	put	it	off	long	enough		Now,	no	more	waiting	No	hesitatin’	Now,	now	Come	on	let’s	get	some	of	that	stuff		It’s	there	for	you	and	me	For	every	he	and	she	Just	wanna	do	what’s	right	Constitutionally		I	went	and	took	a	look	In	my	old	history	book	
		cada	uno	debe	amar	a	su	hermano	debemos	amarnos	unos	a	otros	¡ahora	es	el	momento!	el	mensaje	de	esta	canción	es	muy	claro	no	tiene	discusión		no	queremos	más	promesas	olvidemos	al	tío	tom	aunque	digan	que	no	soy	realista		sigo	pensando	que	hemos	sido	creados		libres	e	iguales	y	ya	que	dicen	que	los	negros	tenemos	ritmo	vamos	a	compartir	ese	ritmo	con	todos		¡ahora	es	el	momento!	¡el	momento	es	ahora!	
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It’s	there	in	black	and	white	For	all	to	see		Now,	now,	Now,	now,	now,	now	Now,	now,	Now,	now,	now,	now		The	message	of	this	song’s	not	subtle	No	discussion,	no	rebuttal	We	want	more	than	just	a	promise	Say	goodbye	to	Uncle	Thomas	Call	me	naïve	Still	I	believe	We’re	created	free	and	equal	Now,	now,	Now,	now,	now,	now		Everyone	should	love	his	brother	People	all	should	love	each	other	Since	they	say	we	all	got	rhythm	Come	on,	let’s	share	our	rhythm	with	‘em		Now	is	the	time	Now	is	the	time	The	time	is	nowww		With	regards	to	the	translation,	a	couple	of	aspects	should	be	noted.	For	one	thing,	it	is	clear	that	not	all	lines	are	translated	but	select	passages,	meaning	that	a	Spanish-speaking	audience	who	doesn’t	speak	English	would	not	have	access	to	Horne’s	full	statement.	Furthermore,	the	translation	subtitles	do	not	appear	in	synchrony	with	their	English	equivalent	as	sung.		The	four	points	of	the	original	English	that	are	translated	into	subtitles	are	those	relating	to	history,	time,	love	and	rhythm.	In	the	next	chapter,	I	will	return	to	the	importance	of	this	historicized	communication	of	time.		
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At	this	point,	one	important	matter	should	be	addressed:	if	Lena	Horne’s	song	is	fully	in	tune	with	Álvarez’s	ideology,	and	is	not	appropriated	in	order	to	deviate	its	message,	can	we	call	its	appropriation	an	act	of	détournement?	I	will	posit	that	we	must	indeed	consider	this	appropriation	an	act	of	détournement,	for	two	reasons:		a. because	in	spite	of	coincidence	with	Álvarez’s	political	stance,	in	incorporating	it	into	his	film,	the	director	integrates	“present	or	past	artistic	productions	into	a	superior	construction	of	a	milieu,”	according	to	the	definition	listed	in	the	Virginia	Tech’s	Situationist	International	Online	archives;	and	b. 	most	importantly,	Álvarez’s	appropriation	of	Horne’s	song	constitutes	an	act	of	détournement	because	it	can	be,	and	has	been,	reclaimed	by	the	spectacle	
under	copyright	law.	In	his	essay	“Master	of	the	Moviola,”	Derek	Malcolm	cites	Álvarez’s	account	of	being	sued	for	his	unauthorized	use	of	the	song,	to	which	he	responded	that	the	song	belonged	to	the	people.	Lena	Horne	agreed	in	a	letter	(10).	In	this	sense,	“the	violence	of	détournement”	(Debord	146)	should	not	be	regarded	as	violence	against	Horne,	but	against	the	copyright	holders	who	claim	spectacular	ownership	of	the	song.		As	I	have	discussed	above,	one	aspect	of	Álvarez’s	appropriation	of	Lena	Horne’s	song	that	is	worthy	of	note	relates	to	what	I	have	called	historicized	détournement.	As	a	matter	of	fact,	the	lyrics	to	the	song	itself,	before	appropriation,	contain	a	
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strong	sense	of	historical	consciousness	when	they	refer	to	historical	figures	of	American	politics	and	urge	to	take	a	look	at	history:	If	those	historic	gentlemen	came	back	today…	We’ve	put	it	off	long	enough…	I	went	and	took	a	look	In	my	old	history	book…	
Historicized	détournement,	in	its	way	of	exposing	the	history	of	appropriations	of	a	particular	piece	(which	itself	may	then	be	appropriated),	constitutes	a	form	of	meta-
détournement,	a	reflection	on	its	methods	and	theory.	But	that	is	not	all	there	is	to	Álvarez’s	utilization	of	Horne’s	song	in	this	respect.	The	director	takes	this	meta-reflection	on	détournement	one	step	further	when	he	delves	into	the	issue	of	quotation	versus	détournement.			 In	Thesis	208,	Debord	explicitly	tackles	this	matter,	positing	that	“[d]étournement	is	the	antithesis	of	quotation,	of	a	theoretical	authority	invariably	tainted	if	only	because	it	has	become	quotable,	because	it	is	now	a	fragment	torn	away	from	its	context,	from	its	own	movement…	Détournement,	by	contrast,	is	the	fluid	language	of	anti-ideology”	(146).	The	very	first	verses	of	Horne’s	lyrics	are	precisely	about	the	problem	of	quoting	or,	rather,	ideologically-biased	quoting:		I’m	sure	[Jefferson,	Washington	and	Lincoln]	would	say		Thanks	for	quoting	us	so	much	But	we	don’t	want	to	take	a	bow	
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	Enough	with	the	quoting		Put	those	words	into	action	And	we	mean	action	now	Together,	these	lines	are	one	of	the	most	strongly	Debordian	statements	one	can	make:	steal	those	quotes,	incorporate	them	into	a	superior	milieu	where	they	will	incite	action,	and	that	action	must	involve	historical	protagonism,	now.	Historicized	
détournement	already	underscores	the	fact	that	most	pieces	are,	at	the	time	of	their	appropriation,	themselves	the	result	of	a	previous	appropriation.	But	what	Horne’s	lyrics	point	out	here	is	a	far	more	crucial	aspect	of	“détournement	of	a	
détournement,”	for	her	claim	calls	for	the	restitution	of	the	Jefferson,	Washington	and	Lincoln	quotes	stolen	and	used	for	political	oppression	back	to	a	proposed	original	sense	that	is	more	just.	In	all	rigor,	“Détournement	of	a	détournement”	is	not	the	most	appropriate	way	to	refer	to	the	process,	as	détournement	involves	the	incorporation	of	material	into	a	superior	milieu.	Since	an	appropriation	for	the	purpose	of	political	oppression	would	not	re-contextualize	it	into	a	superior	new	purpose,	the	most	accurate	way	to	refer	to	the	condition	in	question	is	“détournement	of	a	previous	recuperation20”:	the	act	of	robbing	a	thief,	or	of	detouring	an	already-stolen	piece.																																																										20	“The	annexation	of	avant-garde	strategies	to	official	culture	exemplified	a	process	the	Situationists	called	“recuperation”…	Détournement	and	recuperation	can	only	be	understood	in	direct	relation	to	each	other,	as	they	operate	as	a	sort	of	hinge	between	authority	and	subversion…	Situationist	theory	made	clear	that	any	oppositional	avant-garde	would	become	recuperated	and	thus	negated	by	the	institutions	of	spectacular	culture…	Wariness	of	the	ongoing	problematic	of	recuperation	remains	
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I	will	refer	to	Horne’s	kind	of	appropriation	as	“restitutional	
détournement”:	the	reappropriation	of	material	under	the	claim	that,	in	its	original	context,	it	served	more	equitable	or	humane	goals	than	those	for	which	it	was	recuperated	and	from	which	it	is	now	détoured.	In	the	particular	case	of	Horne’s	song,	the	claim	to	restitution	of	the	quotes	has	to	do	with	the	lack	of	tangible	social	justice	action	(or	contradiction	thereof)	by	those	who	utilize	them	often.		The	claim	to	restitutional	détournement	of	Jefferson	at	al’s	words	that	Horne	makes	in	her	first	verses	does	not	operate	alone:	it	is	precisely	during	these	lines	that	Álvarez	presents	the	motion	collage	in	which	the	head	of	Lincoln’s	statue,	emerging	from	the	eyes	of	a	black	man,	is	restituted	to	Lincoln	himself,	in	his	Memorial.	In	the	sense	in	which	I	have	introduced	the	concept,	restitutional	
détournement	is	the	opposite,	the	countering,	or,	more	precisely,	the	undoing,	of	recuperation.	To	be	sure,	the	normalization	of	the	format	of	the	video	clip	can	be	viewed	as	a	form	of	recuperation,	and	I	will	discuss	that	issue	further	on.	But	Horne	and	Álvarez’s	claim	to	restitution	of	quotes	demands	their	return	to	what	they	claim	to	be	their	original	sense	and	intent.		The	matter	is	further	complicated	by	the	fact	that,	in	reclaiming	Jefferson,	Washington	and	Lincoln’s	quotes,	Horne	herself	attributes	them	invented	quotes:	“Thanks	for	quoting	us	so	much	/	But	we	don’t	want	to	take	a	bow.”	And	there	is	yet	
																																																								necessary,	given	the	subtlety	of	the	problem	of	spectacularization	itself	–	the	process	by	which	those	who	control	the	spectacular	culture…	coopt	all	revolutionary	ideas	by	publicizing	a	neutralized	version	of	them”	(Kurczynski	295).		
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another	instance	of	restitutional	détournement	in	the	song,	one	that	is	also	a	reflection	on	authorial	intention	and	deviation	of	meaning:		Everyone	should	love	his	brother	People	all	should	love	each	other	Just	don’t	take	it	literal,	mister	No	one	wants	to	grab	your	sister	The	last	two	verses	of	course	refer	to	the	fear	of	black	men	sexually	abusing	white	women,	a	common	cultural	figure	in	Latin	America	as	well,	synthetized	in	the	image	of	la	cautiva,	the	captive	woman,	as	evinced	with	particular	force	in	Ángel	Della	Valle’s	1892	painting	La	vuelta	del	malón,	where	a	group	of	Indians	return	from	a	raid	with	a	kidnapped	white	woman	on	horseback.	What	Horne’s	lyrics	do	here,	though,	is	a	form	of	restitutional	détournement	that	complicates	the	order	of	reference	(i.e.,	what	comes	first,	who	referred	to	whom	first)	and	which	could	be	called	“preemptive	restitution”:	the	anticipation	of	the	ideologically-biased	misappropriation	of	one’s	words	and	preemptive	warning	before	they	are	misappropriated.	But	the	order	of	reference	is	indeed	complicated	because	the	presentiment	that	one’s	particular	words	could	be	misused	stems	from	the	fact	that	such	a	deviation	of	meaning	is	already	generally	common,	as	an	installed	social	prejudice.	Ultimately,	historicized,	restitutional,	and	preemptive	appropriations	have	one	thing	in	common:	they	all	highlight	the	fact	that	in	détournement	there	should	be	no	claim	to	original	purity,	for	all	appropriable	materials	are	themselves	
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the	result	of	prior	capture	and	repurposing;	in	other	words	that,	when	one	is	accused	of	theft	for	practicing	détournement,	one	can	really	only	be	robbing	a	thief.			1.6	The	type	of	détournement	that	takes	place	in	Now	is	notable	for	a	number	of	reasons	which	are	not	usually	emphasized	in	the	studies	written	on	the	film.	In	his	annotated	filmography	on	the	Cuban	director,	Michael	Chanan	calls	Now	a	montage	and	further	refers	to	its	segments	in	terms	of	“sequence”	and	“photograph”	before	he	actually	employs	the	term	“film.”	His	commentary	emphasizes	Alvarez’s	resourcefulness	in	his	song-threaded	appropriation	of	found	or	stolen	materials,	as	well	as	the	preponderance	of	formal	play	in	the	way	of	edition	of	both	image	and	sound	(33).	Critical	commentary	on	Now	generally	emphasizes	montage	and	edition	and	video	clip	ancestry21.	Another	frequent	occurrence	in	reviews	of	the	film	is	the	de-emphasis	of	Now	in	favor	of	LBJ,	either	by	pronounced	focus	on	the	latter,	or	by	oversimplified	comparison	of	the	two.	In	his	annotated	bibliography,	Chanan	dedicates	three	pages	to	LBJ	but	a	mere	paragraph	to	Now.	In	his	dissertation	entitled	O	cinema	
documentário	de	Santiago	Álvarez	na	construção	de	uma	épica	revolucionaria,	Marcelo	Vieira	Prioste	devotes	one	section	to	Now	and	LBJ	together	“as	proposals	
																																																								21	“Seen	through	today’s	eyes,	we	could	consider	Now!	a	typical	contemporary	music	video	(“[A]os	olhos	de	hoje,	poderíamos	considerar	Now!	como	um	típico	videoclipe	contemporâneo”)	(Vieira	Prioste	105).	“What	we	see	today	on	the	internet	and	other	media	is	a	harvest	of	Santiago	[Álvarez]’s	sowing...	of	the	language	proposals	present	in	Now!,	LBJ…”	(“[O]	que	temos	agora	na	internet	e	nas	outras	mídias	é	uma	colheita	da	semeadura	de	Santiago	...	das	propostas	de	linguagem	que	estão	em	
Now!,	LBJ...”)	(Senna,	in	Vieira	Prioste	106,	my	translation).		
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for	a	confrontational	cinema”	(my	translation).	He	elaborates	a	careful	analysis	of	content	and	technique,	but	I	do	not	believe	it	serves	his	argument	to	lump	both	films	together	“as	cultural-political	products	engaged	in	confrontational	action...	as	a	response	to	various	other	episodes	such	as	the	economic	blockade,”	among	other	grievances	(100,	my	translation).	While	it	is	true	that	LBJ	encapsulates	the	anger	towards	the	US	that	Wilkerson	noted	in	Álvarez	during	his	meetings	with	the	director	(Connor),	Now	has	a	more	complex	genesis,	which	Vieira	Prioste	acknowledges	in	this	section,	based	on	a	personal	experience	of	Álvarez	in	the	American	South	in	the	1940s,	an	experience	to	which	I	will	return	in	more	detail	in	this	dissertation.	Thus,	the	seed	for	Now	far	predates	the	political	circumstances	of	the	film’s	production;	even	if	Now	will	certainly	be	permeated	–	and	even	determined	–	by	the	political	context,	it	contains	a	foundational	element	not	shared	by	LBJ.		If	what	makes	critics	consider	Now	and	LBJ	as	sister	films	is	technique	rather	than	meaning	or	genesis,	it	should	also	be	pointed	out	that	Now	is	explicit	about	its	challenge	of	the	spectacle	in	a	way	no	other	Álvarez	film	is,	including	LBJ.	Both	Chanan	and	Vieira	Prioste	highlight	the	techniques	of	collage	and	montage	of	“stolen”	material	but,	as	is	the	case	with	most	commenters,	the	concept	of	
détournement	is	not	summoned	into	their	analysis.	And	yet	Now	is	quite	explicit	about	its	main	goal	from	the	start.	As	Vieira	Prioste	mentions	in	his	study,	in	the	opening	titles,	“which	are	very	vague,	the	only	thing	that	can	be	read	is:	photos	from	everywhere.	A	statement	which,	if	on	the	one	hand	shows	concern	with	the	citation	
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of	sources,	on	the	other	hand	it	ironically	tells	the	spectator	that	those	images	were	so	common	that	they	could	come	from	anywhere”	(103,	my	translation).	Precisely,	that	lack	of	concern	with	the	indication	of	sources	is	part	of	the	very	definition	of	
détournement;	the	fact	that	those	photos	come	“from	everywhere”	(1:01)	alludes	to	the	omnipresence	of	the	spectacle,	colonizing	everywhere.	It	is	true	that	both	LBJ	and	
Now	constitute	acts	of	“confrontational	cinema,”	but	the	aim	of	their	confrontation	is	quite	different;	in	the	case	of	Now,	this	confrontation	is	quite	peculiar	for,	unlike	LBJ,	its	main	postulate	is	not	merely		a	cinematographic	form	of	reaction	that	chose	to	question	on	two	different	counts	the	United	States	discourse	regarding	its	democratic	values.	While	
Now!,	in	addressing	the	struggle	for	civil	rights,	showed	the	oppression	of	the	American	black	citizen	at	the	hands	of	the	State,	LBJ	attacked	another	venerated	institution,	the	top	figure	of	the	leader	of	the	Executive	Power	(100,	my	translation).		Leaving	aside	the	enormous	disparity	between	the	two	films	in	terms	of	their	subjective	construction	of	their	respective	historical	narratives,	it	must	be	emphasized	that	Now	does	not	merely	attack	the	United	States	by	questioning	its	democratic	values:	very	much	unlike	LBJ,	Now	addresses	Americans	(a	specific	group	of	Americans,	but	Americans	nonetheless)	in	the	second	person,	as	brothers	and	sisters,	and	utters	a	very	direct	and	fraternal	call	to	action.	Furthermore,	also	unlike	LBJ,	Now	finds	its	roots	in	a	personal	experience	by	Álvarez	far	preceding	the	film	itself.	If,	in	addition	to	those,	Now	confronts	anything,	it	is	less	a	political	
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circumstance	than	the	spectacle	itself,	for	the	strength	of	Now	lies	not	with	a	circumstantial	attack	but	with	its	wide-reaching	meta-reflection	on	political	agency.	In	addition	to	its	emergence	from	a	collection	of	apprehended	materials,	accounts	of	viewer	response	will	often	highlight	the	sense	of	urgency	of	action	that	Álvarez’s	nervous	montage	conveys:	“…	the	images	of	lynchings,	police	brutality,	and	white	supremacy	lead	me	through	a	variation	of	deep	sadness	and	anger.	They	become	one	feeling	in	the	moment.	After	my	first	viewing	of	the	film,	I	felt	very	incensed	and	ready	to	take	action.	You	could	almost	call	the	feeling:	rebellion.”	(Bellinger).	The	director’s	rapid	combination	of	found	images	and	footage	act	in	cooperation	with	Lena	Horne’s	song,	Bellinger	continues:		There	is	a	visceral	reaction	that	elicits	from	the	audience	when	the	film	ends...	The	song	is	able	to	build	both	lyrically	and	sonically	up	to	a	distinct	repetitive	hook	that	insists	that	we	have	waited	too	long…	Sonically,	the	dynamic	voice	of	Lena	Horne	allows	you	to	be	riled	up…	as	she	repeats	the	chant-like	phrase,	“Now	is	the	time.	Now	is	the	time.	The	time	is	now!”		This	concerted	operation	of	song	and	image	in	nervous	ensemble	explains	why	Now	is	considered	the	precursor	of	the	video	clip	or	music	video.	However,	the	film’s	particular	use	of	found	materials	and	the	implications	of	its	form	of	
détournement	places	its	value	beyond	video	clip	ancestry.	The	deep	significance	of	Álvarez’s	documentary	can	only	be	fully	grasped	in	relation	to	the	inner	mechanics	of	the	spectacle	and	its	bearing	on	the	shows	that	construct	the	imaginary	First	
and	Third	Worlds.			
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In	Theses	11,	Debord	expounds	that	“[t]o	analyze	the	spectacle	means	talking	its	language	…	to	the	degree	…	that	we	are	obliged	to	engage	the	methodology	of	the	society	to	which	the	spectacle	gives	expression”	(15),	a	principle	that	fits	
détournement	as	the	appropriation	of	spectacle	itself,	in	pieces.	In	this	sense,	I	will	add	that	countering	the	show	includes	the	operation	of	analysis,	so	as	to	be	able	to	make	it	explicit.	In	the	same	thesis,	Debord	explains	that	the	spectacle	“expresses	…	the	total	practice	of	one	particular	economic	formation”	and	in	Thesis	106	he	asserts	that	the	stronger	the	class	in	power,	“the	more	forcefully	it	proclaims	that	it	does	not	exist	…	[and]	the	bureaucracy	is	obliged	to	be	a	class	imperceptible	to	consciousness”	(74).	A	parallel	can	be	suggested	between	the	manner	in	which	the	dominant	class	procures	historical	invisibility	and	the	way	the	spectacle	relies	on	high	levels	of	mimetic	effect	built	upon	the	hiding	of	the	mode	of	enunciation.	The	camera	must	hide,	the	artifice	must	not	be	exposed	if	what	the	spectacle	seeks	is	total	absorption	among	spectators	so	that	its	mediation	of	social	relationships	becomes	invisible	in	the	same	way	that	the	historical	transience	of	the	capitalist	form	of	production	it	represents	appears	natural	and	eternal.		Thus,	effective	détournement	must	at	the	same	time	speak	the	language	of	the	show,	turn	it	against	it,	and	expose	the	mode	of	enunciation.	Now	carries	out	all	three	operations	quite	effectively.	In	addition	to	the	capture	and	repurposing	of	United	States	media	material,	Álvarez	utilizes	a	nervous	camera	to	underscore	framing	as	a	mode	of	enunciation.	In	her	article	on	the	film,	Guindi	observes	that	frequent	close-ins	generate	an	in-frame/out-of-frame	effect	that	is	immediately	
	 64	
broken	when	the	camera	opens	the	frame	range,	as	is	the	case,	for	instance,	of	the	shot	of	the	police	officer	standing	first	–	a	shot	that	will	be	then	completed	with	his	foot	on	the	head	of	a	black	person.	Thus,	she	continues,	camera	movement	proposes	an	off-frame	or	off-field,	which	is	then	immediately	turned	into	an	in-field.	Guindi	further	concludes	that	this	camera	movement	exposes	the	operations	of	enunciation,	restitutes	artificiality,	and	blocks	the	identification	of	audience	with	a	totalizing	diegesis.		Indeed,	Now’s	rapid	montage	is	not	merely	a	sequence	of	short	shots	–	it	is	a	sequence	of	stolen	shots	and	shots	of	stolen	photos	upon	which	a	play	of	framing	is	added	by	Álvarez	so	that	meaning	is	constructed	by	means	of	the	sequencing	of	varying	framings	of	the	same	shot,	as	shots	dialoguing	with	different	frame-range	versions	of	themselves.	In	doing	so,	Álvarez	exposes	the	arbitrary	and	partial	nature	of	the	way	in	which	the	spectacular	camera	frames	the	reality	it	claims	to	represent:	“[i]mages	detached	from	every	aspect	of	life	merge	into	a	common	stream	…	Apprehended	in	a	partial	way,	reality	unfolds	in	a	new	generality	as	a	pseudo-world	apart,	solely	as	an	object	of	contemplation”	(Debord,	Spectacle	12).	This	is	a	central	condition	of	spectacular	representation	which	Now	lays	bare.							
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Fig.	2	Rapid-eye	movement	discovers		alternative	framings	as	it	shifts	anxiously		form	partiality	to	partiality.			
Fig.	3	In-Field/Out-of-field		counter-framing	of		appropriated	archive	photo	(Now,	02:17)		
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	 Furthermore,	the	plays	of	rapidly-shifting	partial	framings	on	a	single	photograph	install	a	mechanism	of	motion	onto	still	images,	which	I	will	call	“framing-motion	détournement,”	one	which	exposes	and	investigates	the	immanent	movement	of	the	photograph,	an	operation	which	I	will	revisit	in	detail	further	on.		One	would	be	hard	pressed	to	read	through	The	Society	of	the	Spectacle	without	noticing	Debord’s	frequent	use	of	genitive	reversions:	in	critiquing	Boorstin,	he	observes	that	“he	treats	the	excess	of	a	world	that	has	become	alien	to	us	as	excess	alien	to	our	world”	(140);	in	warning	about	the	critical	concept	of	the	spectacle	being	turned	into	an	“empty	formula	of	sociologico-political	rhetoric”	he	claims	that	“no	idea	could	transcend	the	spectacle	that	exists	–	it	could	only	transcend	ideas	that	exist	about	the	spectacle”	(143);	in	Thesis	204,	he	explains	that	the	language	of	critical	theory	must	be	one	of	“contradiction,	dialectical	in	form	as	well	as	in	content	…	not	a	negation	of	style,	but	the	style	of	negation”	(143-144),	and	in	Thesis	206	he	posits	that	“the	young	Marx	achieved	the	most	cogent	use	of	[Feuerbach’s	subject-predicate	reversal	as	an]	insurrectional	style:	thus	the	philosophy	of	poverty	becomes	the	poverty	of	philosophy.”	It	is	precisely	here,	in	Thesis	206,	that	Debord	takes	up	this	practice	of	genitive	reversal	explicitly,	asserting	that	“the	mode	of	exposition	of	dialectical	theory	will	thus	itself	exemplify	the	negative	spirit	it	contains”	and	citing	Hegel	positing	that	the	truth	is	not	“detached	…	like	a	finished	article	from	the	instrument	that	shapes	it.”	Indeed,		
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a	theoretical	consciousness	of	dialectical	movement,	which	must	itself	bear	the	stamp	of	that	movement,	is	manifested	by	the	reversal	of	established	
relationships	between	concepts	and	by	the	diversion	(or	détournement)	
of	all	the	attainments	of	earlier	critical	efforts.	Thus,	the	reversed	genitive	…	came	to	be	considered	the	hallmark	of	Hegel’s	epigrammatic	style	(144,	his	emphases,	my	bold).		If	ethnographic	film	is	popularly	assumed	to	be	“a	documentary	about	“exotic”	people,”	or	the	“exotic	other”	(Ruby	1346,	1348)22,	the	international	social	
																																																								22	Ethno-themed	and	international	social	justice	problem	film	extends	well	beyond	the	realm	of	nonfiction	as	a	truly	spectacular	practice.	Ruby	points	out	that	“[s]ome	scholars	will	even	argue	that	all	film	is	ethnographic”	(1346).	He	adds	that	“production	of	ethnographic	films	for	public	edification	and	amusement	began	as	part	of	a	general	educational-film	movement	in	the	1920s.	Prior	to	that,	films	of	“exotic”	peoples	were	produced	commercially”	(1348).	The	point	of	these	films,	and	what	may	make	some	consider	the	international	social	justice	problem	documentary	a	form	of	ethnographic	film,	is	the	portrayal	of	the	“harsh	geographic	and	human	Other”:	“[a]	number	of	early	attempts	to	represent	native	life	in	…	films	shot	on	location	[included]	Curtis’	In	the	Land	of	the	Head	
Hunters	(1914),	a	romantic	epic	of	the	Kwakiutl	of	British	Columbia	[which]	established	a	precedent	for	Robert	Flaherty’s	Nanook	of	the	North	(1922),	a	portrait	of	the	struggles	of	an	Inuit	(Eskimo)	family	…	against	a	harsh	environment	…		Hollywood	saw	the	box-office	potential	for	productions	that	featured	exotic	locations	and	starred	native	peoples,”	although	by	now	the	drive	for	entertainment	was	“increasingly	at	odds	with	anthropological	concerns.”	In	The	Silent	Enemy:	An	Epic	of	the	
American	Indian	(1930),	director	H.P.		Carver	employed	an	all-native	cast	to	tell	the	tale	of	an	Ojibway	warrior.	The	film	begins	with	Chief	Yellow	Robe,	the	lead	actor,	in	a	complete	Indian	costume,	confronting	the	camera	directly	to	inform	audiences,	“This	is	the	story	of	my	people…	Everything	that	you	will	see	here	is	real…	when	you	look	at	the	picture,	therefore,	look	not	upon	us	as	actors.	We	are	Indians	living	once	more	our	old	life”	(Ruby	1348).		The	deep	tie	between	general	ethnographic	film	and	international	social	justice	problem	film	can	be	traced	to	the	few	ethnographic	films	actually	produced	“by	or	with	anthropologists”	in	the	1920s,	as	opposed	to	by	Hollywood:	“In	colonial	countries	such	as	India,	agencies	such	as	the	Anthropological	Survey,	Films	Division,	and	state	television	maintained	a	continuous	if	weak	tradition	of	recording	native	societies	for	research,	publicity,	development	advocacy,	and	nation-building	activities.	These	films	were	seen	in	movie	houses	and	at	some	of	the	larger	museums.”	They	weren’t	shown	in	the	university	classroom	until	the	1950s	(Ruby	1348).	The	key	force	behind	international	social	justice	problem	film,	and	which	to	some	observers	positions	it	within	the	realm	of	ethnographic	film,	is	the	focus	on	an	“Other	people”	
on	location	(which	simultaneously	means	off	the	viewer’s	location	and,	in	contemporary	practice,	it	also	involves	activism).	Such	is	the	case	of	a	number	of	ethnographic	films	that	began	to	appear	in	the	United	States	in	the	1950s	and	1960s.	In	particular,	“The	Hunters	(1958)	was	the	first	North	American	ethnographic	film	to	gain	worldwide	attention	[and	is]	the	story	of	some	hunters	and	gatherers	living	in	the	Kalahari	desert	[and]	continued	the	Nanook	theme	of	humans	struggling	with	
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justice	problem	documentary,	understood	as	one	that	examines	and	denounces	the	sociopolitical	problems	of	this	exotic	other	but	may	or	may	not	be	made	by	professionally	trained	ethnographers,	can	be	deemed	a	form	of	ethno-journalistic	film.	It	remains	evident,	however,	that	the	practice	of	this	type	of	film	requires	sufficiently	stable	notions	of	exotic,	native,	“other,”	and	Western/Non-Western,	Developed/Underdeveloped,	First/Third	World	categories	firmly	grounded	as	geographical	demarcations.	This	is	what	Álvarez	executes	in	Now	that	Debord	himself	would	not	have	been	able	to	do	within	Europe:	a	détournement	between	the	imagined	First	and	Third	worlds,	which	amounts	to	a	genitive	reversal	of	one	of	the																																																									a	hostile	environment	[and	since	the	1980s,	The	Hunters’	Director	John	Marshall]	has	combined	his	role	as	a	filmmaker	with	that	of	an	activist”	(Ruby	1349).	Activist	film	made	from	the	so	called	First	World	that	focuses	on	the	exotic	“natives”	struggling	with	a	difficult	environment	and	their	own	underdevelopment	in	a	place	foreign	to	the	viewer’s	is	thus	the	defining	program	of	ethno-themed	film	as	of	the	1950s/1960s.	In	this	sense,	international	social	justice	problem	documentary	could	be	regarded	as	a	particular	kind	of	ethnographic	film	in	which	the	“hostile	environment”	is	primarily	economic	and	political.	This	is	what	Now	accomplishes,	only	in	a	reverse	direction	and	with	a	call	for	
solidarity	as	opposed	to	stabilized	differentiation	of	the	viewer	and	the	Other.	There	is,	however,	a	major	problem	with	these	wide	and	flexible	definitions	of	ethnographic	film:	they	tend	to	blur	the	boundary	between	the	work	of	a	professionally	trained	ethnographer	and	the	observation	of	an	ordinary	person	or	the	report	of	a	journalist.	In	this	sense,	I	have	to	agree	with	Anthony	K.	Harrison,	who	in	his	book	Ethnography:	Understanding	Qualitative	Research	expresses	concerns	about	the	instability	of	the	field’s	boundaries.	He	traces	at	least	part	of	the	problem	to	the	fact	that	research	practices	in	the	field	of	ethnography	“[bear]	a	close	resemblance	to	the	routine	ways	in	which	people	make	sense	of	the	world	in	every	day	life”	(Hammersley	&	Atkinson	2,	cited	in	Harrison	3)	and	“quite	regularly,	people	with	no	background	in	qualitative	research	claim	to	be	doing	ethnography”	including	in	non-academic	realms	such	as	consumer	research	(Harrison	4).	Harrison	worries	that	the	distinction	between	“folk	ethnography	and	ethnography	is	blurring”	and	hopes	that	his	book	“provides	some	correction	to	the	notion	of	ethnography	as	a	qualitative	free-for-all,	open	for	anyone,	regardless	of	background	and	training”	(4).	While	I	believe	that	academic	ethnographic,	made	by	professional	scholars	trained	in	the	field,	may	also	participate	in	the	show	of	worlds	and	certain	specific	framings	and	inventions	of	the	so-called	Third	World	in	the	eyes	of	the	First,	I	will	not	enter	into	a	discussion	of	ethnographic	film	per	se	simply	because	I	am	not	academically	trained	in	the	field.	The	question	of	to	what	degree	the	spectacle	operates	within	the	field	of	ethnography	is	of	extreme	importance,	but	it	is	one	for	those	in	the	field	to	deal	with.	Instead,	I	will	deal	with	international	social	problem	documentaries	and	fictional	films	that	contribute	to	the	mutual	imagination	of	First	and	Third	World	as	“ethno-themed	films”	(or	photographs,	or	texts)	or	“ethno-
journalism,”	with	the	“ethno-“	prefix	merely	seeking	to	underscore	the	inter-worlds	portrayal	and	with	no	claim	to	participation	in	the	theoretical	conversions	pertaining	to	the	field	of	ethnography.				
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largest-scale	differential	concepts	of	sociopolitical	epistemology,	whereby	the	“First	World”	of	traditional	ethno-themed	film	becomes	the	other/primitive	Third	World	of	Now.		The	reversal	of	established	relationships	between	(First/Third	World)	concepts	that	operates	alongside	the	détournement	in	Álvarez’s	documentary	must	be	understood	as	the	ethno-journalistic	exploration	of	underdevelopment	(and	chaos)	in	the	United	States	among	Americans,	where	the	natives	examined	are	American	and	the	viewer	is	Latin	American.	If	we	fail	to	see	the	African	Americans	devoid	of	basic	civil	rights	portrayed	in	Now	as	American,	as	the	United	States	itself,	instead	of	a	peripheral	or	external	identity,	and	consider	them	outside	our	understanding	of	the	“American	nation,”	or	if	conceive	of	the	First	World	and	the	United	States	as	coinciding	categories	separate	from	the	African	American	men	and	women	in	Now,	or	merely	as	a	pocket	of	refuse	within	the	imaginary	First	World,	we	run	the	risk	of	playing	into	the	spectacular	mechanics	that	frame	out	sectors	of	American	society	in	order	to	create	the	fiction	of	non-indigenous,	white	European	development	or	“First	World”	based	on	an	apprehension	of	“partial	reality.”	We	would	also	reinforce	the	stability	of	those	First	and	Third	World	categories.	Now	makes	it	very	clear	that	those	African	Americans,	destitute	and	trampled,	are	the	United	States	as	it	shows	them	bearing	US	flags	as	soon	as	01:18:	
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			 The	idea	of	mere	pockets	of	underdevelopment	in	the	First	World	would	then	serve	as	an	apology	to	maintain	the	spectacular	construction	of	the	notion.	The	use	of	First	and	Third	World	as	categories	must	be	in	such	a	way	that	the	concepts	negate	themselves	dialectically.	In	order	to	counter	the	spectacle	as	the	negation	of	its	language,	the	categories	must	be	used	dialectically	in	such	a	way	that	the	United	States	simultaneously	is	and	is	not	the	First	(and	Third)	World	and	Latin	America	at	the	same	time	is	and	is	not	the	Third	(and	First)	World:		Critical	theory	has	to	be	communicated	in	its	own	language	–	the	language	of	contradiction,	dialectical	in	form	as	well	as	in	content:	the	language	of	the	
Fig.	4	African	American	children	bearing	protest	signs	and	U.S.	Flags	(Now,	01:18)		
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critique	of	the	totality,	of	the	critique	of	history.	Not	some	‘writing	degree	zero”	–	just	the	opposite.	Not	a	negation	of	style,	but	the	style	of	negation	(Debord,	Spectacle,	Thesis	204).		This	chapter	has	examined	the	peculiar	manner	and	conditions	in	which	Santiago	Álvarez	executes	détournement	in	his	film	Now.	We	have	seen	that	Álvarez	seems	able	to	realize	a	countering	of	the	spectacle	more	efficiently	than	Debord,	and	in	film	before	the	French	philosopher,	and	that	this	may	be	due	to	the	Cuban	director’s	(not	necessarily	conscious)	incorporation	of	psychogeographical	play	in	conjunction	with	détournement,	the	urgency	with	which	the	US	embargo	against	Cuba	forced	him	to	the	practice,	and	his	inter-worlds	reach,	i.e.,	the	unique	circumstance	of	appropriation	between	imaginary	Third	and	First	Worlds,	as	opposed	to	within	the	space	of	Europe,	for	instance.	Furthermore,	we	have	seen	that	Álvarez’s	Now	contains	counter-spectacular	acts	of	historicized,	restitutional,	
preemptive,	and	framing-motion	détournement,	each	of	which	also	subversively	exposes	the	inner	mechanics	of	the	spectacle	itself.	The	next	chapters	will	expand	on	these	methods	and	conditions	into	more	in-depth	investigations	of	spectacular	time,	psychogeography	and	dérive,	intercultural	film,	and	the	composition	of	collages,	and	will	examine	Now	in	relation	to	other	films	that	contribute	to	a	theory	of	the	spectacle/show.			
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2	
	
Contra	el	ciclón:		
The	counter-spectacular	time	of	Now	
	
“¿Sobre	las	fiestas,	comandante?”	
“¿Eh?”	
“¿Sobre	las	fiestas?”	
“Bueno,	las	fiestas,	ya…	eso	es…	lo	mismo	que	no	hubo	en…	en	fin	de	año	y	todo	el	
mundo	estaba…	hizo	la	fiesta	en	el	cañaveral,	trabajando…	en	julio	habrá	fiesta,	larga,	
y	vacaciones	para	mucha	gente	que	ha	estado	sin	vacaciones,	trabajando	seguido…	en	
el	mes	de	julio	creo	que	el	país	se	merece	un	buen	descanso…	claro	que	un	descanso	
organizado,	¿no?	[risas	del	público],	todo	el	mundo	no	puede	abandonar	la	actividad,	
porque	hay	actividades	que	no	pueden	abandonarse.	Pero	en	julio	se	merece	el	país	un	
descanso.	Lo	habrá.	Sin	duda.	Ahora,	con	un	central	moliendo	en	julio,	le	va	a	
estropear	aquí	a	la	gente,	las	vacaciones.	Pero	pensamos	que…	que	del	15	de	julio	no	se	
pasa.	Ahora	estamos	cómodos,	porque	el	calendario	era	apretado…	apretadito	el	
calendario…”		
	 -	Commandant	Fidel	Castro,	“Noticiero	ICAIC	Latinoamericano	–	Diez	millones,”	while	expounding	on	weather-related	difficulties	facing	the	zafra	de	los	diez		
millones	(the	unaccomplished	10-million-ton	goal	for	the	1970	sugar	harvest).			
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2.1	The	lyrics	to	the	song	Now	can	be	summarized	as	a	call	to	waking	up	from	the	slumber	of	the	spectacle,	“the	bad	dream	of	modern	society	in	chains”	(Debord,	
Spectacle	18),	in	order	to	appropriate	the	present	historical	moment	as	irreversible	
time:	enough	with	the	contemplative	quotations,	put	those	words	into	action	now,	it’s	in	the	history	books,	the	time	is	now.	Álvarez’s	montage	realizes	what	Debord	states	as	the	tenet	of	détournement,	namely	“to	eliminate	all	remnants	of	the	notion	of	personal	property,”	because	“[a]ny	elements,	no	matter	where	they	are	taken	from,	can	serve	in	making	new	combinations”	(A	User’s	Guide	1).	But	this	
détournement	functions	entirely	to	the	rhythm	of	a	specific	notion	of	time.	The	lyrics	to	the	Hebrew	Hava	Nagila,	when	considered	in	silent	cooperation	with	Horne’s	song,	would	be	signing	“Awake,	awake,	my	brothers!	/	…with	a	happy	heart”	while	Horne	signs	“[It’s]	in	my	old	history	book	/	…	/	For	all	to	see	/	Now,	now,	now…	/	Everyone	should	love	his	brother…”	But	what	does	“now”	actually	mean	in	relation	to	the	task	of	countering	the	spectacle?	What	is	“spectacular	time,”	and	what	does	Álvarez’s	documentary	propose	as	counter-tactics?		First	of	all,	it	is	important	to	state	the	obvious:	the	name	of	the	song	that	leads	the	montage	is	Now!,	listed	as	track	A6	with	an	exclamation	point	in	her	1963	album	Here’s	Lena	Now!	(20th	Century	Fox	Records).	Álvarez’s	film,	when	it’s	regarded	as	a	stand-alone	film	and	not	confused	with	the	song	as	if	it	were	a	mere	music	video,	is	generally	listed	without	the	exclamation	point,	including	by	ICAIC’s	
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web	portal23.	In	relation	to	titles,	Debord	stated	that	they	“are	a	basic	element	of	
détournement.	This	follows	from	two	general	observations:	that	all	titles	are	interchangeable	and	that	they	have	a	decisive	importance	in	several	genres”	(A	
User’s	Guide	4).	What	Debord	refers	to	here	is	the	lack	of	novelty	of	popular	texts,	many	of	which	constitute	a	mere	remake	of	the	same	basic	narrative,	repeated	over	and	over	with	slight	changes:	“[a]ll	detective	stories	in	the	‘Série	Noir”	are	extremely	similar,	yet	merely	continually	changing	the	titles	suffices	to	hold	a	considerable	audience,”	and	he	adds	that,	in	the	particular	case	of	music,	“a	title	always	exerts	a	great	influence,	yet	the	choice	of	one	is	often	quite	arbitrary	“(4).		While	Álvarez	or	the	ICAIC	may	have	chosen	to	eliminate	the	exclamation	point	by	omission,	mistake	or	merely	as	a	way	of	distinguishing	the	film	from	the	song,	that	small	divergence	does	not	constitute	a	détournement	of	the	title	and	we	must	thus	not	read	in	the	film	an	opposition	to	Horne’s	political	statement.	As	discussed	in	chapter	1,	for	an	act	of	textual	appropriation	to	constitute	
détournement,	it	must	meet	two	basic	requirements:	to	be	genuinely	stolen,	in	the	sense	that	it	could	be	legally	reclaimed	by	its	authors	or	rights	holders	through	copyright	law,	and	to	be,	as	Debord	puts	it,	incorporated	into	a	superior	milieu.	This	superior	milieu	generally	gives	the	stolen	piece	a	new	meaning	in	political	opposition	to	the	one	it	held	in	its	original	context.		This	is	an	important	distinction																																																									23	There	is	some	discrepancy	in	terms	of	whether	or	not	the	title	of	the	film	is	listed	with	the	exclamation	point.	Critics	like	Monzón	list	the	film	as	Now!	in	his	essay	La	historia	configurada	como	
relato…	.	Notwithstanding	these	discrepancies,	many	reputable	sources,	including	the	ICAIC’s	official	portal	Cubacine,	list	the	film	without	the	exclamation	point,	and	that	is	how	the	title	will	be	treated	in	this	study.		
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that	must	be	made	among	the	appropriated	pieces	included	in	Álvarez’s	montage:	the	newsreel	footage	and	magazine	photos	are	détoured	under	the	Debordian	definition,	but	Horne’s	song	is	not.	While	the	appropriation	of	Horne’s	song	may	involve	certain	aspects	of	subversive	détournement,	such	as	the	fact	that	it	is	genuinely	stolen	in	the	sense	that	it	could	be,	and	was,	reclaimed	by	her	record	label,	and	that	it	is	indeed	incorporated	into	a	new	milieu,	this	new	milieu	is	not	higher	and	does	not	stand	in	divergence	from	Horne’s	views.	Horne’s	song	operates	in	full	cooperation	with	Álvarez	and	the	meaning	of	time	in	Now!	the	song	is	the	meaning	of	time	in	Now	the	film:	Alvarez	intended	no	opposition.	The	song’s	title	does	exert	the	great	influence	Debord	indicates,	but	no	semantic	significance	should	be	ascribed	to	the	modification	of	the	song’s	title	when	appropriated	into	the	film.	The	notion	of	temporal	urgency	that	Horne	articulates	is	indeed	at	the	center	of	the	film’s	counter-spectacular	enterprise.				2.2		Before	Debord	defines	spectacular	time	and	delves	into	its	implications,	he	devotes	Chapter	V	of	The	Society	of	the	Spectacle	to	a	detailed	consideration	of	the	notions	of	time	and	history.	More	precisely,	he	scrutinizes	the	social	construction	of	the	idea	of	a	history	that	“has	always	existed,	but	not	always	in	its	historical	form,”	adding,	by	means	of	one	of	his	frequent	genitive	inversions,	that	“[t]he	temporalization	of	man,	as	affected	through	the	mediation	of	society,	is	equivalent	
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to	a	humanization	of	time”	(92)24.	Once	time	has	been	established	as	an	object	of	social	appropriation,	Debord	is	able	to	trace	an	epistemological	history	of	historical	consciousness	through	the	advent	of	modernity	and	early	capitalism.		As	a	matter	of	fact,	before	a	true	consciousness	of	history	developed,	human	consciousness	remained	limited	to	a	perpetual	present,	as	social	memory	was	limited	to	that	of	its	living	eldest	members	(92).	A	first	form	of	historical	consciousness	denied	passing	time	in	favor	of	an	idea	of	returning	time:	the	cyclic	time	of	nature.	In	this	respect,	Debord	cites	Hegel	as	he	considers	nomadic	people	and	their	“limited”	wanderings	within	uniform	spaces.	In	this	interaction	of	time	and	space,	nomadism	eventually	becomes	displaced	onto	time,	as	society	settles	in	one	locality:	it	is	no	longer	people	who	return	to	places	after	periods	of	time,	but	time	that	returns	to	a	single	place,	as	the	cyclic	temporal	rhythm	of	nature:	“[t]he	agrarian	model	of	production	in	general,	governed	by	the	rhythm	of	the	seasons,	was	the	basis	of	cyclical	time	in	its	fullest	development”	(93).	This	shift	from	pastoralism	to	settled	agriculture	coincides	with	the	abandonment	of	nomadic	freedom	and	the	beginning	of	labor.		The	social	appropriation	of	time,	as	appropriation	of	the	production	that	labor-time	produces,	appears	in	coincidence	with	class	division.	This	class	division	between	masters	and	ordinary	laborers	on	the	land	involved	another	crucial																																																									24	Koselleck	emphasizes	the	meta-historical	consciousness	of	living	in	Modernity	as	part	and	product	of		the	modern	condition	itself:	“[t]he	triad	of	Antiquity,	Middle	Ages,	and	Modernity	had	been	available	since	the	advent	of	Humanism.	But	these	have	only	fully	come	into	use	and	have	organized	then	whole	of	history	quite	gradually	since	the	second	half	of	the	seventeenth	century.	Since	then,	one	has	lived	in	Modernity	and	been	conscious	of	doing	so.”	(Koselleck	12).		
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separation:	a	separation	in	terms	of	consciousness	of	time	and	history.	For	laborers,	time	continues	to	follow	its	cyclic	pattern	of	agriculture;	for	the	lords,	time	was	one	of	protagonism	through	the	forging	of	irreversible	(i.e.,	not	cyclic)	histories	of	war	and	conquest.	Class	division	entailed	a	fundamental	division	of	the	experience	of	history,	as	irreversible	time	occurred	in	a	dimension	completely	alien	to	ordinary	people,	and	history	as	personally-wrought	individual	stories	was	reserved	to	the	lords	and	fully	avoided	the	regular	cycles	of	work	on	the	land.			Two	important	points	must	be	made	in	relation	to	this	early	class	separation	with	regards	to	the	consciousness	of	time	and	the	experience	of	history.	First,	I	must	return	to	my	discussion	on	the	issue	of	Debord’s	understanding	of	“authentic	and	directly-lived	experience”	in	section	1.4	and	add	one	element	that	I	couldn’t	have	properly	tackled	before	these	considerations	on	time.	In	Thesis	128,	Debord	posits	that,	as	the	class	which	organized	the	labor	of	ordinary	men	appropriated	a	limited	surplus	value,	they	also	appropriated	a	temporal	surplus	value.	Indeed,	he	who	must	not	work	on	the	land	has	the	time	to	fight	wars	and	annex	kingdoms.	This	is	a	very	important	matter,	for	it	becomes	clear,	well	before	the	advent	of	capitalism,	that	the	appropriation	of	the	products	of	labor	through	the	division	of	classes	invariably	involves,	as	an	added	bonus,	the	appropriation	of	physical	time	and	the	possibility	of	making	history,	both	in	terms	of	historical	protagonism	and	of	the	construction	of	historical	knowledge,	as	“temporal	surplus	value”	that	yields	“historical	surplus	value”	(94,	Debord’s	emphasis).	For	Debord,	“directly-lived”	experience,	that	
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authentic	experience	of	life	that	the	spectacle	precludes,	relates	to	historical	protagonism,	as	well	as	to	the	consciousness	of,	and	participation	in,	irreversible	
historical	time:	“[t]he	owners	of	this	historical	surplus	value	were	the	masters	of	the	knowledge	and	enjoyment	of	directly	experienced	events”	(94).	“Directly-lived	experience”	thus	relates	to	acts	that	change	history	irreversibly,	executed	with	the	actors’	consciousness	of	that	power	of	making	history,	a	power	which	operated	“at	
society’s	surface”	(94,	Debord’s	emphasis),	for	it	excluded	the	vast	majority	of	people,	namely	all	the	ordinary	laborers	who	remained	trapped	in	the	cyclical	time	of	agriculture	and	untouched	by	the	historical	movements	and	conquests	of	their	masters.	Secondly,	it	might	be	useful	to	state	at	this	point	that	the	problem	of	class	separation	of	historical	consciousness	lies	at	the	center	of	20th-century	revolutionary	concerns	in	general,	and	Santiago	Álvarez’s	Cuban	revolutionary	context	in	particular,	and	that	the	ultimate	goal	of	this	chapter	will	be	to	position	
Now	in	relation	to	the	possibility	of	overcoming	this	division.		Debord	goes	on	to	discuss	the	bearing	of	writing	on	the	construction	of	history,	as	masters	continued	to	possess	history	and	gave	it	orientation	above	and	outside	the	historical	stasis	of	the	cyclical	time	of	commoners	(96).	He	examines	the	role	of	myth	in	relation	to	history,	as	the	earthly	execution	of	myth	(97);	monotheistic	religion,	as	a	compromise	between	history	and	myth,	involves	the	democratization	of	irreversible	time,	but	not	yet	as	a	protagonist’s	consciousness	but	as	the	illusion	of	orientation	“toward	a	single	final	event:	‘The	Kingdom	of	God	is	at	hand’”	and,	while	tied	to	material	time	anchors	(the	birth	of	Christ,	the	flight	of	
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Muhammed),	it	operated	as	a	form	of	countdown,	of	time	running	out	(99).	Debord	identifies	the	European	peasant	revolts	at	the	end	of	the	Middle	Ages	as	indeed	a	modern	revolution,	but	still	without	consciousness	of	history,	unaware	of	“being	
historical	and	nothing	more	…	doomed	to	defeat	because	they	could	not	recognize	revolution	as	their	own	handiwork	…	The	fact	that	they	made	their	action	conditional	upon	an	external	sign	of	God…	[showed]	the	tendency	of	insurgent	peasants	to	follow	outside	leaders”	(102).		It	wasn’t	until	the	victory	of	the	bourgeoisie,	the	first	successful	revolution,	that	all	the	vestiges	of	the	cyclical	time	of	agriculture	were	eliminated	(104):	history	is	now	perceived	not	any	longer	as	the	chronology	of	events	of	the	activities	of	the	members	of	the	ruling	class	but	as	a	“general	movement	–	an	inexorable	movement	that	crushed	individuals	before	it”	(Debord,	Spectacle	105):	“[r]evolution,	at	first	derived	from	the	natural	movement	of	the	stars	and	this	introduced	into	the	natural	rhythm	of	history	as	a	cyclical	metaphor,	henceforth	attained	an	irreversible	direction”	(Koselleck	18).		The	triumph	of	irreversible	time	stands	on	“the	mass	production	of	objects	in	accordance	with	the	laws	of	the	commodity.”	If	ancient	cyclical	time	produced	for	the	masters	of	class	organization	a	surplus	of	historical	time,	the	irreversible	time	of	capitalism	“would	tend	socially	to	eliminate	all	such	lived	time,”	thus	depriving	society	of	the	use	of	the	irreversible	historical	time	it	had	just	bestowed	upon	it	(105).	Irreversible	time	has	thus	become	“the	measure	of	commodities”	(107).		
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Spectacular	time,	characterized	by	the	“infinite	accumulation	of	equivalent	intervals”	and	the	exchangeability	of	its	segments,	becomes	the	time	of	paralysis,	where	humans	are	nothing	and	all	value	resides	on	exchangeable	units	of	time.	This	time	of	“human	non-development”	carries	with	it	the	trait	of	it	being	a	“consumable	
time	which,	on	the	basis	of	a	determinate	form	of	production,	presents	itself	in	the	everyday	life	of	a	society	as	a	pseudo-cyclical	time	…	which	is	the	consumable	
disguise	of	the	time-as-commodity	of	the	production	system”	(110).	Because	
pseudo-cyclical	time	operates	on	the	model	of	consumption	of	augmented	
survival,	one	that	is	governed	by	pseudo-needs,	it	is	fitting	that	pseudo-cyclical	
time	“should	echo	the	old	cyclical	rhythms	that	governed	survival	in	pre-industrial	societies”	and	pick	up	on	the	vestiges	of	real	cyclical	time:	day	and	night,	work	and	rest,	vacations,	etc.	(111).	The	ancient	separation	between	the	appropriation	of,	and	direct	protagonism	in,	irreversible	historical	time	by	the	masters	versus	the	static	experience	of	cyclic	time	by	the	general	population	of	common	laborers	is	replaced,	in	spectacular	society,	by	the	“separated	irreversible	time	of	the	economic	system	of	production”	(116)	as	an	autonomous	power	able	to	institute	permanent	political	change	against	the	pseudo-cyclical	time	experienced	by	society	in	the	form	of	cycling	work	shifts	and	commercial	holidays.	In	an	era	where	the	economic	has	succeeded	as	an	autonomous	power,	irreversible	time	lies	not	even	with	the	few	lords	who	made	history,	but	with	an	entity	that	“exists	independently	of	individuals”	and	which	the	revolutionary	project	of	a	classless	society	should	seek	to	abolish	
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(116-117).	In	this	sense,	the	alienation	of	the	worker	in	relation	to	the	totality	of	the	product	of	his	work	relates	to	this	temporal	alienation	in	the	experience	of	time.	Cultural	geographer	David	Harvey,	who	introduced	the	notion	of	“space-time	compression”	as	a	geocultural	concept	in	The	Condition	of	Postmodernity,	which	will	be	of	central	importance	to	this	dissertation,	traces	a	history	of	the	experience	of	time	that	largely	coincides	with	Debord’s	proposition,	but	with	a	few	important	distinctions.	One	commonality	between	Debord’s	and	Harvey’s	models	must	be	underscored	from	the	start:	both	of	their	analyses	focus	exclusively	on	European	history	and	thought.	Harvey	does	so	with	the	goal	of	arriving	at	an	understanding	of	the	postmodern	condition	of	time	and	identifies	a	series	of	revolutionary	moments,	or	epistemological	crises,	in	the	perception	of	time,	namely:	Renaissance,	Enlightenment,	First-wave	Modernist	(mid-nineteenth-century	to	World	War	I),	Second-wave	Modernist	(World	War	I	to	late	1960s	/	early	1970s),	and	Advent	of	Postmodernity.	What	to	Debord	would	constitute	authentic	cyclical	time	roughly	approaches	feudalism	as	described	by	Harvey,	where	“[t]he	finite	centered	qualities	of	place	(an	intricate	territory	of	interdependence,	obligation,	surveillance,	and	control)	matched	time-honoured	routines	of	daily	life	set	in	the	infinity	and	unkowability	of	‘enduring	time’”	(241).	Naturally,	it	would	be	clearly	problematic	to	go	to	feudalism,	of	all	periods,	in	search	for	an	emancipatory	notion	of	time	against	its	appropriation	by	capitalist	epistemologies.	It	must	be	emphasized	that	the	notion	of	unending	authentic	time	that	I	seek	to	propose	from	Debord	refers	merely	to	the	particular	condition	of	agricultural	societies	whereby	social	needs	and	routines	
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were	regulated	by	the	cycles	of	nature	(harvest	season,	natural	daylight,	and	so	on),	as	opposed	to	the	capitalist	pseudo-seasons	of	consumerist	fashion,	whether	that	cyclic	time	occurs	under	feudalism	or	in	a	post-spectacular-capitalist	agricultural	commune.			2.3	At	this	point,	I	will	return	to	the	concept	of	the	show	I	am	developing	as	a	subsidiary	to	Debord’s	theory	of	the	spectacle.	On	the	ground	level	of	the	concrete	shows	of	the	spectacle,	pseudo-cyclical	time	is	everything,	as	life	becomes	dominated	by	television	schedules,	seasons	and	reruns,	sports	and	theater	seasons,	and	various	yearly	commercial	festivities.	Each	of	these	events	constitutes	a	show	fully	operational	and	absolutely	dependent	on	pseudo-cyclical	time,	as	evinced	in	the	rotation	of	media	programs,	sports	events,	educational	calendars	and	holidays,	not	to	mention	the	pseudo-cyclic	rotation	of	clothing	as	a	pseudo-need	which	builds	on	the	remote	ancestry	of	the	real	cyclic	time	of	climatic	seasons	and	need	for	corresponding	dress.	Debord	refers	to	these	explicitly	as	“frequently	recurring	festivities…	[which]	incite	people	to	excessive	spending,	but	they	produce	only	a	disillusion”	(113).	In	regarding	these	as	adopted	and	acted-out	shows	taken	up	by	the	public,	the	colonizing	effect	of	pseudo-cyclical	time	on	society	becomes	more	evident	in	the	pseudo-cyclic	performance	of	“pseudo-festivals”	(113)	and	the	obedient	adherence	to	the	pseudo-cyclic	calendar	of	entertainments	schedules.		I	would	also	like	to	point	out	that	many	of	the	aspects	of	the	spectacle	not	very	developed	but	merely	insinuated	in	Debord’s	book,	and	which	have	prompted	
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me	to	seek	the	complementary	concept	of	“the	show,”	are	hinted	at	in	the	chapter	on	spectacular	time,	in	Thesis	152	particular.	The	spectacle	as	passive	contemplation	seems	to	leave	out	social	scripts	and	derived	performances	relating	to	housing,	vacation,	and	acts	of	sociability	itself.	The	concept	of	the	show	seeks	to	capture	precisely	that	dimension	of	assumed	spectacle:	living	our	ordinary	social	interactions	as	shows	in	which	we	act.	These	are,	of	course,	shows	that	are	injected	into	society	as	primary	shows,	and	then	adopted	and	replayed	dispersively	by	spectators-actors.	By	this,	of	course,	I	do	not	mean	to	state	that	primary	shows	are	a	fully	external	injection	of	commodity-placing	narratives	that	originates	in	some	vacuum	space	outside	society.	Shows,	as	the	spectacle,	are	simultaneously	internal	and	external	to	society,	they	originate	on	the	vestiges	of	desires	and	needs,	and	carry	some	degree	of	reference.	However,	upon	these	material	substrates,	shows	carry	an	excess,	an	augmentation,	that	modifies	social	interactions	according	to	the	mandates	of	the	production	system	as	our	lives	become	a	fast	accumulation	of	“pseudos,”	such	as	“‘fully-equipped’	blocks	of	time,	each	of	which	is	a	complete	commodity	combining	a	variety	of	other	commodities	…	spectacular	forms	of	housing,	of	collective	pseudo-travel”	(111).	And	it	is	precisely	at	this	point	that	we	find	the	strongest	argument	for	developing	a	notion	of	show	out	of	the	spectacle,	when	Debord	concludes	that	“[s]pectacular	commodities	of	this	type	could	obviously	not	exist	were	it	not	for	the	increasing	impoverishment	of	the	realities	they	parody”	(111-112,	my	emphasis).	This	sentence	encapsulates	the	notion	of	“show”	I	attempt	to	develop,	for	it	utilizes	a	strong	performative	term	(“parody”)	to	
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describe	active	social	conduct	that	imitates	falsified	realities.	I	have	called	this	form	of	passive-active	spectacular	obedience	“somnambular.”			2.4	As	I	stated	above,	the	problem	of	class	separation	in	terms	of	historical	consciousness	is	central	to	20th-century	revolutionary	projects,	including,	of	course,	that	of	Santiago	Álvarez’s	Cuban	revolutionary	context.	How	does	Now	position	itself	in	relation	to	the	coordinates	of	(a)	an	ancient	cyclic	time	of	popular	exclusion	from	irreversible	time,	where	masters	forged,	as	only	protagonists,	a	history	that	eluded	laborers;	(b)	the	apprehension	of	irreversible	time	as	the	illusion	of	a	countdown	or	as	the	messianic	promise	of	the	realization	of	paradise	on	Earth25	(also	a	crucial	image	of	modern	evolutionary	thought26);	and	(c)	the	consumable	
pseudo-cyclical	time	of	the	spectacular	era.	In	other	words,	what	is	the	“now”	of	
Now?		 It	is	important	to	emphasize	that	the	“now”	of	Now	is	not	the	“now”	of	Cuba.	Cuba,	as	a	successful	revolution,	is,	depending	on	how	the	state	of	the	Revolution	is	judged	in	1965,	either	in	the	process	of	accelerating	history	to	its	completion,	or	beyond	history,	a	condition	to	which	I	will	return	in	this	chapter.	The	“now”	that	
																																																								25	Giorgio	Agamben	carefully	defines	messianic	history,	as	opposed	to	chronological	history,	as	“defined	by	two	major	characteristics.	First,	it	is	a	history	of	salvation:	something	must	be	saved.	But	it	is	also	a	final	history,	an	eschatological	history,	in	which	something	must	be	completed,	judged.	It	must	happen	here,	but	in	another	time;	it	must	leave	chronology	behind,	but	without	entering	some	other	world.	This	is	the	reason	why	messianic	history	in	incalculable”	(Difference	and	Repetition	314).		26	Revolution	“appears	to	unchain	a	yearned-for	future	while	the	nature	of	this	future	robs	the	present	of	materiality	and	actuality	…	[and]	while	continually	seeking	to	banish	and	destroy	Reaction,	it	succeeds	only	in	reproducing	it…	The	alternation	of	Revolution	and	Reaction,	which	supposedly	is	to	lead	to	a	final	paradise,	has	to	be	understood	as	a	futureless	future”	(Koselleck	18).		
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Álvarez	proclaims	to	Americans	in	the	film	is,	to	some	degree,	the	“now”	of	The	Hour	
of	the	Furnaces.			2.5	Released	in	1968,	La	hora	de	los	hornos	is	a	260-minute-long	Argentine	documentary	directed	by	Octavio	Getino	and	Pino	Solanas	and	produced	by	Grupo	
Cine	Liberación.	This	production	company	was	part	of	a	number	of	groups	throughout	South	America	participating	in	Third	Cinema,	a	movement	devoted	to	the	countering	of	the	capitalist	filmmaking	industry	(Foster	129).	The	documentary	consists	of	three	parts	threaded	in	the	form	of	a	black-and-white	visual	textbook:	“Neocolonialismo	y	violencia,”	“Actos	para	la	liberación,”	and	“Violencia	y	liberación.”	With	a	voiceover	narration	that	adopts	a	quasi-encyclopedic	tone,	the	film	explores	the	subjugation	of	Latin	America	to	imperialist	exploitation	by	the	United	States.		The	Argentinean	documentary	was	released	three	years	after	Now	and	the	two	bear	some	similarities.		However,	I	do	not	intend	to	imply	or	emphasize	any	kind	of	influence	or	intertextuality	of	one	on	the	other.	As	I	have	said,	both	films	share	some	measure	of	a	common	understanding	of	time.	Furthermore,	both	films	constitute	historical	collages	that	lead	up	to	a	call	for	the	appropriation	of	historical	protagonism	encapsulated	in	the	urgencies	of	now	and	la	hora.	La	hora	“draw[s]	on	a	large	body	of	illustrative	material	[as]	the	central	narrative	pursues	relentlessly	the	fashion	in	which	Latin	America	is	constructed	by	imperial	powers	as	a	source	of	economic	exploitation”	(Foster	130)	and	enhances	the	process	of	metonymy	that	
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characterizes	it	by	means	of	the	discursive	practice	of	textual	citation	“in	the	sense	that	briefly	quoted	texts	drawn	from	other	sources	echo	each	other”	(Foster	138).	But	that’s	the	end	of	the	coincidences	between	the	films,	because	precisely	that	relentless	pursuit	that	Foster	finds	in	La	hora	is	not	present	in	Now.		While	Now	relies	fully	on	the	collage	of	image	and	music,	and	editorial	voice	occurs	exclusively	at	the	level	of	montage,	Foster	will	insist	that	La	hora	“unfolds	in	an	unrelentingly	pedagogical	fashion”	(132)	and	will	observe	how	the	film	“develops	an	orderly	progression	of	pedagogical	units	relating	to	and	reinforcing	its	overarching	vision	of	Latin	American	history”	(133).	This	relentless	reinforcement	of	its	vision	is	problematic,	for	it	approaches	a	tone	of	overt	propaganda.	Garibotto	and	Gómez	assert	that	the	film	runs	a	“a	nuclear,	simplistic	chronology	that	tends	to	repeat	itself	over	and	over	again:	colonization,	colonial	exploitation,	underdevelopment,	and	the	wish	for	liberation.	The	repetition	of	this	straightforward	sequence	renders	all	parts	of	the	film	equally	effective”	(129).	Garibotto	and	Gómez	will	concede	that	portions	of	the	film	stage	“an	extremely	cohesive	and	convincing	narrative…	[in	the	form	of]	a	legitimate,	organized	and	rigorous	historical	sequence	[but]	this	is	only	a	narrative	effect	produced	by	the	highly	efficient	manipulation	of	the	disposition	of	image	and	narration	to	construct	a	particular	version	of	history”	(130).		As	I	proposed	in	section	1.2,	there	is	a	dimension	of	détournement	that	occurs	on	the	level	of	territory,	as	psychogeographic	component	of	both	the	spectacle	and	its	countering.	I	must	first	discuss	one	key	element	pertaining	to	the	
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psychogeography	of	La	hora	in	relation	to	Now	in	order	to	establish	a	fundamental	distinction	that	will	later	help	understand	how	the	“now”	of	Now	is	to	some	degree	the	“now”	of	La	hora.	As	Foster	points	out,	“[f]or	the	purposes	of	the	film,	Latin	America	is,	in	the	manner	inspired	by	the	1959	Cuban	revolution	and	its	ideological	principles,	viewed	as	a	continental	unit,	where	local	and	national	differences	cede	importance	to	a	shared	history	of	exploitation”	(129).	Foster	explains	that,	as	Argentina	was	the	most	complex	capitalism	of	the	time,	an	extreme	case	in	its	apparent	“success”	and	“firstworldness,”	which	La	Hora	would	instead	deem	“the	most	efficient	face	of	dependence”	(133),	a	Cuba-Argentina	axis	could	be	established	so	that	“if	the	principles	of	the	Cuban	revolution	could	be	reduplicated	in	what	Hora	alleges	to	be	the	most	complex	capitalist	society	of	Latin	America,	it	would	carry	all	of	the	rest	of	the	continent	in	between”	(131).	Thus,	Latin	America	can	be	treated	as	a	singular	whole.		Both	Now	and	La	hora	build	on	the	authority	of	a	pedagogical	revelation	of	history	in	order	to	urge	to	an	appropriation	of	the	historical	hour	by	the	people:	“the	homologation	of	revolutionary	history	will	become	that	of	a	fissureless	new-day	Latin	American	history”	(Foster	131).	But	while	Getino	&	Solanas	do	this	on	the	basis	of	a	rigorous	“USA	versus	Latin	America”	differential	opposition	(which	correlates	with	“First	and	Third	World,”	“Empire	and	Colony”)	as	sustainable	
geographical	anchorings	for	the	two	political	entities	or	“worlds,”	Álvarez	breaks	with	the	national	demarcations	of	this	binary.	In	this	way,	Álvarez	extends	his	call	for	emancipation	across	the	geographical	borders	of	the	“two	worlds,”	thus	
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effectively	proposing	a	transnational	(indeed,	“trans-world”)	fraternity.	Indeed,	if	the	rest	of	Latin	America	is	to	look	up	to	Cuba	as	its	future	of	reference,	and	Álvarez	makes	his	call	to	revolution	towards	the	“Cuban	completion	of	history”	extensive	to	Americans,	he	is	indeed	contesting	the	narratives	of	progress	while	simultaneously	breaking	imaginary	geographical	boundaries,	which	means	that	Álvarez	is	able	to	operate	both	on	time	and	space.	Cuba,	as	the	only	free	people	of	the	Americas,	stands	at	the	top	and	at	the	end	of	history,	while	transnational	sectors	covering	both	the	United	States	and	Latin	America	are	called	to	understand	their	position	behind	and	prior,	but	in	the	struggle	toward,	the	Cuban	aspiration	on	the	progress	line	to	liberation.		The	obstinate	and	repetitive	pedagogical	tone	of	La	hora	is	indeed	committed	to	the	reinforcement	of	“its	overarching	vision	of	Latin	American	history”	(Foster	133).	And	this	overarching	understanding	is	“the	simplest	version	of	dependency	theory,	i.e.,	“externalist	and	mechanistic”	(Olivera	2008,	quoted	in	Garibotto	and	Gómez	128).	It	is	precisely	this	“externalist	and	mechanistic”	model	of	dependency	theory	which	I	hope	to	be	able	to	transcend	and	complicate	in	this	dissertation	(particularly	in	the	next	chapter),	so	that	Center/Periphery,	Empire/Colony,	First/Third	World	are	not	uncritically	assumed	to	coincide	with	geographical	demarcations	(or	nation-states),	and	the	matter	of	where	exactly	the	First	and	the	Third	World	are	is	permanently	problematized	as	a	matter	of	method.	And	in	proclaiming	his	call	of	emancipation	across	the	borders	of	“the	Worlds,”	Álvarez	succeeds	in	destabilizing	these	categories	in	Now,	an	upset	which	I	will	then	bring	
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into	the	notion	of	the	spectacle/show:	The	United	States	is	and	is	not	the	First	World;	Latin	America	is	and	is	not	the	Third	World.	Rather:	the	illusion	that	First	and	Third	Worlds	are	stably	located	here	or	there	is	itself	a	show,	an	illusion	the	spectacle	seeks	to	maintain	for	its	convenience.	Far	from	the	resolution	of	this	paradox,	I	intend	to	look	into	the	epistemological	value	of	a	paraconsistent	approach	that	operates	dialectically	on	the	live	paradox	of	the	fluid	existence	of	the	Two	Worlds.	Returning	to	the	main	question	of	what	the	“now”	of	Now	is,	I	will	reiterate	my	initial	claim,	namely	that	the	now	of	Now	is	that	of	La	hora	to	some	degree.	It	is	true	that	both	Now	and	La	hora	refer	to	the	time	just	before	the	acceleration	of	history	to	its	end,	that	vertiginous	moment	of	protagonist	consciousness	when	workers	appropriate	irreversible	time	and	accelerate	history	to	its	fulfillment,	that	is,	to	post-revolutionary	freedom27.	But	while	La	hora	positions	Latin	America	alone	in	the	underdeveloped	condition	of	unappropriated	history,	a	condition	that	can	be	matched	to	the	condition	of	the	Third	World,	Now	includes	the	United	States,	at	least	fluid	parts	and	layers	of	it,	against	the	geographic	stasis	of	nation-state	categories,	both	in	terms	of	the	place	of	the	Third	World	and	of	the	audience	to	which	the	call	for	awakening	is	directed.	On	a	timeline	to	proletariat	liberation,	La	Hora	places	Cuba	beyond	the	end	of	this	linear	structure	of	historical	time,	as	an	accomplished	
																																																								27	These	revolutionary	times	of	messianic	reference	naturally	implicate	at	least	a	dimension	of	“political	myth”	as	defined	by	Christopher	Flood,	namely	“an	ideologically	marked	narrative	which	purports	to	give	a	true	account	of	a	set	of	past,	present,	or	predicted	political	events	and	which	is	accepted	as	valid	in	its	essentials	by	a	social	group”	(44).		
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model,	and	the	United	States	is	left	fully	outside	of	the	struggle,	essentialized	into	a	position	of	unitary	and	uncomplicated	enemy.	Now,	on	the	other	hand,	considers	fraternities	of	international	struggle	that	operate	against	established	geographies	of	national	accomplishment.	The	United	States	(at	least	fluid	parts	of	it)	and	Latin	America	(at	least	fluid	parts	of	it)	are	both	addressed	in	Now	as	the	audience	for	the	call	to	revolutionary	action	that	must	orient	itself	toward	“becoming	Cuba.”		I	have	observed	that	one	of	the	ways	in	which	Now	complicates	détournement	is	through	the	psychogeographic	reach	of	its	operation,	and	that	it	does	so	two	years	before	the	publication	of	Debord’s	theory	book28.	Debord’s	notion	of	spectacle	and	counter-spectacle,	apparently	centered	on	Europe,	seems	to	lack	the	nuances	of	transnational	(indeed,	trans-world)	engagement.	And	Álvarez’s	film	also	exceeds	the	conception	of	time	of	La	hora	three	years	before	the	release	of	the	documentary,	by	again	problematizing	geography,	this	time	in	relation	to	time.	In	this	respect,	Álvarez’s	Now	did	not	constitute	itself	as	an	established	precedent	or	influence	for	Debord	himself	or	for	Getino	&	Solanas,	none	of	whom	took	up	this	psychogeographic	play,	even	though	Fernando	“Pino”	Solanas	was	aware	of	Now	and	he	and	co-director	Octavio	Getino	took	pieces	from	Now	for	their	film29.	Despite	
																																																								28	A	review	of	the	issues	of	“Internationale	Situationniste,”	the	publication	of	the	homonymous	organization,	directed	by	Debord,	reveals	no	awareness	of	Álvarez’s	work	on	the	part	of	Debord	or	his	fellow	Situationists.	Two	issues	appeared	between	the	release	of	Àlvarez’s	film	in	1965	and	the	publication	of	Debord’s	book	in	1967:	nos.	10,	of	March	1966,	and	11,	of	October	1967	(there	was	no	issue	in	1965).	Both	issues	contain	scarce	references	to	Cuba	(or	Latin	America)	and	no	mention	of	Álvarez’s	work.		29	“Fernando	Solana	and	Octavio	Getino	took	some	stills	from	other	Latin	American	works,	among	them	Now	(1965),	a	short	film	by	Álvarez”	(Russo,	my	translation).	During	a	2008	interview	with	Pablo	Russo	for	the	Tierra	en	Trance	Latin	American	cinema	supplement	to	Miradas	de	Cine,	Solanas	
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the	fact	that	Humberto	Ríos,	as	cited	in	Russo,	affirms	that	La	hora	was	a	direct	reference	to	Santiago	Álvarez,	the	truth	is	that	the	inclusion	of	parts	of	the	United	States	and	the	American	people	as	part	of	the	solidarity	of	the	oppressed	is	completely	absent	from	Solanas’	film.	Indeed,	Now	passed	largely	unnoticed,	at	least	in	terms	of	the	significance	which	I	propose	to	ascribe	to	the	piece.	In	any	case,	the	sophistication	of	Now	that	makes	it	a	prime	object	for	my	elaboration	of	the	concept	of	show,	as	well	as	for	its	subversion,	lies	with	the	fact	that	it	practices	Debordian	
détournement,	and	conveys	a	notion	of	time	equivalent	to	that	aimed	for	in	La	Hora,	but	it	adds	psychogeographic	play	(and	power)	to	both	that	is	not	carried	on	by	subsequent	films	and	remains	largely	ignored	by	critics30.		At	this	point,	an	important	question	emerges.	If	the	time	of	Now	(and	of	La	
hora,	albeit	the	great	differences	between	both	films)	is	the	moment	immediately	following	awakening	from	spectacular	somnambulism	and	immediately	preceding	
																																																								comments	that	“[t]owards	the	end	of	The	Hour	of	the	Furnaces	there	is	a	very	fast	montage	sequence,	a	collage.	Surely,	some	photo	was	included	from	Now.”	Russo	emphasizes	Álvarez’s	aesthetic	influence	on	the	work	of	Cine	Liberación,	La	Hora’s	production	company,	evinced	in	the	use	of	music	[the	music	video]	and	dynamic	montage	of	La	Hora.	During	the	same	interview	with	Russo,	Solanas	remembers	that	“Álvarez	was	one	of	the	pioneers	of	Nuevo	Cine	Latinoamericano…	[and	before]	making	The	Hour	of	the	Furnaces,	he	and	others	used	to	screen	a	series	of	Latin	American	short	films,	among	which	was	Now,	that	remarkable	photographic	edition	that	is	a	manifesto	against	racism.”	Humberto	Ríos	affirms	that	Álvarez	was	among	the	references	and	tributes	included	by	Solanas	in	La	
hora,	rendered	“in	the	use	of	violent,	accelerated	montage,	[which]	demonstrates	the	force	that	that	montage	possessed,	more	precisely	political-ideological	montage”	(Russo,	my	translation).		30	It	is	remarkable	how	this	transnational	dimension	is	ignored	even	by	critical	essays	that	deal	with	Álvarez’s	most	USA-encompassing	films.	Wilson,	for	instance,	bases	her	essay	“Ecce	Homo	Novus:	snapshots	of	the	‘new	man’…”	on	Now	and	LBJ.	She	will	focus	on	a	film	like	Now,	which	unequivocally	centers	on	Americans,	not	Latin	Americans,	but	then	draws	conclusions	that	assume	a	geographically	static	Third	World.	She	must	have	been	aware	that	in	Now	“underdevelopment”	must	extend	to	the	United	States,	as	she	cites	Álvarez	stating	that	this	film	speaks	of	underdevelopment	(414),	but	then	she	cites	Mestman	in	terms	of	the	director’s	documentary	work	as	“a	symbol	of	the	link	between	the	Third	World	struggles,	from	Latin	America	to	Vietnam”	(2002,	in	Wilson	419),	leaving	the	United	States	completely	out	of	the	matter.		
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the	revolutionary	acceleration	of	time	to	the	conclusion	of	history	–	what	is	the	time	of	Cuba?	By	posing	this	question,	of	course	I	do	not	mean	to	suggest	that	the	issue	hasn’t	been	theorized	and	analyzed.	I	will	seek	to	conceptualize	Cuba’s	post-revolutionary	time	in	a	new	way	not	because	the	task	hasn’t	been	sufficiently	undertaken,	but	because	I	attempt	to	elaborate	a	concept	of	Cuban	time	that	fits	my	understanding	of	the	time	of	accomplished	revolution	in	relation	to	Debord’s	theory	of	the	spectacle,	as	well	as	of	my	contribution	in	terms	of	“shows,”	as	presented	in	Álvarez’s	film.	In	this	sense,	I	will	posit	that	the	time	of	post-revolutionary	Cuba,	and	that	of	the	defeat	of	the	spectacle,	is	anti-cyclonic	time,	a	concept	I	will	seek	to	develop	and	define	in	the	next	section.			2.6	Ciclón	is	a	1963	special	newsreel	directed	by	Santiago	Álvarez	with	music	by	Juan	Blanco	and	photography	contributed	by	ICAIC,	the	Television	National	Newsreel,	and	the	Film	Department	of	the	Ministry	of	Armed	Forces	(Chanan	32).	The	22-minute	piece,	though	clearly	anchored	in	Álvarez’s	more	journalistic	newsreel	era,	already	features	some	of	the	key	techniques	and	methods	that	will	characterize	Álvarez’s	work,	including	Now	two	years	later.	Indeed,	as	Chanan	observes,	Ciclón	“demonstrates	that	Álvarez’s	subsequent	experiments	in	montage	are	based	on	complete	mastery	of	the	most	fundamental	of	filmic	skills:	narration	of	mute	images,	juxtaposed	only	with	music	and	effects”	(32).	These	techniques	will	appear	in	full	force	in	Now,	at	the	service	of	an	agenda	more	advanced	than	that	of	
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his	previous	newsreels.	Ciclón	documents	the	pass	of	Hurricane	Flora	through	the	provinces	of	Camagüey	and	Oriente	in	October	1963.			 The	newsreel	records	the	devastation	caused	by	the	hurricane	with	a	pivotal	emphasis	on	the	Revolutionary	Government’s	evacuation	and	rescue	efforts.	The	piece	is	particularly	notable	for	its	complete	lack	of	commentary	in	the	form	of	narration,	whereby	all	editorialization	operates	through	the	montage	of	footage	and	graphics,	as	well	as	the	use	of	music.	Five	parts	can	be	distinguished	in	the	newsreel,	namely:		a. Cuba	at	work:	This	first	section,	fully	accompanied	by	pleasant	background	music,	shows	Cubans	dedicated	to	work	in	various	production	activities.	The	end	of	this	section	in	marked	by	the	sudden	freezing	of	machines	and	workers	to	symbolize	the	interruption	of	productive	work	due	to	the	hurricane	(0:00	–	2:33);	b. Nature	attacks:	This	section	begins	with	a	title	card	that	features	a	graphic	illustration	of	a	hurricane	with	the	newsreel	title	appearing	in	front,	followed	by	footage	of	the	effects	of	the	hurricane	on	the	land:	rain	and	wind	lashing	at	country	and	town,	people	evacuating	through	flooded	fields	and	streets.	This	segment	utilizes	wind	sound	effects	accompanied	by	dramatic	music	in	the	background.	As	images	move	from	“nature	lashing”	to	the	devastation	caused,	the	music	becomes	increasingly	prominent	until	the	sound	effect	of	wind	eventually	ceases	(2-34	–	5:36);	
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c. The	Revolutionary	Government	responds:	This	section	begins	with	footage	of	Fidel	Castro	on	land	in	response	to	the	crisis,	talking	to	soldiers,	followed	by	a	deployment	of	force	and	technology	against	nature:	radio	equipment,	tanks,	rushing	rescue	crews	and	so	forth	(5:37	–	6:23);	d. The	devastation	is	serious:	This	section,	accompanied	at	times	by	somber	music	and	at	times	by	the	returning	sound	of	wind,	surveys	the	severity	of	the	damage	with	a	combination	of	aerial	views,	ground	footage,	weather	graphics,	and	images	of	newspaper	headlines	(6:24	–	7:52);				e. By	land,	water	and	air:	This	section	begins	with	footage	of	Castro	directing	the	rescuers,	as	rescue	vehicles	are	shown	to	be	making	inroads	against	the	hostility	of	nature.	At	8:10,	a	weather	graphic	shows	the	turning	icon	of	the	hurricane	traversing	Cuba,	and	at	8:18	the	icon	completes	its	passage	above	the	island,	accelerates	and	speeds	off.	Immediately	after	this	sequence,	the	shadow	of	helicopter	blades	are	seen	on	the	ground,	followed	by	images	of	rescuers	boarding	aid	packages	onto	the	vehicles	and	the	helicopters	taking	off	on	their	rescue	missions.	By	now,	the	film	has	shown	land	crews,	amphibious	vehicles,	and	helicopters,	in	an	all-out	response	against	the	natural	disaster.	The	next	minutes	follow	the	rescue	of	citizens,	and	their	assistance	and	care,	as	the	peaceful	music	of	the	beginning	returns,	followed	by	an	even	more	hopeful	theme	that	continues	through	the	final	credits	(7:53	–	21:15).		
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Chanan	points	out	that	“[t]he	central	symbol	is	…	not	Fidel	but	a	helicopter,	whose	blades	revolve	in	the	same	direction	as	the	animated	hurricane	in	the	graphic,	so	that	incutting	[sic]	them	together	the	helicopter	becomes	a	symbol	of	the	command	of	socialism	over	the	forces	of	nature	in	response	to	natural	disaster”	(32).	Indeed,	the	film	is	notable	for	its	reliance	on	machines	and	revolving	(literally,	
revolutionary)	motions.	The	“Cuba	at	work”	segment	features	mixers,	rotary	plows	and	corn	mowers,	among	others;	the	hurricane	is	of	course	symbolized	by	a	revolving	icon;	and	the	helicopter,	with	its	turning	blades,	is	the	synecdoche	of	the	revolutionary	government.	Though	Chanan	insists	that	the	helicopter	blades	revolve	in	the	same	direction	as	the	animated	hurricane,	the	truth	is	that	the	hurricane	symbol	revolves	anticlockwise	the	first	time	it’s	shown	at	7:08	and	then	again	at	8:10,	and	then	once	more	begins	with	a	counterclockwise	motion	at	8:17.	At	this	point,	the	motion	suddenly	reverses	to	clockwise	as	the	hurricane	speeds	off	the	island	and	immediately	before	we	see	the	counter-revolving	motion	of	the	helicopter	blades,	also	clockwise.	What	the	film	presents	is	the	juxtaposition	of	the	hurricane	returning	to	clockwise	motion	(the	clock	is	time	determined	by	humanity)	and	the	counter-turn	that	faces	the	assault	of	nature.	Indeed,	the	“narrative	of	revolving”	of	this	newsreel	can	simply	can	be	summarized	as	hardworking	adherence	to	the	productive	cycles	of	nature	and	the	struggle	for	domination	over	the	adverse	cycles	of	nature.				
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	 			 The	matter	of	the	propitious	and	hostile	cycles	of	nature,	and	the	dutiful	obedience	to	the	first	and	triumph	over	the	latter,	is	present	in	an	extraordinarily	colloquial	manner	in	a	1970	issue	of	the	Noticiero	ICAIC	Latinoamericano	titled	“Diez	millones.”	Here,	Fidel	Castro	appears	on	camera	and,	armed	with	pointing	stick,	maps	and	graphics,	explains	in	a	most	pedagogical	manner	the	progress	and	challenges	facing	the	zafra	de	los	diez	millones,	an	ultimately	unaccomplished	10-million-ton	goal	for	the	1970	sugar	harvest.	At	one	point,	when	asked	about	holidays	for	the	workers	(8:56),	Castro	responds	categorically:	there	will	be	fiestas,	all	workers	will	receive	their	deserved	break,	but	rest	will	be	organized	under	the	strict	
Fig.	5		Revolución	contra	ciclón:	Revolving	and	counter-revolving	(Ciclón,	8:10	–	8:32)	
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priority	of	the	times	of	the	harvest.	As	sentimental	music	enters	the	background	to	underscore	the	humane	commitment	of	Castro	to	the	wellbeing	of	workers,	the	commandant	assures	that,	although	workers	had	to	spend	their	holidays	working	on	the	fields	the	previous	year,	come	July	there	will	be	a	break,	especially	for	those	who	have	not	had	one,	one	that	is	much	deserved	by	all.	But	he	is	quick	to	admonish	that	it	must,	however,	be	an	organized	rest,	because	certain	jobs	cannot	be	abandoned	(8:59	–	9:29).	Under	Cuba’s	revolutionary	time,	society	organizes	itself	around	the	demands	of	work	and	nature:	when	nature	threatens	disaster,	the	people	will	counter	its	effects	whatever	it	takes;	when	nature	helps,	the	people	work.	Time	is	no	longer	the	spectacular	accumulation	of	equivalent	intervals	where	all	segments	are	exchangeable.			2.7		To	answer	the	question	posed	at	the	end	of	section	2.5,	I	will	propose	that	the	time	of	Cuba,	in	reference	to	which	the	“now”	of	Now	is	defined,	is	anti-cyclonic	
time.	I	will	define	anti-cyclonic	time	as	time	that	stands	after	the	end	of	history	
as	the	result	of	irreversible	time	that	has	been	appropriated	by	all	people,	
accelerated	to	its	end,	and	that	needs	to	worry	about	nothing	more	than	the	
forces	of	nature.	This	is,	indeed,	counter-	or	post-spectacular	time.	Going	back	to	Debord’s	brief	history	of	time	and	history,	two	key	stages	in	the	humanization	of	time,	or	the	temporalization	of	man	(92),	are:	(a)	the	static	cyclical	time	of	laborers,	where	only	lords	had	possession	of	irreversible	time	and	thus	of	their	epic	construction	of	history;	and	(b)	the	pseudo-cyclical	time	of	spectacular	society,	
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incapable	of	apprehending	irreversible	time	in	its	paralyzed	seasonal	obedience	to	the	demands	of	production	and	consumption.	In	relation	to	those	two	conceptions	of	time,	counter-spectacular	time	must	be	respectively	(a)	cyclical	time	that	is	the	result	of	the	appropriation	by	all,	not	just	the	dominant	classes,	of	irreversible	time,	and	its	acceleration	to	its	end,	so	that	it	becomes	post-historical	cyclical	time	for	all;	and	(b)	cyclical	time	that	responds	to	the	organic	needs	of	nature	instead	of	the	inflated	pseudo-needs	of	the	spectacle’s	augmented	survival.		Counter-spectacular	time	is	thus	anti-cyclonic	time.	As	such,	it	conveys	the	experience	of	a	new	form	of	cyclical	time	that	has	been	forged	by	all	and	is	in	the	hands	of	all.		If	the	protagonist	construction	of	history	through	participation	in	
irreversible	time	has	remained	in	the	hands	of	the	dominant	classes	in	both	pre-spectacular	and	spectacular	societies,	respectively	in	the	hands	of	lords	and	the	bourgeoisie,	a	counter-spectacular	revolution	must	awaken	workers	out	of	the	
pseudo-cyclical	time	of	the	spectacle	into	appropriation	of	irreversible	time	(now)	and	its	acceleration	to	conclusion.	After	the	revolution	has	been	realized	by	acceleration	of	generally-appropriated	irreversible	time	to	the	end	of	history,	only	the	cycles	of	nature	remain.	This	return	to	the	cycles	of	nature	represents	a	partial	return	to	pre-modern	time,	with	the	crucial	difference	that	now	there	is	no	
irreversible	time	in	the	hands	of	lords.	Moreover,	there	is	no	need	for	irreversible	
time	when	the	end	of	history	has	been	attained,	and	this	new	form	of	cyclical	time	is	now	the	binding	experience	of	all	classes.	A	return	to	the	cycles	of	nature	does	not	only	constitute	a	return	to	the	rhythms	of	nature	once	the	need	for	irreversible	
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history	has	been	extinguished	by	the	accomplishment	of	revolution;	it	also	signifies	the	end	of	the	spectacle’s	augmented	survival,	the	foundation	of	commodity	culture,	in	favor	of	the	reattachment	of	social	need	to	organic	(natural,	biological)	demands:	the	only	motion	of	time	that	needs	to	be	attended	to	now	is	the	motion	of	nature,	most	urgently	that	of	climate	and	weather	in	relation	to	labor,	whether	it	be	the	passing	of	the	seasons	in	the	temperate	regions,	or	the	tempestuous	seasonal	phenomena	more	characteristic	of	the	tropical	realms.	The	experience	of	time	is	now	dominated	not	by	cyclic	time	that	excludes	the	lords,	or	by	the	pseudo-cyclical	
time	of	the	spectacle,	but	by	the	socialized	cycles	of	harvest	and	production	(as	seen	in	“Diez	millones”)	or	by	the	social	response	to	the	natural	cycles	of	climatic	threat	(as	seen	in	Ciclón).		The	time	of	Now	is	thus	the	same	urgent	time	with	which	La	
hora	calls	the	peoples	behind	Cuba	to	take	possession	of	irreversible	time	to	execute	the	revolution	to	conclusion,	but	with	the	notions	of	Empire	and	Neocolony	complicated,	for	in	Now	the	call	is	addressed	not	just	to	Latin	Americans	in	simplistic	opposition	to	the	United	States,	as	it	is	in	La	hora,	but	to	a	transnational	and	trans-world	audience	(i.e.,	across	Empire/Neocolony	“borders”),	in	a	move	that	joins	fluid	parts	of	the	USA	and	Latin	America	together	in	one	single	solidarity.			It	is	important	to	emphasize	that	the	concept	of	a	newly	cyclic,	post-revolutionary	experience	of	time	must	be	understood	not	only	in	terms	of	its	emancipation	from	pre-modern	“cyclic	time	for	commoners	and	irreversible	time	
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for	the	masters”	and	from	spectacular	pseudo-cyclical	time31.	Anti-cyclonic	time	is	of	course	also	liberated	from	closed-constitutional	cycles	in	the	sense	that	Haréau	suddenly	recalled	in	1842,	namely	that	“revolution”	refers	to	a	closed-circle	motion	that	returns	to	its	points	of	origin	(Koselleck	41)32.	This	sense	of	circulation	around	a	closed	set	of	stages,	which	mirrors	the	orbiting	of	astronomical	bodies	and	the	eternal	passing	of	the	seasons,	translated	into	political	epistemology	as	the	ancient	doctrine	whereby	“there	was	only	a	limited	number	of	constitutional	forms,	which	dissolved	and	replaced	each	other	but	could	not	naturally	be	transgressed.	These	are	the	constitutional	forms,	together	with	their	corruptions33,	which	are	still	current	today,	succeeding	each	other	with	a	certain	inevitability”	(Koselleck	41-42).	This	doctrine	of	a	closed	constitutional	cycle	gave	way	in	modernity,	which	detached	itself	from	its	past	“and	at	the	same	time	inaugurated	our	modernity	with	a	new	future	…	a	philosophy	of	progress	…	[that]	opened	up	a	future	that	transcended	the	
																																																								31	“The	naturalistic	undertone	of	this	concept	of	revolution	was	by	no	means	accidental;	it	derived	directly	from	the	cycle	of	the	stars,	among	which,	since	Copernicus,	even	the	earth	could	be	counted	…	In	the	same	way	that	stars	run	their	circular	course	independent	of	earthly	men,	while	at	the	same	time	influencing	or	even	determining	their	lives,	this	dual	meaning	resonated	through	the	political	concept	of	revolution	from	the	seventeenth	century	on:	revolutions	do	take	place	above	the	heads	of	their	participants”	(Koselleck	42).	32	Haréau	added	that	in	the	political	sphere,	this	was	understood	as	the	circulation	of	constitutions	taught	by	Aristotle,	Polybius,	and	their	successors;	but	which	since	1789,	and	through	Condorcet’s	influence,	was	now	barely	comprehensible.	According	to	ancient	doctrine,	there	were	only	a	limited	number	of	constitutional	forms,	which	dissolved	and	replaced	each	other	but	could	not	naturally	coincide.	These	are	the	constitutional	forms,	together	with	their	corruptions,	still	current	today,	succeeding	each	other	with	a	certain	inevitability.		33	“Haréau	cited	a	forgotten	a	forgotten	principal	witness	to	this	past	world,	Louis	LeRoy,	who	had	argued	that	the	first	of	all	natural	forms	of	rule	was	that	of	monarchy,	which	was	replaced	by	aristocracy	as	soon	as	the	former	degenerated	into	tyranny.	Then	followed	the	well-known	schema	in	which	aristocracy	was	transformed	into	oligarchy,	which	was	in	turn	displaced	by	democracy,	which	degenerated	ultimately	into	ochlocracy,	or	mass	rule.	Here,	in	fact,	no	one	ruled	any	longer,	and	the	way	to	individual	rule	was	open	once	more.”	(Koselleck	41).	
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hitherto	predictable,	natural	space	of	time	and	experience,	and	thence	–	propelled	by	its	own	dynamic	–	provoked	new,	transnatural,	and	long-term	prognoses”	(Koselleck	17).	From	a	pre-modern	inescapable	cycle	of	constitutional	forms	that	preclude	the	expectation	of	novelty,	to	a	new	notion	of	progress	towards	a	future	in	which	anything	can	happen,	the	concretion	of	the	revolution	signifies	not	just	the	end	of	history,	but	with	it	the	end	of	politics.		It	is	not	surprising	that	Álvarez	seemed	so	unconcerned	with	posterity,	as	Atkinson	observes	in	his	review	of	the	anthology	He	Who	Hits	First	Hits	Twice:	The	
Urgent	Cinema	of	Santiago	Álvarez34,	where	he	remarks	on	the	fact	that	the	director	“didn’t	believe	in	posterity,	but	…	was	dedicated	only	to	agitprop	that	spoke	to	the	people	in	the	moment.”	What	Atkinson	doesn’t	mention	is	that,	for	Álvarez,	there	was	no	future:	after	the	victory	of	“now”	there	is	acceleration	and	after	acceleration	there	is	no	more	history	–	only	anti-cyclonic	time.	Connor’s	review	of	the	same	compilation	points	out	that	Álvarez	would	call	himself	“a	product	of	accelerated	underdevelopment.”	The	truth	is	that	the	director	was	able	to	imprint	on	his	films	the	urgency	of	time	grab	and	acceleration	because	his	filmmaking	experience	itself	was	marked	by	the	pressures	of	the	rush	and	hurry	of	the	revolutionary	dash:	his	works	carry	in	themselves	the	hectic	speed	of	their	production	like	a	genetic	mark.	
																																																								34	In	this	anthology	program,	documentary	filmmaker	Travis	Wilkerson	presents	eight	Álvarez	films	from	a	number	of	screening	copies	he	received	from	the	director	during	his	meetings	with	him	in	Cuba	two	years	before	his	death	(Connor).		
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As	I	have	posited,	the	call	to	historical	protagonism	of	Now	is	analogous	to	that	enacted	in	La	hora,	with	the	key	distinction	that	Now	operates	against	established	geographies	of	First	and	Third	World	and	is	instead	directed	to	a	world-scale	fraternity	across	borders.	This	means	that	Now	operates	on	space	in	addition	to	time,	putting	pressures	on	both	history	and	geography.	One	way	to	understand	Álvarez’s	ability	to	do	this	is	to	consider	his	background	in	journalism	and	his	status	as	a	“journalist	in	times	of	revolution”:	the	urgency	of	revolution	adds	itself	to	the	intrinsic	urgency	of	journalism,	a	profession	that	also	carries	implicit	the	quest	for	the	largest	possible	audience.	Indeed,	his	documentaries	“were	made	on	tight	schedules	and	quickly	distributed	to	extraordinarily	large	numbers	of	people	…	[W]hen	Che	Guevara	died,	he	was	commissioned	to	make	a	short	film	for	a	public	memorial	in	honor	of	the	revolutionary.	He	was	given	only	48	hours	to	make	the	film	from	start	to	finish”	(Connor)35.	As	a	result,	Álvarez	was	hectic	not	only	in	terms	of	time	but	of	also	of	space:	like	LBJ,	his	films	“move	fast	through	disjointed	time	and	
space36	in	a	rhythm	that	feels	like	current	TV	advertising”	(Connor,	my	emphasis).	
																																																								35	Connor	refers	to	Hasta	la	Victoria	siempre,	a	memorial	film	commissioned	the	day	Guevara	was	assassinated,	to	be	shown	two	days	later	during	the	official	announcement	of	the	death,	and	for	which	Álvarez	had	to	gather	material	that	included	images	of	Bolivian	peasants,	footage	of	interviews	with	Guevara,	and	various	newspaper	headlines.	This	piece	was	made	two	years	after	Now,	whose	aesthetics	it	clearly	echoes,	but	one	year	before	the	release	of	L.B.J.			36	If	we	understand	Álvarez’s	work	as	constitutionally	bearing	the	mark	of	lack	and	difficulty	of	access,	then	we	should	not	be	surprised	that	space,	that	is	geography,	should	play	such	a	central	role	in	his	work,	and	not	just	in	terms	of	the	US	blockade	against	Cuba.	In	her	comparative	study	of	Álvarez’s	El	tigre	saltó	y	mató…	and	Guzmán’s	Salvador	Allende,	which	centers	on	the	different	manners	in	which	the	two	directors	resolve	temporal	or	spatial	restrictions	of	access	to	the	events	surrounding	the	1973	coup	d’état	in	Chile,	Larraín	Pulido	points	out	that,	while	both	films	encounter	the	challenge	of	access	to	become	filmic	testimonies,	Álvarez	has	to	deal	with	geographical	distance	as	main	obstacle,	not	time,	as	his	film	was	made	the	same	year	of	the	events.	This	was	also	the	case	for	his	48-hour	marathon	to	produce	a	memorial	film	after	the	death	of	Che	Guevara,	where	he	could	
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Indeed,	his	films	carry	the	speed	and	transnationality	of	late	capitalist	globalization37,	and	this	is	why	they	are	so	relevant	still	today	and	so	effective	in	light	of	the	theory	of	the	spectacle:	“to	analyze	the	spectacle	means	talking	its	language	to	[the]	degree	…	that	we	are	obliged	to	engage	the	methodology	of	the	society	to	which	the	spectacle	gives	expression”	(Debord	15).	But	in	countering	the	spectacle	in	its	own	terms,	Álvarez	had	more	than	just	the	conventional	space	of	the	neocolonies	in	mind	as	audience:	“He	was	so	angry	at	the	U.S.,	but	there	is	no	question	he	was	excited	that	Americans	would	see	his	work”	(Wilkerson,	cited	in	Connor).	The	trans-world	dimension	to	the	call	for	the	appropriation	of	history	is	the	result	of	the	director’s	permanent	concern	with	the	United	States	and,	as	Wilkerson	points	out	in	his	entry	on	the	director	for	the	Now!	Journal38,	“nearly	all	of	his	key	works	concern	some	matter	of	American	history,”	though	it	would	be	important	to	add	that	only	Now	does	so	in	psychogeographical	terms.	And	we	can	understand	the	legitimacy	of	this	urgency	not	just	of	time	but	also	of	trans-world	reach	in	that,	half	a	century	after	the	release	of	Now,	large	segments	of	the	American	
																																																								not	travel	to	Bolivia	and	every	bit	of	the	film	carries	the	mark	of	compensating	for	geographical	challenge.		37	Álvarez’s	montage	“prefigured	the	types	of	accelerated	crisis	in	modernity	produced	by	transnational	capitalism	and	theorized	years	later	by	poststructuralists	and	postmodernists”	(Wilson	411)	38	One	very	interesting	aspect	of	this	journal	that	stands	as	a	sort	of	sanctuary	for	Now	aesthetics	(it	too	uses	the	exclamation	point,	as	if	deriving	its	title	from	Horne’s	song	alone	instead	of	the	film)	is	that,	in	its	full	name,	it	provides	strong,	though	only	tacit,	evidence	for	the	claim	that	the	film	realizes	Debord’s	theory	almost	a	decade	before	the	Frenchman’s	film.	Indeed,	the	subtitle	to	the	journal	is	“A	journal	of	urgent	practice.”	The	urgency	of	praxis	is	one	of	the	central	tenets	and	critical	arguments	of	Debord’s	theory.		
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population	are	yet	to	act	on	the	call	in	the	United	States	as	an	underdeveloped	nation.			2.8	One	final	remark	must	be	made	regarding	the	meaning	of	the	“now”	of	Now	in	relation	to	Messianism	and	the	role	of	theology	versus/with	historical	materialism	in	Walter	Benjamin.	Since	his	doctoral	theses,	Benjamin	regarded	Messianism	as	fundamental	to	the	Romantic	understanding	of	history	and	“[u]topian	(messianic	or	revolutionary)	images	against	‘formless	progressive	tendencies	…	are	the	terms	of	the	debate	Benjamin	will	continue	to	conduct	throughout	his	life,”	delving	into	the	writings	of	Schlegel	and	Novalis	and	quoting	passages	as	telling	as	this	one	from	the	former:	“The	revolutionary	desire	to	realize	the	kingdom	of	God	on	earth	is	…	the	inception	of	modern	history”	(Löwy	7,	his	quote	and	ellipsis).	Benjamin’s	position	in	terms	of	the	articulation	of	Messianism,	history	and	revolution	puts	him	at	odds	with	most	of	the	established	European	Marxist	thinking	of	his	time,	particularly	in	his	opposition	to	the	empty	institutions	of	ideological	progress,	as	he	retains	his	dialectal	articulation	of	theology/Messianism	and	materialism	(Löwy	8).		The	key	aspect	of	Benjamin’s	thought	thus	relates	to	his	understanding	of	revolution	not	in	terms	of	the	inevitable,	evolutionary	outcome	of	technical	and	economic	process	(indeed,	progress)	but	as	an	interruption,	a	break	that	saves	from	catastrophe.	He	is,	indeed,	a	revolutionary	pessimist	who	sees	the	revolutionary	impetus	not	in	the	fall	of	the	dominant	classes	as	the	inevitable	outcome	of	the	evolution	of	capitalism	but	in	an	interruption	in	the	steady	progression	of	humanity	
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toward	its	destruction:	“[n]othing	seems	more	derisory	to	Bejamin	than	the	optimism	of	the	bourgeois	parties	and	Social	Democracy”		(Löwy	9).		Here	lies	one	of	the	most	important	reasons	the	conception	of	time	and	history,	indeed	the	conception	of	moment,	in	La	hora	is	so	problematic.	Álvarez’s	Now	may	share	La	
hora’s	notion	of	acceleration	of	time	to	“post-historical	time	of	liberated,	post-Revolutionary	Cuba”	but,	in	addition	to	the	critical	operation	of	counter-geography	discussed	above,	Now	functions	teleologically	outside	and	against	the	“ideology	of	linear	progress”	and	historical	pedagogy	which	characterizes	La	hora.	Now,	in	its	non-linear	collage	of	flaring	images,	contains	something	else,	something	theological	about	salvation,	redemption	and	return	to	original	paradise.	A	little	dwarf	hides	inside	Now.	Walter	Benjamin’s	‘Theses	“On	the	Concept	of	History”’	is	an	essay	composed	of	a	series	of	numbered	paragraphs	–	or	theses	–	quite	cryptic,	and	not	meant	for	publication.	French-Brazilian	philosopher	and	longtime	Benjamin	scholar	Micheal	Löwy	has	published	an	essential	guide	to	this	essay	entitled	Fire	Alarm.	One	of	the	key	points	of	Löwy’s	arguments	and	approach	to	the	Theses	lies	with	his	“fourth	approach”	in	relation	to	the	previously	prevailing	other	three,	namely:	1:	that	Bejamin	is	a	true	materialist	and	his	theological	formulations	are	a	metaphor;	2:	that	Benjamin	is	above	all	a	Jewish	theologian	and	he	merely	appropriates	Marxist	terminology;	and	3:	that	he	tries	to	reconcile	the	irreconcilable:	Marxism	and	Jewish	theology.	It	could	be	said	that	Löwy’s	fourth	approach	proposes	a	consideration	of	the	third	school	minus	the	contradiction,	that	is,	that	Benjamin	is	able	to	conjugate	
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the	two	normally	contradictory	conceptions	of	Marxism	and	Jewish	theology	by	illuminating	and	reshaping	both	(20).	It	is	in	this	sense	that	Löwy	interprets	the	first	thesis,	which	builds	upon	the	allegory	of	a	chess-playing	automaton.	This	automaton	is	a	puppet	who,	sitting	at	a	large	chess	table,	can	invariably	respond	to	the	opponent’s	move	with	a	countermove	that	will	beat	them.	The	table,	appearing	transparent	thanks	to	an	illusion	of	mirrors,	indeed	had	a	little	dwarf	hidden	inside,	a	master	chess	player,	who	operated	the	puppet	by	means	of	strings	as	a	sort	of	
marioneta.	Benjamin	calls	the	puppet	“historical	materialism”	(with	quotations),	and	the	dwarf	thanks	to	whose	service	he	wins	is	theology,	no	quotation	marks	(Löwy	23).	Löwy	is	the	first	commenter	to	point	out	that	the	fact	that	historical	materialism	appears	between	quotation	marks	indicates	a	farce,	something	posing	for	historical	materialism,	namely	those	who	Löwy	himself	calls	“epigones”:		the	chief	spokesmen	of	Marxism	in	his	period,	that	is	to	say	the	ideologues	of	the	Second	and	Third	Internationals.	In	Benjamin’s	view,	historical	materialism	actually	becomes	in	their	hands	a	method	that	perceives	history	as	akin	to	a	machine	leading	‘automatically’	to	the	triumph	of	socialism.	For	this	mechanical	materialism,	the	development	of	the	productive	forces,	economic	progress,	the	‘laws	of	history’	lead	necessarily	to	the	last	crisis	of	capitalism	and	the	victory	of	the	proletariat	(Löwy	25).			This	kind	of	mechanical,	fate-driven	and	linear-progressive	pseudo-historical	materialism,	of	which	the	spectacle	is	the	farthest-reaching	broadcaster,	is	prevalent	
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in	the	pedagogical	discourse	of	La	hora,	which	seems	intent	on	“muster[ing]	a	mass	of	data	to	fill	the	homogeneous	empty	space”	(Selected	Writings,	Vol.	4,	396,	cited	in	Ferris	131).	This	is	precisely	what	Benjamin	seeks	to	accomplish	in	a	treatment	of	history	“without	collapsing	under	the	weight	of	accumulated	historical	material	–	which	is	precisely	what	he	sees	happening	within	traditional	accounts	that	seek	to	ascribe	a	universal	significance	to	history	in	the	form	of	progress”	(Ferris	131).	Now	is	different.	In	Now,	history	is	understood	in	struggle	against	the	oppressor’s	point	of	view	from	the	moment	Washington,	Jefferson	and	Lincoln’s	quoted	words	are	reawaken	as	a	prerequisite	to	“defeating	the	historic	enemy	itself”	(Löwy	25).	Now	is	not	linear	nor	is	it	positivist	(a	visceral	musical	collage	of	repurposed	images	can	never	be)	but	carries	a	theology	of	liberation	in	it	that	is	capable	of	the	interruptive	act	of	salvation	that	Benjamin	refers	to	as	the	moment	“before	the	spark	reaches	the	dynamite,	[when]	the	lighted	fuse	must	be	cut”	(quoted	in	Löwy	9	from	Benjamin’s	1923	One-Way	Street,	under	the	header	“Fire	Alarm”):	“[o]nce	again,	the	image	of	a	determining	–	but	invisible	–	presence	of	theology	at	the	heart	of	‘profane’	thought”	(Löwy	27).	Theology	for	Benjamin	is	not	“a	goal	in	itself…	[or]	the	ineffable	contemplation	of	eternal	verities,	nor,	even	less,	reflection	on	the	nature	of	the	divine	Being…:	it	is	in	the	service	of	the	struggle	of	the	oppressed”	(Löwy	27-28)	and	hinges	on	the	concepts	of	Eingedenken	(remembrance)	and	Erlösung	(messianic	redemption).		
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The	Messianic	is	a	topic	present	throughout	Benjamin’s	writing,	but	which	Benjamin	blasts39	into	the	center	once	again	in	Thesis	XVII,	to	which	he	called	special	attention	in	a	1940	letter	to	Theodore	Adorno’s	wife,	Gretel	(Ferris	131-132).	The	images	of	a	collage	such	as	Now	are	indeed	of	an	anti-accumulative,	constellational	nature.	They	are	historical	images	of	oppression	in	which	the	historical	materialist,	approaching	a	historical	object	“only	when	it	confronts	him	as	a	monad	…	recognizes	the	sign	of	a	Messianic	arrest	of	happening,	or,	to	put	it	differently,	a	revolutionary	chance	in	the	fight	for	the	oppressed	past”	(Benjamin,	cited	in	Löwry	95):		Whenever	a	historical	object	appears	as	a	monad,	that	is,	whenever	it	is	separated	from	the	continuous	flow	of	events	and	objects	through	time,	there	occurs	the	messianic	arrest	in	which	history	is	brought	to	a	standstill	[and	where]	Benjamin	sees	the	possibility	of	recognizing	a	past	no	longer	oppressed	by	the	ideologies	(Ferris	132).		The	images	of	Now	are	precisely	images	yanked	from	the	flow	of	capitalist	ideology	and	of	its	constructed	account	and	notion	of	history.	The	collage	of	images	of	Now	does	not	proceed	in	quantitative	accumulative	progression,	as	does	La	hora,	but	constructs	its	moment	through	a	qualitative	and	discontinuous	(Löwy	95)	“blasting	out”	of	images.	Against	empty	historical	accumulation,	Benjamin	opposes	a	
																																																								39	This	explosive	metaphor	is	taken	from	Benjamin	himself:	‘All	these	aspects	of	Benjamin’s	thought	are	now	enlisted	in	a	method	whose	intention	is	“to	blast	a	specific	era	out	of	the	homogeneous	course	of	history”’	(Selected	Writings,Vol.	4,	396,	cited	in	Ferris	131).	Despite	the	image	of	“blasting,”	this	is	not	a	destructive	undertaking	but	rather	a	restructuring	of	history”	(Ferris	131).		
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memory	and	a	time	of	remembrance	that	populates	itself	with	uneven	full	and	empty	moments.	It	is	those	full	moments,	stolen	from	the	accumulative	machine	of	linear	time,	which	bring	the	historian	to	a	halt,	an	arrest	of	history	that	links	in	constellation	the	past	to	the	present	and	enables	the	chance	for	revolution	(Löwy	95-96).	This	chance	for	revolution	constitutes	an	“opportunity	in	the	battle,	today,	for	the	oppressed	past,	but	also,	doubtless,	for	the	oppressed	present”	(Löwy	96).	The	“true	past”	can	thus	only	be	recognized	in	these	privileged	images	that	flash	by	as	fleetingly	as	images	do	in	a	fast	montage	but,	despite	the	problematic	nature	of	their	ephemeral	transience,	in	their	short-lived	luminous		flash	they	are	able	to	illuminate	both	the	present	in	the	past	(Ferris	132):	“the	present	still	recognizes	itself	as	“intended	in	that	image”	(Selected	Writings,	Vol.	4,	391,	cited	in	Ferris	132).	Ferris	proceeds	to	explain	that	“intended”	refers	to	the	recognition	of	the	significance	of	this	past	which	can	only	happen	at	this	moment	(132).	This	is	the	deep	significance	of	the	now	of	Now	in	relation	to	its	constellation	of	photos,	which	lies	so	close	to	Benjamin’s	concept	of	history	and	so	opposed	to	La	hora’s	linear-accumulative	practice:		when	the	present	recognizes	itself	as	intended	it	also	realizes	its	historical	significance	as	the	moment	that	arrests	the	historical	illusions	present	in	ideas	such	as	progress	and	so	on.	This	recognition	makes	the	present	stand	out	from	the	course	of	history…	[as]	the	one	place	where	history	occurs	in	a	meaningful	way…	[and]	allows	the	appearance	of	the	revolutionary	potential	of	concealed	in	the	ideologies	of	the	past.	Only	the	present	is	capable	of	
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recognizing	this	potential	and	only	this	recognition	has	any	meaning	for	the	present	(Ferris	132).		The	revolutionary	power	of	the	historical	image	thus	lies	with	the	messianic	recognition	of	the	present	as	intended	and	of	that	image,	in	its	ephemeral	yet	fiery	flash,	as	capable	of	shedding	light	on	the	oppressive	forces	of	historical	ideology:	“the	past	carries	with	it	a	secret	index	by	which	it	is	referred	to	redemption”	and	this	index	is	“a	secret	agreement	between	past	generations	and	the	present	one”	(Selected	Writings,	Vol.	4,	390,	cited	in	Ferris	134).	Ferris	continues	that	“[t]his	agreement	takes	the	form	of	a	claim	that	the	past	makes	on	a	power	that	the	present	possesses”	(134)	This	present	is	now.			
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PART	II:		
TOWARDS	A	DEMARCATIONAL	MODEL		
OF	SPECTACULAR	CRITIQUE	
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Part	II	introduces	a	model	for	the	critique	of	ideology	in	the	context	of	U.S.	–	Latin	American	political	discourses.	This	model,	called	“demarcational	critique,”	focuses	on	the	epistemological	underpinnings	of	these	discourses	and	examines	the	place	of	the	spectacle	in	the	construction	of	these	orders	of	knowledge.	Starting	from	the	theoretical	considerations	developed	in	Part	I,	this	section	discusses	processes	in	the	construction	of	epistemological	metaphors	in	relation	to	discourses	of	development	and	underdevelopment.			Chapter	3	lays	out	the	basic	elements	for	a	demarcational	critique	of	the	ideologies	that	sustain	“First-and-Third-World”	discourses.	To	this	aim,	it	considers	the	relationship	between	geographical	metaphors	and	epistemological	orders	with	a	particular	emphasis	on	understandings	of	time.	From	Susan	Buck-Morss’s	analysis	of	the	Histomap	and	Debord’s	concepts	of	psychogeography	and	dérive,	this	chapter	argues	that	the	capitalist	spectacle	validates	its	epistemological	orders	by	projecting	them	on	land.	Of	particular	interest	to	a	counter-spectacular	project	is	the	emptying	of	notions	of	time	into	metaphors	of	space	in	such	a	way	that	the	possibility	of	historical	protagonism	becomes	obscured.			Chapter	4	explores	novel	ways	in	which	postcolonial	and	anti-imperialist	narratives	and	discourses	can	be	reorganized	in	light	of	a	demarcational	critique.	It	begins	from	Patrick	Leary’s	work	on	the	topic	and	proposes	specific	theorizations	to	complement	his	archival	account,	including	the	concepts	of	solidarities	and	
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consortiums,	folk	ethnography,	actaeonization	and	artemization.	Finally,	this	chapter	considers	the	implications	of	the	problematization	of	victimhood	in	the	context	of	mutual	U.S.	–	Latin	American	imagination.			
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3	
	
A	line	in	the	sand:		
Elements	of	a	demarcational	critique	of	spectacular	society					
…	In	that	Empire,	the	Art	of	Cartography	attained	such	Perfection	that	the	map	of	a	
single	Province	occupied	the	entirety	of	a	City,	and	the	map	of	the	Empire,	the	entirety	
of	a	Province.	In	time,	those	Unconscionable	Maps	no	longer	satisfied,	and	the	
Cartographers	Guilds	struck	a	Map	of	the	Empire	whose	size	was	that	of	the	Empire,	
and	which	coincided	point	for	point	with	it.	The	following	Generations,	who	were	not	
so	fond	of	the	Study	of	Cartography	as	their	Forebears	had	been,	saw	that	that	vast	
Map	was	Useless,	and	not	without	some	Pitilessness	was	it,	that	they	delivered	it	up	to	
the	Inclemencies	of	Sun	and	Winters.	In	the	Deserts	of	the	West,	still	today,	there	are	
Tattered	Ruins	of	that	Map,	inhabited	by	Animals	and	Beggars;	in	all	the	Land	there	is	
no	other	Relic	of	the	Disciplines	of	Geography.	—Suarez	Miranda,Viajes	de	varones	
prudentes,	Libro	IV,Cap.	XLV,	Lerida,	1658		
	-	Jorge	Luis	Borges,	“On	Exactitude	in	Science,”	translated	by	Andrew	Hurley.		
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3.1	This	chapter	will	argue	that	an	effective	countering	of	the	spectacle	necessitates	the	subversion	of	the	established	psycho-geographies	of	the	shows	of	First	and	Third	World,	i.e.,	of	“developed”	and	“underdeveloped”	countries,	“empire”	and	“colony”	nations	as	stable	geographic	categories.	Conversely,	I	will	attempt	to	demonstrate	the	ways	in	which	a	postcolonialist	criticism	that	uncritically	assumes	the	geographic	distributions	of	First	and	Third	Worlds	may	compromise	its	analytic	and	programmatic	intent.	First	and	Third	World	demarcations,	left	unquestioned,	can	indeed	end	up	collaborating	with	the	spectacle,	for	the	illusion	of	developed	and	underdeveloped	countries	or	continents,	in	its	obedient	adherence	to	nation-state	boundaries,	is	a	constitutional	component	of	the	spectacle.		In	his	1955	Introduction	to	a	Critique	of	Urban	Geography,	Debord	defines	psychogeography	quite	succinctly	as	“the	study	of	the	precise	laws	and	the	specific	effects	of	the	geographical	environment,	whether	consciously	organized	or	not,	on	the	emotions	and	behavior	of	individuals.”	In	the	same	manner	in	which	I	attempt	to	elaborate	on	Debord’s	concept	of	the	spectacle	through	the	development	of	the	notion	of	show,	I	will	now	elaborate	on	the	concept	of	psychogeography	through	a	subsidiary	notion	I	will	call	demarcational	criticism,	which	in	the	above	definition	will	emphasize	consciously	organized	world-scale	geographical	environment	and	its	laws	and	effects	particularly	on	spectacular	behavior,	that	is,	on	the	performance	of	shows	and	the	construction	and	upkeep	of	spectacular	time.	This	elaboration	of	psychogeography	will	thus	involve	expanding	our	understanding	of	psychogeography	so	that	it	is	no	longer	limited	to	the	city	but	can	be	applied	to	the	
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various	political	geographies	of	the	world.	This	in	turn	will	involve	considering	psychogeographic	methods	on	a	worldwide	scale.	One	of	the	most	important	among	such	methods,	that	of	dérive,	when	applied	on	a	world	scale,	will	prove	particularly	effective	in	the	consideration	of	the	counter-spectacular	operation	at	work	in	Álvarez’s	Now.	Ultimately,	I	will	argue	for	the	usefulness	of	a	postcolonialist	criticism	that	begins	by	calling	into	question	the	locative	distribution	of	Empire	and	(Neo)colony	along	nation-state	borders.	I	will	further	propose	that	dependency	theory,	in	particular,	yields	useful	perspectives	when	a	destabilization	of	the	assumed	demarcations	of	development	and	underdevelopment	becomes	a	prerequisite	of	analysis,	so	that	adjectives	like	“developed”	and	“underdeveloped”	are	no	longer	followed	by	whole	established	countries,	continents,	or	Worlds,	but	rather	dislocated	and	left	to	float	as	fluid	transnational	conditions.	Through	the	lens	of	a	postcolonial	criticism	that	is	also	demarcational,	one	would	no	longer	speak	of	“underdeveloped	countries”	but	of	“underdeveloped	realities”	that	cannot	and	should	not	be	matched	with	established	geographical	demarcations.	Where	the	center,	and	the	periphery,	are	located,	as	well	as	if	indeed	they	can	be	located	anywhere,	must	be	part	of	the	critical	inquiry,	as	opposed	to	accepted	assumptions,	and	the	political	implications	of	the	locative	status	quo	of	those	realities	must	be	considered	because	received	spatial	arrangements	are	never	innocent.	Ultimately,	what	is	at	stake	in	this	discussion	is	the	fact	that	psychogeographical	categories	such	as	“developed	and	underdeveloped	country”	constitute	the	territorial	projections	of	epistemological	categories.	If	the	categories	
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of	development	and	underdevelopment	are	mobile	and	contradictory	realities,	any	demarcations	drawn	between	the	two	conditions	must	be,	at	least	to	some	degree,	arbitrary.	By	“territorialization”	I	refer	to	the	process	whereby	these	arbitrary	demarcations	are	extrapolated	onto	land	in	order	to	validate	and	stabilize	them	in	the	fiction	of	a	material	(allegedly	physical,	tangible)	referent,	where	nation-states	and	continents,	summarily	labeled	as	“(under)developed,”	are	believed	to	anchor	the	conditions	assigned	to	them	as	a	self-evident	act	and	function	of	their	borders.	The	forcibly	stabilized	location	of	fluid	realities,	the	borders	that	separate	them,	and	the	permitted	or	prescribed	paths	of	circulation	among	them,	mirror	the	limitations	imposed	by	established	epistemological	categories	as	if	those	“validated	departments	of	knowledge”	had	left	a	residual	imprint	on	the	land,	as	branding	irons	of	demarcation.	These	psychogeographic	categories	and	narratives	are	the	embodiments	of	epistemological	categories	evolving	since	the	Enlightenment,	and	these	epistemological	departments	and	narratives	operate	against	the	unitary	labor	experience	of	the	final	product	through	an	ever-increasing	process	of	uber-specialization	that	follows	the	processes	of	the	capitalist	fragmentation	of	work.	Ultimately,	these	epistemological	systems	yield	political	narratives	capable	of	constructing	epics	of	freedom	that	simultaneously	exclude	or	ignore	most	of	the	world	and	withstand	inconsistencies	such	as	the	fact	that		slavery	–	the	systematic,	highly	sophisticated	capitalist	enslavement	of	non-Europeans	as	a	labor	force	in	the	colonies	–	was	increasing	…	to	the	point	that	by	the	mid-eighteenth	century	it	came	to	underwrite	the	entire	
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economic	system	of	the	West,	paradoxically	facilitating	the	global	spread	of	the	very	Enlightenment	ideals	[of	freedom	as	the	highest	and	universal	political	value]	that	were	in	such	fundamental	contradiction	to	it”	(Buck-Morss	821).		The	emphasis	on	the	word	“non”	in	“non-Europeans”	in	the	quote	above	is	Buck-Morss’	and	is	crucial	to	an	understanding	of	the	territorialization	of	knowledge	as	psychogeographies,	for	it	resolves	an	inner	contradiction	in	a	political	epistemology	through	a	play	on	the	land:	slaves	had	to	be	external	to	Europe.	One	of	the	most	immediate	operations	that	Álvarez’s	Now	carries	out	is	the	break	of	
territorializations	of	this	kind.		Thus,	in	the	same	way	that	certain	categories	of	knowledge	“do	not	mix”	or	allow	one	to	move	between	them	in	one	direction	but	not	in	the	opposite,	so	does	a	socioeconomic	psychogeography	of	the	world	emerge	that	dictates	which	realities	and	conditions	are	“there	but	not	here”	as	well	as	how	one	can	move	“from	here	to	there,”	or,	rather	who	can	move	(and	who	can	gaze)	“from	here	to	there”:	where	the	“exotic	Other,”	political	chaos,	pre-modernity	or	hunger	are,	or	what	path	of	circulation	is	to	be	followed	by	explorers,	ethnographers	or	immigrants.	But	this	
territorialization	of	epistemological	systems	is	not	a	unilateral	process:	indeed,	epistemological	categories,	at	the	service	of	an	ideological	mandate	of	stasis40,	and	
																																																								40	Here,	I	use	“stasis”	merely	in	the	sense	of	political	narratives	that	stabilize	fluid	conditions	into	territorial	compartments	(i.e.,	geographic	labels	such	as	“nation”	or	“continent”).	I	will	define	“stasis”	more	narrowly	further	down	in	this	chapter.				
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their	geographical	imprint,	reinforce	each	other	in	a	cycle	of	mutual	conditioning.	Political	narratives	thus	leave	a	mark	or	track	on	the	ground	as	a	residue	that	returns	to	re-inform	those	political	narratives	and	reinforce	them	and,	as	the	validated	ways	of	thinking	about	political	issues	is	territorialized,	the	epistemological	status	quo	becomes	the	permitted	language	of	a	dominant	ideology	crystalized	onto	a	map.				3.2	These	geographical-epistemological	concerns	are	present	with	particular	force	in	the	scholarship	of	Susan	Buck-Morss.	Of	particular	interest	in	this	regard	is	her	frequent	consideration	of	fluid	transnational	realities	as	non-national	solidarities41,	as	evinced	with	particular	clarity	in	her	article	“Hegel	and	Haiti.”	First	and	foremost	among	the	interesting	aspects	of	this	essay	is	the	fact	that	it	proposes	a	reversion	from	the	traditional	sense	of	circulation	of	modern	knowledge	from	the	center	of	modernity	(Europe	in	this	case)	to	the	colonies	(the	Third	World-to-be)	when	she	suggests	that	“Hegel’s	dialectic	of	master	and	slave	has	its	roots	not	only	on	the	philosophical	tradition,	but	in	contemporary	events	such	as	the	1791	Haitian	Revolution.”	Here,	in	discussing	Locke’s	justification	of	black	slavery,	which	his	outrage	against	the	“Chains	for	all	Mankind”	did	not	cover,	she	considers	a	large	region	including	the	United	States	together	with	alleged	Third	World	nations	as	a	“New	World	plantation”	(826).	Certainly,	this	application	would	be	an	anachronism	
																																																								41	In	the	sense	of	an	understanding	of	oppressed	categories	that	does	not	follow	the	lines	of	nation	states,	such	as	négritude.		
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in	terms	of	today’s	notions	of	First	and	Third	World,	chiefly	because	these	were	British	colonial	times	in	what	today	is	the	United	States42,	but	in	reality,	as	a	consequence	of	this	common	plantation	past,	the	consideration	of	the	“Old	South”	region	of	the	United	States	together	with	parts	of	the	Caribbean	and	northeastern	South	America	as	transnational	“plantation	region”	would	present	an	analytical	advantage.		After	all,	the	very	first	words	of	this	essay	are	a	call	to	demarcational	reflection:		[W]hen	separate	aspects	of	history	are	treated	in	disciplinary	isolation,	counterevidence	is	pushed	to	the	margins	as	irrelevant…	It	should	be	noted	that	specialization	and	isolation	are	also	a	danger	for	those	new	disciplines	such	as	African	American	studies,	or	new	fields	such	as	diaspora	studies,	that	were	established	precisely	to	remedy	the	situation.	Disciplinary	boundaries	allow	counterevidence	to	belong	to	someone	else’s	story	(822).	Although	Buck-Morss	refers	to	purely	disciplinary	and	epistemological	compartments	and	boundaries,	the	problem	she	points	out	is	normally	extrapolated	onto	political	geography.	Indeed,	it	is	worthy	of	note	how	often	epistemological	meta-reflection43	utilizes	geographical	metaphors:	Buck-Morss	herself	uses	“field,”	“boundaries”	and	“margins”	in	that	short	quote,	which	are	primarily	territorial	
																																																								42	Locke	himself	was	a	shareholder	in	the	Royal	African	Company	involved	in	American	colonial	policy	in	Carolina	(Buck-Morss	826).				43	Understood	as	a	conscious	theoretical	reflection	on	the	ways	in	which	epistemological	systems	are	built	or	established,	and	what	realities	those	orders	of	thought	expose	and	hide.	
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terms.	We	may	be	accustomed	to	using	territorial	terms	such	as	area,	field,	and	boundaries	as	epistemological	figures,	but	these	are	all	geographical	metaphors	that	primarily	refer	to	the	land.	In	other	words,	we	talk	about	knowledge	as	land.	This	in	turn	mirrors	the	fact	that	political	struggles	are	projected	on	the	land	as	the	prize	and	effect	of	power	in	the	form	of	territorial	conquest:	we	understand	and	visualize	the	material	praxis	of	political	dominance	on	geography,	as	the	expansion	of	a	kingdom	or	nation	by	its	invasion	of	another,	for	instance,	in	a	manner	analogous	to	that	in	which	we	project	our	symbolic	epistemological	systems	of	thought	also	on	land.		 However,	nowhere	are	the	foundational	notions	of	an	understanding	of	
territorialized	epistemologies	more	clearly	articulated	than	in	a	talk	given	by	Susan	Buck-Morss	in	April	2017	at	the	London	School	of	Economics	and	Political	Science	(LSE).	Hosted	by	the	Internationalism,	Cosmopolitanism	and	the	Politics	of	Solidarity	Research	Group	at	the	Centre	for	the	Study	of	Human	Rights,	this	talk	entitled	“Global	Civil	War:	Solidarity	by	proxy”	establishes	a	number	of	crucial	principles	that	will	allow	me	to	elaborate	my	concept	of	“demarcational	criticism,”	which	will	in	turn	support	my	considerations	on	Debord’s	spectacle	as	shows	and	Álvarez’s	unique	form	psychogeographic	détournement	of	those	shows	in	Now.	Since	I	will	lay	the	foundations	of	this	chapter’s	main	concept	in	a	dialogue	with	this	presentation	by	Buck-Morss,	and	considering	that	this	talk	remains	unpublished,	it	will	be	necessary	to	transcribe	the	most	relevant	portion	of	the	presentation	below,	
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from	the	video	of	the	event	kept	in	the	LSE	repository,	even	though	I	will	then	quote	passages	of	it	as	part	of	my	sequent	argumentation:				One	hundred	years	after	the	Bolshevik	revolution,	where	are	we	in	time?	The	epistemological	form	of	the	question	matters,	determining	the	content	of	the	answers	that	we	provide	regard	the	standard	conception	of	historical	time.	And	I	give	it	to	you	here	in	something	I’m	sure	that	younger	people	do	not	know	but	maybe	there	are	people	older	enough	to	have	had	it	hanging	in	their	classrooms	as	it	was	in	my	sixth-grade	classroom,	and	that	is	a	McNally’s	History	of	the	World,	and	the	map	is	all	about	different	civilizations	and	powers	waxing	and	waning	and	therefore	getting	more	or	less	of	the	map.	It	determines	time	in	terms	of	sovereignty	over	space	with	various	imperial	civilizations	waxing	and	waning	over	the	centuries.	This	schematic	conception	sounds	innocent	enough,	but	notice	what	happens	in	the	last	section,	this	was	actually	done	in	1950,	evidently,	it	was	the	last	section	of	this	map	and	you’ll	see	that	there	are	suddenly	very,	very	nice	thin	lines,	and	every	power	is	understood	to	be	a	nation	state,	so	you	have,	the	United	States	is	kind	of	a	big	nation	state,	Russia	is	still	just	looking	like	Russia,	so	it’s	politically	charged.	So,	look	what	happens	where	this	edition	of	the	map	ends	after	World	War	II	with	the	European	national	time	lines	reflecting	the	end	of	the	European	empires	and	with	the	United	States	in	the	dominant	position,	the	beginning	of	a	postcolonial	geopolitical	order	that	appears	to	have	left	colonialism	behind.	From	this	time	on,	the	world	order	is	to	be	organized	in	
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terms	of	nation-states.	Historically,	some	will	be	in	advance	of	others,	some	will	be	behind	others,	some	will	be	fighting	wars	of	national	liberation,	but	the	ordering	form	remains	dominated	by	the	conceptual	imaginary	of	nation-states.	All	international	issues	after	1950	presume	this	national	order,	and	if	the	Soviet	Union	continued	to	pay	lip	service	to	the	idea	of	a	Communist	International,	the	fact	remains	that	in	most	cases,	Soviet	state	actions	after	1950	were	conceived	in	terms	of	Russian	national	interest.			Now,	the	nation-state	as	an	epistemological	form	captures	certain	realities	but	conceals	others.	It	cannot	recognize	the	existence	of	non-state	political	imaginaries,	which	existed	at	that	time;	négritude,	for	example,	that	was	born	in	Paris	among	the	diaspora	African	and	Caribbean	intellectuals	and	developed	political	theory	from	literature,	poetry	and	painting.	Négritude	provided	an	alternative	form	of	anti-colonial	struggle.	It	rejected	the	model	of	the	struggles	for	national	liberation	that	were	themselves	a	re-inscription	of	the	European	form	of	nation-states.	Négritude‘s	political	goal	was	a	transformation	of	black	consciousness	in	the	context	of	which	Martinique-born	Aimé	Césaire	and	Senegal-born	Léopold	Senghor	proposed	new	forms	of	transnational	solidarity	both	French	and	non-national.	In	our	own	time	of	global	connectedness	and	multiple	diasporas,	these	forms	seem	strikingly	relevant.			
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A	serious	limitation	of	methodological	nationalism,	as	it’s	now	called,	when	analyzing	postcolonial	history	is	that	thinking	in	terms	of	nation-states	makes	the	neoimperial	effects	of	the	global	economy	invisible.	One	of	the	most	blatant	examples	of	the	distortion	that	national	analyses	produce	is	Walt	Whitman	Rostow’s	highly	influential	book,	published	in	1960,	The	
Stages	of	Economic	Growth.	There	were	five	such	stages,	and	all	nation-states	were	expected	to	pass	through	as	they	advanced	toward	the	uncritically	accepted	goal	of	a	modern	national	economy.	The	book	was	subtitled	“An	
anti-communist	manifesto.”	Its	political	purpose	was	to	provide	an	alternative	to	the	equally	stagist	conception	of	time	that	dominated	Marxist	discourse,	the	historically	consecutive	stages	of	feudalism,	capitalism	and	socialism.	To	reflect	on	how	damaging	epistemological	forms	can	be,	how	they	can	block	a	clear	analysis	of	what	in	fact	is	happening,	we	need	only	recall	the	path-breaking	critique	provided	by	the	articulators	of	dependency	theory,	writers	who	replaced	the	imaginary	of	nation-states	and	the	Marxist	variant	of	the	developmental	form.	It	was	Argentinian-born	Raúl	Previsch	who	did	the	initial	empirical	research,	discovering	that	the	increase	in	poverty	of	so-called	underdeveloped	countries	was	directly	correlated	to	the	increase	in	wealth	of	rich	nations.	This	led	to	extraordinarily	rich	theoretical	innovation	by	writers	like	Andre	Gunder	Frank,	Emmanuel	Wallerstein,	Fernando	Enrique	Cardozo,	Walter	Rodney,	and	Theotônio	dos	Santos.	Their	argument,	backed	up	with	empirical	evidence,	was	that	the	wealthy	nations	of	the	world	
	 125	
needed	a	subjugated	peripheral	group	of	poor	states	in	order	to	remain	wealthy.	Dependency	theory	states	that	the	poverty	of	the	countries	of	the	periphery	is	not	because	they	lack	integration	into	the	world	system	–	they	
are	integrated,	but	because	of	how	they	are	integrated	into	that	system.	This	conceptual	shift	was	profound.	In	terms	of	economic	development,	center-periphery	theory,	as	it	was	called,	has	shifted	our	conception	of	time	by	re-ordering	our	conception	of	space.	The	blow	to	methodological	nationalism	struck	by	dependency	theory	was	the	necessary	precursor	to	all	of	postcolonial	theory	that	followed.			Now,	the	historical	situation	of	people	organized	in	nation-states	depends	on	the	position	of	those	nation-states	within	a	common	global	economic	field.	There	would	have	been	no	rise	of	Europe	without	the	rise	of	European	colonial	occupation,	the	extraction	of	their	natural	resources,	exploitation	of	human	labor,	and	accumulation	of	surplus	value	in	the	form	of	private	wealth.	And	when	the	era	of	European	colonialism	as	a	political	order	came	to	an	end,	this	did	not	end	domination	by	the	economically-central	countries	over	the	economic	peripheries	of	postcolonial	nation-states.	But	the	due	political	map	is	now	shifting	as	formerly	central	countries	lose	hegemony	and	the	powers	of	global	capital	expand.	Because	of	the	hegemony	of	the	nation-state	model,	the	only	political	power	that	people	have	today	is	through	the	institutions	of	specific	nation-states	in	which	they	are	citizens.	At	
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the	same	time,	and	in	contradiction	to	this	political	ordering,	their	fates	are	tied	to	those	elsewhere.	So,	the	problem	is,	if	you	have	a	political	analysis,	and	a	political	effectiveness	that’s	inside	of	nation-state	boundaries,	but	your	economic	realities	do	not	respect	those	boundaries,	then	you’re	in	a	very	difficult	political	space	in	which	to	operate,	and	it	distorts	the	spatial	imaginary	because	you	begin	to	think	that	the	reason	Europe	is	ahead	is	because	they’re	smart	or	bright	or	white,	you	name	it,	right?	Whereas	in	fact	they’ve	gotten	ahead	by	taking	and	extracting	value	from	the	periphery.	So	that	was	an	extremely	important	innovation	to	theory.	As	Southeast	Asia	discovered	in	1997,	Argentina	discovered	in	1998,	and	the	United	Sates	discovered	in	2008,	the	capacity	of	governments	to	protect	their	citizens	from	the	crises	within	the	global	economic	order	is	structurally	limited.	Nationalism	continues	its	political	appeal,	and	yet	issues	of	war	and	peace,	and	now	with	increasing	significance,	issues	of	climate	change	and	ecological	limits,	call	for	global	solidarity	as	a	political	imperative.	All	wars	today	are	civil	wars	(06:14	-	15:53).		It	is	brilliant	of	Buck-Morss	to	begin	her	discussion	by	way	of	John	B.	Spark’s	
Histomap,	first	published	by	Rand	McNally	in	1931,	and	updated	and	revised	until	as	recently	as	1997.	In	her	piece	for	The	Vault	(Slate	Magazine’s	history	blog),	Rebecca	Onion	explains	that	the	5-foot-long	chart	followed	a	1920s	and	1930s	nonfiction	trend	called	the	‘outline’	in	which	“large	subjects	(the	history	of	the	world!	every	school	of	philosophy!	all	of	modern	physics!)	were	distilled	into	a	form	
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comprehensible	to	the	most	uneducated	layman.”	This	“uneducated	layman	accessibility”	observation	highlights	the	fact	that	our	tendency	for	speaking	about	the	conditions	of	knowledge	through	territorial	metaphors	is	indeed	popular,	embraced	by	the	kind	of	wide	audiences	that	typically	respond	to	the	spectacle	–	it	is,	indeed,	a	show.	Onion’s	choice	of	the	word	“distilled”	is	very	helpful	to	think	about	the	transfer	from	history	to	geography	that	I	am	trying	to	propose	for	four	main	reasons	into	which	I	will		inquire	in	this	chapter:	(a)	the	idea	of	time	being	distilled	into	space	lies	at	the	foundation	of	the	invention	of	the	territorial	notions	of	First	and	Third	World;	(b)	this	emptying	of	historical	time	into	static	space	constitutes	a	central	mechanism	for	the	imposition	and	maintenance	of	spectacular	time;	(c)	this	process	of		geographization	of	permitted	epistemological	categories	is	not	limited	to	notions	of	time	and	history,	but	extends	to	other	“departments	of	thought”;		and	(d)	Álvarez’s	Now	operates	directly	on	this	mechanism.		In	their	overview	of	The	Condition	of	Postmodernity,	Dickens	and	Fontana	claim	that	“Harvey	argues	that	under	feudalism	space	had	primacy	over	time	as	the	legal,	political,	and	social	meaning	of	everyday	life	was	relatively	self-contained	within	isolated	territorial	boundaries”	(390).	I	do	not	agree	with	this	interpretative	paraphrase	of	Harvey’s	words,	for	what	the	British	geographer	actually	says	is	simply	that	“[i]n	the	relatively	isolated	worlds…	of	European	feudalism,	places	assumed	a	definite	legal,	political	and	social	meaning	indicative	of	a	relative	autonomy	of	social	relations	and	of	community	inside	roughly	given	territorial	boundaries”	(240).	As	I	have	mentioned	in	Chapter	2,	this	relates	to	Debord’s	idea	of	
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authentic	(i.e.,	pre-capitalist/spectacular)	social	relations,	but	I	wish	to	argue	that	space	did	not	have	primacy	over	time	in	any	particular	way	under	feudalism:	space	has	always	dominated	over	time,	and	the	subsequent	epistemological	milestones	observed	by	Harvey	merely	accelerated	this	compression.	Indeed,	as	Harvey	posits,	the	Renaissance	begins	to	pre-establish	the	foundations	of	the	Enlightenment,	with	its	newly-found	need	to	represent	larger	world	spaces,	its	perspectivism,	not	to	mention	the	invention	of	the	chronometer	as	a	method	for	the	objective	measure	of	time.	The	Enlightenment	will	accelerate	this	process	into	the	project	of	modernity,	as	Europe	begins	to	adjust	its	colonial	world	maps	to	postcolonial	maps	in	the	context	of	Western	reason.	The	compression	of	time	and	space	is	thus	not	a	novelty	of	modernity	or	postmodernity	but	has	certainly	acquired	a	new	speed	and	a	new	significance	during	those	cultural	eras,	and	is	not	merely	an	egalitarian	confusion	of	those	categories,	but	is	characterized	by	the	epistemological	subordination	of	time	under	space.	What	continues	to	accelerate	is	thus	not	just	time	and	space	per	se,	but	the	emptying	of	time	into	space,	or	the	erasure	of	history	into	psychogeography,	and,	in	the	age	of	the	spectacle,	the	manipulation	of	that	epistemological	transfer.		In	this	sense,	John	Sparks’	choice	of	name	for	the	chart	is	a	flat	declaration	of	the	mechanism	I	am	describing:	Histomap,	i.e.,	historical	time	as	a	geographical	map.	As	Onion	explains,	“[t]he	chart	was	advertised	as	‘clear,	vivid,	and	shorn	of	elaboration’	while	at	the	same	time	capable	of	holding	you	enthralled.”	And	this	is	precisely	the	matter	with	the	Histomap,	which	is	the	epitome	of	geographization:	its	capacity	to	enthrall	like	a	good	show	depends	exclusively	on	the	manipulated	
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conversion	of	notional	concepts	into	a	spatial	drama:	the	history	of	nations,	their	power	and	achievements,	are	reduced	to	a	mere	spatial	metaphor	on	the	paper	map	that	correlates	assigned	space	to	power.	We	are	expected	to	understand	political	power	through	history	merely	by	size	on	paper,	while	it	is	not	clear	what	scales	are	used	to	assign	that	space.	In	the	Histomap,	history	is	thus	to	be	understood	as	space,	as	an	imprecise	form	of	geography:							
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		 Fig.	6		John	Sparks’	Histomap,	full	length	(left)	and	top	and	bottom	details	(right).		
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	 I	must	clarify	at	this	point	that	it	is	not	my	intention	to	assert	that	
geographization	cannot	be	useful,	or	even	that	it	is	possible	or	desirable	to	blindly	reject	it,	but	rather	that	it	must	be	considered	very	carefully	and	critically	and	put	into	question	before	political	analysis	or	praxis	is	developed	on	top	of	it.	In	terms	of	time,	geographization	allows	for	processes	as	delicate	as	the	manipulation	of	time	
as	if	it	were	space.	Territorial	categories	of	thought	are	not	natural	(no	metaphor	of	time	is,	of	course).	As	accustomed	as	we	may	be	to	the	geographization	of	reality,	the	process	is	arbitrary	and,	most	importantly,	opens	a	wide	margin	for	political	manipulation.	This	too	can	be	clearly	observed	on	the	Histomap,	as	Onion	explains	that	“[t]he	chart	emphasizes	domination,	using	color	to	show	how	the	power	of	various	‘peoples’	(a	quasi-racial	understanding	of	the	nature	of	human	groups…)	evolved	throughout	history.”	But	“[i]t’s	unclear	what	the	widths	of	the	colored	streams	is	meant	to	indicate.	In	other	words,	if	the	Y	axis	of	the	chart	clearly	represents	time,	what	does	the	X	axis	(marked	as	“relative	power	of	contemporary	states,	nations,	and	empires”)	represent?”	And	then	Onion	poses	the	key	question:	“What’s	the	meaning	of	“power”	to	the	mapmaker?.”	Indeed,	much	meaning	can	be	arbitrarily	constructed	or	infused	into	the	possibilities	of	thinking	about	political	realities	through	the	process	of	geographization	of	epistemological	categories.	As	Buck-Morss	will	confirm	in	“Global	Civil	War,”	“[t]his	schematic	conception	sounds	innocent	enough	…	[but	it	is]	politically	charged”	(7:09	–	7:47).		
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The	project	of	modernity	has	energetically	drawn	upon	this	subordination	of	time	under	space	at	the	service	of	its	thought	agenda	in	terms	of	capitalist	progress	and			rationality.	All	maps	constitute	Histomap-like	psychogeographies	in	that	they	are	invested	of	a	fictional	aura	that	far	exceeds	their	territorial	substrate	and	aid	capitalist	modernity	by	placing	a	history	of	material	progress	and	irrational	savagery	onto	a	map	of	the	world	while	demarcating	on	land	places	for	romantic	exoticism	and	assisting	in	“reorganizing	the	world	according	to	the	necessities	of	colonial	administration”	(Dickens	and	Fontana390).	The	spectacle	has	provided	an	endless	influx	of	curated	images	to	reinforce	those	psychogeographies.	First-and-third-world	is	one	of	those	psychogeographies,	one	that	splits	the	whole	world	into	a	nation-state-based	binary	consistent	with	modernity’s	reliance	on	universal	narratives.		Álvarez’s	Now	operates	on	the	Histomap:	its	call	is	for	historical	protagonism,	as	well	as	its	reach,	challenges	the	geographic	demarcations	of	the	notions	of	development/underdevelopment.	Thus,	it	operates	on	the	Histomap	subversively,	applying	the	methods	of	spectacular	countering,	namely	détournement	and,	as	we	will	see	further	on,	dérive,	in	order	to	penetrate	the	demarcations	of	Words,	which	themselves	rest	on	nation-state	demarcations,	in	order	to	effectuate	the	process	opposite	of	geographization:	where	geographization	empties	time	into	space,	history	into	geography,	Now	breaks	the	geography	that	separates	the	struggle	between	First	and	Third	World	demarcations,	creates	one	single	solidarity,	and	returns	it	to	history,	to	the	call	of	now.	In	doing	so,	Álvarez	breaks	the	Cuba-US	
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nation-state	boundaries	(and	by	extension	those	of	the	First	and	Third	Worlds),	at	this	time	exponentially	reinforced	by	the	embargo,	and	steals	from	the	imagined	First	World	residual	pieces	that	contradict	its	discourses	of	political	modernity	(or	“political	civilization”),	and	threads	those	visual	residues	around	a	song	that	was,	and	this	is	quite	notable,	censored	in	the	United	States.		In	“Global	Civil	War,”	Buck-Morss	places	particular	emphasis	on	the	importance	of	epistemological	awareness.	After	her	initial	question	in	terms	of	our	present	historical	time	one	hundred	years	after	the	Bolshevik	revolution,	she	cautions	that	the	“epistemological	form	of	the	question	matters”	as	it	conditions	the	kinds	of	answers	possible	(and	impossible),	and	she	will	go	on	to	point	out	“how	damaging	epistemological	categories	can	be,	how	they	can	block	a	clear	analysis	of	what	in	fact	is	happening”	as	she	considers	the	breakthrough	brought	about	by	dependency	theory	as	opposed	to	the	stagist	models	that	preceded	it.	I	propose	that	the	concepts	of	First	and	Third	Worlds,	and	also	those	of	postcolonial	center	and	
periphery,	as	geographical	categories	that	can	be	delimited	on	a	map,	constitute	the	epistemological	territorialization	of	the	notions	of	(under)development,	modernity,	civilization,	wealth,	as	well	as	those	of	freedom	and	fair	government.	As	epistemological	territorializations,	these	concepts	constitute	a	geographical	metaphor	which,	just	like	the	Histomap,	retains	a	wide	degree	of	arbitrariness	and	political	manipulativeness	by	means	of	the	forceful	spatial	stabilization	of	a	condition	that	is	in	fact	fluid,	ever-mutative,	and	intrinsically	unstable.	As	such,	a	
demarcational	criticism	would	make	those	locative	assumptions	a	part	of	the	
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inquiry:	are	the	Third	and	the	First	Worlds	located	where	it	is	conventionally	assumed	that	they	are	located?	Is	it	even	possible	to	locate	them	stably	within	the	borders	of	a	country	or	continent?	What	are	the	risks	of	embarking	on	a	political	analysis	with	the	unproblematized	assumption	that	“this	country	is	a	First	World	or	developed	country”	and	“that	country	is	a	Third	World	or	precarious	country”?	Who	benefits	from	the	status	quo	of	First/Third	locative	narratives?	In	other	words,	how	can	we	do	postcolonial	studies	without	uncritical	assumptions	in	terms	of	the	national/continental	(that	is,	geopolitical)	locations	of	development	and	underdevelopment?		In	order	to	begin	to	answer	those	questions,	we	must	first	consider	two	key	aspects	of	the	question	at	hand:	(a)	where	we	stand	in	terms	of	our	understanding	of	the	politics	of	world	development;	and	(b)	what	immediate	advantages	could	be	derived	of	a	demarcationally	critical	way	of	doing	postcolonial	analysis.	Buck-Morss	provides	elucidating	reflections	on	both	questions	in	Global	Civil	War.	Sparks’	
Histomap,	she	shows,	traces	civilizations,	their	power	“waxing	and	waning,”	as	conveyed	by	their	“winning”	more	or	less	of	the	map	area.	But	as	one	moves	down	to	the	last	section	of	the	1950	version	of	the	map	she	is	using,	“there	are	suddenly	very	…	nice	thin	lines,	and	every	power	is	understood	as	to	be	a	nation	state”	so	after	World	War	II,	“the	European	national	time	lines	[reflect]	the	end	of	the	European	empires	and	…		the	beginning	of	a	postcolonial	order	that	appears	to	have	left	colonialism	behind.	From	this	time	on,	the	world	is	to	be	organized	in	terms	of	nation-states.”	(6:50	–	8:15).	The	establishment	of	nation-states	constitutes	the	
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necessary	prerequisite	for	what	I	call	“geographical	stasis”:	the	geographization	of	modes	of	understanding	time	as	well	as	modernity	and	development	by	way	of	
spatial	metaphors,	as	I	discussed	above,	in	a	manner	that	first	transfers	time	into	geography	and	then	paralyzes	this	geography	so	that	all	history	(their	proposed	history,	that	is)	is	simultaneously	visible	at	the	present	time	on	the	land.	Not	only	does	this	stasis	follow	the	demands	of	spectacular	contemplation,	which	requires	that	all	be	available	for	immediate	contemplation,	and	of	spectacular	time,	which	requires	the	emptying	of	irreversible	historical	time,	but	it	also	embodies	the	spectacular	tenet	that	“[t]he	spectacle,	being	the	reigning	social	organization	of	a	paralyzed	history,	of	a	paralyzed	memory,	and	of	an	abandonment	of	any	history	founded	in	historical	time,	is	in	effect	a	false	consciousness	of	time”	(Debord,	
Spectacle	114).	Indeed,	the	spectacle	expresses	the	condition	of	a	society	in	which	the	present	state	of	the	world,	including	methodological	nationalism44,	is	naturalized	through	its	conception	as	an	eternal	and	ever-present	static	character	of	humanity.		This	paralyzed	memory45	is	a	condition	that	Fredric	Jameson	tackles	very	directly	in	Postmodernism,	or	The	Cultural	Logic	of	Late	Capitalism,	when	he	claims	that	“memory	seems	to	play	no	role	in	television,	commercial	or	otherwise	(or,	I	am	
																																																								44	Buck-Morss	defines	“methodological	nationalism”	as	“analyzing	postcolonial	history	…		thinking	in	terms	of	nation-states	[which]	makes	the	neoimperial	effects	of	the	global	economy	invisible”	(Global	
Civil	War).	45	In	his	chapter	“From	the	Notion	of	Spectacle	to	Spectacle	2.0:	The	Dialectic	of	Capitalist	Mediations,”	Marco	Briziarelli	and	Armano	bluntly	observe	that,	for	Debord,	“[h]istory	making	and	consciousness	of	‘historical	time’	is	what	is	escaping	the	spectators’	way	of	living”	(27).			
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tempted	to	say,	in	postmodernism	generally)[,]…	the	structural	exclusion	of	memory	(70-1).	Any	sense	of	historical	time	is	now	lost	to	what	Jameson	calls	“pastiche,”	“the	random	cannibalization	of	all	the	styles	of	the	past,	the	play	of	random	stylistic	allusion,	and	in	general	what	Henri	Lefebvre	has	called	the	increasing	primacy	of	the	‘”neo””	(18).	This	recurrence	to	“all	the	masks	and	voices	stored	up	in	the	imaginary	museum	of	a	now	global	culture”	pertains	to	the	same	category	of	cultural	processes	as	the	construction	of	a	stagist	world	psychogeography	where	all	stages	of	an	imaginary	history	to	capitalist	accomplishment	appear	visible	at	any	given	time	on	the	geography	of	the	world,	and	of	which	First-and-third-world	is	the	fundamental	sustaining	binary.	Whether	it	be	for	the	derogatory	rejection	of	anti-modern-capitalist	“primitivism,”	languidness	or	mystical	irrationality,	or	for	the	escapist	purpose	of	refuge	from	modernity	in	a	pre-modern	romanticization,	the	show	of	worlds	operates	under	strong	pastiche	mechanics.		The	concept	of	geographization	as	territorial	stasis	I	attempt	to	develop	here	should	not,	however,	be	equaled	to	Harvey’s	notion	of	time-space	compression	or	Jameson’s	claim	that	“our	daily	life,	our	physic	experience,	our	cultural	languages,	are	today	dominated	by	categories	of	space	rather	than	by	categories	of	time”	(16).	Of	course	both	considerations	relate	deeply	to	geographization,	but	I	do	not	believe	that	the	epistemological	obscurity	surrounding	time,	at	least	in	western	European	cultures	and	languages,	is	a	born	trait	of	modernity	or	postmodernity.	As	a	matter	of	fact,	the	projection	of	sensuous	and	intellectual	experience	on	land	characterized	medieval	thought,	as	Harvey	points	out,	citing	Edgerton:		
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“[m]edieval	parochialism	and	superstition	were	paralleled	by	and	‘easy	and	hedonistic	psycho-physiological’	approach	to	spatial	representation.	The	medieval	artist	believed	that	he	could	render	what	he	saw	before	his	eyes	convincingly	by	representing	what	it	felt	like	to	walk	about,	experiencing	structures,	almost	tactilely,	from	many	different	sides,	rather	than	from	a	single	overall	advantage	(241).		This	is	the	very	seed	of	psychogeographical	theories	such	as	those	of	Debord’s	or	Michel	De	Certeau’s.	Landed	projections	of	thought	and	sense	are	not	new	to	modernity.	What	is	new	to	modernity	is	the	quantitative	and	qualitative	manipulation	of	psychogeographies	on	a	world	scale	as	a	result	of	the	simplification	and	acceleration	of	travel.	In	the	spectacular	age	of	capitalism,	the	following	conditions	of	geographization,	as	defined	in	this	study,	are	significant	beyond	Harvey’s	and	Jameson’s	observations:	(a) the	central	role	of	the	spectacle	in	the	creation	and	upkeep	of	those	psychogeographic	narratives	at	the	service	of	the	dominant	capitalist	ideologies.	The	spectacle	serves	these	ideologies	by	validating	their	tenets	on	land	in	order	to	create	a	fiction	of	material	objectivity	and	referential	precedence;	(b) the	powerful	way	in	which	the	spectacle	is	able	to	sensualize	landed	ideologies,	a	matter	to	which	I	will	return	further	on	when	I	discuss	the	idea	of	“sensuous	ideological	being;”	
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(c) as	a	parallel	to	the	fast-increasing	disconnection	between	organic	needs	and	commodity-mandated	pseudo-needs,	these	psychogeographies	have	become	greatly	dissociated	from	the	economic	substrate	that	is	generally	claimed	for	the	categories	of	“developed”	and	underdeveloped,”	as	the	“developed	manner	of	life,”	territorialized	as	“First	World”	nations,	constitutes	a	commodity	all	its	own	–	an	umbrella	commodity	or	uber-commodity	that	provides	a	container	for	all	others	and	regulates	the	behavior	of	workers	and	consumers	around	the	world	against	the	imagined	race	to	the	capitalist	summit;	and	(d) the	primacy	of	the	nation-state	order	that	characterizes	the	spectacular	era	represents	a	dramatic	turning	point	in	the	epistemological	history	of	territorialization	for	it	affords	the	dominant	ideologies	a	forceful	way	to	lock	psychogeographies,	thus	blocking	and	effacing	the	experiences	of	time	that	have	been	transferred	onto	them.		As	I	have	discussed,	geographical	stasis	takes	the	form	of	stagism.	As	Buck-Morss	explains	in	Global	Civil	War,	the	nation-state	order	means	that	“[h]istorically,	some	[nations]	will	be	in	advance	of	others,	some	will	be	behind	others,	some	will	be	fighting	wars	of	national	liberation,	but	the	ordering	form	remains	dominated	by	the	conceptual	imaginary	of	nation-states”	(8:16).	Walt	Whitman	Rostow’s	The	Stages	of	
Economic	Growth	(1960)	is	a	highly	influential	example	of	stagist	thinking	(10:28).	Here,	all	nations	are	expected	to	pass	through	five	stages,	and	it	is	possible	to	extrapolate	nations	onto	the	resulting	timeline	of	progress	(another	
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geographization)	but	it	is	also	possible	to	see	all	the	stages	of	the	timeline	simultaneously	by	a	distributive	assignment	on	geography:	“this	country/continent	is	at	this	stage	now,	this	other	is	at	this	(more	or	less	advanced)	stage	now;”	“this	nation	accelerates	time	to	“catch	up,”	this	nation	races	that	other	nation,”	where	all	conceptual	handles	(continent/country,	race,	acceleration	,	catching	up)	are	really	metaphors	of	motion	in	space.	This	“now,”	where	all	the	history	of	development	appears	for	contemplation	on	territory,	is	the	exact	opposite	of	the	“now”	of	apprehension	of	historical	time	to	which	Álvarez’s	film	calls	–	geographical	stasis	is,	indeed,	the	spectacular	falsification	of	“now”	and,	as	such,	can	only	be	challenged	on	the	combined	planes	of	time	and	space,	something	Álvarez’s	Now	does	with	exceptional	force.		It	is	indeed	very	interesting	to	verify	that	our	languages	show	an	astounding	lack	of	adjectives	and	lexical	images	that	belong	exclusively	to	time,	as	if	we	suffered	from	an	epistemological	deficiency	in	the	form	a	chronic	inability	to	talk	about	time	without	extrapolating	it	onto	space:		For	populations	who	had	not	yet	reached	modernity,	time	itself	was	put	to	task	…	Stalin’s	five-year	plans	were	attempts	to	push	the	process	forward	at	an	even	faster	pace,	literally	to	accelerate	time:	“ускорение,”	acceleration.	Soviet	modernization	was	described	as	a	race	against	time,	so	that	any	political	protest	as	to	the	direction	of	that	change	to	modernization	was	not	allowed	because	it	slowed	down	the	course	of	history.	Stalin	initiated	what	he	called	the	nationalization	of	time,	over	which	he	had	absolute	mastery.	
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The	speed	of	change	was	itself	an	act	of	violence	(Buck-Morss,	Global	Civil	
War	26;34	–	27:46).		Let’s	observe	the	linguistic	handles	utilized	to	talk	about	time	here:	“reach,”	“push	forward,”	“faster	pace,”	“accelerate,”	“race,”	“direction,”	“slow	down,”	“course,”	“speed”	are	all	spatial-directional	expressions.	Even	the	idea	of	compressing	“double,	triple,	etc.	time	into	time”	emulates	the	doubling,	tripling	or	multifold	distance	covered	on	land	when	one	runs	faster:	“Brasília	…	is	a	beautiful	capital	city,	the	building	of	this	city	was	completed	in	forty-one	months	as	part	of	the	President’s	plan	to	complete	fifty	years	in	five	years,	so	the	same	idea,	as	you	accelerate	time,	you	make	it	go	faster,	so	that	you	catch	up	with	the	rest	of	the	world”	(Buck-Morss	30:54	–	31:10).	We	might	posit	that	this	confusion	of	time	into	space	is	one	fundamental	characteristic	of	modernity	that	emerges	as	part	of	its	defining		meta-historical	conscience46,	for	the	truth	is	that,	“if	modernity	describes	the	500-year	period	of	history	of	European	expansion	that	began	in	1492	with	the	myth	of	the	discovery	by	Christopher	Columbus	of	the	New	World	ushering	the	long	durée	of	coloniality,”	then	that	new	consciousness	of	time	originates	in	geographical	movement:	a	discovery	of	a	“new	world”	that	launches	a	new	understanding	of	progress,	advancement	and	backwardness	or	primitiveness,	where	sailing	to	other	worlds	became	equivalent	to	traveling	to	the	past,	where	moving	on	land	equaled	
																																																								46	In	the	sense	that	the	thought	of	modernity	is	characterized	by	a	conscious	understanding	of	history	and	its	construction	and	periodization,	as	well	as	of	the	condition	of	pre-modern	versus	modern.			
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moving	in	time,	just	as	Joseph	Conrad’s	Marlow	describes	his	voyage	up	the	Congo	River	in	Heart	of	Darkness:	"Going	up	that	river	was	like	traveling	back	to	the	earliest	beginnings	of	the	world,	when	vegetation	rioted	on	the	earth	and	the	big	trees	were	kings."	As	a	matter	of	fact,	the	very	concept	of	“historical	progress”	constitutes	a	temporal-spatial	fusion	(or	a	transfer	of	time	onto	geography,	i.e.,	an	epistemological	territorialization):	progress,	from	“pro“(forward)	+	“gradi”	(step,	walk),	“walking	history	forward”	or	“walking	forward	(down)	history”	(Online	etymology	dictionary).		The	use	of	spatial	language	to	describe	time	might	seem	natural	or	customary,	but	time	and	space	are	not	equal,	though	there	are	epistemological	conveniences	and	political	implications	to	this	equation.	At	any	rate,	modernity	seems	to	be	marked	by	a	negation	of	time	that	takes	the	form	of	its	obstinate	displacement	onto	space.	In	the	realm	of	the	spectacle,	one	immediate	implication	of	the	time-space	epistemological	fusion	is	that	establishment	of	the	imaginary	First	
World	as	the	universal	shop	window	of	commodity	consumption.	The	First	World	is	thus	offered	by	spectacular	machines	such	as	Hollywood	as	an	object	of	contemplation,	the	biggest	object	for	spectacular	contemplation,	because	it	divides	the	whole	world	in	two:	the	“haves	and	appears”	and	the	“have	nots	and	appear	nots”:	an	imaginary	First	World	that	wants	to	be	contemplated	as	the	most	perfect	realization	of	modernity	and	development.	And	it	wants	to	be	imitated	in	shows.	Spectacular	images	have	therefore	assumed	the	task	of	maintaining	the	fiction	of	a	modern,	wealthy	and	free	First	World,	so	that	all	the	promises	of	capitalism	are	
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permanently	on	display	in	a	fixed	location,	just	like	the	well-dressed	window	of	a	department	store,	which	simultaneously	represents	the	goal	and	future	of	the	Third	World,	as	long	as	it	is	willing	to	enter	the	race.	What	is	not	geographically	located	in	the	First	World,	is	backwards	in	time,	and	hence	our	claim	that	modernity,	in	its	
show	of	worlds,	effectively	empties	time	into	space.	Against	this	state	of	affairs,	Álvarez’s	Now,	or	rather,	“the	now	of	his	now,”	must	be	understood	as	one	that	is	aware	and	operational	on	the	very	displacement	of	time	onto	territory:	in	its	portrayal	of	the	United	States	that	counters	the	spectacular	show	of	capitalist	wellbeing	and	freedom,	it	breaks	geographical	stasis	as	part	of	its	construction	of	the	revolutionary	moment.	Álvarez’s	film	does	not	address	its	call	for	the	appropriation	of	irreversible	time	to	this	or	that	nation	or	continent,	upon	a	static	psychogeography	of	nation	states,	but	against	spectacular	psychogeography	towards	a	counter-spectacular	solidarity	that	straddles	national,	continental	and	world	borders.		Debord’s	Marxist	interpretation	of	historical	time	is,	however,	not	without	its	weaknesses.	Buck-Morss	is	quick	to	point	out	that	Rostow’s	model,	subtitled	“An	
anti-communist	manifesto,”	seeks	to	counter	the	“equally	stagist	conception	of	time	that	dominated	Marxist	discourse,	the	consecutive	stages	of	feudalism,	capitalism,	and	socialism”	(10:50).	It	is	thus	important	to	recognize	that	the	notion	of	the	time	of	“now”	in	Álvarez’s	film	I	elaborated	in	Chapter	2,	and	its	related	idea	of	anti-
cyclonic	time,	is	not	exempt	from	stagism,	for	it	partially	retains	a	stagist	model	when	it	defines	anti-cyclonic	time	in	terms	of	a	post-historical	return	to	cyclical	
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time,	this	time	for	all.	But	as	a	concept	that	attempts	to	be	demarcationally	aware,	that	is,	that	seeks	to	consider	how	those	notional	imaginaries	are	transferred	onto	geography,	it	blocks	conventional	territorializations	through	its	transnational	consideration	of	“underdeveloped	solidarities”	that	straddles	Latin	America	and	the	United	States	(as	does	Now).	Dependency	theory	arises	from	a	move	against	“damaging	epistemological	forms”	that	“can	block	a	clear	analysis	of	what	in	fact	is	happening,”	as	a	replacement	of	both	“the	imaginary	of	nation-states	and	the	Marxist	variant	of	the	developmental	form”	(Buck-Morss,	Global	Civil	War	11:11).	Dependency	theory	asserts	that	“the	increase	in	poverty	of	so-called	underdeveloped	countries	was	directly	correlated	to	the	increase	in	wealth	of	rich	nations”	(11:38).	Dependency	theory	will	then	posit	that	the	“underdevelopment”	of	some	nations,	rather	than	representing	the	position	of	those	nations	on	the	timeline	to	progress,	is	in	fact	the	effect	of	the	role	those	nations	play	in	a	system	that	needs	them	to	be	poor	for	rich	nations	to	be	rich,	namely	the	neocolonial	transfer	of	wealth	from	the	periphery	into	the	center.		Buck-Morss	highlights	how	this	radical	break	from	previous	forms	of	understanding	“has	shifted	our	conception	of	time	by	re-ordering	our	conceptions	of	space”	(12:42),	which	connects	to	the	space-time	concept	of	geographization	I	am	developing,	but	one	key	aspect	of	this	shift	must	be	scrutinized.	Dependency	theory	breaks	with	geographical	stasis,	but	it	does	not	fully	break	with	geographization.	In	order	to	illustrate	how	“the	nation	state	as	an	epistemological	form	captures	certain	realities	but	conceals	others,”	Buck-Morss	points	out	the	inability	of	the	
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methodological	nationalism	to	visualize	non-national,	or	trans-national,	forms	of	
solidarity,	such	as	négritude,	which	advocated	for	an	alternative	way	of	doing	anti-colonialism,	one	that	rejected	the	narrative	of	national	liberation	as	an	extension	of	the	European	matrix	of	nation-states	(8:54	–	9:54).	Dependency	theory	does	not	
necessarily	capture	non-national	solidarities	either.	The	very	notions	of	“center”	and	“periphery”	are,	once	again,	fixed	spatial	metaphors,	and	the	endurance	of	
territorial	allusions	simply	exposes	the	difficulty	(perhaps	the	impossibility	in	our	languages)	of	thinking	without	these	geographical	figures.	But	the	key	is	that,	while	dependency	theory	was	able	to	break	geographical	stasis	while	retaining	rigid	
territorial	demarcations	that	continue	to	refer	to	nations	(“wealthy	countries	need	underdeveloped	countries	to	remain	poor	in	order	to	be	rich”),	it	could	also	fully	break	with	uncritical	analytical	usage	of	geographical	locations	of	econo-political	realities	by	referring	not	to	entire	“countries”	or	“continents”	at	the	center	or	the	periphery,	but	to	fluid	trans-national	“groups,”	“solidarities,”	“fraternities”	or	“non-national	regions”	at	the	center	or	at	the	periphery.		Thus,	center	and	periphery	cannot	be	located	in	countries:	they	move	across	national	borders	and	are	in	constant	flow.	This	demarcational	awareness,	applied	to	dependency	theory,	would	allow	us	to	consider	that	not	all	those	who	are	geographically	located	in	a	given	country	participate	in	the	central	or	peripheral	condition.	Moreover,	who	participates	in	either	reality	and	who	doesn’t	is	an	intersectional	and	rapidly	shifting	reality	flowing	transnationally.	Not	all	US	citizens	participate	in	centrality,	development	or	modernity.	It	is	not	natural	that	we	should	
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have	to	refer	to	the	United	States	as	a	whole	as	a	first-world	or	developed	country,	or	that	we	should	refer	to	Latin	America	as	a	whole	as	a	third-world	or	underdeveloped	continent	–	these	territorial	identifications	are	cases	of	
geographization	and	of	geographical	stasis.	They	may	capture	certain	realities,	but	they	hide	others.	Because	geographical	stasis,	and	uncritical	geographization	in	general,	attend	to	the	mandate	of	the	spectacle,	any	social	scripts	or	epistemological	systems	that	operate	unquestioningly	upon	them	run	the	risk	of	reinforcing	spectacular	submission	at	least	to	some	degree.	And	since	First	and	Third	World	are	the	largest-scale	geographizations	of	(under)development	and	modernity,	the	play	of	the	Two	Worlds	constitutes	a	show.	For	sure,	an	epistemologically	aware	practice	of	postcolonial	analysis	or	praxis	does	not	preclude	the	consideration	of	First	and	Third	World	in	the	conventional	sense	of	identification	to	certain	countries	or	continents,	but	it	does	demand	that	we	view	those	geographizations	as	one	of	many	possibilities,	with	its	enlightening	powers	and	its	blind	spots.		This	critical	awareness	of	epistemological	geographization	is	what	
demarcational	criticism	must	do,	as	the	methodical	questioning	of	psychogeographies	such	as	First	and	Third	World,	understood	as	projections	on	land	of	epistemological	categories	such	as	future	and	past,	or	development	and	underdevelopment	(“this	nation	is	developed,”	or	“this	region	is	the	future	and	that	other	one	is	its	past”).	This	questioning	should	in	turn	expose	the	realities	that	certain	conceptual/territorial	demarcations	allow	and	block.	In	the	realm	of	
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postcolonial	studies,	a	demarcationally	critical	perspective	applied	to	models	such	as	dependence	theory	would	require	that,	before	we	initiate	an	analysis	that	will	rely	on	categories	such	as	“modern,”	“precarious,”	“poor,”	“underdeveloped,”	and	so	forth,	we	first	problematize	those	categories,	as	opposed	to	considering	them	as	natural,	common-sense,	or	self-evident.	An	instance	of	postcolonial	analysis	that	assumes,	without	question,	that	the	United	States	is	a	developed	nation	and	that	Latin	America	is	the	unitary	and	stable	locative	recipient	of	underdevelopment	or	pre-modernity	is	doing	more	than	describing	natural	geopolitical	locations:	it	is	standing	on	a	received	epistemological	system	that	will	invariably	obscure	certain	realities,	distort	others,	and	make	certain	political	occurrences	impossible	to	ponder	or	articulate.	On	the	other	hand,	demarcational	criticism	helps	consider	what	realities	suddenly	become	visible	when	we	dislodge	conditions	from	imposed	geographical	locations.		For	instance,	we	are	able	to	recognize	that	underdevelopment	and	precariousness	run	across	the	Americas,	including	Latin	and	North	Americans	as	a	continuum,	and	that	the	center	of	oppression	too	resides	transnationally	as	a	fluid	continuum	across	both	continents.	Álvarez’s	Now	recognizes	this	and	broadcasts	a	call	for	emancipation	that	proposes	alternative	or	de-marcational,	forms	of	
solidarity.	The	solidarities	to	which	Now	appeals	are	indeed	trans-national,	trans-continental,	and	trans-world.	Ultimately,	it	becomes	increasingly	evident	that	the	idea	of	nationally-	or	continentally	located	First	and	Third	world	is	untenable.	There	are	a	number	of	arguments	that	could	be	elaborated	to	defend	the	simplistic	notion	
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that	the	United	States	is	a	First	World	power	and	that	Third	World	is	a	victim	of	imperialist	abuse	without	any	further	complications.	One	of	those	arguments	might	focus	on	military	power,	and	might	claim	that	one	reason	that	the	United	States	can	be	unproblematically	considered	a	developed	imperial	power	in	spite	of	its	internal	pockets	of	underdevelopment	lies	with	its	military	power.	In	order	to	maintain	this	neat	demarcational	definition	of	“imperial	power,”	it	would	have	to	be	claimed	that	the	United	States	exercises	its	military	power	exclusively	against	foreign	targets.	This,	however,	is	not	the	case.	Political	abuses	abroad,	even	those	most	closely	and	fiercely	supported	by	the	United	States,	such	as	the	coup	d’état	against	Chilean	president	Allende,	were	orchestrated	by	a	consortium	that	included	both	US	and	foreign	(Chilean,	in	this	case)	military	power	and	ideological	forces	to	the	benefit	of	dominant	classes	located	both	in	the	United	States	and	in	aboard:	“Significantly,	it	was	not	the	non-sustainability	of	socialist	economic	planning	that	destroyed	democratically	elected	socialism	in	Chile	–	it	was	military	force,	domestic	and	
foreign”	(19:57	–	20:09,	my	emphasis).			Thus,	the	consortium	of	military	oppression	is	transnational	even	if	it	utilizes	U.S.	military	power	(as	it	characteristically	utilizes	the	resources	it	needs	wherever	they	may	be	located).	Most	importantly,	that	very	U.S.	military	power	is	customarily	used	internally	against	Americans	through	militarized	police.	The	de-FirstWorldization	of	the	United	States	I	am	proposing	here	as	a	matter	of	method	and	meta-epistemological	exercise	is	one	that	simultaneously	recognizes	two	processes	at	play:	(a)	the	ever-present	imaginary	nature	of	the	construct	throughout	
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modernity,	or	the	“imaginary	effects	of	hegemonic	power”	(Buck-Morss,	Global	Civil	
War	25:16);	and	(b)	the	rapid	deterioration	of	any	relative,	partial,	or,	above	all,	
spectacular	imperial	power	the	United	States	might	have	had,	momentarily	or	intersectionally,	particularly	in	the	21st	century,	and	especially	after	the	events	of	September	11,	2001,	which	constituted	“the	self-destruction	of	US	power	on	morning	television,”	an	“iconoclastic”	act	which	“destroyed	the	image	of	US	invulnerability	and	the	icons	of	its	power”	(Buck-Morss,	Global	Civil	Wars	24:46	–	24:57).				Process	(a)	above	implies	the	fundamental	problem	that,	if	the	so-called	First	World	was,	at	least	to	some	degree,	a	spectacular	construction	that	sought	to	
territorialize	the	concepts	of	progress	and	underdevelopment	in	stable	and	
geographized	differential	opposition,	both	the	ruthless	practice	or	defense	of	imperial	domination,	and	the	anti-imperialist	denunciation	of	such	abuses,	ended	up	reinforcing	the	symbolic	construct	of	First	and	Third	World,	and	thus	contributing	to	the	demands	of	the	spectacle.	In	other	words,	postcolonial	inquiry	that	unquestioningly	accepted	as	a	self-evident	given	that	First	and	Third	World,	Empire	and	Colony,	were	stably	located	in	this	or	that	geographical	demarcation,	couldn’t	but	participate	in	the	symbolic	construction	of	what	they	claimed	to	be	merely	denouncing	or	documenting.	Even	more	urgent	are	the	implications	of	process	(b)	above,	for	rapidly	consolidating	geopolitical	tendencies	continue	to	disallow	any	claim	as	to	the	possibility	of	nation-state-	or	continent-based	First	and	Third	World	locations.	
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As	Buck-Morss	points	out	in	Global	Civil	Wars,	The	irony	of	history	[is	such	that]	the	hegemony	of	the	United	States	was	dependent	on	its	national	dominance	in	the	world	economy	and	global	leadership	in	the	path	to	modernization	and	the	very	success	of	global	capitalism	…	has	now	turned	against	that	nation	which	most	successfully	spread	its	influence.	Enter:	Donald	Trump.	Every	one	of	the	means	that	the	United	States	used	against	others	during	its	century	of	hegemony	is	now	being	introduced	at	home.	When	it	comes	to	the	distortions	by	power	caused	by	neoliberalism	we	in	the	United	States	are	now	catching	up	with	the	rest	of	the	world.	First	consider	the	election	process.	Without	doubt,	the	Russian	government	interfered	with	the	process	of	democratic	elections	in	the	United	States	…	Second,	in	the	United	States	we	are	now	experiencing	the	loss	of	control	over	the	national	economy	due	to	its	integration	into	the	global	economy,	echoing	what	so	many	other	countries	have	experienced,	that	motivated	many	working-class	people	to	vote	for	Trump	(33:51	–	35:49).		The	notion	of	a	“developed”	United	States	against	an	“underdeveloped”	Latin	America	or	Africa	is	increasingly	difficult	to	defend	because	the	narratives	of	difference,	which	were	always	to	some	degree	a	spectacular	construct,	have	now	accelerated	their	demise.	It	is	precisely	the	United	States’	growing	inability	to	assert	its	difference	and	superiority	from	the	rest	of	the	world,	including	the	so-called	Third	World,	that	feeds	the	drive	to	build	a	wall	between	the	United	States	and	Mexico,	which,	most	importantly,	would	happen	to	be	a	wall	between	the	First	and	
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the	Third	World	as	a	desperate	attempt	to	manually	force	a	differentiation	the	US	can	no	longer	affirm	symbolically:	the	wall	is	not	the	product	of	a	particular	phobia	against	Mexico	but	the	territorialization	of	a	linguistic	and	epistemological	operation	that	can	no	longer	be	executed	on	the	symbolic	plane:	“if	you	make	something	concretely	visible,	like	a	wall	between	Mexico	and	the	United	States,	you	produce	concrete	evidence	that	the	fantasy	of	separating	US	economy	is	in	fact	real”	(Buck-Morss,	Global	Civil	War	36:25	–	36:39).	The	real	fear	is	not	the	Third	World,	which	is	so	badly	needed	as	the	oppositional	term	of	modernity,	but	the	impossibility	
to	differentiate	oneself	from	the	Third	World.	In	this	sense,	a	form	postcolonial	critique	that	accepts	First	and	Third	World	as	an	unquestionable	territorial	distinction	is	really	doing	something	very	similar	to	building	the	wall.	The	threat	to	imperial	imaginaries	is	not	postcolonial	opposition	that	obediently	recognizes	the	First	World	as	superior,	but	postcolonial	opposition	that	begins	by	denying	the	very	claim	to	development	by	problematizing	the	geographic	locations	of	Empire	and	Colony,	thus	interrupting	and	blocking	the	symbolic	construction	of	imperial	power	at	its	inception.		How	can	postcolonial	critique	can	then	be	de-territorialized	and	thus	de-spectacularized?	The	answer	could	be	a	demarcational	critique	as	the	methodical	questioning	of	distributive	demarcations	and	assumed	locative	identities	against	methodological	nationalism	(nation-states	and	continents).	And	the	answer	to	how	
demarcational	critique	might	operate	against	psychogeographic	borders	lies	at	the	
	 151	
intersection	of	Buck-Morss’s	“Global	Civil	War”	essay	in	theoretical	terms,	Álvarez’s	
Now	in	praxis,	and	Debord’s	concepts	of	“détournement”	and	“dérive”:	
ONE	OF	THE	BASIC	situationist	practices	is	the	dérive	[literally:	“drifting”],	a	technique	of	rapid	passage	through	varied	ambiances.	Dérives	involve	playful-constructive	behavior	and	awareness	of	psychogeographical	effects,	and	are	thus	quite	different	from	the	classic	notions	of	journey	or	stroll”	(Debord,	Theory	of	the	Dérive).		
These	three	concepts	must	be	combined	in	theory	as	well	as	in	praxis.	Indeed,	the	seed	of	a	demarcational	language	for	postcolonial	inquiry	is	present	throughout	Buck-Morss’s	essay	in	the	form	of	her	reference	to	“solidarities”	and	“corporate	takeovers.”	Buck-Morss	expresses	her	belief	that	the	unprecedented	threat	posed	by	authoritarian	national	regimes	resting	on	“hyper-neoliberal”	capitalist	systems	(occurring	in	the	U.S.	just	as	in	other	Third	World	nations)	can	only	be	resisted	by	means	of	a	“global	humanity	–	in	the	most	inclusive	understanding	of	the	term”	(37:01).			 And	what	specific	form	might	his	“global	humanity”	take	place?	Early	in	her	essay,	Buck-Morss	speaks	of	solidarities,	pointing	out	that	“the	nation-state	as	an	epistemological	form	captures	certain	realities	but	conceals	others.	It	cannot	recognize	the	existence	of	non-state	political	imaginaries	that	existed	at	that	time;	
négritude,	for	example”	(8:54).	On	the	other	hand,	Buck-Morss	considers	the	other	
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end	of	transnational	“humanities”:	“when	right-wing	populist	Donald	Trump	says	he	is	going	to	make	America	great	again,	what	that	slogan	in	fact	means	is	that	he	wants	to	turn	the	government	itself	into	a	corporation:	this	is	a	hostile	takeover	by	corporate	capitalism	of	a	democratically-constituted	state”	(37:20).	And	this	is	happening	in	the	United	States,	with	(some)	Americans	as	victims	and	(some)	foreigners	as	beneficiaries.	In	other	words,	both	perpetrators	and	victims	of	practices	of	political	and	economic	domination	are	no	longer	full	countries	or	continents	but	fluid	transnational	humanities	in	constant	motion.	They	have	always	been	this	way,	but	the	recent	acceleration	of	globalization	that	characterizes	late	capitalism	has	deepened	and	expanded	its	reach.		In	the	context	of	a	demarcational	critique	of	postcolonial	studies	(and	of	the	original	imperialism	to	which	it	responds),	I	will	propose	that	we	think	not	of	neo-colonizing	and	neo-colonized	countries	or	continents,	or	geographically	stable	First	or	Third	Worlds,	but	of	global	consortiums	versus	solidarities.	Those	are	the	two	terms	of	the	struggle	under	capitalist	domination:	transnational	consortiums	taking	over	capital,	labor,	resources,	governments,	and	spectacular	means	of	control,	versus	transnational	solidarities	of	oppressed	peoples	resisting	–	or	not.	Under	a	
demarcationally	critical	approach	to	postcolonial	analysis,	there	are	no	geographical	First	World	or	Third	World,	no	fixed	Empire	or	Center	and	no	national	neocolony	or	periphery.	There	are	only	stateless,	global	consortiums	and	
solidarities	in	struggle.	In	this	way,	perpetrator	and	victim	are	complicated	in	a	world	in	flux	and	hidden	conditions	suddenly	emerge,	such	as	the	“new	hyper	rich	
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[classes	that]	came	into	being,	those	Russian	oligarchs	who	are	now	a	global	presence	among	capitalism’s	cosmopolitan	elite”	(Buck-Morss,	Global	Civil	War	24:05),	that	“global	oligarchy	[that]	is	increasingly	international	[and	comes]	from	all	ethnic	backgrounds,	all	religions	[and	are]	are	now	multi-national,	multi-racial,	and	multi-cultural	(40:59	-	42:04).	This	applies	to	Latin	American	oligarchies	as	well.	And	these	international	oligarchies	victimize	Americans	in	America	perhaps	as	much	as	anywhere	else.	Thus,	the	oppressing	capitalist	class	is	not	understood	to	reside	or	be	headquartered	in	one	particular	nation	but	is	transnational	and	volatile.	Its	center	is	not	unitary	but	multiple	and	rapidly	fleeting	and	mutating.	Solidarities	too	are	nationless,	dislocated	and	international.	They	too	are	volatile,	intersectional,	at	times	contradictory,	in	permanent	flow	and	reconfiguration,	its	peripheries	and	concentrations	perpetually	on	the	move.	We	are	no	longer	able	to	pose	the	simplistic	claim	that	“Latin	America”	is	a	neocolonial	victim,	for	its	imperial	insiders	are	suddenly	exposed,	not	as	capataces	(imperial	on-site	foremen)	but	as	native,	fully	domestic	members	of	the	global	dominant	class	that	trace	their	ideologies	to	early	national	thinkers	such	as	Argentina’s	Sarmiento.	By	the	same	token,	one	can	no	longer	claim	that	all	Americans,	for	instance,	participate	in	imperial	Firstworldness:	abused	and	submitted	by	the	same	political,	economic	and	military	(-turned-militarized-local-police)	powers	that	subjugate	the	colonized	elsewhere,	poor	Americans	themselves	are	the	victims	of	imperialism	and	as	such	must	not	be	denied	solidarity	with	those	in	the	same	condition	transnationally.		
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This	kind	of	transnational	solidarity	constitutes	the	most	fundamental	meaning	of	Álvarez’s	Now.	Now	represents	a	call	to	appropriation	of	time	in	
solidarity	against	the	psychogeographies	of	the	spectacular	binary	of	First/Third	World:	because	of	the	hegemony	of	the	nation-state	model,	the	only	political	power	that	people	have	today	is	through	the	institutions	of	specific	nation-states	in	which	they	are	citizens.	At	the	same	time,	and	in	contradiction	to	this	political	ordering,	their	fates	are	tied	to	those	elsewhere.	So,	…	if	you	have	a	political	analysis,	and	a	political	effectiveness	that’s	inside	of	nation-state	boundaries,	but	your	economic	realities	do	not	respect	those	boundaries,	then	you’re	in	a	very	difficult	political	space	in	which	to	operate	…	[T]he	capacity	of	governments	to	protect	their	citizens	from	the	crises	within	the	global	economic	order	is	structurally	limited.	Nationalism	continues	its	political	appeal,	and	yet	issues	of	war	and	peace,	and	now,	with	increasing	significance,	issues	of	climate	change	and	ecological	limits,	call	for	global	
solidarity	as	a	political	imperative	(Buck-Morss,	Global	Civil	War	13:52	–	14:27,	15:24	–	15:49).			A	demarcational	perspective	on	political	processes	thus	practices	the	systematic	questioning	of	difference.	Wherever	difference	is	claimed	as	self-evident,	a	
demarcational	critique	will	utter	the	methodic	questioning	of	this	difference.	In	the	same	way	that	the	“fantasy	of	modernity	and	history	was	shared	on	both	sides	[Stalinist	and	western	capitalist	models]”	(Buck-Morss,	Global	Civil	War	29:50)	and	
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despite	spectacular	narratives	of	difference,	east	and	west	shared	the	common	dream	of	“capturing	industrialization,”	whether	it	be	by	means	of	production	(east)	or	consumption	(west)	(25:35	–	26:15).	This	type	of	commonality	among	allegedly	mutually	exclusive	terms	can	only	become	visible	through	systematic	focus	on	continuity	among	seemingly	unquestionably	distinct	terms,	as	a	trans-
demarcational	understanding	previously	precluded	by	spectacular	fragmentation.		Moreover,	in	the	case	of	the	North-versus-South	narrative	of	difference	which	anchors	the	developed/First-versus-underdeveloped/Third	worlds,	the	methodological	countering	of	established	narratives	of	difference	may	be	the	only	way	to	comprehend	processes	such	as	the	“reversed	acceleration”	of	the	imagined	First	into	the	imagined	Third	World	that	has	been	in	process	most	evidently	in	the	21st	century.	By	“reverse	acceleration”	I	refer	to	the	process	whereby	countries	like	the	United	States	move	backwards	in	time	and	psychogeography	so	that	they	end	up	catching	up	with	allegedly	underdeveloped	countries,	often	falling	into	the	traps	the	U.S.	itself	planted	against	others,	for	instance	“[w]hen	it	comes	to	the	distortions	by	power	caused	by	neoliberalism	we	in	the	United	States	are	now	catching	up	with	the	rest	of	the	world”	after	Russian	intervention	in	U.S.	elections	(33:51).	A	clearer	example,	in	the	midst	of	the	current	transformation	of	the	U.S.	federal	government	into	a	corporate	model,	is	that	of	Malaysia	in	the	1980s,	another	instance	of	reverse	acceleration	by	the	U.S.,	as	it	“catches	up	backwards”	with	the	Malaysian	model	becoming	“explicitly	that	of	a	corporation”	(Buck-Morss,	Global	Civil	War	38:38).	Therefore,	not	only	are	stable	geographic	locations	of	First	and	Third	World	
	 156	
untenable	today,	but	neither	are	the	assumed	paths	of	circulation	between	them:	who	follows	the	path	of	whom,	do	peripheral	nations	imitate	the	model	central	nations,	or	is	it	the	other	way	around?	Where	is	underdevelopment	and	where	and	from	where	does	a	social	justice	ethnographer	move	to	explore	it?		In	a	world	where	national	populations	north	and	south	of	the	imaginary	First/World	divide	are	losing	control	not	only	of	their	capital	but	of	their	governments	as	well	(40:00),	and	“[m]eanwhile,	the	center/periphery	argument	has	a	new	articulation…	[as]	global	inequality	keeps	expanding”	for	the	United	States,	the	United	Kingdom,	as	well	as	Third-World	countries:		the	growing	gap	between	rich	and	poor	is	a	global	phenomenon”	as	the	“economic	hegemony	of	the	center	is	slipping	considerably	…	the	global	oligarchy	is	increasingly	international	…	they	come	from	all	ethnic	backgrounds,	all	religions…	[and]	when	the	ruling	capitalist	family	plans	an	unfriendly	takeover	of	the	US	federal	government,	the	only	democracy	that	results	from	this	is	the	de-Westernization	and	de-Northification	of	the	global	oligarchy:	the	rich	are	now	multi-national,	multi-racial,	and	multi-cultural	(40:59	-	42:04).		There	is	no	more	geographically-located	First	and	Third	World	today.	Any	insistence	on	territorial	stabilizations	of	(under)development	are	remnants	of	spectacular	narratives.	What	we	have	today	is	global	solidarities	in	struggle	against	global	consortiums.	And	the	only	way	to	both	counter	the	spectacular	inertia	of	the	nation-state-model	First/Third	World	and	follow	the	new	struggle	of	transnational	
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solidarities	against	transnational	consortiums	is	by	means	of	demarcational	praxis,	which	is	no	other	than	the	intersection	of	the	counter-spectacular	exercises	of	détournement	and	dérive	in	order	to	interrupt	spectacular	psychogeographies.	Debord	conceived	of	these	concepts	on	an	urban	scale,	and	Álvarez	is	able	to	apply	them	on	a	global	scale.	The	film	Now:	(a)	circulates	the	political	map	à	la	dérive	against	established	paths	of	circulation:	the	director	goes	from	the	imagined	Third	World,	which	sits	at	the	end	and	summit	of	history,	into	the	imagined	First-World	to	document	underdevelopment	against	the	circulative	hindrance	of	the	U.S.	blockade	against	Cuba	by	stealing	the	images	he	couldn’t	travel	to	obtain);	(b)	détours	of	the	images	of	the	U.S.	spectacle	into	a	montage	constructed	around	a	censored	song);	(c)	questions	the	psychogeographies	of	nation-state-demarcated	development/freedom/civility	by	documenting	the	vulnerability	of	Americans;	and	(d)	creates	transnational	solidarities	of	oppressed	peoples	in	differential	opposition	to	an	also-transnational	consortium.	In	light	of	this,	and	considering	the	rarity	of	
Now’s	form,	content	and	distribution,	its	being	the	predecessor	of	the	modern	video	clip,	as	it	is	so	often	primarily	characterized,	pales	in	comparison	with	its	value	as	a	counter-spectacular	intervention	in	its	time	and	an	uncanny	prediction	of	times	to	come	decades	later.			3.3	This	sense	of	de-marcational	transnationalism	is	present,	to	some	degree	and	in	any	case	in	seminal	form,	at	the	center	of	Marxist	theory.	The	idea	that	the	proletariat	has	no	country	has	been	around	since	the	Communist	Manifesto,	
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although	I	certainly	do	not	intend	to	commit	the	anachronism	of	trying	to	connect	Marx	and	Engels’	assertion	directly	to	today’s	globalized	connectedness.	However,	a	genealogical	path	can	be	established.	The	notion	of	proletarian	internationalism,	so	evident	in	Now,	appears	with	explicit	force	in	the	very	designations	of	radical	collectives	of	the	1950s	and	1960s,	including	the	Letterist	International	and	the	Situationist	International,	in	which	Debord	participated.	This	sense	of	internationalism	began	to	be	threatened	precisely	when	epistemological	categories,	strongly	geographized	as	nation-states,	made	the	articulation	of	internationalism	progressively	difficult	or	impossible.	Buck-Morss	observes	in	Global	Civil	War	that,	as	the	ordering	form	falls	under	the	domination	of	the	conceptual	imaginary	of	nation-states,	“[a]ll	international	issues	after	1950	presume	this	national	order,	and	if	the	Soviet	Union	continued	to	pay	lip	service	to	the	idea	of	a	Communist	International,	the	fact	remains	that	in	most	cases,	Soviet	state	actions	after	1950	were	conceived	in	terms	of	Russian	national	interest”	(8:23).		In	Thesis	19	of	The	Society	of	the	Spectacle,	Debord	refers	to	the	spectacle	as	heir	to	the	categories	of	Western	philosophy,	noting	that	it	constituted	“an	attempt	to	understand	activity	by	means	of	the	categories	of	vision”	(17),	a	drive	which	lies	at	the	foundation	of	the	metaphorization	of	conceptual	imaginaries	as	geographical	figures.	But	this	idea	of	territorialization	as	the	politically	charged	maps	generated	by	the	spectacle,	is	particularly	explicit	in	Thesis	31,	where	he	asserts	that	the	abundance	produced	by	workers	is	a	force	independent	from	them	and	“[a]ll	time,	all	space,	becomes	foreign	to	them	as	their	own	alienated	products	accumulate.	The	
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spectacle	is	the	map	of	this	new	world	–	a	map	drawn	to	the	scale	of	the	territory	itself”	(23).	The	geographic	stasis	that	characterizes	the	localization	of	First	and	Third	World	is	indeed	the	expression	of	the	spectacle	that	“arrogates	to	itself	everything	that	in	human	activity	exists	in	a	fluid	state	so	as	to	possess	it	in	a	congealed	form”	(26).	In	reality,	the	First/World	division	serves	the	spectacle	in	that	it	establishes	a	fake	narrative	of	conflict,	whether	it	be	in	terms	of	fake	conflicts	of	security	(this	or	that	other	nation	as	a	threat),	or	as	the	threat	and	fear	of	underdevelopment	(“don’t	be	like	the	Third	World”).	When	political	analyses	uncritically	follow	this	division	and	build	upon	the	“difference”	between	First	and	Third	Worlds,	they	fail	to	recognize	that	capitalist	oppressors	and	exploited	workers	are	on	both	sides	of	the	binary,	transnationally,	because	capitalism	is	everywhere:		Just	as	the	development	of	the	most	advanced	economies	involves	clashes	between	different	agendas,	so	totalitarian	economic	management	by	a	state	bureaucracy	and	the	condition	of	those	countries	living	under	colonialism	or	semi-colonialism	are	likewise	highly	differentiated	with	respect	of	modes	of	production	and	power.	By	pointing	up	these	great	differences,	while	appealing	to	criteria	of	quite	different	order,	the	spectacle	is	able	to	portray	them	as	makers	of	radically	distinct	social	systems.	But	from	the	standpoint	of	their	actual	reality	as	mere	sectors,	it	is	clear	that	the	specificity	of	each	is	subsumed	under	a	universal	system	as	functions	of	a	single	tendency	that	has	taken	the	planet	for	its	field	of	operations.	That	tendency	is	capitalism	(36-37).	
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It	is	important	to	note	that,	in	naming	these	sectors	and	functions	within	the	worldwide	reign	of	capitalism,	Debord	alternatively	utilizes	the	terms	“countries”	and	“social	systems.”	From	a	demarcationally	critical	point	of	view,	“social	systems”	would	be	a	preferable	designation,	for	it	allows	for	the	recognition	of	non-national	solidarities	and	closely	resembles	the	solidarities/consortiums	proposed	in	this	study.		
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4	
	
Unmarking	the	territory:		
Deconstructing	the	epistemological	order	of	the	show	of	worlds		
to	imagine		new	postcolonial	psychogeographies			
“Underdevelopment,”	of	course,	is	a	concept	that	most	readers	will	associate	with	the	
Cold	War-era	social	sciences.	I	will	show,	however,	that	it	is	also,	even	primarily,	a	
cultural	category	that	helps	us	understand	the	history	of	American	exceptionalism	…	
This	complex	[United	States	–	Latin	America]	history	of	mutual	recognition	belies	the	
cultural	hierarchies	and	national	time	scales	assumed,	and	often	made	explicit,	in	
historical	uses	of	the	term	“underdeveloped.”	…	I	argue	that	what	came	to	be	called	
Latin	American	“underdevelopment”	is	best	understood	as	the	ideological	projection	
abroad	of	the	United	States’	own	internal	uneven	development.	Because	U.S.	
intellectuals	could	only	define	it	in	comparative	terms,	the	Latin	American	condition	of	
underdevelopment	was	inevitably	a	reflection	of	the	United	States’	spatial	and	political	
inequalities,	from	the	sprawling	urban	slums	of	the	coasts	to	the	rural	poverty	in	the	
south	and	west.	Viewed	comparatively	and	ideologically,	underdevelopment	is	an	
ideology	that	alleviates	American	fears	of	falling	behind.				
	-	John	P.	Leary,	Introduction	to	A	Cultural	History	of	Underdevelopment.	Latin	
America	in	the	U.S.	Imagination.		
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4.0.1	Thus	far,	I	have	proposed	that	the	geopolitical	concepts	of	First	and	Third	Worlds,	as	well	as	their	subsidiary	notions	of	development	or	center,	and	underdevelopment	or	periphery,	so	normally	assumed	to	rest	on	stable	self-evident	geographical	and	economic	reference,	can	be	understood	as	functions	of	spectacular	media:	they	are	shows.	In	this	sense,	I	have	proposed	an	update	and	expansion	of	Guy	Debord’s	theory	of	the	spectacle	that	introduces	the	concept	of	“shows”	as	concrete	instances	or	happenings	of	the	spectacle	that	are	assumed	by	the	public	so	that	the	spectacle	becomes	autonomous	(self-reproducing	by	the	spectators	in	somnambular	imitation),	dispersed	(originating	from	multiple,	simultaneous	and	shifting	centers)	and	capitalist-disciplinary	(installing	closed	repertoires	of	social	
scripts	that	obey	the	demands	of	commodity	placement).	I	have	posited	that	the	largest-scale	show	possible	is	that	of	two	worlds	in	differential	opposition	at	the	service	of	the	ideological	discourses	of	capitalism	and	modernity.	The	“show	of	
worlds,”	whether	used	by	explicit	pro-capitalist	discourses	or	by	postcolonial	activism,	is	thus	a	psychogeographic	form	of	the	spectacle	directly	tied	to	commodity	placement.	As	a	show,	First-and-Third-World	requires	heroic	and	anti-heroic	figures	in	tension:	modern,	developed,	civilized	and	joyfully	consumerist	on	the	one	hand,	as	a	shop	window	for	the	mimetic	contemplation	of	the	dream	and	promise	of	capitalism	and	modernity,	and	its	opposing	term	lacking	in	those	traits	on	the	other.	I	have	further	posited	that	epistemological	categories	of	time	and	space,	in	their	need	to	validate	the	arbitrary	nature	of	their	demarcational	orders	(as	if	conditions	like	development	and	pre-modernity	existed	as	stable	material	
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departments	in	mutually	exclusive		differential	opposition),	project	themselves	on	the	land	as	static	territorializations	in	such	a	way	that	their	stabilized	geographical	inscriptions	(and	resulting	psychogeographies)	establish	a	positivist	illusion	of	immediate	material	reference	for	those	ideologically	charged,	permitted	categories	of	knowledge.		Furthermore,	I	have	proposed	that	concepts	of	time,	so	fundamental	to	all	elaborations	of	both	spectacular	and	revolutionary	narratives,	tend	to	be	emptied	onto	space	as	epistemological	discourses	execute	a	transfer	of	metaphorical	handles	of	time	onto	spatial	forms	of	conveyance:	time	and	space	are	thus	confused	and	time	loses	its	autonomy,	so	that	it	seems	naturally	possible	to	“view	time	on	land”	as	
geographically	located	“showings”	of	future,	past,	primitive,	advanced,	backward	and	modern.	I	propose	that	all	these	resulting	economic	and	political	geographies	can	be	understood	as	psychogeographies	in	the	Debordian	sense	–	as	a	matter	of	fact,	all	political	geographies	constitute	psychogeographies.	Spectacular	psychogeographies	are	further	complicated	by	what	Susan	Buck-Morss	refers	to	as	the	“national	order”	in	the	sense	of	nation-state-based	demarcations	of	the	psychogeographical	entities	of	“the	worlds.”	Since	the	spectacle	seeks	to	reinforce	a	clear-cut	opposition	of	worlds	upon	nation-state	and	continental	demarcations,	Buck-Morss’s	call	to	attention	to	the	dangers	of	negating	the	fluid	transnational	nature	of	political	developments	and	to	the	importance	of	non-national	solidarities	takes	on	a	critical	urgency	as	we	begin	to	imagine	de-marcational	(i.e.,	“against	established	demarcations”)	models	of	political	and	revolutionary	thought.			
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In	spite	of	certain	anachronisms,	notably	mitigated	by	the	philosopher’s	presageful	vision,	Guy	Debord’s	mid-twentieth-century	theorizations	on	the	spectacle	and	détournement	on	one	hand,	and	psychogeography	and	dérive	on	the	other,	constitute	an	insightful	model	for	the	countering	of	the	spectacle	on	the	ground	level	of	its	shows,	and	an	especially	useful	tool	for	probing	the	particular	spectacle	of	(under)development	as	a	show	of	worlds.	Détournement	articulates	the	method	of	stripping	the	spectacle	of	its	own	language	to	turn	it	against	itself	as	the	inversion	of	its	own	terms.	Dérive	enunciates	the	method	of	critically	examining	received	psychogeographies	in	order	to	challenge	the	emotional	and	behavioral	effects	and	limitations	of,	and	alternatives	to,	their	circulatory	paths	and	geometries.	As	I	have	asserted,	these	theories	and	praxes	are	unprecedentedly	present	in	Santiago	Álvarez’s	Now,	well	in	excess	of	Debord’s	elaboration.	One	of	the	main	dimensions	lacking	in	Debord’s	conceptions	is	a	global	or	transnational	(trans-
world)	perspective.	The	demarcational	critique	that	I	propose	in	order	to	intervene	in	post-/neo-colonial	analysis	and	anti-imperialist	activism	can	be	defined	as	the	combined	operation	of	détournement	against	spectacular	operations	and	intrusions	in	epistemological	narratives	of	progress	and	development	plus	the	operation	of	
dérive	against	the	psychogeographical	territorializations	of	those	epistemological	narratives:	demarcational	critique	=	détournement	+	dérive	on	a	world	scale47.	That	combined	operation	constitutes	the	very	meaning	of	Now.		
																																																								47	Debord	conceived	of	dérive	as	the	urban	practice	of	circulating	through	various	ambiances	in	a	playful	(i.e.,	non-utilitarian)	manner	that	creates	awareness	of	the	psychogeographical	effects	of	the	
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Now’s	unique	political	move	lies	chiefly	with	the	fact	that	the	film	(a)	robs	the	spectacle	of	its	own	images	against	political	borders	and	economic	embargo	(détournement	à	la	dérive),	while	exercising	a	metareflection	on	the	spectacle’s	own	status	as	a	first-instance	thief;	(b)	broadcasts	a	call	for	the	appropriation	of	historical	time	that	counters	both	the	spectacle’s	pseudo-cyclical	time	and	the	unproblematized	kind	of	call	seen	in	La	hora	de	los	hornos,	where	the	psychogeographic	show	of	worlds	is	also	uncritically	accepted	as	a	self-evident	given;	and	(c)	directs	the	call	to	a	transnational	(and	trans-world)	solidarity.			As	we	imagine	new	postcolonial	(meta-)epistemologies	that	are	non-national	and	that	systematically	question	status-quo	psychogeographies,	a	model	of	
demarcational	critique	emerges	that	opposes	the	spectacularly	compromised	discourse	of	First-and-Third-World	and	developed-or-underdeveloped	nation.	I	have	proposed	to	conceive	of	an	alternative	model	of	fluid,	transnational,	and	de-centered48	non-national	“solidarities	versus	consortiums”	to	replace	the	First-and-Third-World	(developed	or	central	versus	underdeveloped	peripheral)	model,	which	is	exactly	what	Now	already	does,	intentionally	or	not,	as	the	call	to	emancipation	directed	to	black	Americans	in	the	film	unites	them	with	oppressed	
																																																								urban	space.	Breaking	with	global	psychogeographies	(this	nation	or	continent	is	evenly	the	future;	this	other	is	evenly	underdeveloped)	requires	an	understanding	of	this	practice	on	a	world	scale,	as	a	drift	against	established	territorial	demarcations,	such	as	those	of	First	and	Third	World.		48	In	such	a	way	as	to	describe	the	very	mutation	of	the	spectacle	to	follow	economic	de-centering	in	the	post-Fordist	era,	where	“the	large	industrial	factory	was	gradually	dismembered	and	took	the	form	of	a	network	structure	geographically	scattered	across	territories	and	made	up	of	small	centers	of	production	as	well	as	a	workforce	fragmented	into	many	small,	increasingly	mobile	and	precarious	units”	(Codeluppi	56).		
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Latin	Americans	in	a	transnational	solidarity	that	can	no	longer	be	opposed	to	the	United	States	as	a	simplistic	whole.	This	chapter	will	consider	the	implications	of	this	alternative	model	of	demarcational	critique	in	terms	of	the	model’s	(a)	status	against	the	particular	history	and	mechanics	of	the	show	of	worlds	in	the	context	of	mutual	U.S.	–	Latin	America	imagination;	(b)	position	in	relation	to	the	forces	of	preservation	of	the	established	narratives	of	difference;	(c)	inscription	in	an	epistemological	history	of	poverty;	(d)	bearing	on	the	construction	of	narratives	of	victimization	essential	for	the	elaboration	of	a	revolutionary	discourse;	(e)	pertinence	to	the	construction	and	reading	of	what	I	will	call	“inter-worlds”	texts;	and	(f)	relevance	to	our	understandings	of	ideology	in	the	age	of	the	dispersed	spectacle	(the	spectacle-turned-shows).			4.0.2	One	of	the	most	thorough	works	to	exercise	a	form	of	demarcational	critique	of	the	ideology	of	(under)development	is	John	P.	Leary’s	A	Cultural	History	of	
Underdevelopment:	Latin	America	in	the	U.S.	Imagination.	Published	in	2016,	the	book	consists	of	a	series	of	multi-textual	case	studies,	ranging	from	the	mid-nineteenth	century	to	the	Cold	War	era,	organized	around	the	thesis	that	the	so-called	“Latin	American	condition	of	underdevelopment,”	that	is,	the	continent’s	very	“thirdworldness,”	constitutes	a	projection	of	the	United	States’	anxieties	and	insecurities	over	its	own	internal	uneven	development.	In	its	function	as	a	blank	canvas	for	the	foreignization	of	the	United	States’	own	domestic	underdevelopment,	Latin	America	assumes	the	historically	mutating	roles	of	Edenic	anachronistic	
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reserve,	languorous	tropical	paradise,	insurgent	battlefield,	good	neighbor,	and	solidary	sibling.		Leary	examines	these	changing	roles	by	means	of	a	wide-ranging	archival	analysis	of	fiction,	film,	photography,	travel	writing	and	music,	among	others.	In	Chapter	1,	the	literature	of	pre-Civil	War	Cuban	annexation,	observed	at	the	intersection	of	the	ideological	intents	of	white	Cuban	exiles	and	U.S.	expansionists,	allows	Leary	to	create	a	historical	record	of	the	U.S.	imagination	of	Cuba	either	as	an	Edenic	anachronism	or	as	soon-to-be	U.S.-like	republic.	Chapter	2	turns	its	attention	to	travel	writing	in	order	to	document	the	Anglo-American	imagination	of	the	Latin	American	space	as	a	place	of	tropical	(natural)	exuberance.	Chapter	3	returns	to	Cuba	during	the	War	of	1898,	where	Leary	draws	on	a	comparative	study	of	accounts	of	violence	and	suffering	in	Cuba	on	one	hand,	and	the	suffering	of	poor	New	Yorkers	in	the	Lower	East	Side	on	the	other,	to	conclude	that	New	York’s	poverty	and	thirdworldliness		was	displaced	onto	Latin	America	by	means	of	discursive	analogies	utilized	to	render	the	foreign	suffering	legible	to	domestic	US	readers.	The	last	three	chapters	document	the	US	literary	and	filmic	treatment	of	Latin	America	as	a	space	where	repressed	drives	are	released.	Chapter	4	moves	to	Mexico	and	the	“latinophilia”	of	the	decades	following	the	end	of	the	Mexican	Revolution,	where	it	identifies	the	Anglo-American	bohemian	enthusiasm	for	the	perceived	cultural	and	political	vitality	of	Latin	America,	of	which	the	US	was	perceived	as	lacking	at	the	time.	Chapters	5	and	6	look	at	US	representations	of	Latin	American	political	radicalism:	the	former	documents	the	limits	of	Latin-Anglo-
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American	racial	solidarity	through	Nicolás	Guillén	ambiguous	feelings	of	collaboration	and	suspicion	towards	the	Harlem	Renaissance;	the	latter	focuses	on	the	bivalent	threatening/romantic	erotic	appeal	of	the	male	Latin	American	revolutionary	hero	in	U.S.	media.			As	the	book	publisher’s	synopsis	states,	Leary	does	examine	development	theory	per	se,	along	with	other	genres	and	media	forms,	but	it	is	important	to	point	out	that	the	great	strength	of	his	work	rests	on	the	depth	and	breadth	of	his	archival	investigation	of	the	matter.	As	Adela	Pineda	points	out	in	her	review	of	the	book,	the	work	does	not	carry	out	a	“theoretical	study	of	Latin	America	and	underdevelopment	[but]	relies	on	concrete	case	studies	[and]	situates	cultural	analysis	within	the	frame	of	a	historical	perspective”	(3).	Leary	does	not	seek	to	offer	a	counter-theory	for	Latin	American	underdevelopment	in	the	eyes	of	the	United	States,	nor	does	it	embark	on	more	universal	theorizations	on	the	global	condition	of	underdevelopment.	Therefore,	while	it	is	useful	to	have	a	documentary	repertoire	of	the	kind	summarized	above,	the	sections	of	Leary’s	book	that	most	closely	relate	to	the	intent	of	this	dissertation	are	not	the	chapters	themselves	but	the	Introduction	(and	to	a	lesser	degree	the	Coda),	which	is	where	theoretical	frameworks	are	surveyed	in	relation	to	the	thesis	thereafter	attended	to	through	archival	research.		In	addition	to	its	“impeccabl[e]	research,”	as	Karem	puts	it,	Leary	makes	a	major	contribution	to	a	critique	of	the	ideologies	in	question	when	he	extricates	the	conversation	from	the	merely	“economist	perspective	dominating	most	debates	on	
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underdevelopment	[and]	instead	sets	forth	a	culturalist	framework”	(Pineda	1).	This	“culturalist	perspective”	effectively	brings	into	light	the	symbolic	excess	of	the	concept	of	Latin	American	underdevelopment	beyond	its	material	substrate	(namely,	its	claimed	economic	referent),	but	Leary	does	not	thoroughly	engage	the	principles	and	mechanics	of	this	symbolic	excess.	Had	that	been	the	author’s	intention,	one	conceptual	barrier	that	would	have	stood	in	the	way	of	any	such	attempt	would	have	been	the	book’s	deeply	US-centric	view	of	the	matter,	which	Leary	does	not	conceal	or	deny.	As	a	matter	of	fact,	the	impetus	of	Leary’s	analysis	lies	firmly	with	the	exposure	of	internal	uneven	development	fully	within	the	U.S.	in	a	unilateral	perspective	that	does	not	seek	issues	on	the	side	of	Latin	American	victimization49.	At	times,	the	book	seems	to	hope	for	the	salvation	of	trans-American	republicanism,	or	for	the	“extraction”	of	imperialism	out	of	hemispheric	discourses	
																																																								49	Indeed,	whether	Leary	is	arguing	for	the	observation	of	similarity	between	the	US	and	Latin	America	or	arguing	against	uncritically	assumed	narratives	of	difference,	as	I	am,	his	analysis	never	detaches	itself	from	a	US-based	viewpoint.	His	reference	to	Caroline	Levander’s	essay	“Confederate	Cuba”	(18)	centers	on	Levandre’s	reading	of	a	post-Spanish-American-war	almanac,	whereby	the	proclaimed	“declarations	of	a	U.S.	similarity	to	Cuba,”	seen	in	the	island’s	struggle	for	freedom	from	Spain	as	the	American	colonies’	own	past	struggle,	“worked	to	sanitize	U.S.	imperial	designs	on	Cuba”	(828-9).	Leary	proposes	that	those	observations	of	resemblance	between	the	US	and	Cuba	be	regarded	as	sincere	(which	I	again	consider	a	novel	and	useful	move)	thus	making	those	“professions	of	similarity	therefore	disruptive,	rather	than	only	compensatory.”	Established	“Manichean”	Cold	War-era	differential	narratives	seem	to	naturalize	them	“as	themselves	cohesive	and	permanent,”	a	reasoning	that	fails	to	recognize	just	“how	anxiously	competitive	U.S.	accounts	of	Latin	America	have	always	been”	and	the	extent	to	which	they	have	served	as	an	ideological	operation	for	“negotiating	the	reality	of	uneven	development	at	home,	without	ever	acknowledging	its	existence	as	such”	(18,	my	emphasis).	Both	Leary’s	argument,	with	whose	basic	premise	I	agree,	and	his	refuted	counterargument,	are	almost	unmovably	centered	at	home,	in	the	United	States,	with	the	unidirectional	gaze	of	inquiry	firmly	positioned	north	of	Latin	America.	How	Latin	America	might	actively	participate	in	this	show	of	(under)development,	at	least	in	the	form	of	the	somnambular		participation	I	have	ascribed	to	spectacular	shows,	or	what	purposes	the	show	of	the	United	States	as	a	unitary	“developed”	country	might	play	within	Latin	America	is	completely	absent	from	Leary’s	analysis	or	intent.	His	discussion	is	about	a	cultural	phenomenon	which,	seen	exclusively	in	terms	of	one	partiality,	could	not	support	a	comprehensive	cultural	theory	of	the	matter.	
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to	make	them	more	frank	or	egalitarian.	While	I	believe	there	may	be	value	to	these	considerations,	as	a	demarcational	critique	would	precisely	seek	to	emphasize	continuums	where	difference	has	been	dogmatically	assumed,	this	U.S.-centric	view	runs	counter	to	any	general	theorizations	on	the	cultural	invention	of	underdevelopment,	let	alone	its	opposition.					The	goal	of	this	dissertation	is	to	theorize	on	the	mechanics	of	First/Third	World	imagination	as	a	function	of	the	spectacle	and,	as	such,	I	believe	its	endeavors	complement	Leary’s	work.	While	I	too	center	my	analysis	on	United	States	–	Latin	American	relations,	I	attempt	to	do	so	in	a	bidirectional	or	counterdirectional	manner.	And	while	I	initially	construct	some	of	my	arguments	around	texts	emerging	from	this	realm,	I	do	not	primarily	intend	to	conduct	any	sort	of	archival	work	on	the	matter.	I	hope	some	of	my	conclusions	may	be	of	universal	value	with	regards	to	the	global	mechanics	of	the	cultural	(dimension	of	the)	notions	of	underdevelopment.	In	this	sense,	Leary’s	work	will	be	my	chief	interlocutor	for	this	chapter,	both	as	the	source	of	the	archival	documentation	I	will	rely	on	but	will	not	expand	as	a	matter	of	approach,	and	as	a	partner	in	conversation	where	more	general	and	multilateral	considerations	can	be	posited	on	the	matter.	Furthermore,	I	believe	there	are	other	ways	to	tie	some	of	Leary’s	broad	archival	repository	items	that	go	beyond	the	loose,	merely	chronological,	interconnection	of	its	case	studies,	as	Pienda	asserts	in	her	aforementioned	review	(1).		As	discussed	in	Chapter	3,	one	key	concept	of	my	proposed	demarcational	critique	of	postcolonial	ideology	is	the	territorialization	of	epistemological	
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categories	as	a	way	of	validating	them	through	the	illusion	of	an	origin	from,	and	a	return	to,	land	as	a	material	reference	that	hides	the	ideological	arbitrariness	of	those	categories.	This	territorialization	executes	a	geographization	of	imagined	human	conditions,	so	that	epistemological	compartmentalizations	are	mirrored	on	land	as	stable	geographical	demarcations	that	not	only	confine	conditions	such	as	underdevelopment	and	modernity	to	“stable”	geographical	entities,	but	also	dictate	patterns	of	circulation	among	these	entities,	such	as	for	instance,	where	modern	knowledge	comes	from	and	goes	to	(such	as	“from	Europe	to	America”):50	hence	the	need	for	the	combined	operation	of	counter-spectacular	détournement	and	anti-psychogeographically	normative	dérive	on	a	global	scale.	These	established	global	psychogeographies	(such	as	future	and	development	“moving	north”	and	modern	knowledge	“traveling	south”)	simultaneously	replicate	and	expand	colonial	paths	of	circulation	and	serve	the	spectacle	by	staging	on	land	shows	of	modernity	for	the	purpose	of	commodity	placement.		Therefore,	forms	of	postcolonial	analysis	that	uncritically	assume	geographical	distributions	of	center/modernity/development	and	periphery/pre-modernity/underdevelopment	as	self-evident	and	stable	locations	run	the	risk	of	perpetuating	what	they	attempt	to	counter	by	obediently	reinforcing	colonial	paths	and	participating	in	established	spectacular	narratives.		
																																																								50	Hence	the	importance	of	works	such	as	Buck-Morss’s	“Hegel	and	Haiti,”	which	examines	the	connections	between	Hegel’s	master-slave	dialectic	and	the	thought	of	the	Haitian	revolution	against	the	assumed	path	of	influence	going	from	Europe	to	America.			
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As	a	matter	of	fact,	the	most	compelling	argument	for	the	methodological	rejection	of	the	use	of	the	labels	“First	World”	and	“Third	World,”	both	as	economic	and	as	cultural	notions,	must	be	the	fact	that	these	terms	do	not	originate	in	the	alleged	“Third	World”	–	they	are	imposed	terms,	and	they	are	imposed	by	the	once	colonial	metropoles	as	a	protraction	of	their	own	semantic	politics.	As	Leary	notes,	the	term	“Third	World”	was	probably	first	used	by	French	scholar	Alfred	Sauvy	in	195251	and	the	term	itself	is	charged	by	European	epistemologies,	namely	the	idea	of	the	French	Estate	and	with	it	the	French	Revolution	(202).	And	the	seminal	concepts	of	“First	World”	and	“Third	World,”	as	different	as	they	may	have	been	in	their	inception	from	their	current	culturalist	use,	originate	from	a	conflict,	the	Cold	War,	in	which	the	geographical	regions	stamped	with	the	level		“Third	World”	were	precisely	neutral	–	if	anything,	the	so-called	“Third	World”	was	the	no-world	as	far	the	conflict	was	concerned,	and	inasmuch	as	it	was	the	negation	or	the	non-happening	of	the	conflict.	But	even	this	conflict	had	to	be	projected	on	land	onto	the	whole	world	upon	the	old	colonial	territorial	grid.	The	very	assertion	of	a	First	World	carries	with	it	a	spectacular	claim	to	superiority	that	its	ordinal	numerology	merely	confirms.	This	geopolitical	assertion	is,	indeed,	the	central	piece	of	what	
																																																								51	As	Graham	Crow	points	out,	“the	division	of	the	countries	of	the	globe	into	three	worlds	of	industrial	capitalist,	state	socialist	and	underdeveloped	societies	is	a	prime	example	of	a	comparative	typology	generated	in	order	to	make	sense	of	the	bewildering	diversity	of	reality.	Grouping	countries	into	first,	second	and	third	worlds	has	a	long	and	complicated	history	which	can	be	traced	back	to	the	period	immediately	following	the	Second	World	War.	Current	developments	are	taking	us	rapidly	beyond	the	three	worlds,	and	most	commentators	would	agree	with	Gidden’s	assessment	that	that	‘The	term	“third	world”…	has	become	distinctly	threadbare	with	the	virtual	disappearance	of	the	“second	world.”	The	text	by	Anthony	Giddens	that	Crow	cites	is	“Introduction,”	in	Human	Societies	(1992).		
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Edward	Said	calls	“imaginative	geography,”	a	term	also	utilized	by	Arturo	Escobar	in	his	book	Encountering	Development:	The	Making	and	Unmaking	of	the	Third	World	(Leary	12).	Here,	Escobar	refers	to	the	construction	of	“discourses	under	unusual	power52,”	referred	to	as	“colonial	move”	by	Mohanty	and	others,	and	which	executes	“specific	constructions	of	the	colonial	/	Third	World	subject	in/through	discourse	in	ways	that	allow	the	exercise	of	power	over	it”	(9).	Escobar	will	carry	his	argument	in	a	direction	similar	to	Levander,	namely	that	the	discourses	of	difference	and	recognition/rejection	of	racial,	cultural	and	historical	differences	constitutes	a	mechanism	to	justify	dominance	over	them;	I	will	insist	that	the	dominance	is	primarily	symbolic	and	then	anything	else.	The	discourse	of	development,	he	continues,	with	its	associated	psychogeographies,	I	will	add,	is	governed	by	the	same	principles	as	colonial	discourse	and	contains	and	deploys	a	geopolitical	space	made	up	of	series	of	imaginative	geographies,	as	a	geopolitical	imagination	(9),	ones	that	simultaneously,	and	very	problematically,	control	and	assign	the	meanings	of	“developed”	and	“underdeveloped.”		Said	introduces	the	term	in	his	study	of	orientalism	but	it	fully	applies	to	the	matter	at	hand	in	this	analysis.	Orientalism,	according	to	him,	emerges	in	Europe	from	the	“collective	notion	identifying	“us”	Europeans	against	all	“those”	non-Europeans”	and	what	really	makes	European	culture	hegemonic	inside	and	outside	of	Europe	is	the	very	notion	of	its	superiority	in	defining	opposition	to	all	the	non-
																																																								52	I	will	claim	in	this	chapter	that	that	power	is	more	spectacular	and	tautological	than	materially	anchored,	and	vitally	dependent	on	possession	of	the	camera.	
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European	cultures,	thus	perpetuating	this	“superiority	over	Oriental	backwardness”	(15,	his	quotations	marks).	Orientalism	relies	on	this	self-location	of	relative	superiority,	but,	most	importantly,	Said	wonders	how	it	could	have	possibly	been	different	when	“[t]he	scientist,	the	scholar,	the	missionary,	the	trader,	or	the	soldier	was	in,	or	thought	about,	the	Orient	because	he	could	be	there,	or	could	think	about	it,	with	very	little	resistance	on	the	Orient’s	part”	(15,	my	emphasis).	In	this	chapter,	I	will	inquire	deeper	into	this	“forced	posturing”	as	an	object	of	imagination,	which	the	thirdworldization	of	geographical	areas	summarizes,	when	I	consider	the	implications	of	a	demarcational	critique	of	postcolonial	thought	for	the	textual	representation	of	“the	foreign.”	As	I	will	discuss	further	on	in	this	chapter,	the	“Third	World”	label	may	have	been	appropriated	by	Latin	American	intellectuals	almost	proudly	as	an	act	of	political	reappropriation,	but	I	will	argue	that	such	an	appropriation	implied	a	submissive	act	of	obedience	that	merely	ensured	the	symbolic	perpetuation	of	colonialism.			Said’s	concept	of	imaginative	geography,	and	its	borrowed	use	by	Escobar,	underscore	the	urgency	with	which	these	terms	must	be	rejected	as	a	prerequisite	of	any	project	of	postcolonial	emancipation.	If	the	First	World	creates	two	opposing	terms	and	ascribes	one	to	itself,	the	Third	World	must	be	very	suspicious	of	the	operation,	and	not	docilely	accept	it	as	its	own	terms	of	liberation.	As	I	will	discuss	in	this	chapter,	the	appropriation	of	“Terce(i)r(o)	Mundo”	by	Latin	American	intellectuals	can	never	live	up	to	its	anti-imperialist	intent	because	it	validates	epistemologies	of	symbolic	imperialist	construction.	There	can	be	no	postcolonial	
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endeavor	whenever	the	show	of	worlds	is	submissively	assumed.	Any	Third	World	appropriative	project	may	claim	that	the	characterization	of	underdevelopment	it	assumes	should	be	deemed	to	carry	no	connotation,	but	its	adoption	of	European	epistemological	terms	implies	that	those	terms	are	already	ideologically	marked:	wealth,	centrality,	urbanity,	modernity	and	civilization	are	already	charged	as	positive	terms	in	differential	opposition	to	tropical	languor	at	the	service	of	the	intellectual	and	behavioral	demands	of	capitalist	modernity.	If	we	are	going	to	play	by	the	terms	of	a	“First	World”	that	first	invents	and	positively	characterizes	the	“First	World”	and	then	assigns	it	to	itself,	we	may	not	negate	the	ideological	charges	that	come	with	those	terms.	As	I	have	posited	in	Chapter	1,	the	validation,	affirmation	and	propagation	of	those	terms	constitutes	one	of	the	chief	missions	of	the	spectacle,	reinforced	by	countless	ideologically	charged	images	of	the	“underdeveloped	others”	circulating	in	writing,	photography	and	film.	Passively	assuming	the	label	Third	World	amounts	to	participation	in	the	spectacle.	The	first	step	toward	a	true	postcolonial	enterprise	is	to	deny	the	First	World	its	firstworldness	as	a	strategy	to	confuse	its	(territorialized)	epistemologies	and	block	the	production	of	its	own	spectacle	at	its	inception.	In	other	words:	to	muddle	its	psychogeographies	and	turn	its	images	against	itself,	as	opposed	to	playing	obediently	on	its	pre-drawn	hopscotch,	something	that	amounts	to	concurrent	subversive	dérive	and	textual	détournement,	which	in	turn	constitutes	a	
demarcational	countering:	this	Now	achieves	with	rare	strength.			
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One	particular	form	of	territorialization	occurs	with	the	projection	on	land	of	the	categories	of	time	in	particular.	I	have	proposed	from	Chapter	2	that	manipulations	and	inventions	of	time	constitute	a	crucial	operation	of	both	spectacular	and	revolutionary	projects	in	a	modern	era	so	deeply	defined	by	meta-historical	consciousness.	The	transfer	of	time	onto	space	by	means	of	metaphorical	fusions	and	psychogeographical	illusions	must	be	looked	at	very	carefully,	for	this	form	of	territorialization	can	be,	simultaneously,	a	revolutionary	weapon,	and	a	way	to	empty	time	and	the	possibilities	of	the	appropriation	of	historical	time	onto	locked	space.	In	relation	to	this,	we	must	also	consider	that	the	acceleration	of	time-space	that	characterizes	late	modernity	is	accompanied	by	the	fusion	of	the	two,	whereby	time	constantly	leaks	into	space.	This	concept	is	certainly	not	new,	and	lies	at	the	foundation	of	the	physicomathematical	concept	of	spacetime,	so	central	to	Einstein’s	theory	of	relativity,	defined	as	a	“single	concept	that	recognizes	the	union	of	space	and	time,	first	proposed	by	the	mathematician	Hermann	Minkowsky	in	1908	as	a	way	to	reformulate	Albert	Einstein’s	special	theory	of	relativity	(1905)”	(Encyclopædia	Britannica).		It	should	also	be	noted	that	there	are	diachronic	and	synchronic	dimensions	to	the	phenomenon	of	time-space	fusion.	On	the	one	hand,	time	has	always	had,	at	least	in	Western	European	languages,	a	notorious	dependence	on	spatial	vocabulary,	as	I	pointed	out	in	Chapter	3.	On	the	other	hand,	however,	the	advent	and	development	of	(meta-)historically	conscious	epistemological	systems	in	modernity,	and	especially	the	geo-stagist	economist	models	of	the	twentieth	
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century,	have	accelerated	the	bleeding	of	time	onto	imagined	geographical	chrono-	palimpsests53.		Both	forms	of	territorialization,	namely	geographization	and	the	fusion	of	time	onto	space,	are	considered	in	Leary’s	Introduction.	They	appear	as	a	theoretical	review,	rather	than	as	a	theoretical	reflection,	but	they	once	again	serve	as	an	archival	ground	for	my	own	considerations	as	I	bring	them	into	the	realm	of	updated	Debordian	theory.	Underdevelopment,	Leary	posits,	“modernization’s	object	and	its	opposite	…	mobilizes	what	Hsuan	Hsu	calls	“spatial	feelings”:	sentiments	like	nostalgia,	patriotism	or	love	that	ground	people’s	experiences	and	
																																																								53	As	Leary	points	out,	the	“national	fantasy	of	U.S.	development”	builds	upon	an	understanding	of	history	whereby	the	Latin	American	space	becomes	(a)chronologically	charged	and	North	America	constitutes	the	locus	of	a	“destiny	written	in	the	topography	of	the	continent”	(11).	This	is	the	
geographization	of	time	that	I	propose	to	regard	as	a	specially	delicate	case	of	epistemological	
territorialization	and	which	I	refer	to	as	a	form	of	psychogeaography	so	that	Debord’s	theory	and	the	methods	of	dérive	can	be	summoned	as	a	critical	response.	This	phenomenon	in	turn	corresponds	to	Hegels’	“geographical	basis	of	history”	(Klein,	in	his	suggestively	titled	book	Frontiers	of	Historical	
Imagination,	cited	in	Leary	11).	It	is,	Leary	continues,	a	common	place	in	Anglo-American	writing	to	represent	Latin	America	as	the	past	or	as	the	persistence	of	social	and	political	conditions	and	structures	overcome	and	far	by	gone	in	the	United	States,	such	as	“the	repression	of	women,	plantation	slavery,	indigeneity,	and	Catholic	“superstition”	(11).	The	fantasized	nationally-even	condition	of	modernity	or	backwardness	is	founded	on	this	territorialization	of	time:	“[m]odernization	is	even	because	it	holds	within	itself	and	theory	of	spatial	and	temporal	convergence:	all	societies	will	come	to	look	like	us,	all	will	arrive	eventually	at	the	same	stage	or	level,	all	the	possibilities	of	the	future	are	being	lived	now,	at	least	for	the	West:	there	they	are,	arrayed	before	us,	a	changeless	world	functioning	smoothly	under	the	sign	of	technique	…	Modernization	promises	a	perfect	reconciliation	of	past	and	future	in	an	endless	present”	(Ross	10-11).	This	is	the	false	time	of	the	spectacle,	with	its	endless	pseudo-cyclical	motion	detached	of	authentic	needs,	to	which	anti-cyclonic	time	opposes	itself.	“Underdevelopment	is	a	concept	that	implies	both	a	spatial	and	a	temporal	direction	of	movement…	[and]	combines	a	hemispheric	spatial	scale	and	an	implied	national	timescale”	(Leary	16-7).	Indeed,	historical	periodization	is	for	Peter	Hulme	noteworthy	among	“the	most	resistant	categories	of	Eurocentrism…	[and]	which	are	so	deeply	embedded	that	we	have	come	to	think	of	them	as	parts	of	a	natural	geohistorical	landscape”	(2);	along	with	Eurocentric	stagism,	the	circular	tautology	that	Leary	observes	in	the	discourse	of	(under)development	stems	from	design,	as	periodization	effectuates	a	“reintroduction	of	the	modernist	teleology	that	drove	Enlightment	and	colonization	alike”	(Dalleo	vii).	Ultimately,	the	First/Third	World	discourse	boils	down	to	one	party	inventing	a	two	term	binary,	declaring	one	as	the	winning	term,	and	then	assigning	that	“winning”	term	to	itself.		
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attachments”	(10).	These	“spatial	feelings”	are	part	of	the	“specific	effects	of	the	geographical	environment	…	on	the	emotions	and	behavior	of	individuals”	that	Debord	describes	as	part	of	his	definition	of	psychogeography,	and	are	of	a	spectacular	nature	inasmuch	as	the	spectacle	collaborates	in	the	construction	of	
territorialized	epistemologies54.		At	this	point,	it	might	be	important	to	state	explicitly	that	the	way	in	which	I	employ	the	term	“psychogeography”	refers	to	both	the	study	of	the	“geographical	environment,”	as	Debord	sets	it	forth,	and	to	the	created	or	resulting	environments	
themselves,	or,	more	precisely,	to	the	ideological	engineering	of	those	environments	to	produce	submissive	behavior,		and	with	a	major	emphasis	on	culturally	and	politically-managed	international	environments.	When	this	space	is	ideologically	organized	on	a	global	scale,	these	emotions	and	behavior	acquire	a	new	dimension	that	must	be	carefully	attended	to:		[i]n	shifting	focus	from	Americans’	fascination	with	the	abstract	space	of	manifest	destiny	to	heterogeneous	spaces	shaped	by	economic,	political,	and	affective	forces,	I	wish	to	complicate	critical	accounts	of	spatial	feeling.	Psychoanalytic	accounts	of	spatial	identification,	environmentalist	discussions	of	“eco-centrism,”	and	human	geographers’	inquiries	into	
																																																								54	Dalleo	posits	that	it	is	“almost	impossible	to	draw	distinct	lines”	between	different	periods:	“the	real	topic	of	peiodization	is	the	lines	themselves”	(13).	This	focus	on	the	lines	is	precisely	what	the	
demarcational	critique	I	propose	means:	the	demarcations	and	the	process	and	effects	of	demarcations	as	an	object	of	study.	This	impossibility	of	periodization	reminds	Leary	of	Rodrigo	Lazo’s	assertion	of	“impossible	epistemology”	in	relation	to	“the	spatial	framework	of	the	field”	(17).	Indeed,	it	is	perhaps	not	so	much	of	an	impossible	epistemology	but	rather	the	ineludible	need	for	constant	meta-epistemology.			
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“topophilia”	have	been	profoundly	influential	in	theorizing	alternatives	to	the	liberal	individualist	subject.	In	practice,	however,	we	do	not	identify	with	“space”	itself	but	with	multiple	and	differently	scaled	spaces.	Instead	of	“space”	in	the	abstract,	nineteenth-century	writers	and	readers	were	attracted	to	the	affective	and	spiritual	fulfillment	provided	by	a	well-ordered	household;	the	nation	both	in	its	existing	and	continually	expanding	forms;	the	mobility	and	attractions	of	the	emergent	metropolis;	and	the	exotic	cultural	forms	associated	with	foreign	nations.	At	times,	they	imagined	communities	that	cut	across	even	these	diverse	and	unstable	spaces:	hemispheric	ties	to	Latin	America	and	the	Caribbean;	“Black	Atlantic,”	trans-pacific,	and	other	diasporic	affiliations;	regions	imagined	as	foreign	to	the	nation-state”	(Hsu	8).		It	is	with	this	level	of	complexity	that	a	demarcational	critique	of	postcolonial	thought	must	intervene	on	practices	that	originate	in	the	colonial	era	and	that	are	further	affirmed	by	the	nation-state	perspective,	and	hence	Buck-Morss’s	great	concern	with	this	epistemological	status	quo	in	Global	Civil	War55.	
																																																								55	Leary	observes	that	while	the	economic	forces	that	drive	development	are	global,	we	speak	of	development	and	underdevelopment,	rather	improbably,	as	national	traits	–	there	are	“developed”	countries	and	“underdeveloped”	ones,	and	the	latter	aspires	to	become	the	former”	(10-11).	He	also	points	out	how	unusual	it	would	be	for	the	adjective	“underdeveloped”	to	be	used	for	anything	other	than	nation-state,	or	multi-nation-state,	categories:	“rare	is	the	“underdeveloped”	city,	state,	or	province,	a	consequence	of	development	studies’	nation-based	administrative	and	research	apparatuses	and	historically	Eurocentric	approach”	(11).	As	I	propose	in	Chapter	3	of	this	study,	the	model	of	non-national	“m	versus	consortiums”	that	is	free	from	stagism	(as	a	form	of	de-centered	dependency	theory	to	replace	the	First/Third	World	model)	would	help	overcome	these	difficulties	and	gain	valuable	insight	into	realities	otherwise	hidden,	as	we	will	see	further	down	in	this	chapter.		
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In	this	same	talk,	Buck-Morss	also	speaks	of	transnational	solidarities	such	as	négritude,	which	are	equivalent	to	the	“imagined	communities	that	cut	across	even	these	diverse	and	unstable	spaces,”	as	Hsu	describes	them.	However,	Hsu	speaks	of	“regions	foreign	to	the	nation-state.”	One	key	aspect	of	a	demarcational	perspective	would	rest	on	its	ability	to	speak	not	of	“trans-national”	solidarities,	which	would	do	little	more	than	reinforce	the	nation-state	epistemological	form,	but	of	non-national	entities,	“non-state	political	imaginaries”	as	Buck-Morss	puts	it	(Global	Civil	Wars	9:01).	From	the	end	of	World	War	II,	Buck-Morss	asserts,	with	nation-state	representations	on	the	Histomap	marking	the	apparent	end	of	European	empires	and	of	colonialism,	the	nation-state	model	will	dominate	political	epistemologies	and,	while	revealing	certain	realities,	it	will	preclude	others,	such	as	a	clear	apprehension	of	the	notion	of	non-national	solidarities.		In	this	sense,	the	demarcational	power	of	Now	resides	not	in	its	mere	imagination	of	developed-nation-state-centered	solidarities,	as	Hsu	puts	it,	but	as	the	inversion	of	colonial	paths	of	circulation	whereby	the	exposure	of	political	underdevelopment	and	call	to	liberation	comes	from	the	imagined	Third	World	in	a	position	of	relative	superiority.	This	is	why	we	must	refer	to	La	hora	de	los	hornos	in	spite	of	its	many	deficiencies:	the	call	to	development,	directed	to	United	States	citizens	living	in	primitive	political	conditions,	comes	from	the	same	discursive	location	as	that	of	La	hora:	Cuba	as	an	accomplished,	post-historical	beacon.	Where	
La	hora	fails	is	in	its	uncomplicated,	binary	construction	of	postcolonial	power	and	
	 181	
victim,	leaving	the	U.S.	out	of	need	for	development,	and	the	possibility	of	visualizing	Latin	American	participation	in	imperial	oppression	is	thus	irremediably	hindered.			4.1	While	both	Buck-Morss	and	Leary	point	out	the	global	nature	of	political	realities,	Buck-Morss	does	so	while	remaining	closer	to	economics	and	Leary	approaches	the	matter	by	creating	a	historical	archive	that	underscores	the	cultural	construction	of	the	notion	of	development.	Neither	thinker,	however,	attempts	a	theory	for	the	invention	and	functioning	of	underdevelopment	in	a	world	where	ideological	narratives	of	development	and	underdevelopment	constitute	the		interpretative	grid	through	which	the	impoverished	regions	of	the	world	are	known	to	us.	Within	this	interpretative	grid,	a	host	of	everyday	observations	are	rendered	intelligible	and	meaningful.	Poor	countries	are	by	definition	“less	developed”	and	the	poverty	and	powerlessness	of	the	people	who	live	in	such	countries	are	only	external	signs	of	this	underlying	condition.	The	images	of	the	ragged	poor	of	Asia	thus	become	legible	as	markers	of	a	stage	of	development,	while	the	bloated	bellies	of	African	children	as	the	signs	of	social	as	well	as	nutritional	deficiency.	Within	this	problematic,	it	appears	self-evident	that	debtor	Third	World	nation-states	and	starving	peasants	share	a	common	“problem,”	that	both	lack	a	single	“thing”:	“development.”	(Ferguson	xiii)		These	“interpretive	grids”	operate	at	the	intersection	of	“marked”	land	(nation-states,	and	“our”	nation-state	versus	“the	foreign”)	and	“landed”	time:	a	geographical	
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grid	of	“stages”	on	the	vector	line	of	chronological	development	towards	the	model	on	display,	namely	the	alleged	“First	World.”	But	there	is	another	key	element	here:	Ferguson	speaks	of	the	“images	of	the	ragged	poor”	that	become	“legible	markers	of	stage	of	development”	(my	emphasis).	It	is	the	images	that	mediate,	transport,	validate	and	reinforce	these	psychogeographic	epistemological	grids.	And	as	mediators	of	ideologically	charged	epistemologies,	these	images	constitute	the	spectacle	in	its	worldwide	show	of	worlds.	Ultimately,	what	ascribes	“modernity”	to	an	imaginarily	unitary	geographic	entity	is	not	merely	whoever	controls	wealth,	but	just	as,	or	even	more,	importantly,	who	owns	the	camera56.	Whoever	gained	possession	of	the	camera	will	have	the	upper	hand	as	to	who	gets	framed	how,	what	is	left	out	of	frame,	and	what	the	very	frames	(i.e.,	demarcations)	will	be.		The	definitive	aspect	of	the	notions	of	unitary	First	and	Third	World	countries	or	continents	is	thus	to	be	traced	to	possession	of	the	camera	to	generate	shows.	When	the	accumulation	of	shows,	and	its	ensuing	demarcation	of		spectacular	stages	on	world	geography,	succeeds	in	declaring	this	or	that	country	or	continent	“thirdworldly”	or	“underdeveloped,”	everything	that	country	or	continent	does	will	therefore	be	“thirdworldly”	because	the	imaginary	status	quo,	in	its	framed	partialities	and	hidden	off-frames,	seeks	to	validate	these	locative	
																																																								56	The	camera	or	the	page,	for	the	spectacle	takes	on	the	form	of	visual,	written,	and	even	oral	texts.	The	“spectacle	of	the	New	World”	certainly	depended	on	the	explorers’	control	of	journal	and	quill,	rather	than	a	camera.	However,	because	this	study	focuses	on	advanced	modernity,	and	therefore	only	secondarily	on	pre-photographic	materials,	and	mostly	on	twentieth-century	visual	texts,	I	will	refer	to	the	power	dynamics	at	hand	contractedly	as	“control	of	camera”	without	the	intention	to	exclude	any	other	recording	devices.		
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generalizations	so	that	the	“tautological	circularity”	that	Leary	sees	in	the	notion	of	development	and	underdevelopment	(10)	is	indeed	accomplished	by	means	of	an	inversion	whereby	people	do	not	do	things	that	give	a	place	its	character,	but	the	place	itself,	already	spectacularly	labeled,	determines	that	whatever	people	do	there	will	be,	by	definition,	“firstworldly”	or	“thirdworldly.”	The	where	becomes	the	who.	And	the	how.	A	riot	in	Brazil	is	the	sociopolitical	unrest	of	an	uncivilized	society,	but	the	same	riot	in	London	is	just	a	protest	gone	awry57.		The	show	of	worlds,	as	a	world-scale,	commodity-normative	spectacle	that	
territorializes	its	associated	epistemologies	(with	time	already	embedded	in	them),	is	primarily	dependent	on	control	of	the	camera	and	its	resulting	“curatorial	upper	hand”	on	the	spectacular	images	put	in	circulation,	so	that	the	First	World	and	the	Third	World	are	shown	(literally	imagined)	to	be	what	needs	to	be	claimed	about	them	through	an	operation	of	in-framing	and	out-framing.	It	becomes	therefore	essential	that	we	consider	the	matters	of	gaze,	objectification,	exotification	and	posing	in	relation	to	spectacular	inventions	of	First	and	Third	World.	To	this	aim,	I	will	turn	to	a	classical	myth.		According	to	the	most	common	version	of	the	Greek	myth	of	Actaeon	and	Artemis,	Actaeon,	a	Boeotian	hunter,	having	wondered	off	in	the	woods	and	away	from	his	hunting	companions,	accidentally	walked	upon	Artemis,	the	Olympian	
																																																								57	The	2011	England	riots	were	an	entirely	British	political	event	that	began	after	a	protest	in	Tottenham	over	the	fatal	shooting	of	Mark	Dugan	by	police	on	August	4	of	that	year	and	quickly	spread	as	looting	and	arson	across	England.			
	 184	
goddess	of	wild	animals,	vegetation	and	childbirth,	who	was	naked	while	bathing	in	a	pool	of	water	in	a	cave,	accompanied	by	her	attending	nymphs.	Upon	seeing	Actaeon	entering	the	cave,	the	nymphs	screamed	to	warn	the	Artemis	and	rushed	around	the	goddess	in	an	attempt	to	cover	her	body.	Furious	that	Actaeon	had	seen	her	disrobed,	Artemis	splashed	water	in	his	face,	saying:	“Now	you	are	free	to	tell	that	you	have	seen	me	all	unrobed	–	if	you	can	tell.”	As	these	words	were	being	uttered,	horns	began	to	grow	from	Actaeon’s	head,	and	he	turned	into	a	stag.	Actaeon	ran	away	in	fear,	only	to	be	pursued,	caught	and	torn	to	pieces	by	his	own	hunting	dogs	(Encyclopædia	Britannica;	Maicar	&	Förlag;	Morford,	Lenardon	&	Sham).		This	myth	perfectly	metaphorizes	the	problem	of	the	“thirdworldizing	eye.”	At	its	most	basic,	the	myth	reads	like	this:	a	roaming	hunter	walks	upon	the	goddess	of	wild	animals	and	vegetation,	whom	the	hunter	catches	in	a	position	of	vulnerability.	In	other	words,	Artemis	finds	herself	forced	to	pose	in	shame,	the	victim	of	an	unwelcome	gaze,	and	unable	to	arrange	herself	for	the	inquiring	eye.	The	woman’s	biggest	fear	is	that	the	wandering	hunter	might	tell,	thus	propagating	her	disgrace.	As	punishment	and	defense,	she	intervenes	the	gazer’s	own	image,	whose	conversion	into	a	stag	“is	simply	a	matter	of	attaching	horns	to	his	head,	enough	to	impel	his	hunting	dogs	to	attack	him”	(Neils	293).	Artemis	is	effectively	torn	into	pieces	as	a	result	of	an	inversion	that	moves	him	from	the	position	of	hunter	to	that	of	game.	In	other	words,	a	traveling	conquistador,	by	virtue	of	his	hunting	voyage,	happens	upon	the	embodiment	of	exotic	wilderness	and	exuberant	
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nature,	and	surprises	it	disrobed.	Having	found	herself	forced	to	pose	in	disgrace	for	the	intruder,	and	facing	the	risk	that	this	intruder	might	spectacularize	her	pathetization	(“Now	you	are	free	to	tell	that	you	have	seen	me	all	unrobed”),	the	only	recourse	for	Artemis	to	save	her	honor	is	to	attack	the	very	possibility	of	the	spectacularized	dissemination	of	her	shame	by	inverting	the	indiscreet	eye’s	defenses,	thus	détouring	its	internal	mechanics	and	breaking	it	into	pieces.		What’s	at	stake	in	the	spectacular	invention	of	the	First/Third	Worlds	is	control	of	the	camera,	and,	by	virtue	of	this	control,	the	possibility	of	framing	oneself	and	the	Other,	or	denying	the	Other	the	possibility	of	self-framing,	as	needed	to	convey	the	territorialized	narratives	of	the	shows	of	modernity.	Like	Actaeon,	the	conquistador,	the	travel	writer,	the	ethnographer,	enjoy	above	all	freedom	of	circulation	supported	by	a	defense	apparatus	(soldiers,	hunting	dogs)	and	the	possibility	of	artemizing	exotified	or	primitivized	spaces	(vegetation	and	wild	animals,	respectively)	by	way	of	a	surreptitious	actaeonic	eye	that	forces	the	object	of	artemization	to	pose	in	disgrace.	Leary	very	accurately	illustrates	artemization	in	his	discussion	of	Shakespeare’s	play	The	Tempest	and	Aimé	Cesaire’s	postcolonialist	restaging	Une	Tempête,	about	the	power	of	images	to	invent	new	worlds:		[i]n	one	sequence	of	the	play,	Prospero	has	conquered	Caliban’s	island	and	imposed	upon	him	what	Caliban	calls	“an	image	of	myself.”	The	“image”	of	“the	underdeveloped”	is	Prospero’s	greatest	weapon:	it	becomes	“the	way	you	have	forced	me	to	see	myself”	(Leary	19)	
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The	spread	of	this	pathetized	image	can	only	be	stopped	by	means	of	an	act	of	
détournement,	whereby	the	artemized	term	“puts	horns	on	the	spectacle”:	indeed,	the	combined	operation	of	intervening	an	image,	turning	it	against	itself,	and	breaking	it	into	pieces	describes	the	praxis	of	détournement	almost	too	perfectly.		In	an	attempt	to	defend	the	spectacle	and	restore	the	discourse	of	development,	one	might	present	the	counterargument	that	“who	gained	control	of	the	camera”	as	a	means	of	symbolic	domination	is	not	different	than	the	economist	perspective	of	who	was	more	developed,	that	the	actaeonic	part	has	control	of	the	camera	precisely	because	it	is	more	developed.	The	illusion	of	development	is	probably	more	tied	to	the	hunting	dogs	(savagery	of	military	action,	whether	it	comes	from	an	alleged	first-	or	third-world	demarcation)	and	to	the	chance	of	voyage	(he	who	travels	for	hunting	stands	a	better	chance	to	“catch”	a	bathing	Atremis,	whether	intended	or	not).	But,	above	all,	as	Artemis	demonstrates	in	her	actions,	shows	can	be	stolen,	the	spectacle	can	be	disrupted	by	the	pathetized	term.	It	is	more	about	awareness	of	spectacular	mechanics,	what	we	might	call	a	“meta-spectacular	conscience,”	than	it	is	about	“development.”	If	the	United	States	has	invented	the	thirdworldly	Latin	America	as	a	projection	of	its	doubts	and	anxieties	about	its	own	development,	civility,	political	maturity,	and	modernity,	as	Leary	affirms,	then	Santiago	Álvarez’s	Now	can	be	summarized	as	Artemis’	punishment,	as	it	inverts	the	projectional	narrative	by	sending	those	images	of	underdevelopment,	backwardness,	political	immaturity	and	anachronistic	languidness	back	to	the	US,	while	adopting	a	south-to-north	actaeonic	eye	against	colonial	paths	of	circulation.	
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And	it	shows,	all	too	vividly,	how	the	hunting	dogs	do	turn	against	Americans	as	much	as	they	do	against	foreigners,	thus	making	a	stable	geographical	demarcation	of	perpetrator/victim	of	U.S.	military	violence	difficult	to	say	the	least.	As	critical	tools,	the	concepts	of	actaeonic	eye	and	artemization	should	be	useful	to	describe	the	dynamics	of	power	at	play	in	terms	of	(self-)framing	in	the	context	of	the	mutual	imagination	of	the	so-called	Third	and	First	Worlds.			4.2	I	will	now	consider	the	implications	of	the	power	mechanics	described	above	in	relation	to	ethno-themed	texts	in	general,	and	to	Santiago	Álvarez’s	Now	in	particular.	The	bearing	of	the	actaeonic	eye	and	the	artemization	of	the	Third	World	on	inter-worlds	representations	as	a	function	of	spectacular	politics	certainly	applies	to	the	practice	of	ethnography.	However,	as	I	explained	in	Chapter	1,	I	will	ascribe	to	a	restrictive	understanding	of	that	field,	whereby	ethnographic	texts	are	produced	by	trained	and	professional	ethnographers.	The	degree	to	which	ethnography	participates	in	the	spectacular	construction	of	the	two	worlds	is	a	crucial	discussion,	but	one	for	those	in	the	field,	and	in	which	I	cannot	participate.	Therefore,	when	I	say	“ethno-themed”	texts,	I	speak	of	what	Harrison	refers	to	as	“folk	ethnography”	as	per	Elijah	Anderson’s	definition:	“a	form	of	people	watching	that	allows	individuals	informally	to	gather	evidence	in	social	interactions	that	supports	their	own	viewpoints	or	transforms	their	common-sense	understanding	of	social	life	(xv,	cited	in	Harrison	4).	This	distinction	matters	because	this	is	fully	at	play	in	Now.	But	it	also	matters	because	there	are	forms	of	“folk	ethnographic	
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readings”	constantly	originating	from	non-academic	texts	that	are	close	to	Anderson’s	definition.	As	Jay	Ruby	asserts,	“[s]ome	scholars	will	even	argue	that	all	film	is	ethnographic”	(1346).	So,	if	“folk	ethnography”	refers	to	the	first-hand	experience	whereby	“racially,	ethnically	and	socially	diverse	peoples	spend	casual	and	purposeful	time	together,	coming	to	know	one	another”	(Anderson	xv),	ethnographic	knowledge	or	imaginations	extracted,	consciously	or	not,	from	non-academic	texts,	from	Hollywood	film	to	activist	documentaries,	could	be	called	“pop	
ethnography.”	And	then	there	is	a	third	form	of	non-professional,	“commoners’	ethnography”:	that	exercised	by	journalism,	another	factor	heavily	at	play	in	Álvarez’s	work.	I	have	been	calling	this	last	form	“ethno-journalism.”		To	summarize,	this	study	will	not	deal	with	professional	ethnographic	texts	because	that	field	falls	outside	of	my	scope.	It	will,	however,	deal	with	“ethno-
themed”	texts,	namely	non-scholarly	texts,	including	images	and	film,	from	which	ethnographic	ideas	(i.e.,	“ideas	about	others”)	are	drawn	by	regular	(i.e.,	non-professional	academic)	audiences,	otherwise	definable	as	the	ethnographic	component	that	any	text	contains	as	long	as	it	attempts	to	represent,	document	or	invent	“the	others.”	And	I	will	further	classify	these	ethno-themed	texts	and	their	associated	processes	into	three	kinds,	namely:	(1)	folk	ethnography;	(2)	pop	
ethnography;	and	(3)	ethno-journalism,	with	an	understanding	that	these	three	categories	are	often	complementary	or	concurrent.	The	latter	two	are	essential	to	an	understanding	of	Now	from	a	demarcational	point	of	view.		
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In	addition	to	the	U.S.	-	Latin	America	projectional	inversion	described	above,	there	is	one	other	inversion	at	play	in	Now.	Álvarez’s	peculiar	“documontage”	is	seminally	rooted	in	a	field	experience	the	director	had	in	the	United	States	in	his	youth	which	can	be	understood	as	a	“folk	ethnographic	observation”	with	a	vocation	for	ethno-journalism.	During	an	interview	with	Castillo	and	Hadad	for	
Revista:	Harvard	Review	of	Latin	America,	Álvarez	insists	that	the	“mystery	of	intuition,”	which	the	director’s	assistant	Rebeca	Chavez	ascribes	to	the	genesis	of	his	work,	is	not,	at	least	in	and	of	itself,	the	most	accurate	way	to	characterize	his	work:		If	I	hadn’t	had	the	experience	I	had	in	my	life,	if	I	hadn’t	been	to	the	United	States,	if	I	hadn’t	worked	as	a	dishwasher	in	New	York,	if	I	hadn’t	been	a	miner,	…	if	I	hadn’t	worked	on	an	hour	of	youth	radio	when	I	was	14	and	15	years	old,	because	I	had	a	political	vocation,	if	I	hadn’t	had	all	that	background,	I	don’t	think	intuition	would	have	yielded	results	(my	translation	from	Spanish)	As	a	low-wage	worker,	Álvarez	had	seen	first-hand	the	realities	of	poverty	and	vulnerability	among	the	United	States	underdeveloped	solidarities.	It	is	also	very	important	that	he	mentions	his	work	in	the	mines.	In	adherence	to	the	common	spectacular	framing	of	American	identity,	which	tries	to	frame	“the	American”	as	a	white	middle-class	while	leaving	Americans	of	color	out	of	frame,	counterarguments	might	insist	that	what	Álvarez	knew	was	not	the	real	United	States,	as	dishwashing	jobs	tend	to	be	held	by	foreign	immigrants.	While	even	this	statement	would	be	problematic,	the	mines	are	a	labor	space	that	deeply	complicates	U.S.	framings	of	
	 190	
“even”	development,	as	mining	company	towns,	like	plantations,	were,	according	to	a	Coal	History	article	on	Company	Towns,	notorious	in	Álvarez’s	time	for	“[r]acial	and	ethnic	violence”	and	were	deeply	segregated	among	non-immigrant	white	Americans,	African	Americans,	and	immigrants,	who	lived	in	separate	sections	of	the	towns	and	formed	their	own	cultural	and	fraternal	community	institutions	(West	Virginia	National	Coal	Heritage	Area	&	Coal	Heritage	Trail).		Álvarez’s	field	experience	in	the	United	States	did	not	only	afford	him	a	perspective	of	underdeveloped	America	key	to	the	inversion/détournement	of	the	country’s	spectacular	development	discourse.	According	to	the	biography	prepared	by	the	ICAIC’s	Santiago	Álvarez	Office	(Oficina	Santiago	Álvarez),	the	director-to-be	moved	to	the	United	States	at	age	19,	after	having	been	unable	to	continue	his	studies	in	medicine.	The	director	explains	that	the	idea	for	Now	originates	in	an	event	which	took	place	during	this	experience:		I	took	a	Greyhound	bus,	a	line	that	covered	the	Miami	–	New	York	route	(…)	The	bus	started	to	fill	with	black	people.	At	one	point,	a	black	woman	boards	with	a	child	in	her	arms.	Logically,	when	I	saw	her	get	on	I	tried	to	offer	her	my	seat.	The	people	on	the	bus	started	to	tell	me	horrible	things	(…)	I	told	the	black	woman	to	give	me	the	child	to	put	him	in	my	arms.	The	people	on	the	bus	started	to	yell	“son	of	a	bitch”	and	a	thousand	other	things	at	me.	I	answered	to	them:	“you’ll	have	to	kill	me	to	take	this	child	off	my	lap.”	There	the	black	woman	became	desperate	and	terrified	and	asked	me	not	to	do	that.	In	those	times,	there	was	a	law	(…)	per	which	black	people	could	only	
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sit	in	the	two	seats	in	the	back	of	the	bus.	Because	of	this,	the	black	woman,	panicked,	took	her	child	and	went	to	the	back.	That	experience	was	strongly	engraved	in	my	mind”	(cited	from	Labaki,	my	translation	from	Spanish).		This	anecdote	is	notable	for	a	number	of	reasons.	First	of	all,	because,	as	I	have	asserted,	the	experience	itself,	before	becoming	Now,	constitutes	an	inversion	of	the	vector	of	displacement	of	US	underdevelopment	as	Leary	proposes	it:	this	is	a	Latin	American	man	experiencing	the	precarious	life	conditions	of	Americans	–	not	“Black	people”	as	if	“Black	persons”	were	not	Americans,	in	the	way	that	the	spectacle	often	frames	U.S.	identity,	but	full	Americans.	As	we	will	see	further	on,	that	the	country’s	citizens	of	color	“happen”	to	be	the	most	dispossessed	only	makes	the	United	States	resemble	Latin	America	even	more	closely.		There	is	another	subtle	element	at	play	in	Álvarez’s	experience:	from	his	own	anecdotal	narration,	we	understand	that	he	was	sitting	where	black	passengers	couldn’t	sit.	In	that	situation,	Álvarez	was	(being/passing	as/demarcated	as)	white	and	was	riding	in	the	front	seats.	If	they	were	yelling	at	him,	it	was	for	his	“white	betrayal,”	as	perhaps	they	would	have	yelled	at	a	white	Anglo	American	from	the	northern	states	who	was	attempting	some	sort	of	subversion.	Furthermore,	it	is	hard	to	digest	the	line	“you’ll	have	to	kill	me	to	take	this	child	off	my	lap”	without	it	ringing	overdramatic	and	corny.	As	a	matter	of	fact,	the	phrase,	as	related,	sounds	very	much	like	the	discourse	of	a	“white	hero”58.	The	experience	really	summarizes	
																																																								58	These	“white	heroes”	are	what	Magdalena	Malinowska	calls	“intrepid	white	saviors”	in	her	dissertation	on	international	development	in	travel	writing,	where	she	examines	how	narratives	of	
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as	the	act	of	a	white	hero,	paternally	defending	destitute	people	of	color,	only	that,	against	the	common	geocirculatory	conventions	of	First-on-Third-World	folk	
ethnographic	shows.		The	seed	of	Now’s	inversion	of	the	anxious	displacement	onto	Latin	America	of	the	United	States’	internal	underdevelopment,	as	Leary	describes	and	documents	it,	is	thus	material,	field	experience,	not	just	wishful	thinking	or	a	symbolic	exploration	of	desire.	Although	a	demarcational	critique	of	ideology,	as	the	systematic	contestation	of	all	boundaries	assumed	stable	or	self-evident,	may	involve	an	act	of	manifesto,	and	thus	pledge	to	counter	indistinctively	all	
demarcational	claims	to	superiority	as	a	matter	of		revolutionary	strategy,	what	the	field	experience	at	the	genesis	of	Now	implies	is	that	the	stable	and	nation-state-based	First-and	Third-World	demarcational	status	quo	is	materially	untrue,	in	its	physical	referential	substrate	as	much	as	in	its	symbolic	excess.	The	show	of	worlds	does	hide	realities	and	preclude	solidarities	by	highlighting	partial	framings	and	one-way	paths	as	absolute	and	exhaustive.	As	a	matter	of	fact,	the	show	of	worlds	is	
designed	to	do	this:	as	the	symbolic	and	temporal	extension	of	the	ever-constructed	Eurocentrism,	one	chief	function	of	the	spectacle,	disseminated	through	the	show	of	
worlds,	is	to	hide	the	destitute	in	the	imaginary	First	World	and,	quite	problematically,	also	ends	up	hiding	the	powerful	hegemons	in	and	of	the	
																																																								white	Spaniards	combating	“underdevelopment”	in	poor	countries	update	the	myths	of	the	colonial	explorer	and	the	missionary.		
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imaginary	Third	World,	an	issue	to	which	I	will	return	further	down,	when	I	look	into	problematizations	of	Latin	American	victimization.			As	I	have	mentioned,	the	field	of	ethnography	would	do	well	to	look	at	their	practice	through	a	demarcational	lens	that	puts	into	question	the	possibility	of	their	participation	in	the	spectacular	invention	of	the	two	worlds.	That	is	something	I	cannot	do,	as	I	am	not	a	scholar	in	the	field.	Instead,	I	have	focused	on	what	I	call	“ethno-themed	texts,”	a	term	by	which	I	wish	to	capture	not	just	the	extent	to	which	this	or	that	inter-worlds	text	carries	non-academic	ethnographic	meanings	extractable	by	common	audiences,	but	also	the	fact	that	any	text	can	be	ethnographic,	as	per	Ruby’s	assertion,	and	casual	ethnographic-like	readings	by	non-academic	observers	can	be	referred	to	as	folk	ethnography,	as	per	Harrison.	What’s	of	the	greatest	importance	about	Now	in	this	respect	is	the	fact	that	its	conception	covers	the	three	modalities	of	ethno-themed	texts:	in	terms	of	Álvarez’s	seminal	field	observation,	it	constitutes	an	example	of	folk	ethnography.	In	the	interview	with	Castillo	&	Hadad	referenced	above,	Álvarez	insists	that	his	work	is	not	just	the	product	of	“magical”	intuition	but	it	would	not	have	been	possible	“[I]f	[he]	hadn’t	had	the	experience	[he]	had	in	[his]	life,	…	hadn’t	been	to	the	United	States,	…	hadn’t	worked	on	an	hour	of	youth	radio	when	I	was	14	and	15	years	old,	
because	I	had	a	political	vocation”	(my	emphasis).	Indeed,	it’s	not	the	“magical	mystery	of	intuition”	that	resulted	in	his	work,	but	the	combination	of	folk	
ethnographic	field	experience	and	journalistic	work	with	a	political	drive,	which	adds	the	element	of	ethno-journalism	to	the	director’s	production.	And	we	cannot	
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forget	that	Now,	the	product	of	that	experience,	is	a	prime	example	of	politically-purposed	pop	culture,	from	Lena	Horne’s	song	to	a	form	of	music-threaded	montage	that	constitutes	the	predecessor	of	the	music	video	or	video	clip,	possibly	the	epitome	of	(post-)modern	pop.	Álvarez’s	unique	accomplishments	in	Now	are	the	result	of	the	most	comprehensive	form	of	ethno-themed	textuality:	folk	
ethnography	processed	through	the	testimonial	commitment	of	ethno-journalism,	and	delivered	with	the	aesthetic	appeal	of	pop	ethnography.		As	Debord	posits	in	Theses	11	of	The	Society	of	the	Spectacle,	“[t]o	analyze	the	spectacle	means	talking	its	language	…	to	the	degree	…	that	we	are	obliged	to	engage	the	methodology	of	the	society	to	which	the	spectacle	gives	expression”	(15).	One	of	the	most	determinant	strengths	of	Now	stems	precisely	from	its	pop	discourse,	from	its	ability	to	speak	like	the	spectacle	while	detouring	it.	But	Now’s	pop	language	must	always	be	understood	as	a	pop	ethnographic	discourse	in	the	terms	defined	above,	for	its	power	rests	on	the	director’s	field	experience,	where	he	was	able	to	assume	and	hijack	a	racialized	show	that	normally	runs	in	the	opposite	direction:	on	that	Greyhound	bus,	the	Latin	American	was	the	white	savior,	and	an	American	woman	was	the	vulnerable	person	of	color.	Álvarez	is	thus	able	to	sneak	into	the	United	States’	“contradictory	discourse	of	difference	and	desire,”	as	Leary	asserts,	whereby	Mexico	was,	as	annexationist	John	O’Sullivan	posited,	racially	and	culturally	incompatible	with	the	meaning	of	the	United	States	due	to	its	being	too	“Old	World”	(Leary	3).	The	“vestigial”	condition	of	Mexico’s	“indigenous”	and	“backwards”	culture,	as	he	would	consider	it,	also	existed	within	the	United	States,	
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of	course,	but	had	to	be	displaced	and	“dealt	with”	as	a	dislocated	projection	onto	Latin	America,	following	Leary’s	postulate.	O’Sullivan	saw	Cuba,	on	the	other	hand,	as	“a	white,	Christian	country,	a	natural	and	necessary	part	of	the	United	States’	modern	future”	(Leary	3).	This	is,	of	course,	a	dangerous	nationalist	discourse	of	racist	desires,	but	it	is	precisely	in	Álvarez’s	experience	that	its	fundamental	instability	is	exposed.	On	the	bus,	Álvarez	was	able	to	pass	as	a	white	man,	a	move	only	possible	because	the	racialized	dimension	of	the	First-and-Third-Worlds	discourse	tends	to	displace	non-whiteness	onto	the	imaginary	Third	World	while	hiding	or	denaturalizing	Africanity	in	the	alleged	First	World.	It	is	Álvarez’s	ability	to	sneak	into	the	most	fundamental	vulnerability	of	this	discourse	that	allows	him	to	hijack	the	show	of	worlds	that	anchors	and	projects	races	and	conditions	on	geographic	stages,	thus	presenting	that	form	of	racialized	spectacle	inverted	in	a	pop	language	(a	music	video)	that	spectacularized	audiences	can	readily	recognize.		That	the	show	of	worlds	seeks	to	displace	indigenousness	and	Africanity	onto	the	imagined	Third	World	is	problematic	for	a	number	of	reasons.	First	of	all,	the	conflation	of	pre-charged	epistemologico-geographical	compartments	with	race	presents	dangers	and	cannot	be	left	unquestioned.	Whether	the	term	“backward”	or	the	newer	“underdeveloped”	is	used,	they	“both	imply	a	hierarchy,	with	an	implied	temporal	progression	of	“backward”	to	advanced	and	a	spatial	progression	of	“under”	and	“above”	[and	where]	[t]he	direction	of	“advancement”	is	onward	in	time,	upward	in	space	to	the	United	States	and	Western	Europe”	(Leary	5).	This	is,	as	I	have	noted,	time	fully	leaked	onto	space.	When	one	adds	race	to	the	mechanism,	
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and	it	seems	as	though	“Latin	America	is	indigenous”	but	the	United	States	is	not,	the	full	extent	of	the	deep	racism	the	underlies	the	show	of	worlds	becomes	evident.	This	show	hides	the	people	of	color	in	the	United	States	as	full	Americans.	When	it	insists	that	the	United	States	is	a	“developed	first-world	nation,”	the	only	way	it	can	save	that	impossible	epistemology	is	by	degrading	non-white	Americans	(and	poor	whites)	to	mere	“pockets	of	underdevelopment.”	The	American	poor	of	color	are	not	pockets	of	underdevelopment:	they	are	full	U.S.	citizens	and	if	so	many	full	U.S.	citizens	experience	underdevelopment	then	the	United	States	cannot	be	deemed	a	developed	nation	and	Latin	America	cannot,	by	differential	opposition,	be	deemed	
its	Third	World.		Whatever	conditions	we	associate	with	“development”	and	“underdevelopment,”	those	must	not	be	assigned	unitarily	to	geographical	departments	such	as	“country”	or	“continent,”	but	to	fluid	non-national	human	entities	that	I	have	proposed	to	call	“solidarities.”	One	very	interesting	“de-marcational”	challenge	that	postcolonial	scholarship	could	assume	in	this	respect	would	be	its	ability	to	conduct	a	full	analysis	of	the	domination	of	the	poorer	workers	and	vulnerable	societies	(the	“solidarities”)	by	the	owners	of	capital	(the	“consortiums”)	without	using	one	single	country	or	continent	name	in	order	to	espouse	a		postcolonial	perspective	fit	for	a	political	landscape	in	which	it	had	become	difficult	to	pinpoint	single	stable	centers	(or	peripheries).	Along	these	lines,	a	de-marcational	critique	of	postcolonial	studies	would	require	that	we	put	into	question	the	habit	of	speaking	of	United	States	and	Latin	American	issues	in	
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different	terms.	Such	perspectives	would	open	up	useful	methodological	questions,	including	to	what	degree	the	insistence	on	treating	U.S.	sociopolitical	problems	as	fundamentally	different	from	Latin	America’s,	and	thus	impossible	to	analyze	under	the	same	lens	as	a	continuum,	contributes	to	the	creation	of	the	spectacular	fiction	of	U.S.	exceptionalism,	something	Leary	emphasizes	in	his	book.	Furthermore,	a	non-nation-states	approach	to	development	discourses	would	suddenly	shed	light	on	the	historical	participation	of	white	Latin	Americans	in	imperialist	consortiums.	It	would	also	highlight	the	fact	that	Latin	America,	from	the	earliest	stages	in	the	construction	of	its	national	identities,	has	sought	to	frame	itself	to	the	image	of	Europe	and	has	historically	attempted	to	hide	its	indigenous	and	black	identities	just	as	much	as	the	United	States	has.	I	will	return	to	this	particular	question	further	on	in	this	chapter.				4.3	Ultimately,	a	demarcational	critique	of	postcolonial	and	international	political	economic	studies	would	constitute	a	permanent	meta-reflection	on	the	spectacular	process	by	which	arbitrary	epistemological	demarcations	seek	to	validate	themselves	by	projecting	themselves	on	land	and	on	bodies.	I	have	discussed	
territorialization,	but	at	this	point	I	am	able	to	posit	that	the	territorialization	of	epistemologies	includes	bodies	as	well	as	land,	by	means	of	racial	compartmentalizations	that	are	conflated	with	geographical	demarcations.	As	Leary	points	out,	“even	though	the	‘third	world’	idea	was	successfully	reclaimed	as	a	
political	entity	of	cross-racial	anticolonial	unity,	the	concept	also	has	a	colonial,	
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racist	lineage,	which	it	has	never	entirely	lost”	(202).	Todd	Shepard,	in	his	analysis	of	the	inaugural	uses	of	the	term	“Third	World”	by	its	inventor,	French	demographer	Alfred	Sauvy,	points	out	how	the	Frenchman’s	1952	article	“connected	the	“Third	World”	with	the	pseudoscientific	idea,	elaborated	in	the	1920s	and	1930s	to	advance	racist	ends,	that	racially	“distinct”	populations	existed	and	that	the	ways	they	grew	or	shrank	shaped	world	history”	(59).	In	that	same	article,	Sauvy	argued	that,	in	the	context	of	the	Cold	War,	both	countries	should	modify	their	ideological	understanding	of	the	conflict	to	account	for	the	demographic	“problem”	posed	by	a	growing	“Third	World,”	something	the	Soviets	did;	the	US	did	not,	and	instead	continued	to	ignore	matters	of	race	and	racial	injustice,	which	hindered	its	efforts	to	win	over	those	“Third	World	nations”	for	“if	there	was	one	issue	that	the	country	that	still	had	Jim	Crow	laws	wanted	to	avoid	bringing	up	in	international	discussion	during	the	1950s	it	was	racial	injustice”	(Shepard	60).	These	racialized	geographical	demarcations	are	psychogeographies	in	as	much	as	they	come	pre-loaded	with	hierarchical	values	in	relation	to	the	values	of	modernity	(and	the	behavioral	needs	of	capitalism)	and	certain	paths	of	circulation	are	prescribed	among	them:	civilization	and	knowledge	is	imagined	to	circulate	from	north	to	south,	migrants	from	south	to	north,	development	and	modernization,	with	time,	are	deemed	to	“advance”	from	under/backward/south	up/forward/north,	and	white	saviors	of	poor	people	of	color	from	north	to	south.		As	I	have	mentioned,	the	spectacle	requires	a	stage	to	enact	its	shows,	and	the	largest	version	of	that	territorialized	stage	is	the	world	divided	in	two	halves	
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according	to	the	imagined	timetable	to	development.	Any	attempt	to	disrupt	the	
show	of	worlds	thus	requires	the	joint	operation	of	a	détournement	of	the	images	of	those	shows	and	a	subversive	and	global	adaptation	of	the	urban	practice	of	dérive	against	the	psychogeographies	that	maintain	the	epistemological	apparatus	of	the	spectacle.	That	joint	operation	I	have	defined	as	a	demarcational	critique	of	ideology.	In	the	same	way	in	which	Álvarez	is	able	to	“detour”	the	spectacle	both	symbolically	(in	inverted	pop	ethnographic	terms)	and	materially	(through	a	field	experience	where	he	himself	upsets	geo-racial	understandings	of	development),	the	director	also	moves	against	established	paths	of	psychogeographic	movement	both	physically	(as	a	white	savior	penetrating	the	underdeveloped	north,	as	questionable	as	that	form	of	“heroism”	can	be)	and	symbolically	(by	circumventing	the	embargo).	A	subversive	flâneur	in	the	urban	environment	will	challenge	the	city’s	prescribed	geometries,	its	established	(and	blocked)	forms	of	circulation.	In	overcoming	the	embargo	to	steal	artemizing	images	from	south	to	north,	Álvarez	executes	a	powerful	form	of	counter-spectacular	dérive.		The	spectacular	imagination	of	the	First	World	depends	on	its	actaeonic	eye.	In	the	times	of	Now,	control	of	the	camera	was	physically	reinforced	by	the	embargo,	which	prohibited	Álvarez	from	reenacting	the	path	that	put	him	in	the	seminal	Greyhound	experience	to	make	a	film	in	favor	of	the	revolution.	But	spectacular	pathetization	of	the	south	needs	more	than	just	an	actaeonic	eye	that	artemizes	it.	Its	racialized	inventions	of	the	two	worlds	involve	leaving	portions	of	itself	–	and	of	the	Other	–	out	of	frame:	in	its	self-representations,	it	must	exclude	any	internal	
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traits	in	conflict	with	modernity	or	Europeanness,	while	projecting	those	onto	the	“underdeveloped”	term.	The	First	World’s	underdevelopment,	indigenousness,	and	other	“pre-modern”	elements	must	thus	be	left	out	of	frame	in	order	to	construct	its	image	of	futuristic	modernity	while	simultaneously	cutting	out	of	frame	anything	other	than	those	same	elements	in	its	projectional	Third	World.	To	recognize	the	degree	to	which	Latin	America	may	contain	the	same	racial	narratives	as	the	United	States,	similar	uneven	pockets	of	(under)development,	and	analogous	ways	of	imagining	itself	as	an	extension	of	Europe,	albeit	in	varying	proportions	throughout	the	continent,	would	be	to	recognize	the	un-exceptionalism	of	the	United	States,	and	to	underscore	the	extent	to	which	the	notion	of	difference	and	exceptionalism	is	symbolic	in	excess	of	the	material	substrate.			
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PART	III:	
DEMARCATIONAL	CRITIQUE	
AS	A	METHOD	OF	TEXTUAL	ANALYSIS	
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Part	III	considers	a	demarcational	critique	of	the	capitalist	spectacle	in	relation	to	film	theory.	It	explores	the	double	operation	of	applying	theory	to,	and	extracting	theory	from,	filmic	texts	through	the	critical	model	proposed	in	the	previous	two	parts.	Finally,	this	part	considers	the	trilogy	of	films	Now	(Cuba,	1965),	The	Society	
of	the	Spectacle	(France,	1973)	and	Não	me	fale	sobre	recomeços	(Brazil,	2016)	as	a	theory	of	the	spectacle	in	transition	from	the	mechanical	to	the	digital	eras.			Chapter	5	tests	demarcational	critique	as	a	method	of	textual	analysis	in	film.	The	chapter	begins	with	a	review	of	Gregory	Nava’s	El	Norte	(1984)	and	considers	the	textual	functioning	of	concepts	introduced	in	parts	I	and	II,	including	framing,	circulation	of	images,	artemization	and	actaeonization,	grounded	epistemologies,	development	anxieties	and	imaginations	of	solidarities	and	consortiums.	Ultimately,	this	chapter	considers	the	particular	status	in	the	film	of	the	term	“gringo”	as	a	fleeting	signifier.				Chapter	6	traces	a	theoretical	history	of	the	spectacle	from	the	times	of	Debord	to	through	the	digital	era	into	the	current	age	of	virtual	reality	and	social	media.	It	proposes	that	three	films	can	be	deemed	a	theoretical	trilogy	in	this	respect:	Now	(Santiago	Álvarez,	1965),	The	Society	of	the	Spectacle	(Guy	Debord,	1973)	and	Não	
me	fale	sobre	recomeços	(Arthur	Tuoto,	2016).	The	chapter	examines	the	peculiar	way	in	which	each	of	these	films	carry	the	theory	of	the	spectacle	into	the	twenty-first	century.	As	it	reaches	Tuoto’s	film,	the	analysis	proposes	an	application	of	
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Walter	Benjamin’s	notion	of	constellations	to	describe	the	most	recent	patterns	in	the	circulation	of	spectacular	images.					
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5	
	
¿Dónde	están	los	gringos?:		
A	demarcational	reading	of	El	Norte.	
	
	
	
I’m	from	San	Diego,	but	I	come	from	a	border	family.	I	have	relatives	in	Tijuana.	As	a	
kid,	I	crossed	the	border	several	times	a	week,	often	wondering	who	lived	in	all	those	
cardboard	shacks	on	the	Mexican	side…	The	border	is	unique	–	the	only	place	in	the	
world	where	an	industrialized	first-world	nation	shares	the	border	with	a	third-world	
country.	In	California,	it’s	just	a	fence:	on	one	side	are	the	Tijuana	slums,	on	the	other	
side	–	San	Diego.	It’s	so	graphic!	This	was	the	gem	of	the	story.			
	
-	Gregory	Nava,	in	an	interview	with	Annette	Insdorf	for	The	New	York	Times,	1984	.		
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5.1	Chapter	1	of	this	study	introduced	and	updated	the	fundamental	theoretical	basis	for	my	critique	of	the	First-Third-World	epistemological	order	and	its	derived	ideological	establishment.	That	theoretical	foundation	comprised	Debord’s	Marxist	theory	of	the	spectacle,	here	reconsidered	and	expanded	through	the	concept	of	“shows,”	and	the	French	philosopher’s	notions	of	psychogeography	and	dérive,	adapted	to	a	global	perspective	of	geopolitical	epistemologies.	Chapter	2	delved	into	the	crucial	issue	of	time	in	relation	to	the	spectacle,	the	possibility	of	revolution,	and	the	illustrative	cornerstone	of	this	study,	Santiago	Álvarez’s	Now.	In	that	chapter,	I	consider	the	spectacle-related	problems	of	falsification	of	time	in	relation	to	the	documentary,	the	Cuban	revolution,	the	Latin	American	anti-imperialist	documentary,	and	spectacular	epistemologies,	and	proposed	“anti-cyclonic	time”	as	a	form	of	restitution	of	authentic	(and	lost)	cyclical	time	(against	false	pseudo-
cyclical	time,	as	per	Debord).	A	critique	of	La	hora	de	los	hornos	pointed	to	the	need	for	a	consideration	of	imaginations	of	time	in	relation	to	political	psychogeographies,	and	the	emancipatory	solidarities	that	those	psychogeographies	allow	or	preclude.		Chapter	3	departs	from	the	elaborations	of	spectacular	orders	of	knowledge,	including	the	particularly	delicate	categories	of	time,	of	the	previous	chapters,	to	postulate	a	model	for	the	territorialization	of	epistemological	systems	as	a	function	of	spectacular	media.	With	the	possibility	that	knowledge	of	time,	so	indispensable	to	any	revolutionary	project	that	requires	meta-historical	consciousness,	being	so	deeply	compromised	by	spectacular	falsifications,	and	the	lack	of	an	autonomous	
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(i.e.,	non-spatial)	epistemological	lexicon	for	time	itself,	there	emerges	the	need	for	a	critical	model	that	seeks	to	counter	the	spectacle	at	all	levels:	by	disrupting	and	reversing	its	imaginary	mechanics	at	the	levels	of	framing,	territorialization	of	time,	and	general	psychogeographization.	That	model,	which	I	have	called	a	“demarcational	critique”	of	ideology,	would	require	the	combined	services	of	counter-framing	détournement	and	counter-psychogeographic	dérive,	and	could	be	summarily	defined	as	the	questioning	of	the	oppositional	demarcation	matrix	upon	which	spectacular	texts	build	themselves	to	reinforce	or	preclude	certain	orders	of	thought,	with	particular	attention	to	spatialized	assumptions	of	time.	A	
demarcational	reading	of	a	text	would	thus	concern	itself	with	the	system	of	demarcations	upon	which	that	text	builds	its	differential	oppositions.	In	other	words,	this	kind	of	reading	would	descend	on	the	lines	that	establish	differences	and	could	thus	de	understood	as	the	systematic	questioning	of	presumed	difference,	or	as	the	critical	probe	of	all	processes	of	sameness	and	difference	taken	for	granted	as	self-evident,	referential	or	stable.	The	particular	focus	of	my	demarcational	critique	is	on	notions	of	geographically-anchored	developed	and	developed	nations	and	societies,	as	conveyed	by	the	current,	post-Cold	War	Era,	cultural	use	of	the	differential	terms	of	“First	World”	and	“Third	World.”		That	chapter	considers	the	elaborations	of	Susan	Buck-Morss	in	relation	to	the	dangers	of	(certain)	epistemological	orders	and	the	need	for	non-nation-state	models	of	political	thought,	to	propose	a	form	of	postcolonial	analysis	devoid	of	all	stable	geographical	handles,	whereby	the	struggle	for	emancipation	from	capitalist	
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domination/falsification	of	life	in	the	age	of	the	advanced	spectacle	can	be	described	as	one	between	solidarities	being	exploited	by	consortiums.	These	would	be	the	two	terms	of	a	non-national	model	of	emancipatory	discourse,	under	the	caution	that	neither	of	them	is	stable	and	that	both	are	of	a	paradoxical	nature:	any	one	individual,	society	or	institution	should	be	understood	as	dialectically	and	intersectionally	capable	of	simultaneously	being	both	a	solidarity	and	a	
consortium.	This	also	means	that,	in	this	very	fluid	manner,	solidarities	comprise	individuals,	entities	and	land	that	encompass	the	realm	of	the	imaginary	Third	and	First	World,	not	as	mere	“pockets	of	underdevelopment”	in	the	“First	World”	but	as	full	participant	of	this	ever-shifting,	de-centered	global	reality.	What	this	means	is	that	the	who	is	no	longer	epistemologically	anchored	to	the	where	or	the	when,	and	political	realities	are	considered	in	the	same	way	as	spectacular	images	in	the	stage	of	digital	capitalism:	ever-flowing,	ever-mutating,	winding	and	unwinding	around	multiple	and	contradictory	centers,	with	apexes	and	peripheries	impossible	to	view	in	clean	and	mutually	exclusive	binary	terms,	let	alone	fixed	on	land.	This	chapter	considers	the	implications	of	a	demarcational	critique	of	ideology	on	a	number	of	crucial	fronts.	One	of	those	fronts	is	the	simplest	form	of	textual	analysis,	in	which	case	a	demarcational	critique	would	constitute	a	form	of	controlled	reading.	The	1983	film	El	Norte,	directed	by	Gregory	Nava,	lends	itself	to	a	particularly	interesting	demarcational	reading.		
El	Norte,	directed	by	Gregory	Nava	and	co-written	by	the	director	and	Anna	Thomas,	is	a	U.S./U.K.	independent	drama	film	released	in	1983.	Funded	by	PBS’s	
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American	Playhouse	series	and	England’s	Channel	4,	the	film	went	on	to	receive	an	Oscar	nomination	for	Best	Original	Screenplay	and	won	prizes	including	the	Montreal	World	Film	Festival’s	Grand	Prix	des	Amériques	and	selection	for	preservation	by	the	Library	of	Congress’s	National	Film	Registry.	It	tells	the	story	of	two	Mayan	indigenous	peasants	who	flee	their	native	Guatemala	for	the	United	States	to	escape	economic	and	political	abuse,	not	to	mention	the	sanguinary	Guatemalan	army	which,	after	killing	their	father,	destroying	their	village,	and	presumably	abducting	(disappearing,	in	the	transitive	form)	their	mother,	is	now	after	them.	The	story	begins	with	the	moments	prior	to	the	murder	of	their	father	by	government	troops	for	attempting	to	unionize	and	follows	them	along	their	journey	to	the	United	States	through	Mexico	and	to	the	difficulties	of	life	in	El	Norte.	Writing	for	the	New	York	Times,	film	scholar	Annette	Insdorf	claims	that,	in	the	film,	“Americans	are	peripheral	to	the	action,	and	the	United	States	is	a	foreign	and	exotic	locale.”	This	demarcational	analysis	seeks	to	demonstrate	that,	while	the	film	does	evince	some	awareness	of	the	imaginary	politics	at	play,	it	is	far	from	constituting	the	reversal	of	the	narratives	of	exotification	and	centrality	that	Insdorf	sees	so	clearly.		A	demarcational	reading	must	begin	by	identifying	the	demarcations	that	sustain	the	textual	system,	test	their	stability	and	imagine	alternative	forms	of	demarcation	(or	constructively	chaotic	“de-marcation”	all	together).	One	strength	of	the	term	“demarcation”	lies	with	the	fact	that	its	etymology	covers	not	just	the	immediate	meaning	that	relates	to	borders	and	divisions,	but	also	relates	to	frame:	
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de-marcate	as	both	de-lineate	and	de-frame.	As	I	have	discussed	above,	framing	(i.e.,	leaving	this	or	that	in,	out,	at	the	center	or	at	the	periphery,	of	frame	over	decades	of	spectacular	insistence)	is	a	key	mechanism	in	the	spectacular	construction	of	psychogeographies	of	“development”	and	narratives	of	“superiority”	as	the	stage	for	the	show	of	worlds.	The	first	and	most	obvious	demarcation	in	the	film	is	that	of	El	Norte	versus	The	Non-El	Norte.	El	Norte	is	interestingly	complicated	by	the	intermediate	presence	of	Mexico,	an	element	to	which	I	will	return.	The	established	path	of	circulation	is	south	to	north	for	migrants,	and	north	to	south	for	images	of	developments	(magazines,	etc.).	That	path	connects	a	Guatemalan	society	partialized	as	rural	Mayan	indigenous,	leaving	out	of	frame	urban	or	alternative	demographic	diversities,	to	the	second-largest	city	by	population	in	the	United	States,	where	those	from	El	Norte,	when	they	finally	begin	to	appear,	are	partialized	as	white	and	middle-to-upper	class,	thus	framing	out	poor,	indigenous	or	black	Americans.		All	narratives	of	geoidentity	and	belonging	rest	fully	on	this	demarcational	structure.	El	Norte	also	excludes	Los	Angeles	Latinos	by	omission,	and	Latinos	and	Hispanic	immigrants	are	portrayed	as	permanently	on	the	run,	while	those	from	El	Norte	tend	to	remain	unrushed,	restfully	anchored	to	either	their	assigned	
territorial	demarcation	or	their	actaeonic	eye	when	in	voyage.	Those	not	from	El	Norte	are	first	romanticized	as	permanent	de-anchored	runners	between,	or,	more	accurately	towards,	the	firmly-fixed	centers	of	El	Norte.	In	a	common	back-to	the-lander	form	romanticizing	Latin	America,	the	story	must	begin	with	this	imaginary	
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strong	attachment	of	Latin	American	indigenous	persons	to	the	land.	The	disturbance	of	this	attachment	by	Latin	America’s	“economic	and	political	underdevelopment”	unchains	the	dramatic	motor	of	the	story,	which	must	begin	with	this	primordial	demarcational	breakage.	Director	Gregory	Nava	tells	Insdorf	during	the	interview	with	The	New	York	Times,	“I	was	very	moved	by	these	people	who	had	been	so	tied	to	their	land	and	I	felt	this	is	where	these	people	who	had	been	so	tied	to	their	land	and	I	felt	this	is	where	the	story	should	start”	(1984).			To	put	the	narrator	down	with	the	characters,	“Third-World”	characters	should	normally	remain	tied	to	their	demarcation,	while	the	“First-World’s”	
actaeonic-eyed	narrator	moves	freely,	voyages	and	watches,	for	mystical	anachronistic	peace	or	artemized	pathetization.	To	be	clear,	the	tension	between	territorial	attachment	and	wandering	dwells	within	both	terms	of	the	spectacular	binary,	but	it	is	at	the	level	of	spectacular	power	that	the	show	of	worlds	is	constructed:	the	“Third	World”	is	supposed	to	be	romantically	attached	to	the	land.	Indeed:	indigenous	to	the	land,	in	the	most	literal	sense	of	the	word:	“growing,	living,	or	occurring	naturally	in	a	particular	region,”	according	to	Merriam-Webster.	If	indigeneity	is	disturbed,	those	“Thirdworlders”	will	remain	terminally	on	the	run,	while	still	being	magnetically	pulled	towards	the	North/First	World,	into	which	the	solutions	of	all	their	underdevelopments	are	demarcated.	The	spectacular	First	World,	a	geometric	center	that	orders	the	tempogeographies	of	redevelopment,	travels	and	watched:	penetrates	with	its	actaeonic	eye	when	in	the	opposing	terms	(the	“Third	World”)	and	remains	restive	within	its	demarcation.	While	the	South	
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should	stay	where	it	belongs	and	let	the	North	watch	it	in	disgrace,	it	is	the	very	disruption	of	this	geonormativity	that	triggers	an	unnatural	notion	that	never	affects	the	First-World	term.		Insdorf’s	assertion	that,	in	this	film,	Americans	are	not	the	center	of	the	action,	and	that	the	United	States	is	foreign	and	exotic,	a	“traditional	land	of	promise	rather	than	the	center	or	the	point	of	reference”	deserves	some	scrutiny.	The	film,	forcefully	titled	El	Norte,	establishes	the	United	States	as	the	center	of	all	motion	and	desire.	It	would	be	very	difficult	for	a	demarcational	term	to	constitute	the	land	of	promise	without	it	being	the	center	of	the	narrative.	Religious	connotations	aside,	the	land	of	promise	is	the	motor	of	all	movement,	geographical	and	temporal.	It	also	happens	to	be	a	necessary	basis	for	any	notion	of	manifest	destiny	or	exceptional	status,	lending	force	to	Leary’s	assertions	about	the	bearing	of	imaginations	of	“First	World	center”	on	the	construction	of	American	exceptionalism.	The	film	is	quite	accurately	titled	El	Norte,	and	El	Norte	remains	the	commanding	center	and	cardinal	point	of	reference	of	all	narrative	movements,	epistemological	and	territorialized.	As	a	psychomap	where	all	geometries	are	arranged	to	point	in	one	inevitable	direction,	El	Norte	is	the	protagonist	of	this	film:	as	much	as	it	may	claim	to	reverse	the	direction	of	the	exotifying	eye,	it	remains	the	central	object	of	every	single	attention	except	that	of	the	actaeonic	eye’s,	as	the	emplacement	of	“[d]evelopment	[that]	organizes	our	frames	of	international	geographical	reference”	(Leary	10).	Furthermore,	it	is	very	difficult	to	support	Insdorf’s	claim	that	the	film	turns	El	Norte,	that	is,	the	United	States,	into	an	exotic	
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land,	when	the	director	paints	an	image	of	the	Guatemalan	village	so	intensely	romanticized	as	a	land	of	picturesque	anachronism	that	Insdorf	herself	ends	up	calling	those	images	“tableaux	of	Mayan	village	life.”		Indeed,	the	representation	of	the	village	would	constitute	a	great	addition	to	Leary’s	archive,	for	it	exemplifies	too	exactly	the	kinds	of	anachronistic	projection	that	the	United	States	executes,	whereby	the	United	States	“was	“advanced”	when	others	were	“backward,”	had	subdued	a	wilderness	that	triumphed	elsewhere,	became	modern	when	others	languished	in	tradition”	(Leary	1,	his	quotations).	The	film’s	grandiloquent	old-world	family	interactions,	bombastic	revolutionary	speeches,	romantic	visits	through	barred	windows,	clay	houses,	magical	realistic	forest	appearances,	and	repeated	scenes	of	altars	full	of	candles,	are	little	more	than	the	oppositional	term	necessary	to	the	“national	fantasy	of	U.S.	development”	(Leary	11),	and	follows	in	the	“familiar	convention	of	Anglo-American	writing	on	Latin	America	to	identify	it	with	the	past,	either	with	antiquity	or	with	supposedly	vestigial	of	social	and	political	life		surpassed	in	the	United	States:	the	repression	of	women,	plantation	slavery,	indigeneity,	and	Catholic	‘superstition’”	(Leary	11)59.		
																																																								59	Conversely	reinforcing	these	anachronistic	views	of	Latin	America,	we	are	faced	with	scenes	such	as	when	Rosa	seems	to	discover	a	lipstick	for	the	first	time,	in	the	United	States	(01:23),	the	camera	trucking	of	the	wondrous	First-World	machines	in	the	banquet	hall	kitchen	where	Enrique	gets	his	first	job	(01:18),	or	the	(01:26,	01:29)	utter	confusion	surrounding	Rosa’s	attempt	at	operating	a	watching	machine.	As	Nacha	unequivocally	puts	is,	“That	is	how	things	are	one	her	in	The	North,	you	always	work	with	machines”	(1:31,	my	translation).		
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	 	Fig.	7		Gregory	Nava’s	El	Norte.		Those	four	themes	are	indeed	all	the	film	shows	about	Guatemala,	and,	by	
demarcational	extension,	Latin	America,	as	if	Nava	and	Thomas	had	followed	the	
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formula	articulated	by	Leary	with	the	most	diligent	obedience.	The	North,	on	the	other	hand,	and	the	spaces	of	the	“gringos”	within	it,	constitute	the	realm	of	wealthy	modernity	and	wall-to-wall	technological	advancement.	In	all	truthfulness,	Nava	and	Thomas	didn’t	have	to	put	too	much	effort	to	vest	onto	United	States	its	meanings	of	destiny	and	superiority	considering	how	that	cardinal	point	is	charged	in	western	culture,	from	cartographic	design	to	the	very	compass:	North	is	up.	The	choice	of	such	a	simple	title	for	the	film,	unintervened,	allows	this	enormous	flow	of	pre-charged	associated	connotations	to	fill	the	space	which	will	be	equaled	to	the	United	States,	to	which	any	other	space	cannot	but	look	up.			Naturally,	one	can	claim	that	there	is	truth	to	this:	that	there	are	of	course,	varying	degrees	of	tradition	and	indigeneity	in	Latin	America	and	that	the	siblings’	village,	San	Pedro,	can	very	well	correspond	to	the	more	traditional	areas	of	the	continent,	and	that	the	plot	of	Latin	American	peasants	emigrating	to	wealthy	North	American	suburbs	is	valid.	This	is	the	caution	with	which	one	must	analyze	and	critique	the	spectacle:	the	things	it	says	are	true	in	the	rawest	sense	of	truth,	but	the	ideological	manipulation	dwells	in	the	symbolic	excess	off	that	material	substrate.	There	are	traditional	indigenous	villages	in	Latin	America	where	people	did	not	know	how	to	apply	makeup	or	operate	home	appliances	in	1983	as	there	are	today,	but	Latin	America	is	also	a	highly	urbanized	continent,	home	to	some	of	the	largest	megacities	in	the	world	and,	while	a	romanticizing	eye	might	suggest	that	the	peasant’s	lens	is	a	comprehensive	way	to	inquire	into	Latin	American	society,	the	truth	is	that	many	of	Latin	America’s	most	comprehensive	narratives	are	urban	
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narratives,	perhaps	often	more	so	than	is	the	case	in	the	United	States.	And	there	are	indigenous	villages	in	the	United	States,	and	Nava	could	have	chosen,	say,	a	Cherokee	village	in	Oklahoma	instead	of	Los	Angeles.	The	problem	with	the	spectacle	is	thus	that	many	of	its	statements	are	true:	the	spectacular	equivocation	operates	through	re-proportioning	through	framing	(what’s	left	in	and	out,	at	the	center	and	at	the	edge,	of	each	term’s	identity	frame)	and	geographization	with	time	embedded,	whereby	conditions	are	fantasized	to	be	located	on	(often	racialized)	land,	with	time	pre-inscribed	on	that	land.	Hence	the	need	for	a	counter-spectacular	strategy	that	intervenes	those	two	process,	respectively	through	
détournement	and	anti-psychogeographical	dérive	–	demarcational	critique	in	fewer	words.	The	spectacular	construction	of	the	fictions	of	First	and	Third	World	lies	not	with	whether	or	not	it	would	be	materially	possible	for	a	location	in	Latin	America	to	be	like	the	Guatemalan	village,	but	with	the	prevalence	(the	“convention,”	as	Leary	calls	it)	with	which	the	Third	World	is	systematically	shown	to	be	like	that	village,	with	its	other	realities	cut	out	of	frame,	and	the	First	World	is	shown	not	to	be	like	the	village,	with	the	possibility	of	an	American	San	Pedro	also	cut	out	of	frame.	In	this	way,	the	San	Pedros	and	Enriques	and	Rosas	of	the	United	States	are	hidden	and	silenced,	and	then	displaced	onto	Latin	America	as	if	there	were	no	point	of	similarity;	indeed	as	the	heavily	guarded	discourse	of	difference	that	invents	the	“First	World”	by	“deporting”	its	own	underdevelopment.	Now	disrupts	this	precise	show	at	this	precise	level.				
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To	illustrate	the	arbitrariness	of	geographical	demarcations,	and	how	fundamentally	they	depend	on	the	nation-state	order,	it	should	be	noted	that	the	same	story	could	be	fully	located	within	Guatemala	or	within	the	Third	World	demarcation,	as	that	of	two	indigenous	peasants	moving	to	Guatemala	City	or	to	Santiago	de	Chile.	The	story	could	also	have	been	fully	contained	within	the	United	States,	as	that	of	two	poor	black	brothers	moving	from	Alabama	or	Detroit	to	the	same	such	rich	Los	Angeles	suburb.	Or,	most	interestingly,	it	could	be	inverted:	those	poor	black	siblings	from	Santiago	Álvarez’s	Now	move	to	Buenos	Aires,	or	Mexico	City,	or	Sao	Paulo.	The	hand	of	the	spectacle	in	this	is	in	how	often	the	very	oppositional	identity	of	the	“Third	World”	and	the	“First	World”	is	imagined	to	exhaust	itself	in	only	one	of	these	possible	(de-)concentric	narratives	that	could	easily	cut	across	the	two-worlds	demarcation,	lending	interest	to	Leary’s	claim	about	the	place	of	Latin	America	in	the	United	States’	anxious	and	symbolically	inflated	identity	invention.	Indeed,	the	possibility	of	concentric	narratives,	binaries	within	binaries,	and	the	inversion	or	altogether	negation	of	the	binary,	point	to	the	impossibility	of	the	demarcational	order,	or,	more	precisely,	to	its	territorial	instability	and	reliance	on	spectacular	framing.		One	important	counterargument	that	must	be	attended	to	relates	to	given	proportions	within	nation-state	demarcations.	It	may	be	easily	claimed	that,	while	it	is	true	that	both	development	and	underdevelopment	exist	in	both	worlds,	underdevelopment	happens	“more”	in	the	alleged	Third	World	and	development	occurs	“more”	in	the	alleged	First	World	–	that	Latin	America	“tends”	to	be	more	like	
	 217	
San	Pedro,	and	the	First	World	“tends”	to	be	more	like	Los	Angeles,	and	the	generalization	is	therefore	valid.	Economic	surveys	and	statistics	can	be	quickly	produced	in	defense	of	this	claim.	This	train	of	thought,	however,	presents	a	number	of	problems,	chief	among	them	the	fact	that	it	reinstitutes	the	tautological	problem	of	the	development	discourse,	as	Leary	observed	it.	There	are	no	natural	and	stable	geographical	demarcations	to	which	developed	or	underdeveloped	geotags	correspond	–	the	inverse	is	actually	true:	there	are	nation-state	demarcations	that	cut	across,	divide,	and	interrupt	non-national	fluid	conditions	and	only	under	the	epistemological	force	of	those	nation-state	demarcations	can	we	justify	development	attributions	to	units	by	virtue	of	mere	prevalence.	This	territorial	proportioning	will	then	be	magnified	multi-fold	by	the	framing	mechanics	of	the	spectacle.	Here	lies	the	importance	of	Susan	Buck-Morss	consideration,	in	“Hegel	and	Haiti,”	of	a	“New	World	plantation,”	which	would	encompass	a	large	region	including	the	United	States	together	with	alleged	Third	World	nations	(826).		The	second	problem	with	the	potential	counterargument	examined	above	relates	to	the	practical	implications	of	unquestioningly	accepting	the	nation-state	order	as	the	epistemological	matrix	for	politico-economic	analysis	(and	of	any	kind	of	revolutionary	enterprise).	Buck-Morss	repeatedly	warns	of	the	limitations	and	dangers	imposed	by	epistemological	orders	when	those	orders	are	not	made	part	of	the	critical	inquiry	and	challenged,	or	at	least	considered	in	terms	of	their	determinant	bearing	on	the	production	of	knowledge.	In	“Hegel	and	Haiti,”	the	intimately	connected	nature	of	supposedly	immaterial	epistemological	systems	and	
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material	territorialization	is	forcefully	highlighted,	with	the	center/periphery	tension	clearly	emerging	as	the	geographized	reinforcement	of	a	problem	that	is	(at	least,	also)	epistemological:	“when	separate	aspects	of	history	are	treated	in	disciplinary	isolation,	counterevidence	is	pushed	to	the	margins	as	irrelevant…	It	should	be	noted	that	specialization	and	isolation	are	also	a	danger	for	…	African	American	studies,	or	…	diaspora	studies,	that	were	established	precisely	to	remedy	the	situation.	Disciplinary	boundaries	allow	counterevidence	to	belong	to	someone	else’s	story	(822,	my	emphasis).		Epistemological	boundaries	and	territorial	boundaries	are	thus	critically	interdependent.	The	concepts	of	developed	First	World	and	underdeveloped	Third	World	are	the	kind	of	geographized	epistemological	categories	of	which	Buck-Morss	warns	us,	furthermore	assisted	by	the	ways	in	which	the	spectacular	camera	is	able	to	play	with	frame	and	therefore	with	centers	and	what	is	pushed	off	to	the	margin60,	and	what	belongs	to	one	world’s	story	and	what	is	framed	to	belong	to	someone	else’s	story.	In	Global	Civil	Wars,	Buck-Morss	takes	this	epistemological	critique	one	step	further	into	the	precise	realm	of	the	nation-state	order.	Indeed,	postcolonial	studies	rely	vitally	on	the	epistemological	order	of	two	worlds	and,	it	must	be	emphasized,	on	the	nation-order	state	by	extension,	with	all	its	derived	problems.	Postcolonial	studies	must	therefore	be	very	careful	not	to	begin	their	
																																																								60	This	notion	of	framing	that	connects	camera	range	with	the	invention	of	epistemological	geographies	refers	to	both	the	in-/out-framing	of	the	single	camera	shot	and	to	the	resulting	accumulative	body	of	thusly	constructed	images	that	supplant	and	mediate	social	relations	as	assumed	shows.		
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analysis	as	if	their	crucial	notions	of	developed/center/First-Word	and	underdeveloped/periphery/Third-World	were	a	dogmatic	given	that	requires	no	examination,	in	order	to	avoid	merely	reinforcing	some	of	what	they	attempt	to	explain	and	combat.	As	Buck-Morss	points	out,	“the	nation-state	as	an	epistemological	form	captures	certain	realities	but	conceals	others”	(0:08:53).	Indeed,	it	severely	complicates	the	imagination	of	non-national	solidarities	when	it	insists	in	treating	the	condition	of	underdevelopment	in	the	United	States	and	Latin	America	differently,	in	exceptionalist	terms;	it	contributes	to	the	spectacle’s	silencing	of	the	most	destitute	in	the	“First	World”	as	a	function	of	its	projectional	identity	mechanics;	it	precludes	the	realization	of	the	“workers	international”	ideal	so	dear	to	twentieth-century	revolutionary	projects61,	and	it	validates	the	same	nation-state	order	that	underlies	the	notions	of	national	patriotism	and	racially	marked	space	so	fundamental	to	some	of	the	most	politically	oppressive	actions	and	regimes,	both	in	Latin	America	and	in	the	United	States.	As	we	have	noted,	El	Norte	exercises	no	de-marcational	subversion	but	rather	unproblematically	reinforces	the	geographical	distribution	of	the	two	worlds.	Now,	on	the	other	side,	exposes	those	very	solidarities	that	are	silenced	in	El	Norte	but	which	Rosa	and	Enrique	might	have	discovered	if	they	had	been	able	to	liberate	themselves	from	the	actaeonic	
																																																								61	Buck-Morss	posits	in	“Global	Civil	War”	that,	as	epistemological	models	begin	to		submit	to	the	domination	of	the	conceptual	imaginary	of	nation-states,	“[a]ll	international	issues	after	1950	presume	this	national	order,	and	if	the	Soviet	Union	continued	to	pay	lip	service	to	the	idea	of	a	Communist	International,	the	fact	remains	that	in	most	cases,	Soviet	state	actions	after	1950	were	conceived	in	terms	of	Russian	national	interest”	(8:23,	my	emphasis).			
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narrator	and	out	of	the	mansions	of	their	Los	Angeles	suburbs,	perhaps	just	a	few	blocks	into	the	many	San	Pedros	of	Los	Angeles,	where	militarized	police	forces	exercised	violence	against	poor	Americans	of	color	with	an	impunity	that	was	already	brewing	the	Los	Angeles	riots	that	would	explode	less	than	a	decade	later.		After	probing	the	most	basic	demarcational	structure	upon	which	a	text	is	erected,	a	demarcational	textual	analysis	would	require	the	related	tasks	of:	(1)	an	analysis	of	the	text’s	internal	narratives	of	difference	and	sameness,	solidarities	and	
consortiums;	(2)	an	examination	of	the	operation	of	actaeonism	and	artemization;	(3)	a	consideration	of	any	folk	ethnographic	components	that	might	collaborate	with	the	aims	of	the	spectacle;	and	(4)	a	reading	in	terms	of	the	circulation	of	spectacular	images	in	relation	to	spatial	psychopatterns	and	the	falsification	of	time;	and	(5)	a	focused	description	of	just	how	the	“Third	World”	imagines	the	“First,”	and	how	the	“First”	imagines	the	“Third,”	and	what	political	aims	those	imaginations	serve.	A	demarcational	textual	analysis	as	a	form	of	epistemologically-conscious	controlled	reading	cannot,	however,	be	understood	as	a	form	of	themed	reading.	On	the	contrary,	it	can	be	applied	to	a	number	of	perspectives.	A	gender-	or	sexuality-based	demarcational	reading	would	test	the	system	of	assumed	demarcations	among	genders	and	sexual	orientations,	for	instance,	and	imagine	the	analytic	or	activist	usefulness	of	various	de-marcations.	It	would	question	the	stability	of	mutually	opposing	terms	such	a	“heterosexual”	and	“homosexual,”	and	propose	that	it	is	not	enough	for	a	text	to	convey	compassion	from	a	protected	hegemonic	demarcation	(the	compassionate,	yet	untouched,	heterosexual):	that	hegemonic	
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demarcations	must	be	put	in	crisis	and	alternative	demarcations	or	non-demarcations	must	be	imagined.	It	would	also	consider	how	one	imaginary	gender	or	sexuality	category	imagines	the	other	and	the	implications	of	such	imaginations.	A	race-based	demarcational	analysis	would	test	the	stability	of	racial	boundaries	and	the	understandings	that	are	permitted	or	hindered	by	such	compartmentalizations	such	as	“white”	and	“black”	(or	“Hispanic”	when	used	as	a	racial	category).	What	I	attempt	to	do	in	this	study	is	a	demarcational	critique	of	the	development	ideology,	and	a	demarcational	readings	of	texts,	from	the	perspective	of	postcolonial	theory	in	the	specific	realm	of	mutual	U.S.	–	Latin	America	representation.		That	said,	it	would	defeat	my	argument	to	claim	that	those	themes	are	totally	unrelated,	for	both	race	and	gender	are	territorialized	in	a	manner	analogous	to	the	way	time	and	development	are.	As	I	have	argued	above,	postcolonial	geocategories	are	often	racialized.	In	the	discourses	of	colonialism,	gender	metaphors	have	often	been	utilized	to	conceptualize	land:	from	Mother	Nature	to	“patria,”	from	virgin	continents	to	motherly	nurturing	lands	to	the	rape	of	America	by	conquistadores.	Whether	it	focuses	on	gender	or	sexuality	or	race,	the	defining	element	of	a	
demarcational	reading	would	relate	to	its	attention	to	the	territorialized	place	where	differential	opposition	between	two	terms	is	arbitrarily	established	to	forcefully	stabilize	naturally	fluid	conditions,	and	the	utility	of	alternative,	unstable	or	chaotic	demarcations.		
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As	discussed	above,	solidarities	in	El	Norte	are	deeply	obedient	to	the	order	of	worlds	and	racialized	nation-states.	The	construction	of	solidarities	is	well	explored	in	the	film,	from	the	Rosa’s	godmother’s	generous	gift	to	the	Mexican	trucker	who	gives	them	their	first	lift,	to	Nacha	and	ESL	teachers	in	The	North,	and	partially	complicated	in	the	various	abuses	the	siblings	suffer	at	the	hand	of	fellow	Latin	Americans,	in	Latin	America	and	in	the	United	States.	However,	the	actaeonic	eye	fully	hides	the	U.S.	realm	of	those	solidarities,	for	El	Norte	is	racially	confabulated	with	middle-	to	upper-class	white	Anglo-Americanism.	All	those	belonging	to	The	North	are	white	and	well-off,	and	the	one	American	working	with	Enrique	of	whom	we	get	to	know	anything,	promptly	has	to	quit	the	job	to	study	for	the	bar	exam	(01:34):	the	one	American	among	immigrants	is	quickly	returned	to	his	law	education,	and	the	solidarities	available	for	the	siblings	are	exclusively	among	foreigners	and	immigrants,	with	no	Black	or	indigenous	Americans	portrayed,	much	less	solidarized	with	the	protagonists.	The	American	condition	that	
Now	exposes	is	firmly	muted	in	El	Norte.		The	construction	of	consortiums	is	interesting	but	ultimately	problematic.	A	de-marcational	investigation	would	imply	seeing	oppressed	solidarities	also	in	the	imagined	First	World	as	part	of	it,	and	seeing	consortiums	(i.e.,	the	imperialist,	labor-abusive	machine)	also	in	the	imagined	Third	World.	While	there	is	no	question	that	Americans	are	the	consortiums,	any	denunciation	of	their	condition	as	such	is	hindered	not	only	by	the	silencing	of	the	siblings’	possible	solidarities	in	The	North,	but	also	by	the	fact	that	any	criticism	that	the	film	makes	of	Americans	as	
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consortiums	relies	on	characteristics	that	the	spectacle	of	capitalist	modernity	has	already	charged	very	strongly	with	positive	connotations:	“los	gringos”	all	tend	to	retain	at	least	a	faint	gesture	of	civilized	kindness,	however	hypocritical,	and	their	flaws	are	being	too	rich,	or	too	used	to	machines,	or	educated.	We	might	call	this	a	
self-deprecatory	fallacy,	that	is,	to	“critically’	ascribe	to	oneself	a	trait	as	negative			when	one	knows	that	those	traits	are	ultimately	well-regarded	defects	against	a	certain	value	system.	The	value	system	I	question,	in	the	case	of	El	Norte	and	of	the	spectacle	in	general,	is	that	of	Enlightened	modernity.	On	the	other	hand,	strong	
artemization	ensures	that,	while	the	side	of	the	consortium	that	resides	in	The	North	gets	away	with	false	reprimand,	the	Third-World	side	of	the	consortium	contains	all	the	traits	of	savagery,	from	the	Guatemalan	army	to	fellow	Latin	American	immigrants.	The	film	takes	place	historically	right	between	the	kind	of	military-police	abuses	seen	in	Now	and	those	that	lead	to	the	aforementioned	Los	Angeles	riots,	to	name	two,	and	yet	that	reality	is	fully	ascribed	to	the	Third	World,	while	its	Artemis	is	fiercely	guarded	off	the	story.		Nonetheless,	there	is	one	exploration	of	the	non-national	consortium	and	of	the	illusionary	nature	of	The	North.	During	his	ardent	speech,	Enrique’s	father	tells	his	son	that	he	has	known	plantations	in	other	places,	and	in	all	places	the	situation	is	the	same:	for	the	rich,	the	peasant	is	just	arms,	sheer	arms	for	labor	(10:29).	His	father	bases	his	foreign	experience	in	his	stay	in	Mexico,	but,	towards	the	end	of	the	film,	Enrique	will	find	about	that	is	also	the	case	in	the	imaginary	North:	at	the	end,	after	Rosa	has	died,	an	informal	employer	arrives	at	an	immigrant	worker	waiting	
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point	and	announces	that	he	wants	“strong	arms	to	work.”	Against	imagination,	the	
consortium	that	exploits	peasants	for	the	arms	is	non-national	and	extends	from	the	beginning	to	the	end	of	the	film,	from	Guatemala	to	The	North.	And	yet,	the	film	continues	to	hide	its	own	“American	abused	arms,”	for	all	we	are	shown	in	this	respect	is	foreigners,	and	the	text	remains	unable	to	fully	make	Americans	responsible	for	the	abuses	of	the	consortium	beyond	self-deprecatory	fallacy,	for	the	employer	who	summons	those	strong	arms	is	a	fellow	Hispanic.		While	we’re	on	the	topic	of	fallacies	and	neologisms,	it	might	be	useful	to	consider	one	particular	conversation	between	Rosa	and	her	protecting	character	Nacha	at	a	diner	in	Los	Angeles.	Rosa	looks	out	the	window	into	the	surrounding	Hispanic	neighborhood	and	asks	a	very	telling	question	to	which	I	will	return	further	on:	“Nacha,	do	you	know	where	the	gringos	are?	Just	look	at	the	street:	just	like	Mexico,”	to	which	Nacha	replies:	“Oh	God,	you	don’t	believe	gringos	are	going	to	want	to	live	with	Mexicans,	do	you?	No,	they	live	up	there	in	their	suburbs”	(01:22	–	02:23).	This	statement	by	Nacha	seems	simple	enough	but	it’s	deeply	problematic.	It	seems	as	though	she	is	describing	a	reality	that	precedes	her	observation,	but	the	possibility	remains	that	she	might	be	contributing	to	its	creation.	In	other	words,	the	order	of	reference	must	be	carefully	examined.	I	am	going	to	propose	the	term	“denunciative	fallacy”	to	refer	to	the	measure	in	which	certain	texts	might	execute	a	reversal	of	the	order	of	reference	and	end	up	creating	or	reinforcing	what	they	claim	to	be	merely	denouncing,	or	the	more	or	less	inevitable	risk,	inherent	to	all	
inter-worlds	texts,	of	partially	contributing	to	the	symbolic	construction	and	
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upkeep	of	the	conditions	they	seek	to	denounce	and	the	need	to	balance	these	risks.	It	should	be	immediately	obvious	that	the	notions	of	“underdeveloped”	and	“Third	World”	fall	squarely	within	this	matter.	Naturally,	I	do	not	intend	to	posit	that	all	inter-worlds	discourses	constitute	
denunciative	fallacies,	or	that	it	is	not	possible	to	denounce	capitalism’s	teleological	creation	of	underdevelopment,	but	rather	to	pose	the	critical	concept	of	
denunciative	fallacy	and	let	it	stand	as	an	open	question,	not	one	to	be	closed	by	terminal	answers	but	rather	one	to	be	utilized	as	an	“exploratory	device”:	to	what	degree	does	this	or	that	text,	including	ethnographic	accounts	of	“the	others”	practice	a	form	of	this	fallacy,	and	to	what	extent	do	all	inter-worlds	texts	inevitably	participate	in	the	symbolic	construction	or	validation	of	what	they	intend	to	denounce.	This	critical	measurement	requires	the	cooperative	consideration	of	all	the	other	demarcational	testers	to	gauge	psychogeographical	and	spectacular	mechanics	at	play:	how	does	the	actaeonic	eye	work	in	relation	to	the	possibility	of	
denunciative	fallacy,	how	does	the	spectacle	circulate,	are	there	stable	centers,	and	so	forth.	But	there	is	one	other	key	literary	measure	that	must	be	taken	in	this	respect.	When	Chinua	Achebe,	in	his	famous	essay	“An	Image	of	Africa:	Racism	in	Conrad’s	Heart	of	Darkness,”	calls	Joseph	Conrad	a	“bloody	racist”	for	what	his	character,	Marlow,	says,	he	refers	to	the	question	of	author	shielding62.	When	the																																																									62	“It	might	be	contended,	of	course,	that	the	attitude	to	the	African	in	Heart	of	Darkness	is	not	Conrad’s	but	that	of	his	fictional	character,	Marlow,	and	that	far	from	endorsing	it	Conrad	might	indeed	be	holding	it	up	to	irony	and	criticism.	Certainly,	Conrad	appears	to	go	to	considerable	pains	to	set	up	layers	if	insulation	between	himself	and	the	moral	universe	of	his	story.	He	has,	for	example,	a	narrator	behind	a	narrator…	But	[Conrad]	neglects	to	hint,	clearly	and	adequately,	at	an	alternative	
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narrator/character	Marlow	makes	racist	statements,	is	Conrad	able	to	establish	a	buffering	zone	credible	enough	to	differentiate	himself	from	Marlow?		In	El	Norte’s	case,	the	first	major	problem	is	the	term	“gringo.”	I	will	return	to	the	slippery	semantics	of	this	term,	but	at	any	rate	Rosa	is	looking	for	Americans,	who	she	assumes	to	be	all	however	she	imagines	gringos	to	be,	possibly	white.	The	truth	is	that,	once	again,	the	demarcational	system	that	underlies	this	claim	is	not	tenable	for,	if	what	they	really	mean	is	that	light-skinned	upper-class	persons	do	not	wish	to	live	with	dark-skinned	poor	persons,	they	are	describing	the	aporophobia	that	almost	defines	life	within	Latin	America.	There	are	U.S.	citizens,	even	white	U.S.	citizens,	living	in	ghettos,	and	there	are	U.S.	citizens	of	all	colors	living	with	Mexicans.	White	Mexicans	in	Mexico	too	may	not	want	to	live	among	the	poor.	The	problem	at	the	center	of	the	statement,	which	in	turn	touches	on	ghetto	narratives	and	racial	segregation,	can	fully	occur	within	the	Third	World	and	within	the	First	World,	and	can	have	“thirdworlders”	as	victimizers	and	“firstworlders”	as	victims.	However,	and	this	is	the	key	to	spectacular	framings	and	the	show	of	worlds,	the	matter	is	presented	as	if	it	were	the	geographically	determined	binary	that	defines	the	Third	World	and	the	Third	World.	As	such,	what	screenwriter	Anna	Thomas	writes	as	a	mere	denunciation	of	racial	discrimination	could	only	be	valid	if	U.S.	citizen	is	equaled	to	“white	upper-class.”	In	other	words,	that	statement,	which	
																																																								frame	of	reference	by	which	we	may	judge	the	actions	and	opinions	of	his	characters.	It	would	not	have	been	beyond	Conrad's	power	to	make	that	provision	if	he	had	thought	it	necessary.	Conrad	seems	to	me	to	approve	of	Marlow,	with	only	minor	reservations	–	a	fact	reinforced	by	the	similarities	between	their	two	careers.””	(Achebe	19-20).						
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seems	like	the	enactment	of	existing	discrimination,	is	actively	participating	in	the	construction	of	a	racist	fantasy	of	whiteness	and	even	development	among	U.S.	citizens	while	projecting	those	traits	elsewhere,	in	the	manner	in	which	Leary	proposes.	This	is	the	spectacular	dimension	of	the	show	of	First	and	Third	Worlds:	it	is	disseminated	by	countless	images	which,	just	like	El	Norte,	position	themselves	on	either	side	of	the	political	spectrum,	may	claim	to	be	ally	films	or	social	activist,	or	even	emphatically	non-Hollywood,	as	Nava’s	film	is,	and	yet	they	operate	the	same	framing	mechanics	that	construct	the	development-anxious	racialized	fantasies	of	the	psychogeographic	First	World	simply	by	virtue	of	its	actaeonic	eye.	The	notion	of	degrees	of	denunciative	fallacy	should	allow	a	demarcational	critique	to	consider	the	risks,	inherent	to	all	activist	texts,	and	involved	in	the	binary	pathetizations	required	for	the	construction	of	victimhood	in	any	solidary	project,	no	matter	how	well-intended,	and	the	possibilities	of	its	participation	in	the	spectacle.	In	his	sense,	El	Norte	is	not	an	evenly	solidary	film.					The	film	presents	a	high	degree	of	artemization	of	Latin	America,	with	an	
actaeonic	narrator	that	simultaneously	romanticizes	and	pathetizes	the	imagined	Third	World	and	its	“own”	place	and	then	follows	it	with	a	punitive	eye	throughout	its	migration.	The	United	States’	anxious	projection	of	uneven	development	onto	Latin	America,	as	Leary	postulates	it,	must	necessarily	contain	a	combined	operation	of	displacement	and	punishment:	internal	underdevelopment	must	be	externalized	and	castigated	there,	as	a	foreign	condition.	The	Artemis	that	is	caught	in	disgrace,	forced	to	pose	and	have	her	disgrace	disseminated	is	neatly	demarcated	
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onto	Guatemala,	and	this	Artemis	is	not	able	to	neutralize	the	indiscreet	eye	of	Actaeon.	There	are	no	stags	here,	but,	if	there	is	an	animal,	that	is	the	one	that	guarantees	that	migration	is	punished	with	death.	Indeed,	in	addition	to	the	permanent	pathetization,	exclusive	to	the	siblings	and	fellow	immigrants,	that	accompany	the	protagonists	from	beginning	to	end	of	their	migration,	the	very	act	of	crossing	the	border	receives	the	ultimate	punishment	when	Rosa	is	bitten	by	a	rat,	from	which	she	will	eventually	die.	If	there	is	any	remote	superficial	sense	of	compassion	for	immigrants,	the	truth	is	that	the	act	of	migrating	is	severely,	unyieldingly	punished.	As	is	so	often	the	case	with	spectacular	texts	that	construct	the	show	of	worlds,	the	traveler	is	able	to	travel,	penetrate	with	their	morbid	eye,	have	their	fun	in	the	romanticized	land	of	the	past	or	danger,	and	then	return.	But	when	the	Thirdworlders	attempt	their	version	of	the	travel,	demarcations	are	strictly	enforced:	it	is	in	the	very	tunnel	that	runs	underneath	the	U.S.-Mexico	border,	at	the	exact	moment	when	she	crosses	the	demarcational	line,	that	Rosa	is	bitten	by	the	rat	and	thereafter	condemned	to	death.	Despite	its	independent	heroic	aspirations,	the	combination	of	an	Artemis	fully	displaced	onto	the	opposing	term	to	The	North,	and	the	mercilessly	punitive	eye	of	the	actaeonic	narrator,	inscribes	this	film	much	closer	to	the	Hollywood	spectacle	than	the	director	hoped	for	when	“he	and	his	producer,	Anna	Thomas,	worked	outside	the	Hollywood	structure	in	making	their	movie”	(Insdorf).	If	Nava	succeeded	in	any	way	towards	his	claim	that	“[i]n	order	to	get	films	made	about	Latin	America,	you	have	to	have	Latin	Americans	in	the	center	of	the	story”	(in	Insdorf).	If	Latin	Americans	are	the	center	of	anything	in	
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El	Norte,	it	would	be	of	constant	pathetization	and	punishment,	and	that	very	centrality	on	“Latin	American	problems”	allows	him	to	hide	his	own	national	equivalent	of	the	disgrace	he	merely	projects.		I	have	introduced	the	concept	of	folk	ethnography	following	Elijah	Harrison’s	and	highlighted	the	importance	of	this	aspect	of	texts	in	relation	to	the	spectacular	invention	of	the	two	worlds.	Whether	it	be	as	a	field	experience	translated	into	fictional,	artistic,	journalistic	or	pop	texts,	observations	by	non-academic	ethnographers	may	contain	a	quasi-ethnographic	element	that	simultaneously	derives	from	and	constructs	the	spectacle.	The	existing	show	of	
worlds,	with	its	psychogeographies,	precedes	these	experiences	as	an	a	priori	epistemological	organizer,	and	its	thusly	disciplined	knowledge,	made	up	of	assertions,	generalizations	and	conclusions	as	to	who	“the	others”	are	and	where	these	“others”	are	demarcated	on	land,	will	end	up	engrossing	and	affirming	the	spectacular	geodiscourse	of	development,	unless	those	very	preexisting	epistemological	territorializations	are	put	in	question	and	made	part	of	the	critique	of	the	ideological	reading	of	those	experiences.	Certainly,	not	all	texts	can	be	traced	to	a	personal	experience,	by	their	authors,	that	the	authors	themselves	can	claim	as	the	geneses	of	their	texts.	But	both	Now	and	El	Norte	contain	this	element.	I	have	discussed	Álvarez’s	experience	in	the	United	States,	the	greyhound	bus	anecdote	that	he	claimed	was	the	seed	of	Now,	and	the	bearing	of	that	experience	on	the	demarcationally-subversive	character	of	the	documentary.	I	am	now	going	to	examine	the	folk	ethnographic	element	that	underlies	El	Norte.	
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Much	folk	ethnographic	information	can	be	extracted	from	an	interview	that	Nava	gave	Insdorf	for	the	New	York	Times	in	1984,	and	which	I	have	already	cited	above.	All	the	director’s	quotations	in	this	section	on	the	folk	ethnography	of	El	
Norte	come	from	Insdorf’s	article.	First	of	all,	it	is	important	to	note	that	both	a	strong	sense	of	worlds	and	an	actaeonic	circulatory	entitlement,	have	been	with	the	director	since	childhood.	Nava	grew	up	on	the	border,	in	San	Diego,	California:	“I’m	from	San	Diego,	but	I	come	from	a	border	family	…	I	have	relatives	in	Tijuana.	As	a	kid,	I	crossed	the	border	several	times	a	week,	often	wondering	who	lived	in	all	those	cardboard	shacks	on	the	Mexican	side.”	It	is	immediately	clear	that	El	Norte’s	highly	actaeonic	eye	has	accompanied	the	director	since	tender	age:	his	curious	wondering	eye,	always	on	voyage,	looking	for	his	Artemises,	not	the	homeless	tents	cities	in	California,	but	on	the	other	side	of	the	border,	never	mind	that	the	infamous	Skid	Row	in	Los	Angeles	was	sadly	in	full	swing	both	when	Nava	was	a	child	(and,	arguably,	was	closer	to	Mexico	than	Los	Angeles)	and	when	the	film	was	made.		A	firm	belief	in	the	show	of	worlds	also	accompanied	him	from	his	early	days	in	San	Diego:	“the	border	is	unique,”	Nava	said,	“the	only	place	in	the	world	where	an	industrialized	first-world	nation	shares	the	border	with	a	third-world	country.	In	California,	it’s	just	a	fence:	on	one	side	are	the	Tijuana	slums,	on	the	other	side	–	San	Diego.	It’s	so	graphic!	This	was	the	germ	of	the	story”	(my	emphasis).	This	graphic	germ	to	El	Norte	may	be	rooted	in	less	perspective	than	one	would	believe	a	border	experience	would	confer.	Growing	up	next	to	a	border,	one	may	certainly	develop	a	hybrid	bicultural	perspective,	or	one	may	grow	up	with	that	border	engraved	in	
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one’s	mind,	as	an	absolutely	naturalized	epistemological	mold,	particularly	when	one	exercises	the	actaeonic	entitlement	of	travel-for-disgrace.	It	is	interesting	to	note,	in	his	own	words,	that	Tijuana	is	the	slums,	but	San	Diego	is	just	San	Diego:	the	illusion	of	evenness	that	Leary	examines.	Nava’s	Tijuana,	and	San	Pedro,	are	the	slums	or	the	old-indigenous	village,	but	San	Diego	is	just	San	Diego	–	the	kind	of	reality	that	Now	brings	to	light	does	not	exist	in	his	imaginary	San	Diego,	and	his	carefully-framed	United	States	by	extension	(let	us	not	forget	that	the	film	is	titled	“El	Norte”)	unless	it	is	projected	on	the	foreigners.	It	is	artemized	(that	is,	overromanticized	and	overpathetized)	Hispanics	as	the	full	spectrum	of	the	Latin	American	psychogeographic	space,	against	white	upper-class	Anglo-Americans	as	the	full	spectrum	of	the	United	States’	psychogeographic	space,	as	a	struggle	between	the	spectacle-operated	falsification	of	victim	and	victimizer	–	hence	the	importance	of	Debord’s	theorizations	for	a	demarcational	critique.		The	actaeonic	eye,	at	the	service	of	the	spectacle’s	falsifications	of	time	in	the	form	of	territorialized	stagisms,	progressivism,	and	“upward”	motion	to	the	dream	of	modernity,	thus	combines	its	indiscreet	expeditions	onto	the	others’	land	with	a	double	artemizing	play	of	romanticizing	exotification	and	merciless	pathetization	(which	may	become	unforgiving	punitiveness,	as	evident	with	the	“migra”	rat	and	Rosa’s	death).	In	El	Norte,	Nava	reacts	particularly	strongly	to	this	epistemological	possibility	of	using	Latin	America	as	a	projectional	reservoir	of	anachronism	to	quench	safely-displaced	nostalgia:	he	and	Thomas	“were	attracted	to	the	Mayan	Indians	of	Guatemala	because	of	their	rootedness	to	the	land,	their	striking	and	well-
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preserved	traditions.”	But	because	this	back-to-the-land	exotifying	impetus	is	more	about	the	United	States	and	the	demands	of	its	self-imaginations	than	it	is	about	Latin	America,	the	very	demarcational	discourse	that	sustains	the	director’s	motivations	is	full	of	contradictions:	he	had	initially	thought	of	the	original	protagonists	to	be	Mexican,	perhaps	to	cater	to	his	childhood	experience,	but	then	decided	to	make	them	Guatemalan	Indian	to	correct	misapprehensions	about	their	cultures,	only	to	end	up	selecting	actors	who	were	mostly	Mexican	to	play	the	Guatemalans,	“including	the	two	young	leads”	(Insdorf);	he	insists	that	his	film	seeks	to	address	a	common	misunderstanding:	“[s]o	much	attention	is	given	to	ancient	pre-Columbian	cultures	–	the	ruins	which	suggest	the	end	of	a	civilization	–	that	people’s	understanding	ends	with	archeology	…	[b]ut	there	are	millions	of	people	who	still	dress	that	way	and	follow	those	customs”	(my	emphasis);	yet,	he	recounts	that,	in	looking	for	filming	locations,	they	“found	an	incredible	ruined	hacienda	that	you	see	in	the	film	and	shot	some	scenes	[there].”	The	ruins,	of	course,	whether	he	would	ultimately	settle	on	demystifying	or	affirming	them,	can	be	found	in	The	North,	in	places	like	Detroit63	and	New	York	where	US	citizens	live	in	them,	in	those	times	and	today,	as	could	be	the	“ancient	Indian	cultures”	he	so	much	wants	to	vindicate,	but	he	merely	displaces	those	onto	the	imaginary	Other.		
																																																								63	In	his	book,	Leary	examines	an	interesting	account	of	a	Mexica	immigrant	moving	from	California	to	Detroit	and,	upon	entering	the	northern	city	on	its	west	side,	seeing	the	vacant	houses,	empty	factories,	and	shuttered	warehouses,	nervously	wondering:	“Are	we	still	in	America?”	(207).		
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As	much	as	the	realities	Nava	is	interested	in	portraying	flow	across	the	border	he	grew	up	perhaps	too	close	to,	he	wants	us	to	“know	the	people	to	whom	things	are	really	happening	down	there.”	It	bothers	him	that	“to	get	films	made	about	Latin	America,	you	have	to	have	Americans	in	the	center	of	the	story,”	but	his	film,	called	El	Norte,	is	all	about	The	North	and	its	need	for	imaginative	psychogeographies.	El	Norte	is,	above	all,	the	imposition	of	a	highly	ideological	differential	opposition	in	the	most	classic	Saussurean	manner.	Arbitrary	like	all	differential	oppositions,	it	delineates	itself	around	the	racial	(racist)	and	anxiously	pro-modern	imperatives	of	U.S.	identity	construction	by	silencing	its	undesired	traits	and	citizens	out	of	frame	and	magnifying	the	focus	of	its	actaeonic	dreams.		Like	many	expeditionary	voyagers	and	some	ethnographic	travelers,	the	spectacular	Actaeons	must	put	themselves	at	risk	and	Nava	is	not	the	exception.	Even	though	“[t]he	filmmakers	encountered	adventures	almost	as	harrowing	as	those	experienced	by	their	characters,”	they	fortunately	“emerged	unscathed”	(Insdorf).	According	to	Insdorf’s	article,	they	had	encounters	with	real	armed	men,	the	secret	police;	their	cinematographer	was	chased,	run	over,	the	exposed	negative	stolen	from	him	at	gunpoint;	their	production	manager	was	kidnapped;	and	had	to	pay	high	ransom	for	the	negative,	which	they	recuperated	from	men	in	sunglasses	bearing	submachine	guns,	during	a	parking	lot	rendezvous	at	night;	and	had	to	rush	out	of	the	country	within	an	imposed	allowance	of	24	hours.	But	they	made	it	out	alive	with	their	negatives.		
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The	folk	ethnographic	experience,	both	at	the	borderside	genesis	of	the	text	and	during	filming,	must	thus	be	considered,	particularly	when	the	director	himself	claims	those	field	experiences	to	lie	at	the	foundation	of	the	text.	Both	Nava	and	Álvarez	make	those	claims	about	their	films,	and	the	stark	difference	between	their	personal	backgrounds	and	experiences	helps	explain	the	equally	different	epistemological	matrixes	that	sustain	the	resulting	accounts.	In	Nava’s	case,	great	attention	was	paid	to	documentary	genres	and	discourses.	Both	Nava	and	Thomas	carried	out	research,	during	which	they	“came	across	a	community	of	Mayans	from	Guatemala	–	5,000	from	one	village	–	now	in	Los	Angeles.”	One	can	only	hope	those	had	better	luck	than	El	Norte’s	protagonists.	I	have	proposed	a	non-exhaustive	categorization	of	the	format	in	which	these	folk	ethnographic	experiences	may	result,	including	journalistic	ethnography	and	pop	ethnography.	Nava	and	Thomas	remained	convinced	that	“any	issue	would	be	better	served	by	an	involving	and	dramatic	story	than	a	lecture:	Nobody	goes	to	the	movies	to	hear	a	lecture.”	This	is	important,	for	it	recognizes	the	degree	to	which	all	texts	must	speak	the	language	of	the	spectacle,	as	Debord	warns.	El	Norte	is	aware	of	the	need	for	“pop	appeal”	but	largely	fails	demarcationally;	La	hora	de	los	hornos	fails	on	both	counts;	Now	succeeds	on	both	fronts,	as	a	pop-appealing	de-marcational	text.	The	director	and	screenwriter	were	clear	on	the	fact	that	they	“didn’t	want	‘El	Norte’	to	look	like	a	docu-drama,	or	have	any	stylistic	elements	that	would	remind	people	of	journalism	or	‘rough-around-the-edges’	documentary,”	instead	opting	for	what	they	call	“dream	realism”	that,	they	claim,	“comes	from	Mayan	culture	[since]	[f]or	Nava,	“[t]he	
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Mayans’	dress,	language,	mythology	and	religion	are	very	strong	–	a	fertile	field	from	which	their	magical	culture	comes”	(Insdorf).	That	effort	to	capture	a	“magical	culture”	explains	many	things	about	the	film	and	its	actaeonic	gaze,	especially	considering	that,	for	the	director,	“the	whole	point	of	the	film	is	to	make	people	understand	someone	coming	from	another	culture”	–	a	“magical”	one.			This	analysis	of	the	folk	ethnographic	element	of	El	Norte	helps	visualize	the	degree	to	which	most	inter-worlds	texts	contain	a	strong	ideological	charge,	even	when,	according	to	Insdorf,	Nava	avoids	the	dogmatic	ideological	character	of	films	about	“explosive	situations	in	Latin	America”	and	“insisted	that	El	Norte	is	not	a	political	film	but	“a	human	drama,	a	journey	through	cultural	layerings.”		This	ideological	substrate	often	lies	at	least	partly	in	the	interpretations	of	experience,	with	all	interpretative	biases	and	epistemologically	permitted	conclusions.	Furthermore,	in	the	age	of	the	disseminated	spectacle	(i.e.,	of	the	shows),	material	experience	on	land	is	but	an	intermediate	stage	between	the	symbolic	constructions	that	emerge	from	the	spectacle	to	dress	materiality	like	fetishes	and	the	spectacle	to	which	those	fetishized	materialities	return	as	the	illusion	of	validation	and	physical	reference.	But	one	should	consider	the	possibility	that,	occasionally,	certain	experiences	carry	a	powerful	singularity	capable	of	breaking	the	above-mentioned	cycle	and	provoke	subversive	epistemologies.	Nava	grew	up	with	the	U.S.-Mexico	border,	the	most	explicit	territorialization	of	the	show	of	worlds,	in	his	backyard	and	in	his	mind.	Álvarez	once	found	himself	as	a	“white	hero”	among	the	American	forgotten.						
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A	tendency	toward	self-deprecatory	fallacy	in	inter-worlds	discourse,	on	the	other	hand,	compromises	the	ability	to	think	beyond	what’s	permitted	and	protected	by	existing	epistemological	geometries.	A	folk	ethnographer,	despite	intentions	as	good	as	Nava’s,	who	travels	from	a	place	of	compassionate	superiority,	ends	up	adding	to	the	spectacle	no	matter	how	much	effort	he	puts	into	avoiding	the	spectacular	market.	And	Nava’s	adamant	avoidance	of	Hollywood	funding	vis-a-vis	a	
demarcational	critique	of	his	film	product	illustrates	that	futility	well.	In	the	age	of	the	spectacle,	unfortunately,	most	Actaeons	do	not	get	punished.	Let	us	remember	Artemis’s	words	upon	being	surprised	unrobed:	“Now	you	are	free	to	tell	that	you	have	seen	me	all	unrobed	–	if	you	can	tell.”	The	problem	is	narration,	that	is,	dissemination	of	actaeonic	narrations	of	“others”	caught	in	a	moment	of	shame,	a	pathetizing	artemization	that	does	not	get	neutralized	because,	just	like	Nava’s	harrowing	escape	from	Mexico	with	the	negatives,	Actaeons	often	don’t	get	turned	into	stags	as	they	are	in	the	Greek	myth:	they	run	and	tell.		An	actaeonic	narrator	who	penetrates	the	pathetized	“other”	as	if	none	of	what	he	gazes	at	had	anything	to	do	with	them	follows	in	a	long	tradition	of	the	compassionate	liberal	activist	who	watches	externalized	disgrace	from	a	protected	tower,	like	Conrad’s	Marlow	in	Heart	of	Darkness,	who	narrates	King	Leopold’s	Congo	with	a	harmful	form	of	racist	and	superior	“compassion.”	While	denouncing	King	Leopold’s	abuses,	Conrad/Marlow	offers	a	most	problematic	discourse,	from	his	racist	descriptions	of	the	Congolese,	to	his	territorializations	onto	the	River	Congo	of	anachronistic	and	naturalistic	impositions	(“Going	up	that	river	was	like	
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traveling	back	to	the	earliest	beginnings	of	the	world,	when	vegetation	rioted	on	the	earth	and	the	big	trees	were	kings”),	to	his	opening	description	of	the	River	Thames	as	the	geographization	of	earthly	maturity:	Forthwith	a	change	came	over	the	waters,	and	the	serenity	became	less	brilliant	but	more	profound.	The	old	river	in	its	broad	reach	rested	unruffled	at	the	decline	of	day,	after	ages	of	good	service	done	to	the	race	that	peopled	its	banks,	spread	out	in	the	tranquil	dignity	of	a	waterway	leading	to	the	uttermost	ends	of	the	earth.	We	looked	at	the	venerable	stream	not	in	the	vivid	flush	of	a	short	day	that	comes	and	departs	for	ever,	but	in	the	august	light	of	abiding	memories.	And	indeed	nothing	is	easier	for	a	man	who	has,	as	the	phrase	goes,	“followed	the	sea”	with	reverence	and	affection,	that	to	evoke	the	great	spirit	of	the	past	upon	the	lower	reaches	of	the	Thames	(Conrad	2).			Achebe	asserts	in	his	essay	“An	Image	of	Africa,”	where	he	calls	Marlow/Conrad	racist,	that	“Marlow	comes	thought	to	us	not	only	as	a	witness	of	truth,	but	one	holding	those	advanced	and	humane	views	appropriate	to	the	English	liberal	tradition	which	required	all	Englishmen	of	decency	to	be	deeply	shocked	by	atrocities	in	Bulgaria	or	the	Congo	of	King	Leopold	of	the	Belgians	or	wherever”	(5).	This	kid	of	compassionate	liberalism	“managed	to	sidestep	the	ultimate	question	of	equality	between	white	people	and	black	people,”	Achebe	posits,	offering	the	epitomic	example	of	this	ambivalence	in	missionary	Albert	Schweitzer’s	oft-quoted	comment:	“The	African	is	indeed	my	brother	but	my	junior	brother”	(5).	This	sense	
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of	“brotherhood”	whereby	the	writer	or	filmmaker	or	traveler	retains	a	position	of	“mature	superiority”	and	a	heavily	guarded	sense	of	difference	from	what	they	are	showing	or	denouncing	in	foreign	lands	lies	at	the	center	of	Leary’s	proposition	in	terms	of	the	projectional	mechanics	in	the	construction	of	the	notion	of	nation-state-attributed	“development.”		Indeed,	the	compassionate	activist	narrator’s	claim	to	elder	psychogeographic	position,	like	the	River	Thames	peacefully	resting	after	a	long	history	of	human	service	to	the	world,	the	backwards	move	along	the	River	Congo,	and	the	idea	of	the	“junior	brother,”	is	present	with	utmost	clarity	in	what	is	perhaps	the	most	influential	text	in	terms	of	the	spectacular	construction	of	the	illusion	of	First-	and	Third-Word:	NGO	infomercials.	Leary	points	out	that,	when	he	asks	1990s-born	U.S.	undergraduate	students	to	define	“underdevelopment,”	a	term	so	often	associated	with	the	Cold	War,		they	recognize	it	instantly,	with	unusual	consistency.	Whether	they	are	sitting	in	an	underfunded	public	university	in	the	center	of	one	of	America’s	poorest	cities	or	a	pastoral	private	campus	in	a	wealthy	eastern	suburb,	they	invariable	define	“underdevelopment”	by	referring	to	late-night	infomercials	for	NGOs	like	Save	the	Children:	the	adds	that	solicit	…	the	empathy	of	a	northern	insomniac	for	some	unfortunate	child	elsewhere.	The	appeal	comes	from	an	older	white	man	in	a	tropical	shantytown	on	behalf	of	a	child	of	color	(“He’s	always	got	the	beard!	Always,”	said	one	student	…	observing	the	…	metaphorical	metaphor	of	growth	and	maturity…)”	(5)		
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As	I	have	said,	this	penetration	onto	the	foreign	projectional	canvas	from	a	safe	position	of	compassionate	yet	superior	difference	can	be	imagined	as	a	watch	tower,	whereby	the	actaeonic	narrator	tells	the	other’s	disgrace	in	such	a	way	that	that	disgrace	does	not	touch	or	involve	the	narrator	in	any	way	–	as	required	by	the	spectacular	mechanics	of	displacement,	underdevelopment	must	be	foreignized.	I	will	call	this	“locus	narrationis”	an	“atalaya.”	This	Spanish	word	captures	the	two	aspects	of	the	actaeonic	act:	watch	and	tell,	as	defined	by	the	Real	Academia:	“Tower	commonly	built	in	a	high	place	in	order	to	register	from	it	the	country	or	the	sea	and	notify	of	what	is	discovered.”		As	Achebe	claims,	the	kind	of	liberalism	espoused	by	Conrad/Marlow	eluded	“the	ultimate	question	of	equality	between	white	people	and	black	people”	(5).	It	is	a	contradictory	discourse	of	difference	and	desire	that	has	produced	“a	durable	fiction	of	Latin	America	as	either	an	incorrigibly	backwards	other	or	as	an	aspirant,	but	not	yet	arrived,	partner”	(Leary	3).	A	demarcational	critique	must	thus	pay	close	attention	to	established	discourses	and	narratives	of	difference,	both	zealously	guarded	and	carelessly	unquestioned	difference,	and,	just	like	a	flâneur	à	la	dérive	will	playfully	rebel	against	the	city’s	marked	grids,	must	imagine	alternative	and	unstable	patterns	of	sameness	and	difference	and	their	resulting	newly	identifiable	
solidarities	and	consortiums.	A	demarcational	textual	analysis	must	therefore	concern	itself	with	the	methodological	suspicion	of	all	alleged	difference	as	the	most	basic	epistemological	foundation	of	ideological	meaning,	so	that	oppositional	differences	among	the	concepts	in	use	become	part	of	the	critical	inquiry	in	fields	
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like	postcolonial	studies,	which	rely	so	heavily	on	the	demarcation	of	worlds.	For	revolutionary	texts	as	much	as	for	folk	ethnographic	film,	in	which	one	world	imagines	the	other,	the	critical	measure	of	the	narrator’s	atalaya	is	key	in	relation	to	the	actaeonic	eye	and	the	extent	of	artemization:	does	the	narrator	observe	from	a	fully	sealed	atalaya,	like	a	glass	capsule	of	full	stable	difference	between	them	and	their	object	of	gaze,	one	from	which	nothing	of	the	drama	they	narrate	seems	to	connect,	relate,	or	apply	to	them	–	from	where	penetration	is	one-sided?	Or	is	there	a	degree	of	atalaya	shattering,	whereby	the	narrator	is	unable	or	unwilling	to	maintain	a	closed	capsule	and,	as	the	glass	shatters,	a	process	of	de-
actaeonization	can	be	observed,	as	the	narrator	can	no	longer	fully	differentiate	themselves	from	their	object?	A	shattered	atalaya	involves	the	loss	of	the	protecting	narrative	of	difference	and	the	free	flow	of	the	portrayed	realities	between	one’s	and	the	other’s	demarcation.	The	more	the	atalaya	shatters,	the	more	it	is	able	to	counter	the	spectacle,	for	a	shattered	atalaya	blocks	the	projectional	construction	of	the	spectacle’s	essential	show	of	worlds	by	confusing	its	epistemologies	and	dismantling	its	territorialization	as	“underdevelopment’s”	“geographic	specificity:	its	use,	in	the	so-called	first	world,	for	clearly	defined	“areas”	abroad,	either	colonial	territories	and,	later,	nations”	(Leary	5).	In	his	film,	Nava	observes	from	an	extremely	high	and	well-fenced	atalaya.	Nothing	of	what	happens	to	immigrants	in	El	Norte	seems	to	have	anything	to	do	with	those	from	El	Norte.	Here,	the	atalaya	is	carefully	sealed	as	The	North	is	equaled	with	wealthy	white	Anglos,	a	racial	anchoring	for	the	invention	of	the	success	of	capitalist	
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modernity	–	and	a	spectacular	falsehood	in	the	Debordian	sense.	And	what	is	hidden	is	projected	onto	the	automatically-implied	term	of	differential	opposition,	that	is	The	Non-Norte,	or	Latin	America,	is	equaled	to	what	El	Norte	silences	and	hides	about	its	identity.	Álvarez	brings	to	light	those	muted	realms	of	the	imaginary	First	
World	in	Now.		For	all	its	shortcomings	and	its	ultimate	lack	of	de-marcational	merit,	El	
Norte	succeeds	in	highlighting	a	number	of	key	aspects	in	the	spectacular	construction	of	the	show	of	worlds	and	by	extension	U.S.	identity	by	psychogeographic	play.	One	important	task	pertaining	to	a	demarcational	textual	analysis	must	be	an	analysis	of	the	circulation	of	images	between	the	imaginary	worlds	in	relation	to	the	theory	of	the	spectacle.	El	Norte	is	exceedingly	notable	in	this	respect,	for	it	clearly	stages	the	spectacular	mechanics	by	which	the	show	of	the	First	World	is	disseminated.	During	the	dinner	scene	at	the	beginning	of	the	film,	Rosa	and	Enrique	sit	at	the	table	with	their	parents	and	Rosa’s	godmother,	Josefita,	and	her	husband.	Here,	Josefita	gives	a	remarkable	spectacular	speech:	“Up	there,	even	the	poorest,	even	the	poorest	of	the	poorest,	has	a	toilet	just	like	Don	Rodrigo’s	[her	presumably	rich	boss].	Just	like	it.	One	flushes	it	with	water	and	everything	disappears	in	no	time!	One	can	pee	in	style.”	When	her	husband	humorously	complains	that	she’s	always	talking	about	The	North	and	wonders	whether	she	could	possibly	talk	about	something	else,	Rosa	glowingly	reports	that	she	loves	hearing	about	The	North,	to	which	Rosa’s	mother	adds,	in	Mayan	language,	that	that	is	good,	for	it	is	all	they	hear	about	anyway.	Enrique	then	adds:	“They	say	that’s	true,	
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there’s	a	lot	of	money	up	there.	Look	at	all	the	people	who	have	relatives	up	there,	who	left	[Guatemala]:	they	all	tell	things.	And	on	TV,	you	see	really	well	how	life	is	up	there.”	“That’s	right,	son,	that’s	right,”	Josefita	replies,	“even	the	poorest	have	their	own	cars.”	Enrique	then	asks	Josefita,	quite	directly,	how	it	is	that	she	knows	so	much	about	the	North,	and	she	explains:	“For	your	information,	Don	Rodrigo’s	cook	has	been	passing	me	her	old	copies	of	“Good	Housekeeping”	for	ten	years.	I’ve	been	reading	it	for	ten	years,	so	I	should	know	something	about	it,	son”	(05:47	-	06:56,	my	translation).			The	passage	above	constitutes	a	true	visual	essay	on	the	theory	of	the	spectacle	and,	within	it,	the	show	of	worlds	and	its	auxiliary	mechanics.	As	I	have	argued,	the	notions	of	First	and	Third	World	are	to	a	large	degree	imaginary	in	their	stabilized	geographic	specify	and	must	therefore	not	be	taken	for	granted	in	subsequent	analysis	but	problematized	into	it,	as	well	as	considered	in	relation	to	the	workings	of	the	spectacle	and	its	shows	proposed	in	this	study.	As	it	turns	out,	“the	meanings	of	modernity	would	have	to	be	more	complex,	elusive	and	paradoxical”	not	just	where	“modernization	was	not	going	on,”	as	Marshall	Berman	claims	for	Russia,	stating	that	modernist	thought	was	none	of	those	things	but	implicitly	stable	and	unambiguous	“in	the	great	cities	of	the	West”	(174).	The	spectacular	dimension	of	the	show	of	worlds	implies	that	the	imaginary	First	
World	disseminates	its	images	of	development	and	modernity	around	the	world	and	into	the	projectionary	Third	World	in	what	we	can	view	as	the	process	exactly	opposite	to	actaeonization/artemization:	if	the	Third	World	is	forced	to	pose	is	
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disgrace	so	that	the	actaeonic	expeditioner	can	then	run	and	tell,	the	First	World	constructs	and	projects	its	identity	by	means	of	grandiloquent	images	of	development	framed	by	the	spectacular	camera.	This	is	clearly	examined	in	the	passage:	Josefita’s	“knowledge”	of	The	North	derives	from	American	Good	
Housekeeping	magazines	in	their	Spanish	Buenhogar	version:	she’s	been	reading	these	ostentatious	portrayals	of	modern	mansions	and	glossy	lifestyles	for	a	decade,	so	she	should	know,	she	claims.	Then	Enrique	mentions	television	images:	there	you	see	well	what	life	is	like	up	there,	he	affirms,	and	adds	that	the	testimony	of	all	those	who	have	emigrated	–	never	mind	that	their	true	luck	might	have	been	no	better	than	the	siblings’.		Life	in	the	First	World,	the	promise	of	modernity	and	capitalism,	is	thus	as	the	movies	show:	that	is	the	claim	of	the	spectacle.	It	is	almost	shocking	to	notice	the	extent	to	which	the	film	seems	aware	of	all	these	spectacular	mechanics	at	play	in	the	constructions	of	The	North,	and	yet	still	ends	up	spectacularizing	the	United	States.	That	dinner	gathering	is	a	perfect	demonstration	of	what	Debord	means	when	he	states	in	in	Thesis	4	of	The	Society	of	the	Spectacle	that	the	spectacle	“is	not	a	collection	of	images,	but	a	social	relation	among	people,	mediated	by	images”	(12).	The	spectacular	images	of	The	North	fully	mediate	the	conversation	and	the	entire	social	exchange	at	that	table.	The	way	those	images	frame	El	Norte,	everyone	there	is	a	Don	Rodrigo	in	the	Good	Housekeeping	magazines	as	much	as	in	Nava’s	film.	
Now,	on	the	other	hand,	steals	and	rearranges	that	same	kind	of	spectacular	images,	
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from	Life	magazine	and	so	forth,	and	counter-spectacularly	detours	them	to	show	those	in	The	North	who	do	not	live	like	Don	Rodrigo.			The	First	World	thus	stands	as	the	largest	commodity,	for	it	is	literally	one	of	two	possible	worlds	in	the	culturalist	use	of	the	terms:	first	and	third,	fetish	or	Artemis.	The	First	World	thus	becomes	the	permanently-broadcast	script	for	the	largest	social	script	in	the	world,	the	most	advertised	show	for	imitation.	It	is	ever-present	and	it	invades	and	saturates	the	cultural	space	with	irresistible	beauty:	“The	North,	The	North,	The	North,	always	The	North!	Can’t	you	talk	about	anything	else?”	Josefita’s	husband	protests;	“I	love	hearing	about	The	North,”	says	Rosa;	“Good,	since	that’s	all	we	hear,”	her	mother	retorts.	After	the	killing	of	her	father	and	the	disappearance	of	her	mother,	Rosa	stumbles	upon	her	godmother’s	Good	
Housekeeping	magazines	and	it	is	while	browsing	through	them,	with	their	photos	of	modern	kitchens,	and	headlines	like	“¡DECORAR	CON	HIGH	TECH!”	and	“LO	PRINCIPAL	ES	EL	ORDEN.”	that	she	informs	Josefita	of	her	decision	to	go	north	with	her	brother.	In	this	sense,	Nava’s	film	also	illustrates	with	sharp	precision	another	key	aspect	of	the	show	of	worlds,	and	of	shows	in	general:	the	endless	postponement	of	the	illusionary	mirage	of	the	First	World.	While	the	spectacular	images	on	magazines	and	television	operate	like	a	magnetic	allure	for	the	siblings,	the	truth	is	that	El	Norte	is	perpetually	deferred	and	delayed	for	Rosa	and	Enrique.	Like	a	phantasmagoric	illusion	that	summons	them	only	to	retreat	away	from	them	forever,	The	North	is	everywhere	and	nowhere	as	the	promise	that	must	always	charm	and	entice,	yet	never	fulfill	or	deliver	–	it’s	the	insatiable	desire	for	the	fetish	
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of	commodity.	Thus,	the	first	Norte,	and	the	first	landed	demarcation	to	The	North	that	the	siblings	must	pass	is	Mexico,	then	the	United	States’,	and	even	when	they	are	finally	California,	it	seems	as	though	El	Norte	has	already	left,	it’s	always	somewhere	else,	somewhere,	further	North.	Because	that	is	how	commodity	fetishism	operates:	it	slips,	it	flees,	it’s	moved	to	the	suburbs,	it’s	always	one	shelf	up.	The	fantasy	of	the	First	World	as	the	claimed	geotemporal	destiny	of	all	modern	histories	is,	like	El	Norte,	nothing	but	an	endless	postponement	on	the	chain	of	signification,	one	that,	like	desire,	always	sends	on	to	the	next	link,	from	signifier	to	signifier,	never	to	land	on	a	genuine	signified.	This	is	the	crucial	importance	of	
territorialization:	by	anchoring	these	chains	onto	arbitrary	psychogeographical	demarcations,	it	creates	the	illusion	of	material	reference,	even	when	that	georeference	keeps	one	wondering	“¿Dónde	están	los	gringos?”			5.2	In	El	Norte,	the	endlessly	deferred	mirage	of	The	North	is	reinforced	by	its	use	of	the	term	“gringos,”	whom	Rosa	can	never	seem	to	find	as	seen	in	the	Buenhogar	magazines	(except	for	one	brief	gringo	sighting,	when	she	sees	two	fashion	models,	interestingly	enough,	being	fitted	at	the	sewing	workshop	where	she	works).	As	I	have	argued,	the	root	of	the	problem	is	that	“gringo”	registers	the	spectacular	framings	at	play	so	that	the	United	States	can	imagine	itself	white,	developed,	modern	and	European.	As	such,	gringo	is	a	dangerous	term.	It	must	not	be	used	by	a	responsible	observer	unless	it	is	being	quoted	for	critique.	The	utilization	of	this	
	 246	
term,	no	matter	where	the	user	comes	from	geographically	or	politically,	can	only	reinforce	the	racist	falsifications	of	the	spectacle	in	the	realm	of	the	show	of	worlds.			In	his	discussion	of	Katrina,	Leary	observed	how	the	term	“refugee”	becomes	problematic	when	used	to	refer	to	the	residents	of	New	Orleans	because	those	residents	are	historically	poor	and	black	and	the	term	“refugee”	has	been	spectacularized	as	a	foreign	condition.	In	actuality,	the	problem	in	certainly	not	with	the	word	“refugee,”	but	with	its	underlying	association	with	the	“Third	World”	as	a	racialized	canvas	for	all	anti-modern	traits:	“refugees	are	a	“Third	World	thing”	and	it	is	either	insulting	to	call	Americans	thirdwordly,	or	to	call	New	Orleanians	thirdworldly	because	the	Third	World	is	where	non-whiteness	is	
psychogeographized	and	the	association	is	thus	a	racist	one	in	reference	to	the	fact	that	residents	in	that	city	are	African	American	in	great	proportion.	Whichever	position	we	adopt	politically,	whether	we	refer	to	the	imaginary	Third	World	as	a	place	of	backwardness	or	of	colorful	anachronistic	purity,	the	use	of	the	term	must	be	problematized	and	the	many	manipulations	it	conveys	must	be	countered.	“Third	World”	is	registered	in	western	pop	culture	as	an	insult.	The	chief	question	in	relation	to	spectacular	terms	like	“gringo”	and	“Third	World”	is	indeed	whether	they	can	be	appropriated	in	the	way	other	terms	originally	meant	as	an	insult	have	been	reclaimed	by	those	subjected	to	it.	Psychogeographic	terms	that	refer	to	human	collectives,	such	as	countries	and	continents,	pose	exceptional	resistance	to	appropriation,	for	there	can	never	be	consensus	within	societies	whether	the	conditions	implied	in	the	terms	as	negative	
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can	be	truly	neutralized:	because	of	the	complex	narratives	of	victimization	and	self-
artemization	at	play,	many	in	the	“Third	World”	continue	to	dream	of	the	“First,”	or	be	ashamed	of	the	actaeonic	eye	of	the	imaginary	“gringo,”	or	be	used	to	the	
artemization	of	their	demarcations.	Conversely,	whether	the	U.S.	is,	or	should	be,	a	white	European	Christian	nation	continues	to	be	an	unsettled	discussion	for	some	in	2019,	quite	tragically,	and	thus	the	forces	of	appropriation	can	summon	a	consensus	so	limited	on	their	behalf,	and	the	spectacular	machine	remains	so	powerful	and,	above	all,	sensuous,	that	appropriators	would	permanently	run	the	risk	of	self-defeatingly	reinforcing	what	they	hope	to	resist.	In	addition	to	these	arguments,	one	must	not	forget	the	popular	charge	of	ordinal	numbers	(the	meaning	of	“first	rate”	versus	“third	rate”)	and	the	Eurocentric	genesis	of	the	term	Third	World,	inaugurated	by	Sauvy	and	charged	by	European	epistemologies,	namely	the	idea	of	the	French	Estate	and	with	it	the	French	Revolution	(202).		Furthermore,	demarcational	panics	stem,	as	I	have	argued	with	Leary	and	Lee,	not	just	from	fear	of	difference,	but	also	from	anxieties	of	sameness:	in	this	context,	the	appropriation	of	terms	of	“gringo”	or	“Third	World”	would	too	often	end	up	strengthening	imaginary	differentiations,	for	often	the	response	to	spectacular	falsifications	of	self	and	other	are	not	to	be	countered	by	preaching	a	“superior’s”	compassion	for	the	unquestionably	demarcated	other	but	by	shattering	atalayas	so	that	differentiations	become	impossible.	Sometimes,	the	most	subversive	statement	one	can	make	in	inter-worlds	contact	is	“you	and	I	are	the	same.”	The	spectacular	First	World	may	not	fear	the	other	if	the	other	stays	in	their	place;	what	it	fears	most	
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is	porous	boundaries:	epistemological,	racial,	of	time	and	progress,	of	worlds.	The	response	to	American	exceptionalism	cannot	thus	be	to	validate	thirdworldness	and	exercise	compassion,	but	to	negate	the	First	World,	negate	the	gringo,	confuse	
demarcational	matrixes	and	shout	back:	“same!”	A	demarcational	critique	of	ideology	can	thus	be	regarded	as	the	counterspectacular	practice	of	highlighting	similarity	whenever	difference	is	taken	for	granted,	as	a	matter	of	both	method	and	tactic.		
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6	
	
The	show	of	cinema	and	the	cinema	of	shows:		
Meta-spectacular	reflections	from	Álvarez		
and	Debord	to	Tuoto	(1965	–	2016)			
“In	Houston,	Texas	…	you	know,	it’s	a	land	of	opportunity,	you	know,	and	I	like	it,	you	
know,	it’s	peaceful.”	As	if	to	validate	his	decision,	two	years	ago,	on	the	storm’s	eighth	
anniversary,	his	one-year-old	granddaughter	…	was	killed	by	a	bullet	that	passed	
through	her	babysitter’s	body.	“So,	you	know,	my	feelings	of	going	back	to	New	Orleans	
is	a	little,	you	know,	torn,	you	know,	it’s	just…	it’s	just	out	of	control.”		-	Associated	Press,	“Many	Katrina	Refugees	Never	Went	Home”	report.	Quoted	testimony	is	by	Katrina	refugee	Keenon	Reed	speaking	from	“Sleepy’s	Po-Boys,”	a	Houston,	Texas	sandwich	shop	that	caters	to	the	New	Orleans	migrant	community.		
	
“Olha	um	carro	novinho,	nem	foi	vendido,	tá	todo	queimado.	É	um...	Picasso.”	-	in	Arthur	Tuoto’s	Não	me	fale	sobre	recomeços.						
Aquí	todo	sigue	igual.	Así	de	pronto	parece	una	escenografía,	una	ciudad	de	cartón.	El	
“Titán	de	Bronce.”	Cuba	libre	e	independiente.	¿¡Quién	iba	a	sospechar	todo	esto!?	Sin	
el	águila	imperial.	¿Y	la	Paloma	que	iba	a	mandar	Picasso?	Muy	cómodo	eso	de	ser	
comunista	y	millonario	en	París.	Esta	humanidad	ha	dicho	“basta”	y	ha	echado	a	
andar.	Como	mis	padres,	como	Laura,	y	no	se	detendrá	hasta	llegar	a	Miami.	Sin	
embargo,	todo	parece	hoy	tan	distinto.	¿He	cambiado	yo	o	ha	cambiado	la	ciudad?	-	Sergio,	in	Memorias	del	desarrollo,	as	he	examines	the	city	of	Havana	through	a	telescope	from	his	high-rise	balcony.		
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Over	half	a	century	after	the	release	of	Álvarez’s	Now	and	the	publication	of	Debord’s	The	Society	of	the	Spectacle,	how	has	the	spectacular	capitalist	consortium	developed	and	mutated?	How	have	its	shows	unfolded	across	the	multiple,	disorderly,	and	ever-shifting	accumulations	of	capital	and	the	vast	non-national	expanses	of	underdevelopment?	How	have	theoretical	imaginations	followed,	documented,	denounced,	and	helped	create	spectacular	shows	old	and	new	in	the	digital	era?		6.1	Santiago	Álvarez’s	Now	presents	the	earliest	theory	of	the	spectacle	as	shows.	Two	years	before	Debord’s	book,	the	Cuban	film	probes	and	counters	some	of	the	most	fundamental	principles	in	the	(un)making	of	the	show	of	worlds.	Above	all,	
Now	constitutes	a	theory	of	spectacular	language,	and	understanding	that	language	does	not	only	communicate	stable,	precedent	realities	but	makes	those	realities	and	indeed	invents	the	very	world	it	simultaneously	“describes.”	Upon	mechanics	of	differential	opposition,	that	world-shaping	language	either	sustains	or	prohibits	epistemologies	and	cartographies	of	the	world	and	of	reality,	as	well	as	of	the	spectacle	and	its	shows.	The	theories	examined	and	developed	in	the	preceding	chapters	propose	that	we	must	negate	that	language,	contradict	it,	deny	it,	if	anything	to	see	what	becomes	visible	in	its	negation,	which	is	what	a	
demarcational	critique	must	do	for	a	living.	Demarcational	critique	is,	after	all,	the	confrontation	of	ideology	by	way	of	the	suppression	of	the	communicability	of	that	ideology,	as	well	as	an	understanding	that	that	ideology	remains	healthy	and	
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communicable	when	we	simply	choose	to	counter	it	in	its	own	demarcational	terms.	Thus,	speaking	of	a	stable	“developed	empire”	simultaneously	describes	what	to	some	degree	is	a	material	political	reality	but	also	helps	magnify	that	reality	in	its	symbolic	(spectacular)	dimension.	To	oppose	neocolonialism	with	the	language	of	colonialism	cannot	avoid	validating	and	reinforcing	what	that	opposition	claims	to	be	merely	combating.	The	imagined	First	World	must	to	some	degree	be	denied	its	firstworldness,	which	amounts	to	blocking	its	indispensable	processes	of	self-imagination.	Ultimately,	the	problem	with	the	First-and-Third	World	discourse	is	that	it	is	a	colonized	epistemology	beyond	recuperation.	Debord	posits	that	all	human	relations	are	now	mediated	by	the	spectacle,	and	the	U.S.	–	Latin	American	relation	is	indeed	one	of	those	interactions	mediated	by	the	spectacle,	with	its	fixed	cartographies	of	gringos	and	tropicalities.	Discourses	of	underdevelopment	in	mutual	U.S.	–	Latin	America	imagination	constitute	the	measure	of	spectacular	mediation	of	that	relationship.	Furthermore,	because	the	post-Columbian	American	continent	possesses	such	a	short	pre-modern	(indeed,	pre-spectacular)	history,	the	“New	World”	being	one	of	the	prime	projects	of	modernity,	transatlantic	and	North-South	imaginations	cannot	be	said	to	have	degraded	to	spectacular	mediation:	those	relations	grew	up	in	the	spectacle	for	most	of	their	historical	existence.		Above	all,	it	becomes	crucial	for	emancipatory	activism	to	remain	permanently	conscious	of	the	irreducible	paradox	whereby	to	denounce	oppression	without	attacking	the	language	of	the	oppressor,	and	without	attending	to	the	
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imaginary	dimension	of	that	oppression64,	invariably	contributes	to	the	making	of	that	reality	as	desired	by	the	oppressing	term.	In	the	specific	realm	of	postcolonial	thought,	a	demarcational	attack	on	the	language	that	sustains	the	show	of	worlds,	as	well	as	on	the	ideologies	and	epistemologies	that	this	show	reinforces,	must	problematize	established	narratives	of	oppression	and	victimhood.	This	demarcational	offensive	would	seek	to	obstruct	the	self-deprecatory	fallacy,	whose	operation	can	be	summarized	as:	attacking	the	imagined	oppressor	by	calling	it	what	it	loves	to	be	called	–	rich,	developed	and	civilized,	all	of	which	are	positively-charged	traits	a	priori	against	the	axiological	background	of	modernity.	As	we	have	seen,	the	imaginary	First	World	cannot	fully	or	evenly	self-ascribe	those	traits	without	major	spectacular	manipulations	and	anxious	projections.	Among	those	manipulations,	the	curated	framing	of	its	own,	and	the	Other’s,	spectacular	images	to	stabilize	time	and	space	as	one	is	crucial.	That	manipulation	can	only	be	countered	by	the	kind	of	inter-worlds	détournement	executed	in	Now,	for	
détournement	is	really	nothing	but	the	methodological	de-framing	of	shows.	When	emancipatory	language	remains,	as	is	the	case	in	La	hora	de	los	hornos,	unaware	of	its	place	as	an	act	of	political	communication	that	stands	a	priori	and	a	posteriori	in	relation	to	the	reality	it	articulates,	referencing	a	prior	reality	but	also	helping	to	
																																																								64	It	is	of	the	utmost	importance	to	specify	that	by	“imaginary	dimension	of	oppression”	I	am	not	at	all	proposing	that	postcolonial	oppression	is	not	real,	or	that	oppressed	peoples	are	merely	imagining	their	subjugation,	but	rather	that	the	stabilization	of	understandings	of	oppression	along	nation-state	lines	helps	to	hide	both	the	oppressed	in	the	psychogeographic	“First	World”	and	the	oppressors	in	the	psychogeographic	“Third	World,”	thus	precluding	the	conception	of	many	forms	of	
solidarity	and	terminally	obscuring	understanding	of	the	fluid	and	contradictory	nature	of	late-capitalist	spectacular	consortiums.		
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create	it	or	imagine	it,	it	succumbs	to	the	great	risk	that	resides	in	all	political	activism	and	which	can	only	be	mitigated	by	confusing	the	language	of	established	epistemologies	and	their	subsidiary	narratives	of	nation-state-based	patriotism.		The	particular	powers	of	Now	were	well	understood	from	the	time	the	film	was	released	in	1965.	A	review	of	issues	of	the	revista	Cine	Cubano	of	the	time	offers	a	revealing	insight	into	its	early	reception.	The	first	mention	to	the	film	is	probably	a	one-page	poster-style	preview	on	page	48	of	no.	30	(1965)65,	which	calls	it	a	documentary	and	places	the	American	singer	in	a	protagonist	role	as	“the	voice”	(“Canción	Now	en	la	voz	de	Lena	Horne”).	The	centrality	of	music,	which	in	Cine	
Cubano’s	reports	on	the	film	often	amounts	to	the	equation	of	song	and	work,	and	the	preview’s	arrangement	of	a	selection	of	stills	from	the	film	collage-style	on	the	page,	point	to	a	clear	perception	of	the	uniqueness	of	what	would	be	the	predecessor	of	the	music	video:	
																																																								65	Here,	as	is	the	case	in	all	references	in	the	revista,	both	the	film	and	Horne’s	song	appear	without	an	exclamation	point.	Álvarez’s	film	is	normally	treated	without	the	exclamation	point,	but	Horne’s	song	appears	as	“Now!”	on	its	1963	release.			
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	Fig.	8		Cine	Cubano	no.	30,	p.	48			Álvarez’s	film	is	first	covered	in	a	brief	article	by	Mario	Rodríguez	Alemán	in	special	no.	31-32-33	of	1966,	and	it	is	interesting	to	note	that	subsequent	issues	of	the	
revista	do	not	return	to	the	film.	The	article	itself	is	preceded	by	a	double-page	“poster”	of	the	song’s	lyrics	over	a	photograph	from	the	film	that	shows	a	circle	of	chained	protesters	under	the	eye	of	a	troop	of	police	officers	(138-139):	
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			 	Fig.	9		Cine	Cubano	special	no.	31-32-33,	pp.	138-9		In	the	article,	Rodríguez	Alemán	makes	several	references	to	the	specific	form	of	documentary	realism	and	veracity	(“verismo	documental”)	in	Now,	for	which	Álvarez	saw	in	each	phrase	of	Horne’s	song	a	“cumulus	of	images	that	the	documentary	reality	enabled	to	record	in	one	film,	as	short	as	the	song	itself	(six	minutes)	…	[a]	film	irrefutable	because	of	its	veracity”	(140-141)	and	“necessary	to	the	cause	of	human	rights”	(143).	That	veracity	includes	the	acknowledgement	of	U.S.	underdevelopment	and	the	shows	behind	which	it	tries	to	hide	it:	“recent	U.S.	history	(Little	Rock,	Alabama,	California,	Chicago)	has	given	the	film	Now	the	necessary	images,	as	it	has	given	the	original	song	the	reason	for	its	lyrics	…	behind	the	Statue	of	Liberty,	a	dung	field	(‘un	estiercolero’);	under	the	skyscrapers,	the	
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slums”	(142-143).	Rodríguez	Alemán	is	also	well	aware	of	the	visceral	element	of	the	film,	one	which	guarantees	its	ability	to	counter	the	spectacle	in	its	own	language	to	some	degree,	as	Debord	prescribed,	and	which	is	essential	in	a	spectacular	world	of	sensuous	ideological	beings:	“The	film	possesses	unusual	force	which	strikes	us	and	excites	us,	which	moves	us	through	the	realism	of	its	denouncement	…	[and]	reveals	itself	as	an	epic	film.	Its	tone	is	that	of	the	pamphlet.	Allegation	and	history	alive”	(141-143).	Rodríguez	Alemán	underscores	the	imperative	call	to	historical	protagonism	that	I	have	discussed	when	he	refers	to	the	song	as	a	history	lesson,	an	anthem,	and	a	war	cry	(140),	while	highlighting	the	fact	that	the	song	was	censored	and	banned	by	authorities	in	the	U.S.	As	I	have	proposed	in	chapter	2,	the	possibility	of	historical	protagonism	hinges	on	a	revolutionary	project’s	ability	to	break	with	epistemological	and	spectacular	manipulations	of	the	notions	of	time,	from	the	accelerating	fusion	of	time	onto	space	to	the	falsifications	of	cyclical	time.	It	is	interesting	to	note	how	metaphorizations	of	these	concepts	return,	time	and	again,	to	the	cyclic	forces	of	nature,	from	the	astronomical	sense	of	planetary	revolution	that	preceded	its	modern	use,	to	periodicity	of	natural	disasters	and	its	bearing	on	the	mandate	of	revolutionary	forces.	In	Cuba,	the	metaphor	of	the	cyclone	has	remained	commonplace.	It	is	for	this	reason	that	I	have	developed	my	concept	of	counter-spectacular	time	as	“anti-cyclonic	time,”	for	it	thus	captures	both	Debord’s	proposition	of	authentic	cyclical	time	falsified	by	the	spectacle	as	what	he	terms	“pseudo-cyclical	time,”	and	the	understanding	that,	when	history	has	been	
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accelerated	to	its	end	by	successful	revolutionary	struggle,	only	the	forces	of	nature	remain,	as	seen	with	particular	clarity	in	the	“Diez	millones”	ICAIC	newsreel	program	analyzed.	Rodríguez	Alemán	claims	that	Horne’s	song	is	“a	hurricane’s	wind	that	blows	fiercely	against	the	policy	of	racial	discrimination	practiced	by	the	fascist	authorities	and	institutions	of	the	American	South”	(140).	Naturally,	one	might	wonder	if	Rodríguez	Alemán	is	aware	of	the	persistence	of	racial	discrimination	within	post-revolutionary	Cuba,	and	this	is	clearly	a	weakness	of	
Now	and	an	excellent	argument	for	the	demarcational	urge	to	not	only	identify	non-national	oppressed	solidarities	in	the	psychogeographic	“First	World,”	but	to	also	complicate	the	imaginary	Third	World’s	nation-state/continental	victimhood	to	shed	light	on	the	equally	non-national	nature	of	oppressive	consortiums66.	In	Rodríguez	Alemán’s	words,	those	hurricane’s	winds	carry	the	emancipatory	demand	through	American	cities	and	counties:	“Now,	the	fight,	now	the	truth,	now	the	victory	…	because	the	moment	is	now”	(140),	and,	he	concludes,	“the	film	is	categorical,	as	categorical	as	Ciclón”	(143).			6.2	While	we	are	on	the	topic	of	hurricanes,	it	is	important	to	consider	the	significance	of	Hurricane	Katrina	in	the	history	of	the	spectacle.	If	Álvarez’s	Now	contains	the	earliest	theory	of	the	spectacle	and	its	countering,	two	recent	events	
																																																								66	In	this	case,	Cuba	once	again	stands	in	this	place	of	post-revolutionary	superiority	with	regards	to	both	the	United	States	and	the	rest	of	Latin	America,	for	the	Cuban	revolutionary	project	sought	to	combat	racism,	but	racist	oppression	in	the	rest	of	Latin	America	is	often	comparable,	to	some	degree	and	depending	on	the	particular	regime	and	realm,	to	that	portrayed	in	Now.		
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mark	the	peculiar	and	contradictory	place	in	which	the	spectacle	stands	in	the	twenty-first	century,	one	of	unprecedented	expansive	potential	and	enormous	risk.	Susan	Buck-Morss	discusses	one	of	these	in	Global	civil	wars,	when	she	refers	to	September	11,	2001	as	“the	self-destruction	of	U.S.	power	on	morning	television,”	an	anti-spectacle	and	“iconoclastic	act	[which]	destroyed	the	image	of	U.S.	invulnerability	and	the	icons	of	its	power”	(24:38	-	25:20).	However,	one	thing	had	not	taken	place	by	2001	which	had	by	2005,	when	Hurricane	Katrina	struck	New	Orleans:	the	widely	available	cell	phone	with	a	built-in	camera,	which	amounts	to	the	popularization	and	decentralization	of	the	capture	and	distribution	of	images,	or	the	loss	of	the	spectacle’s	curatorial	powers	and	the	compromise	of	the	principles	of	
actaeonization.	That	an	event	so	third-worldizing	as	Hurricane	Katrina	would	happen	after	the	first	cell	phones	with	built-in	cameras	became	commercially	available	to	the	public	in	2002	clearly	demonstrates	the	unique	danger	that	the	spectacle	faces	in	the	age	of	the	widespread	camera.	On	the	one	hand,	the	disciplined	reenactment	of	the	spectacle	by	the	public,	who	have	now	been	entrusted	with	the	obedient	creation	and	dissemination	of	its	shows,	could	find	an	unparalleled	opportunity	of	endless	expansion	through	the	popular	phone	camera.	By	the	very	same	token,	however,	this	opportunity	comes	with	great	potential	for	spectacular	fissures	through	which	the	spectacle’s	framings	necessary	for	the	construction	of	the	shows	of	two	worlds	can	be	subverted:	anyone	can	now	actaeonize	their	phone	camera	and	artemize	the	United	States	if	the	spectacular	discipline	that	restrains	them	fails	
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but	for	a	second.	What	represented	a	great	image-collection	challenge	for	Álvarez	in	the	1960s	under	the	embargo	can	now	be	achieved	by	a	mere	tap	of	the	finger	on	a	pocket-sized	screen.	I	will	return	to	the	status	of	these	two	milestones	in	the	history	of	the	advanced	spectacle	in	section	4	of	the	epilogue.			6.3	A	complete	history	of	the	advanced	spectacle,	one	which	includes	its	latest-age	dissemination	into	shows	as	proposed	in	this	study,	can	be	traced	when	three	films	are	examined	as	a	unified	trilogy.	Those	films	are	Santiago	Álvarez’s	Now	(1965),	Guy	Debord’s	La	Société	du	Spectacle	(1973),	and	Arthur	Tuoto’s	Não	Me	Fale	Sobre	
Recomeços	(2016).	That	trilogy	is	best	examined	in	that	order,	even	though	Debord’s	theoretical	foundation	was	published	two	years	after	the	Cuban	film.		
La	Société	du	Spectacle	is	Debord’s	black-and-white	film	rendition	of	his	1967	book	of	the	same	name.	Released	in	1973,	the	film	consists	of	a	jumble	of	detoured	footage,	clips	and	photographs	appropriated	from	all	walks	of	media,	including	Hollywood	and	Soviet	film,	television	advertisement,	pornography,	and	news	coverage	of	urban	rioting	and	historical	events,	including	the	murder	of	Lee	Harvey	Oswald,	the	Spanish	Civil	War	and	the	May	68	riots	in	Paris.	Interspersed	periodically	throughout	this	chaotic	multitude	of	confused	(co-fused)	images	are	series	of	quotations	from	Marx,	Machiavelli	and	Tocqueville,	among	others.		The	film’s	primary	quote	stream,	however,	is	Debord’s	book	itself,	as	the	juxtaposed	found	images	accompany,	ironically,	illustratively	or	else,	book	excerpts	read	in	voice-over,	beginning	from	Thesis	1:	“Toute	la	vie	des	sociétés	dans	
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lesquelles	règnent	les	conditions	modernes	de	production	s’annonce	comme	une	immense	accumulation	de	spectacles.	Tout	ce	qui	était	directement	vécu	s’est	éloigné	dans	une	représentation”	is	thus	read	against	footage	of	an	astronaut	emerging	from	a	spaceship	onto	a	spacewalk	in	Earth’s	orbit	abruptly	followed	by	a	semi-naked	woman	squirming	and	writhing	on	a	tropical-rainforest-themed	stage,	or	technology	and	fetish,	as	Hampton	summarizes	it	(62).	In	spite	of	Debord’s	adamant	critique	of	intellectual	property	in	general,	the	opening	credits	specify	a	select	list	of	six	filmmakers’	works	utilized	in	the	“détournement	of	pre-existing	films”:	John	Ford’s	Rio	Grande,	Nicholas	Ray’s	Johnny	Guitar,	Josef	von	Sternberg’s	
The	Shanghai	Gesture,	Raoul	Walsh’s	They	Died	with	Their	Boots	On,	Orson	Welles’	
Mr.	Arkadin,	and	Sam	Wood’s	For	Whom	the	Bell	Tolls.	After	this	sign	of	respect	for	those	films,	the	rolling	now-anti-credit	continues	“as	well	as	those	by	a	certain	number	of	bureaucratic	filmmakers	from	the	so-called	socialist	countries”	(0:01:21).	If	Now	stands	as	the	inaugural	piece	in	the	proposed	trilogy,	the	status	of	the	other	two	films	with	regards	to	Álvarez’s	is	not	equal.	While	Tuoto’s	2016	film	constitutes	an	update	along	the	lines	of	the	concept	of	“the	show”	proposed	in	this	study,	as	we	will	see	further	on,	Debord’s	film	stands	in	a	position	of	acute	tension	in	relation	to	Now.	That	tension,	which	is	best	considered	irreducible,	centers	on	the	possibility	of	preservation	of	cultural	media	under	a	counter-spectacular	revolutionary	endeavor.	In	other	words,	need	the	medium	of	culture	be	destroyed	as	part	of	the	anti-spectacular	struggle,	or	is	it	able	to	retain	a	redeeming	pedagogical	function,	and,	if	so,	to	what	degree	and	at	what	cost	and	compromise?		
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In	tune	with	the	intellectual	principles	of	the	Cuban	revolution,	Álvarez	believed	strongly	in	the	pedagogical	power	of	film.	One	of	the	ways	in	which	the	Cuban	(and,	of	course,	Soviet)	revolution	remains	close	to	capitalist	productivist	optimism	is	in	its	profound	care	for	cultural	media,	far	from	the	cynicisms	of	Debord	and	his	gang	of	Situationists.	As	Howard	Hampton	puts	it	in	his	aptly-named	article	“The	Devil’s	Envoy:	Guy	Debord	and	the	Cinema	of	Annihilation,”	Guy	Debord	was	nothing	shy	of	“the	total	supersession	of	politics	and	arts	alike”	(60),	a	conviction	particularly	evident	in	his	first	feature-length	film,	The	Society	of	the	Spectacle,	whose	confusion	sought	to	“problematize	reception,”	as	Keith	Sanborn	warns,	and	eventually”	drive	the	audience	out	of	the	cinema	and	into	the	streets,	to	dispel	the	hold	of	images	over	reality,”	even	his	own	images	in	his	own	film,	“[t]urning	filmmaking	against	itself”	(Hampton	60).	Debord	did	not	care	for	cinema	or	for	any	vehicle	of	“bureaucratic	culture”	as	he	calls	it	in	his	film:	his	images	were	meant	to	run	through	their	media	channels	like	an	acid	that	burns	its	own	bridges	and	annihilates	all	in	its	path67.	He	“felt	the	cinema	had	to	be	razed	along	with	every	other	tool	of	bourgeois	and	state	socialization”	to	extricate	a	“a	free	world	beneath	
																																																								67	Noys	tackles	the	potential	of	a	major	misunderstanding	surrounding	Debord’s	decision	to	bring	his	work	on	the	spectacle	to	cinema,	a	possibility	he	calls	“performative	contradiction,”	as	the	denunciation	of	the	society	of	the	spectacle	“in	its	most	spectacular	medium”	(395).	This	is,	Noys	warns,	an	inadequate	criticism,	for	“Debord	recognizes	that	cinema	is	an	integral	part	of	capitalism;	that	is	the	point.”	The	destruction	of	cinema	to	which	Debord	has	set	out	“might	be	characterized	more	precisely	as	a	negation	of	cinema,	in	the	Hegelian	sense.	That	is,	the	negation	of	cinema	as	Aufheben:	an	act	that	ends,	abolishes	or	annuls	at	the	same	time	as	it	rises,	picks	up	or	preserves”	(395-6).		
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the	cardboard	banality	if	the	present	society”	(Hampton	60).	That	cardboard	must	for	Debord	burn	through	as	entirely	as	celluloid.		While	Álvarez	differs	from	Debord	in	this	most	fundamental	way,	his	1965	documentary	still	manages	to	stand	as	the	predecessor	of	Debord’s	theory	by	years,	and	not	just	in	the	manner	in	which	it	is	normally	claimed	to	precede	it,	namely	in	its	détournement	of	found	and	stolen	footage	around	music.	Indeed,	Álvarez’s	pedagogical	belief	in	the	medium	of	cinema	unfolds	with	a	degree	of	psychogeographic	play	that	amounts	to	the	Situationist	practice	of	dérive,	as	I	have	argued,	on	a	global	scale,	with	the	unique	vantage	of	a	drift	able	to	deconstruct	both	time	and	space	in	spectacular	stasis.	In	few	testimonies	is	Álvarez’s	psychogeographically-insurgent	respect	for	the	medium	of	filmmaking	more	evident	than	in	an	interview	he	gave	the	revista	Hablemos	de	Cine	in	Lima,	Peru	in	1970.	When	asked	about	his	integrated	use	of	varied	sources	in	his	then-recent	film	Piedra	
sobre	piedra,	Álvarez	demonstrates	his	optimistic	care	for	cultural	and	media	materials	as	he	explains	that,	in	registering	the	testimony	of	that	year’s	Peruvian	earthquake	on	the	Sierra	to	re-elaborate	it	according	to	their	[revolutionary]	intentions	without	claiming	“political	neutrality,”	he	holds	an	advantage	as	a	Cuban	filmmaker:	“we	have	better	resources	than	you	[Peruvians],	you	work	with	what	you’ve	got,	even	8mm.”	But,	he	continues,		[w]hen	a	revolutionary	has	no	platform,	no	radio	or	t.v.	station	or	newspaper	in	his	grasp,	he	paints	on	the	walls.	So	if	one	doesn’t	have	an	Arriflex	or	a	Nagra	one	communicates	with	the	people	in	whatever	way:	with	slides,	
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photographs	–	black	and	white	if	not	in	colour	–	you	create	a	sequence,	and	if	you	haven’t	got	sound	you	narrate	in	person;	all	of	this	stimulates	a	search	for	further	steps	in	communication.	But,	already,	contact	with	the	people	is	an	incentive	to	develop	the	medium	of	expression	whatever	they	may	be.	And	if	you	have	a	vocation	for	cinema,	that’s	what	you	have	to	do	(16)		These	terms	stand	in	stark	contrast	to	Debord’s	acid	and	annihilatory	utilization	of	media.	The	words	above	describe	Now	to	the	letter,	but,	as	close	as	Now	can	be	to	Debord’s	film	in	form,	its	urgent	appropriation	of	“whatever”	in	the	face	of	lack	is	one	of	profound	pedagogical	conviction.		And	yet,	in	his	anti-cynical	posture,	Álvarez’s	captures	the	entire	apparatus	of	the	spectacle	as	shows,	as	updated	in	this	study,	including	the	countering	of	
territorialized	epistemologies,	chief	among	them	time,	by	means	of	global	dérive	and	the	hope	for	the	recovery	of	anti-cyclonic	time.	Against	the	rigidity	of	the	nation-state	order	in	the	imagination	of	the	postcolonial	struggle,	the	Cuban	director	retains	what	the	interviewer	calls	“a	universalising	passion”	(14).	The	most	obvious	way	in	which	Álvarez	conceives	of	a	psychogeograhic	consciousness	against	establishment	is	the	fact	that,	for	him,	Cuba	is	all	the	conventional	notion	of	“First	World”	attempts	to	encapsulate:	Cuba	is	that	nation	of	futurity	and	development	that	the	United	States	tries	to	imagine	for	itself:		[C]oming	to	Peru,	like	visiting	any	other	country	of	the	so-called	third	world,	is	an	important	experience	for	a	Cuban	documentary	film	maker	[sic],	because	we	encounter	a	similarity	with	the	problems	we	had	before	the	
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Revolution	in	Cuba,	and	this	makes	us	feel	as	if	we	were	going	back	in	time;	here	in	Peru,	or	in	Chile,	when	you	walk	in	the	streets,	when	you	watch	television,	it	feels	like	a	time-machine	that’s	taken	you	back	eleven	years.	The	same	structure	in	the	t.v.	programs,	the	commercials,	the	style	of	the	news,	the	restaurants,	the	fact	that	you	sometimes	forget	you	have	to	leave	a	tip	…	There	are	a	series	of	elements	in	daily	life	which,	if	you	wanted	to	describe	them	filmicly,	you	might	say	belong	to	an	archive	of	impressions	which,	in	my	country,	are	those	of	another	epoch	(13).	What	Álvarez	describes	here	is	not	just	the	status	of	Cuba	as	the	“new	First	World”	in	its	perpetually	futuristic	position,	beyond	history;	indeed,	Álvarez’s	references	to	the	eerie	feeling	of	seeing	TV	programs	and	advertisement,	news,	and	even	restaurant-related	social	scripts	of	another	era	bear	testimony	of	a	reencounter	with	the	society	of	the	spectacle	from	post-spectacular	Cuba.		While	Debord’s	The	Society	of	the	Spectacle	centers	most	heavily	on	European	and	North	American	imageries,	Álvarez’s	work	offers	a	new	global	psychogeography	where	Cuba,	from	its	position	of	superiority	in	accomplished	history,	sends	out	a	war	cry	to	solidarities	which,	unlike	the	simple	anti-Yankee	encyclopedic	exhortation	of	La	hora	de	los	hornos,	is	one	that	problematizes	the	locations	of	
solidarities	and	consortiums	while	also	catering	to	the	sensuous	ideological	
being.	Thus,	the	United	States	occupies	a	position	of	underdevelopment	among	other	yet-to-be-liberated	regions:		
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one	sees	the	need	…	to	move	beyond	the	condition	of	underdevelopment	characteristic	of	all	the	peoples	of	the	third	world.	As	Cubans,	we	have	a	political	position	in	the	face	of	everything	that’s	going	on	at	the	moment	in	the	international	arena,	and	being	in	Peru	is	like	being	in	other	parts	of	the	world,	like	Algeria	or	Vietnam	or	Laos	or	the	United	States	itself	(13,	my	emphasis)		And,	immediately	after	casually	throwing	the	United	States	among	“the	peoples	of	the	third	world,”	Álvarez	identifies	the	very	reason,	the	spectacular	reason,	the	United	States	can	hide	its	underdevelopment:	its	defense	barrier	against	being	
artemized,	in	the	form	of	anxious	travel	bans	(the	hounds	of	the	actaeonic	myth)	placed	on	the	potentially	actaeonic	eyes	of	the	South:	“If	I	were	to	go	to	the	United	States,	as	I’ve	tried	to	do	several	times,	I’d	like	to	do	something	directly	on	racial	discrimination,	on	the	problems	on	North	American	youth	…	If	they	were	to	issue	permits,	as	we’ve	often	asked	of	North	American	journalists	who	indeed	can	come	to	Cuba”	(13).		Moreover,	Álvarez’s	anti-spectacular	recognition	understands	the	specific	nature	of	the	time	from	which	the	war	call	of	Now	is	broadcast,	namely	“anti-
cyclonic	time,”	as	I	have	offered	to	view	it,	and	the	particular	relation	between	religion	and	spectacularly-falsified	pseudo-cyclical	time,	as	per	Debord’s	theory.	Debord’s	idea	of	authenticity	relates	to	a	direct	experience	of	labor	and	its	product,	one	before	the	workers	became	alienated	from	the	totality	or	ownership	of	the	product	of	their	labor.	This	loss	of	direct	experience	of	labor	is	rooted	in	the	
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capitalist	mode	of	production,	and	with	that	mode	of	production	come	falsifications	of	time.	In	agricultural	labor,	circular	time	is	authentically	rooted	in	the	cycles	of	nature,	following	the	seasons	of	plantation	and	harvest.	Capitalist	society	offers	instead	pseudo-cyclical	time	made	up	of	falsifications	of	circular	time	which	are	far	removed	from	the	processes	of	nature,	and	which	discipline	consumers	and	workers	as	they	follow	the	returning	cadence	of	commercial	holidays	and	the	exchangeability	of	commodified	time	blocks,	such	as	work	shifts.	Religion,	however,	must	continue	to	play	a	key	role	in	mediating	the	relationship	between	political	subjects	and	the	forces	of	nature	in	capitalist	society.	In	agricultural	times,	religious	exercises	were	aimed	at	pleading	the	gods	for	rain	or	against	natural	disasters	as	a	way	of	ritualizing	human	powerlessness	in	the	face	of	nature,	indeed	as	a	way	of	asking	the	gods	to	keep	climatic	cycles	normal.	In	capitalist	society,	the	faith	of	workers	is	no	longer	grounded	in	nature,	for	the	cycles	that	determine	their	lives	and	material	survival	(namely,	their	income)	are	now	in	the	hands	of	capitalist	consortiums.	Yet,	when	laborers	in	modern	times	pray	to	the	saints	for	rain,	or	employment,	or	against	calamity,	that	religion	continues	to	mediate	with	nature	as	if	it	still	were	nature	alone,	and	not	the	capitalist	consortium,	the	primary	determinant	of	their	fates,	as	if	those	consortiums	didn’t	own	the	pseudo-cycles	that	now	govern	the	workers’	lives.		A	counter-spectacular	effort	must	eliminate	this	alienating	gap	between	work	and	nature,	as	all	labor	must	identify	itself	not	just	with	its	specific	products	but	with	nature	itself	as	a	whole	if	this	planet	is	to	be	saved:		
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In	Cuba,	for	example,	catholicism	is	practised,	but	we’re	not	such	a	fanatically	religious	country	as	some	Latin	America	peoples	like	Colombia	and	Peru.	That	mass	of	people	today	are	poor	people,	for	the	most	part,	looking	for	a	way	out	of	their	poverty	through	something	mystical	…	[But]	in	the	end,	they’ll	leave	the	saint	in	the	church	and	they	won’t	have	to	take	it	out	into	the	streets	any	more.	This	is	surely	the	greatest	wish	for	an	underdeveloped	people	of	believers:	no	longer	to	have	to	take	the	saints	out	into	the	streets	for	it	to	rain…	(15).		This	is,	indeed,	the	impetus	of	post-spectacular,	“anti-cyclonic	time”	as	I	have	defined	it:	time	after	the	end	of	history	that	needs	to	worry	about	nothing	more	than	the	cyclic	forces	of	nature.		But	Álvarez’s	inversion	of	the	show	of	worlds	is	not	without	problems.	And	his	problems	are	really	the	greatest	risks	of	the	kind	of	demarcational	critique	I	propose	in	this	study.	Indeed,	in	the	same	interview,	Álvarez	displays	a	degree	of	romantic	indigenist	nostalgia	that	can	be	problematic	when	he	expresses	that		[t]he	misery	of	the	Peruvian	Indian	must	wound	the	sensitivity	of	any	citizen	of	the	world	…	that’s	enough	for	one	to	want	to	be	here	and	record	this	testimony	of	the	exploitation	suffered	by	the	peasant	for	so	many	years.	But	Peru	has	some	special	characteristics	which	attracts	us	…	including	a	physical	image	of	the	countryside	which	is	new	to	us	[Cubans]	(14).	We	cannot	help	but	wonder	about	Álvarez’s	romantic	eye	here,	one	that	sounds	too	much	like	that	of	Nava	and	Thomas’s	El	Norte,	depositing	its	curious	actaeonic	gaze	
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on	the	indigenous	countryside	in	order	to	run	and	tell	of	the	disgrace	of	the	exotic	Other.	In	the	narrative	that	supports	this	testimony,	Álvarez	seems	to	adopt	not	just	the	political	superiority	of	the	post-revolutionary	Cuban,	but	also	the	colonialist	
atalaya	of	the	white	European	eye.	This	testimony	reverts	the	two	worlds,	but	not	as	a	mere	inversion	of	the	spectacular	reinforcement	of	national	epistemologies	and	their	self-attribution	of	development	and	subsidiary	projection	of	underdevelopment.	On	the	contrary,	this	testimony	seems	closer	to	a	mere	inversion	of	terms	so	that	the	subordinate	term	adopts	the	arrogance	of	its	enslaver,	like	a	slave	who	conquers	the	dream	of	becoming	the	master	and	sets	out	to	savor	the	imagined	pleasures	of	the	upper	hand.	This	notion	was	clearly	present	during	Álvarez’s	folk	ethnographic	experience	on	the	Greyhound	bus,	as	I	have	pointed	out,	and	is	indeed	the	greatest	danger	against	which	a	demarcational	critique	of	postcolonial	thought	must	guard	itself	permanently:	in	its	systematic	search	for	the	“third	world	in	the	first	and	the	first	world	in	the	third,”	demarcational	thought	can	be	a	tempting	matrix	for	a	mere	slave-master	inversion	of	terms,	whereby	the	imagined	Third	World	merely	denies	its	condition	and	imagines	itself	to	be	the	First,	like	a	bitter	payback.	The	chief	safeguard	against	this	risk	is	the	understanding	that,	once	artemic-actaeonic	mechanics	have	been	disrupted,	a	non-national	break	with	geopolitical	epistemologies	must	follow	in	the	manner	initially	suggested	by	Buck-Morss	in	Global	Civil	Wars,	as	fluid	non-national	terms	in	the	postcolonial	struggle.	In	the	trilogy	proposed,	what	must	be	read	between	Álvarez’s	Now	and	Debord’s	The	Society	of	the	Spectacle	is	not	evolution,	as	I	will	trace	for	Tuoto’s	film,	
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but	tension.	That	standing	paradox	describes	the	dialectal	forces	of	preservation	and	annihilation	that	must	underlie	the	anti-spectacular	emancipation.	This	is	indeed	a	definitional	status	of	Álvarez’s	cinema:	repeatedly	standing	as	the	unwitting	follower	or	the	solid	predecessor	of	thoughts	of	which	he	had	no	theoretical	knowledge:	predecessor	of	Debord’s	theory	of	the	spectacle,	book	and	film,	and	of	the	pop	music	video;	whether	he	can	be	considered	an	“unaware	follower	of	Vertov”	is	a	more	complicated	issue.			For	reasons	of	focus	and	scope,	this	study	has	treated	the	Cuban	revolutionary	film	project	on	its	own	standing,	without	reference	to	its	foundational	influences	in	Russian	revolutionary	cinema.	Naturally,	though,	the	first	and	primary	principles	of	the	intellectual	front	in	post-1959	Cuba	drew	on	the	almost	four	decades	of	the	preceding	Soviet	revolutionary	experience	in	the	arts.	This	was	particularly	the	case	of	documentary	film.	However,	the	specific	work	of	Álvarez	presents	problems	in	this	respect,	which	in	turn	relate	to	the	specific	tensions	Now	maintains	with	Debord’s	1973	film.	In	his	dissertation	on	the	Cuban	filmmaker,	cited	in	the	special	BFI	Dossier	on	Álvarez,	Miguel	Orodea	points	out	that,	although	Álvarez’s	work	“looks	a	priori	as	if	it	could	be	defined	as	the	most	faithful	continuation	of	the	ideas	of	Dziga	Vertov,”	the	truth	is	that	Álvarez	could	not	have	possibly	been	influenced	by	the	Russian	director	because	he	didn’t	see	any	of	his	works	until	the	early	1970s	(23).		Orodea	proposes	that	these	similarities	between	the	two	must	then	be	traced	back	to	the	common	demands	of	socialist	revolutionary	
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ideologies	and	general	situational	environments	and	limitations	that	both	directors	faced.		However,	that	is	as	far	as	commonalities	between	Vertov	and	Álvarez	should	be	pondered.	If	Now	in	particular	seems	to	stand	avant	la	lettre	in	relation	to	Debord’s	theory	and	its	cinematic	rendition,	and	après	la	lettre	with	regards	to	Vertov’s	style,	the	Cuban	film	is	also	a	theory	against	purely	sequential	and	chronological	understandings	of	artistic	partnership.	Now	participates	in	a	theoretical	trilogy	with	Debord’s	Theory	of	the	Spectacle	film	in	tension,	not	in	terms	of	sequential	influence	(which	would	indeed	amount	to	a	form	of	stagism),	and	it	relates	to	Vertov’s	work,	even	in	its	similarities,	in	the	negation	of	the	Russian	filmmaker’s	devotion	to	theoretical	formalism.	Clearly,	all	three	filmmakers	evince	a	“belief	in	organising	images	according	to	Marxist	dialectics,	with	editing	as	the	means	of	synthesis”	(Orodea	24)68	as	well	as	deeply-held	convictions	regarding	the	political	manipulation	of	repurposeable	materials,	appropriated,	stolen,	or	otherwise.	However,	Debord’s	elaborations	on	the	spectacle,	both	in	the	book	and	in	the	film,	have	been,	as	I	pointed	out	in	chapter	1,	criticized	for	remaining	too-theoretical,	excessively	abstract	in	spite	of	how	much	the	thinker	insists	on	praxis,	and,	in	Vertov,	manipulations	of	found	materials	in	his	films	“responded	to	aesthetic	positions	that	were	already	defined	in	the	declaration	of	the	Cinema-eye	and	the	Cinema-truth	principles”	(25).			
																																																								68	Orodea	refers	only	to	Vertov	and	Álvarez	in	this	quote;	the	extension	to	Debord	is	mine.		
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It	is	one	of	the	main	points	of	this	study	that	the	anti-imperialist	struggle	cannot	be	conceived	of	demarcationally,	that	is,	with	a	subversive	attitude	that	also	targets	the	internal	geo-epistemologies	of	current	post-colonial	thought,	unless	two	conditions	are	present:	dominant	need,	and	full	anti-formalist	artistic	freedom.	Both	conditions	underlie	Álvarez’s	work	with	rare	force,	but	lack	in	both	Vertov	and	Debord.	Flanêuring	around	the	streets	of	Paris,	Debord	lacked	more	than	just	a	more	practical	perspective.	As	I	have	argued,	his	theoretical	principles	were	extremely	useful,	but	need	the	complementation	and	practical	development	of	a	non-Euro-centered	perspective	that	has	also	found	itself	on	a	Greyhound	bus	in	the	poor	American	South.	Quite	ironically,	the	pressures	of	necessity	lack	in	both	Debord	and	Vertov,	at	least	in	the	extreme	degree	and	closeness	with	which	they	shape	Álvarez’s	work,	where	“[t]he	devices	employed	…	while	they	result	from	the	same	ideological	preoccupations,	also	find	practical	justification	in	the	lack	of	available	material	and	resources.	Perhaps	this	is	why	there	isn’t	a	theory	that	holds	Álvarez’s	work	together	and	why	he	doesn’t	seem	interested	in	elaborating	one”	(Orodea	25).		For	Álvarez,	the	reality	of	lack	and	need	takes	on	a	unique	force	of	patent	and	immediate	proximity,	with	the	United	States	a	mere	100	miles	away,	and	the	blockade	in	the	middle.	And	yet	there	is	still	something	else	that	sustains	Now’s	
demarcational	narrative,	without	which	even	Álvarez’s	peculiar	experience	of	need	would	not	have	meant	much.	As	Álvarez	puts	it,	“[w]e	don’t	care	in	Cuba	about	any	one	style,	we	don’t	care	if	it	is	naturalistic,	impressionist,	abstractionist,	pop,	all	styles	are	good	depending	on	how	to	use	them.	Sometimes	Socialist	countries	are	
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against	certain	styles,	but	we	do	not	subscribe	to	this	thesis”	(Chanan	26).	With	Álvarez,	one	cannot	talk	about	“style”	or	aesthetic	principles;	if	anything,	his	style	is	that	of	plastic	adaptation	to	circumstance	and	need	in	the	most	complete	freedom.	Orodea	points	out	that	“[t]he	aesthetic	preoccupations	in	Vertov’s	cinema	have	been	seen	as	a	consequence	of	the	declaration	of	principles	and	for	many	this	was	to	the	detriment	of	the	content”	(25).	This	could	never	be	the	case	of	Álvarez’s	since,	for	him,	content	was	sacred:	while	anything,	any	aesthetics	whatsoever,	were	fair	game	for	him,	content	and	communicability	were	sacred	and	could	not	be	compromised,	jeopardized,	delayed,	or	restricted.		Between	Vertov’s	national	formalism	Debord’s	Euro-centered	theorism,	Álvarez’s	work	confers	a	liberating	energy	on	the	political	imperatives	he	shared	with	those	thinkers.	The	limiting	weight	of	“the	orders	of	knowledge,”	both	theoretical	and	epistemological,	can	get	in	the	way	of	certain	discoveries;	or	rather:	certain	discoveries	are	only	possible	under	given	theoretical-epistemological	orders,	of	which	they	are	products,	as	are	the	silences	that	those	orders	command.	This	is,	quite	rightly,	one	of	Buck-Morss’s	constant	concerns.	Demarcational	realities,	such	as	non-national	solidarities,	become	visible	when	theory	and	formalism	take	a	step	back	in	the	most	extreme	manner.	This	extreme	manner	does	not	only	entail	freeing	the	artist	from	the	caprices	of	abstract	theorization	and	the	edicts	of	film	theories;	indeed,	it	involves	the	artists	themselves	freeing	their	work	so	that	it	can	be	carried	away	by	solidary	forces	external	to	them.	As	Amir	Labaki	observes,		
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[r]arely	does	[Álvarez]	utilize	voice-over	as	the	organizing	or	explaining	thread	of	his	films.	In	most	cases,	music	plays	this	role	of	dramatic	guide.	The	most	extreme	case	is	precisely	that	of	Now,	in	which	the	song	performed	by	Lena	Horne	over	the	Hebrew	melody	Hava	Nagila	represents	the	heart	of	the	film,	directing	the	very	internal	logic	of	image	articulation.	Once	the	song	ends,	the	film	closes	(12).	Indeed,	in	Álvarez’s	Now,	it	is	not	just	that	abstract	theory	is	rejected	as	the	main	source	of	internal	textual	logics,	as	is	to	some	degree	the	case	with	Debord’s	film,	or	that	those	internal	organizing	logics	owe	themselves	to	some	a	priori	theory	of	cinematic	principles.	After	a	defining	folk	ethnographic	experience,	Álvarez	is	willing	to	throw	the	driving	wheel	of	his	film	to	an	external	commander	on	the	other	side	of	the	Straight	of	Florida,	so	that	Lena	Horne,	in	solidarity	to	those	for	whom	the	song	is	written,	is	the	very	organizing	logic	of	the	text.	It	is	only	in	the	absence	of	certain	established	theoretical	and	formal	orders	that	certain	voices	begin	to	be	heard	and	certain	continuities	can	be	imagined	where	before	there	was	only	difference	anchored	in	psychogeography;	differences,	one	must	observe,	that	often	belong	in	the	same	order	as	other	spectacular	falsifications	and	displacements	of	conflicts.	Moreover,	Álvarez’s	surrender	of	textual	logics	effectively,	materially	gives	voice	over	silence,	for	Horne’s	song	was	censored	in	the	U.S.	at	the	time.		In	Álvarez,	the	film’s	adherence	to	theory	is	thus	grounded	on	folk	
ethnographic	experience	in	a	way	it	is	not	in	Debord,	and	further	complicated	by	the	generic	instability	of	the	texts,	many	of	which,	including	Now,	stand	in	a	hybrid	
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position	in	relation	to	time,	as	“durable	news	reports.”	As	Álvarez	explains	to	Labaki	in	interviews	given	to	him	in	Sao	Paulo,	Brazil	and	Havana,	Cuba	in	1993,	only	48	copies	of	the	noticieros	were	made	for	each	issue,	while	Cuba	had	about	500	theaters.	This	meant	that	each	copy	had	to	get	around	to	10	salas:		[w]e	started	to	make	a	newsreel	in	such	a	way	that	it	could	be	seen	in	twenty	weeks	or	three	years,	because	it	didn’t	lose	current	status	…	We	had	to	give	the	news	in	such	a	way	that	the	events	presented	today	should	have,	or	awake,	the	same	interest	in	a	year’s	time.	There	are	many	newsreels	that	have	this	characteristic	of	being	news	that	don’t	get	old;	for	example,	the	news	on	racial	discrimination,	which	continues	to	exist	…	Reality	made	us	modify	the	structure	of	the	newsreel	in	a	way	that	came	to	look	very	much	like	documentaries	…	Now	was	born	of	a	newsreel.	Ciclón	(1963)	too”	(44).		The	folk	ethnographic	element	is	by	no	means	minor.	And	if	Horne’s	song	is	the	organizing	logic	to	which	Álvarez	defers	in	Now,	that	song	too	comes	from	experience.	In	the	interview	referenced	above,	Álvarez	provides	a	detailed	account	of	the	Greyhound	experience.	Labaki	then	inquires	into	the	particular	way	in	which	this	experience	materializes	into	what	he	calls	the	“proto-videoclip.”	Álvarez	answers	with	another	chance	experience	(chance	is,	of	course,	central	to	the	notion	of	folk	ethnographic	experience	developed	here),	explaining	that	he	met	members	of	the	Black	Panthers	group	in	Cuba,	one	of	whom	became	his	friend	and	gave	him	as	a	gift	a	record	that	included	the	song	Now	(50).			
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6.4	If	in	the	“trilogy	of	the	show”	proposed	here	Now	stands	in	dialectal	tension	with	
The	Society	of	the	Spectacle,	its	relationship	with	Arthur	Tuoto’s	Não	Me	Fale	Sobre	
Recomeços	traces	a	more	chronological	edge,	not	one	of	textual	influence	but	of	the	way	in	which	the	two	films,	treated	as	theories	of	the	spectacle,	follow	the	development	of	the	spectacle	into	shows	in	the	digital	era,	as	proposed	in	this	study.	Released	in	2016,	the	film	is	directed	by	Brazilian	filmmaker	Arthur	Tuoto	and	is	captioned	in	the	director’s	official	site	as		audiovisual	notes	on	the	individual	and	the	state.	The	film	utilizes	the	most	varied	forms	of	found	material	to	conceive	of	a	game	of	verbal	and	imagetic	citations	which	reflects	on	historical	concepts	of	art,	film	and	politics	from	the	imperative	of	image.		At	first	sight	and	on	its	most	superficial,	formal	level,	the	film	resembles	Debord’s	The	Society	of	the	Spectacle,	with	its	anarchic	collage	of	film	and	news	footage	interspersed	with	quotes	in	inter-title	style.	The	film’s	hectic	accumulation	of	image	and	sound	includes	materials	as	diverse	as	YouTube	videos,	videogame	scenes,	graffiti	(pichações),	music	video	(videoclipes),	varied	fictional	films,	and	footage	of	street	protests,	art	vandalism,	and	the	frenzied	opening	of	the	first	Apple	store	in	Brazil.	In	a	vertiginous	cascade	of	undistinguishing,	counter-categorizing	juxtaposition	of	unforgiving	homogenization,	“amateur	registers”	(registros	
amadores)	fall	anywhere	around	a	scene	from	a	John	Ford	film	“complemented	by	Lara	Croft,	of	the	videogame	“Tomb	Raider,”	levitating	over	the	mountains,”	as	Felipe	Moraes	observes.	Moreover,	the	poetic	of	“repetition	and	stoppage”	that	
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Agamben	describes	in	Debord’s	film	can	be	observed	clearly	in	Tuoto’s,	as	the	restoration	of	“the	possibility	of	what	was”,	to	make	it	“possible	anew”	(Difference	
and	Repetition	316)	which	stands	in	direct	opposition	to	the	newsreels	from	which	the	Brazilian	director	extracts	a	considerable	number	of	his	pieces:	We	understand	why	work	with	images	can	have	such	a	historical	and	messianic	importance,	because	they	are	a	way	of	projecting	power	and	possibility	toward	that	which	is	impossible	by	definition,	toward	the	past.	Thus	cinema	does	the	opposite	of	the	media.	What	is	always	given	in	the	media	is	the	fact,	what	was,	without	its	possibility,	its	power:	we	are	given	a	fact	before	which	we	are	powerless.	The	media	prefer	a	citizen	who	is	indignant,	but	powerless.	That’s	exactly	the	goal	of	the	TV	news	(Agamben,	
Difference	and	Repetition	316).		This	is	the	precise	operation	that	both	Debord	and	Tuoto	execute	with	their	appropriation	of	news	footage.	However,	unlike	Debord’s,	Tuoto’s	work	does	not	quote	or	reference	the	filmmaker’s	previously	written	work;	indeed,	in	Não	Me	Fale,	the	montage,	with	its	relentless	complications	of	reference,	is	the	theory	and	the	post-theory	of	the	spectacle.		Both	Now	and	Não	Me	Fale	constitute	theories	of	the	spectacle	in	and	of	themselves,	with	Álvarez’s	film	retaining	a	status	of	unwitting	predecessor	and	precocious	subverter	of	the	spectacle.	Historically,	Now	stands	at	the	Cold	War-era	height	of	the	advanced	spectacle’s	mechanical	age.	The	acceleration	of	the	spectacle’s	dissemination	into	viewer/citizen-assumed	shows	reenacted	and	
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reinvented	in	somnambular	contemplation	coincides	with	the	advent	of	the	digital	age,	indeed	as	its	key	function.	What	Tuoto’s	film	is	able	to	register	is	not	only	this	stage	of	spectacular	“evolution,”	but	the	possibilities	of	its	post-history.	A	central	question	that	emerges	with	almost	violent	insistence	in	Não	me	fale	is	“what	happens	after	this?	What	will	be	the	memory	of	all	this?”		In	his	critical	review	of	the	film,	Wallace	Andrioli	observes	that	the	film	“seems	to	be	about	the	bombardment	of	images	that	regulates	existence	in	the	contemporary	world”	(my	emphasis),	but	it	also	reflects	on	“memory,	its	role	in	the	constitution	of	human	identity.	And	memory,	at	least	in	its	raw	state,	is	fragment.”	But	what	happens	when	everything	is	filmed,	when	the	recording	of	everything	destroys	the	imaginary	boundaries	between	art	and	life,	between	eventful	happening	and	mundane	occurrence,	between	imagetic	value	and	trash,	between	posing	and	appearing,	between	memorable	and	forgettable?	The	product	of	image	is	its	attempt	to	assimilate	the	viewer,	not	mere	reproduction	or	projection,	says	João	Pedro	Faro,	and	he	warns	that		if	today	everything	is	constantly	being	recorded	(from	a	civil	war	to	the	most	stupid	commercial	store	opening	of	all	time69)	that	assimilation	becomes	more	difficult	and	many	times	more	confusing.	A	Tony	Hawk	gameplay	has	as	
																																																								69	Indeed,	the	arch	in	Tuoto’s	film	between	the	footage	of	the	opening	of	Brazil’s	first	Apple	store	and	those	of	attacks	on	world	chain	stores	register	the	rebellion	against	the	commodity	that	Debord	discusses	in	“The	Decline	and	Fall	of	the	Spectacle-Commodity	Economy”:	[l]ooting	is	a	natural	response	to	the	unnatural	and	inhuman	society	of	commodity	abundance.	It	instantly	undermines	the	commodity	as	such,	and	it	also	exposes	what	the	commodity	ultimately	implies:	the	army,	the	police…”				
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much	imagetic	weight	as	John	Wayne.	It	seems	as	though	before,	in	the	classic,	in	the	black	and	white,	only	what	was	prepared	to	be	filmed	was	filmed.	Cinema	begins	to	die	when	a	camera	is	given	to	every	home	and	to	all	audiences.	It	marks	the	recording	(the	register)	of	what	should	never	be	recorded	(registered)	or	at	least	of	what	they	wouldn’t	want	recorded	(registered)…	It	is	no	longer	about	enchantment,	about	illusion.	It’s	about	anything	that	happens	and,	inevitably,	some	generate	an	urgency	for	destruction	and	revolt	(my	alternative	translations	in	brackets).		It	is	hard	to	tell	if	“one	camera	per	pocket”	is	the	end	of	cinema,	or	of	the	spectacle,	or	its	most	daring	and	final	act	of	colonization	of	life.	But	the	realm	of	the	sacred,	any	claim	to	importance	or	ranking	of	images,	has	been	thrown	into	the	most	inextricable	state	of	crisis.	Today,	all	images,	from	classic	to	pedestrian,	may	be	proposed	to	be	worth	the	same,	and	reference,	validity,	authority,	or	centrality	can	no	longer	be	traced	with	simplicity;	or	rather,	if	they	can	indeed	be	traced,	they	matter	little	in	today’s	society	of	the	spectacle.		Tuoto’s	exploration	of	videogame	“footage”	(0:12:50,	0:14:22)	is	extremely	important,	for	that	is	much	of	what	has	become	of	the	spectacle	in	the	advanced	digital	age	(post	2010s).	If	the	mimetic	effect	of	images	in	conjunction	with	commodity	placement	initially	scattered	the	spectacle	into	all	spheres	of	life	as	reenacted	social	scripts	built	around	false	needs	in	the	form	of	commodity	justification,	today’s	shows	no	longer	require	a	central	generator	of	primary	images.	
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In	the	age	of	social	media70,	virtual	reality	and	YouTube,	it	is	the	citizens’	most	commonplace	experiences	that	make	up	the	spectacle:	advertisements	are	thus	affixed	to	someone’s	photo	of	breakfast	on	a	Facebook	feed,	or	of	a	trip	or	a	graduation	on	Instagram.	Facebook	and	YouTube	do	not	need	to	produce	images	anymore:	they	get	those	for	free.	And	those	photos	themselves	are,	of	course,	already	an	advertisement	for	“the	life”	before	a	commercial	banner	is	even	stamped	on	them	by	the	platform	of	aggregation	that	hosts	them.	If	there	is,	however,	one	element	lacking	in	Tuoto’s	anti-collection	of	advanced	spectacular	images,	it	would	be	the	trace	of	data	generated	as	spectacular	citizens	go	about	the	business	of	their	days	using	their	phones,	credit	cards	and	preferred	search	engines,	what	Thatcher	and	Dalton	suggestively	call	“the	data	of	everyday	life”	(135).	Thus,	in	today’s	imagetic	vortex,	a	montage	is	no	longer	a	filmmaker’s	way	of	explaining	reality	to	the	worker;	in	the	maelstrom	of	today’s	fast-whirling,	quick-passing	juxtapositions	of	everything,	treasure	or	rubbish,	life	itself	is	a	montage	terminally	appropriated	by	the	spectacle	in	the	same	manner	in	which	it	appropriated	Álvarez’s	format	as	the	music	video,	and	the	only	response	possible	is	the	counter-montage.	If	the	spectacle	has	colonized	the	language	of	liberation,	of	the	ideologically-charged	image	for	the	popular	explication	of	the	political	condition,	as	dreamt	of	for	cinema	from	the	time	of	the	Russian	formalists,	the	act	of	seeing	must	
																																																								70	Considering	the	extremely	important	caution	in	Debordian	theory	that	the	spectacle	is	not	a	collection	of	images	but	a	social	relationship	of	people	mediated	by	images,	Sciortino	and	Wright	observe	that,	“[v]iewed	from	this	perspective,	social	media	may	offer	a	critical	instance	within	which	to	explore	these	complex	border	operations	in	the	age	of	late	capitalism”	(82).		
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become	perpetually	meta-targeted	and	fully	re-conceived.		“I	think	it	is	a	film	about	the	re-articulation	of	viewing,”	says	Tuoto:	If	I	want	to	see	something	on	YouTube,	I	see	a	work	of	publicity	before	and,	the	next	second,	the	video	I	wish.	Or	even	the	television	experience	(different	contexts	connecting	each	other	at	every	moment),	or	the	simple	scrolling	of	a	Facebook	page	(videos	playing	automatically)	generates	that	natural	tendency	toward	a	re-articulation	of	viewing	(cited	in	Moraes).		That	re-articulation	of	viewing	will	involve	a	re-articulation	of	memory.	How	will	we	know	what	is	worth	remembering	if	all	is	registered	with	seemingly	the	same	level	of	worth?	But,	most	importantly,	how	will	we	be	able	to	forget?	There	can	be	no	distinguishable	memory	without	oblivion.	Will	the	omnipresent	spectacle	ever	allow	us	to	forget	or	be	forgotten	(and	thus	die	in	peace,	biologically	or	spectacularly),	or	to	decide	what	to	forget,	or	even	to	curate	our	memories	and	parse	them	out,	to	even	know	which	ones	of	those	memories	are	ours?	“Reality	only	being	accessible	through	abstraction,”	says	Diogo	Serafim,	implies	“seeing	as	an	act	of	providing	consistency	to	the	impermanence	of	memory	…	searching	for	integration	through	resistance.”	And,	he	concludes,	“to	resist	is	to	remember.”		This	is	the	spectacular	frailty	of	“humanity’s	library	of	images”	to	which	Filipe	Furtado	refers	when	he	wonders,	in	relation	to	Tuoto’s	film,	about	“the	importance	of	representation	and	offering	a	body	of	memories	and	impulses	as	a	form	of	resistance,	the	possibilities	of	its	expression	and	looking	for	a	center	to	anchor	them.”	The	problem	is:	there	is	no	center	any	more.	That	vacuum	will	either	
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be	acknowledged	by	emancipatory	thought	or	remain	in	the	hands	of	the	spectacle.	Furtado	praises	Tuoto’s	film	for	its	sincere	belief	that	images	“even	when	they	are	cheap	and	mercantile	can	offer	some	of	anarchic	purge.”	That	is	the	risk	I	have	claimed	the	spectacle	runs	in	this	late	age:	its	dissemination	comes	at	the	expense	of	loss	of	control,	for	we	cannot	assume	that	every	spectacular	citizen	is	so	fully	alienated	and	integrated	into	the	society	of	the	spectacle	that	no	systemic	cracks	can	be	discovered	and	exploited.	The	impetus	is	thus	a	perpetual	critical	reflection	on	the	spectacle	that,	as	is	the	case	with	Não	Me	Fale,	develops	a	“metalanguage	of	amalgamation”	in	order	to	“unite	images	to	think	about	the	very	meaning	of	montage,”	as	Filipe	Leal	proposes,	so	that	the	orders	of	knowledge	that	the	spectacle	simultaneously	generates	and	reinforces	remain	forever	exposed.		The	way	in	which	the	“meta-language	of	amalgamation”	without	center	is	orchestrated	in	Não	Me	Fale	differs	deeply	from	that	at	play	in	Now	and	Debord’s	film.	This	is	indeed	one	central	question	that	must	be	posed	for	montages	of	the	kind	included	in	the	proposed	trilogy:	what	force	or	forces	drive	the	internal	rhythm	of	the	piece?	For	Now,	this	is	clear	and	has	been	affirmed	by	the	director:	beyond	its	ideological	and	folk	ethnographic	agendas,	the	documentary	is	fully	regulated	by	Lena	Horne’s	song,	fully	in	terms	of	form	and	greatly	in	terms	of	content.	It	is	a	music	video	in	the	truest	sense	of	the	term.	It	begins	and	ends	with	the	song,	the	speed	of	montage	adheres	to	its	tempo,	and	the	images	attend	to	the	meaning	of	its	words	in	the	most	faithful	terms.	Debord’s	film,	on	the	other	hand,	does	not	
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recognize	a	sensuous	overarching	rhythm,	and	its	unifying	force	is	decidedly	conceptual:	it	is	the	theory	itself,	from	the	1967	book.		In	Tuoto’s	film,	internal	systems	of	rhythm	and	rhyme	are	fundamentally	tied	to	the	film’s	meta-critical	thesis.	Like	Now,	Não	Me	Fale	recognizes	internal	movements	regulated	by	music,	but,	unlike	Now,	it	does	not	move	to	one	song	but	to	many	that	often	run	against	each	other;	like	Debord’s	film,	Tuoto’s	film	responds	to	theory,	but,	unlike	Debord’s	film,	it	does	not	respond	to	one	theory,	much	less	the	director’s,	but	to	a	multitude	of	theoretical	voices	that	too	clash	against	each	other.	If	there	is	one	central	element	that	Now	and	The	Society	of	the	Spectacle	have	in	common,	and	against	which	Não	Me	Fale	stands	in	stark	opposition,	is	a	claim	to	unity.	Within	the	trilogy	of	the	spectacle	to	the	show,	Não	Me	Fale	thus	indexes	the	abandonment	of	all	dreams	of	organizing	unity	in	favor	of	complete	and	terminal	fragmentation.	This	in	turn	registers	the	transition	from	the	spectacle,	as	presented	in	Debord’s	1960s	theory,	with	its	overarching	narratives	of	centralized	generation,	to	the	show,	as	dispersed,	contradictory	and	potentially	self-defeating,	as	presented	in	this	study.	From	Jean-Luc	Godard	to	Susan	Sontag	to	Kanye	West,	Não	me	fale	elaborates	its	meta-reflections	upon	the	principle	of	disunity.		Tuoto’s	embracement	of	fragmentation	does	not	in	any	way	involve	a	rejection	of	rhythm.	Very	much	on	the	contrary,	the	meta-critical	attitude	that	the	film	maintains	relies	heavily	on	its	ability	to	repeatedly	create	and	disarm	relative	rhythms	out	of	incongruence,	against	any	totalizing	pretense.	There	are,	indeed,	several	fleeting	and	conflicting	ways	in	which	internal	patterns	of	rhythm	can	be	
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established	in	the	film.	The	one	I	will	propose	is	but	one	of	them,	unstable	and	arbitrary	as	any	other	and	will	thread	the	film’s	textual	structure	around	its	blind	and	theoretical	intertitles.	In	a	fashion	reminiscent	of	Debord’s	film,	Tuoto’s	film	consists	of	a	series	of	intertitles	as	white	scripts	on	a	black	foreground.	As	a	matter	of	fact,	the	thread	contains	two	kinds	of	this	type	of	plaque:	one	that	I	will	call	“blind	intertitle,”	and	which	acts	as	a	dark	curtain	behind	which	exchanges	occur	as	if	blindly	overheard	by	the	audience,	and	one	which	I	will	call	“theoretical	intertitle,”	and	which	includes	read,	transcribed/translated	quotations	from	such	sources	as	Castellion,	Lezama	Lima,	Sontag	and	Benjamin.	Theoretical	intertitles	can	be	understood	to	establish	a	vertebral	chain	around	which	a	series	of	thematic	clusters	form	and	disassemble	on	the	topics	of	remembering,	dreaming,	seeing,	believing	and	returning.	Time	and	again,	all	of	these	conversations	return	to	the	fundamental	problem	of	the	status	of	the	spectacular	citizen	before	the	consortium	materialized	as	a	national	state:	“To	kill	a	man	to	defend	an	idea	is	not	to	defend	an	idea.	It	is	to	kill	a	man,”	Sebastian	Castellion’s	words,	first	read	in	Spanish	(00:06),	then	in	French	(00:35),	open	the	film.	These	words	summarize	the	French	theologian’s	argument	in	Contra	labellum	Calvini,	namely	that	each	individual	is	divinely	endowed	with	reason	and	thus	worth	more	than	any	unifying	doctrine	(Guggisberg	109).	The	critique	of	the	dreams	of	unification	thus	marks	the	opening	of	Tuoto’s	film,	surrounded	by	footage	of	prisoner	abuse	that	returns	at	the	end,	as	the	re-beginning	“of	which	you	should	not	speak	to	me,”	for	if	to	kill	a	man	to	defend	an	
	 284	
idea	is	not	to	defend	an	idea	but	merely	to	kill	a	man,	the	tragedy	is	such	that	to	kill	a	man	continues	to	be	the	preferred	act	of	the	spectacle.		The	spinal	structure	that	establishes	Tuoto’s	philosophical	treatise	relies	rather	heavily	on	the	words	of	Jean-Luc	Godard,	who	in	the	second	theoretical	intertitle	takes	up	the	matter	of	the	individual	before	the	unifying	forces	of	the	state:	“The	dream	of	the	individual	is	to	be	two.	The	dream	of	the	State	is	to	be	one”	(03:56).	At	its	most	bare,	the	film’s	initial	postulates	flow	through	the	following	cardinal	intertitles,	for	whose	discussion	I	have	carefully	traced	each	quotation	to	its	origins.	It	is	of	utmost	importance	that	I	clarify,	however,	that	my	tracing	back	of	the	sources	of	those	citations	does	not	seek	to	oppose	the	principle	of	“derivation”71	that	sustains	the	work.	I	do	not	intend	to	“restitute”	these	found	materials	to	any	sort	of	“primordial”	context	or	“authoritative”	source,	nor	does	my	investigation	of	origin	seek	to	validate	any	sense	of	“original”	right	to	primary	authorship.	I	follow	these	appropriated	pieces	back	to	their	prior	contexts	in	order	to	acknowledge	the	halos	or	palimpsests	of	meaning	with	which	they	come	to	clash	against	other	materials	in	the	new	milieu	of	Tuoto’s	montage	(Godard	on	left,	others	on	right,	my	translations):				
To	kill	a	man	to	defend	an	idea	is	not	to	defend	an	idea.		
It	is	to	kill	a	man,”		-	Sebastian	Castellion	(in	Contra	labellum	Calvini)																																																									71	As	Tuoto	calls	his	brand	of	détournement	at	the	end	of	the	film:	“This	is	a	derived	work”	(1:10:31).		
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If	our	times	have	achieved	an	endless	force		
of	destruction,	a	revolution	must	be	made	
that	creates	an	indeterminable	force	
of	creation	that	will	strengthen	memories,	
delineate	dreams,	and		
materialize	(corporize)	images.		-	José	Lezama	Lima	(from	Oppiario	Licario,		recited	in	Godard’s	Notre	musique)			
	
An	individual’s	dream	is	to	be	two.		
The	dream	of	the	state	is	to	be	one.	-	Jean-Luc	Godard	(from	Notre	musique)		
Nature	is	a	temple	in	which	living	pillars	
Sometimes	let	confused	words	out;	
Man	passes	there	through	forests	of	symbols	
Which	watch	him	with	familiar	looks.	-	Charles	de	Baudelaire	(from	the	poem	Correspondences)		
Artistic	thought	begins	with	the	invention	
of	a	possible	world,	or	of	a	fragment	of	a	possible	world.	-	Jean-Luc	Godard	and	Anne-Marie	Miéville.		
The	world	today	is	split	between	those	who	
are	ready	to	manifest	their	disgrace,	
and	those	for	whom	that	public	demonstration	
furnishes	the	dose	of	moral	comfort	
to	their	domination.		-	Jean-Luc	Godard	(from	Notre	musique)		
Every	time	I	fought	for	the	majorities	in	need,		
I	was	threatened	in	the	stupidest	ways.		
I	retreated	several	times,	putting	off	problems		
of	the	present	to	think	about	the	future.		
But	if	I	transfer	the	present	to	the	future	
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I	would	only	find	a	future	replete	with	bigger	tragedies.		
That’s	why	we	need	to	begin	to	face	up	to		
the	internal	and	external	enemies	of	Eldorado	now.	Unite	the	masses.		
Break	away	once	and	for	all.	Let	the	wagon	run	away	free.		-	Glauber	Rocha	(from	Terra	em	Transe)		
We	are	all	lost	in	the	immensity	of	the	universe.	We		
have	lost	our	birth	country,	we	have	nowhere	to	go,	or,		
even	worse,	too	many	places	where	we	can	turn	ourselves	in.	-	Jean-Luc	Godard		
When	people	used	to	live	on	one	single	planet,		
they	knew	where	they	used	to	be.	They	had	a		
measuring	criterion,	they	had	their	index	finger		
to	determine	the	direction	of	winds.	But	currently,		
even	when	we	think	we	know	where	we	are,		
we	are	lost.	Or	there	is	no	way	back	to	go	back	home,		
or	we	don’t	have	a	Motherland	that	is	worth	recovering.		-	Jean-Luc	Godard	
	
This	is	the	first	visible	animal	of	the	invisible.	-	José	Lezama	Lima		
We	don’t	have	a	home	any	more.	The	human		
species	has	burst	into	pieces,	dispersed,	still		
continues	to	disperse	among	the	stars.		
Our	species	as	a	whole	cannot	tolerate	the	past.		
Many	among	us	equally	hate	the	present,	and		
we	only	have	one	direction:	the	future,	which		
takes	us	farther	and	farther	away		
from	the	concept	of	Motherland,	of	home.	-	Jean-Luc	Godard		
Our	species	is	made	up	as	a	whole	of	incurable	vagabonds.		
We	reject	all	ties,	all	we	can	hold	on	to.	This	is		
undoubtedly	going	to	continue	until	the	inevitable	day		
when	we	understand	that	we	are	not	free,	as	we	think,		
but	lost.	It	is	only	when	we	try	to	remember		
with	our	ancestral	memory	where	we	have	been		
and	why	that	we	fully	understand	to	what	extent	we	are	lost.	
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-	Jean-Luc	Godard	
	
The	light	and	the	submerged,	the	
deliveries	of	the	stellar	and	the	
return	of	the	submerged	should	
have	already	reached,		
in	our	time,	having	shamefully	left	
those	dominions	to	the	physicists,	a	
prodigious	identity.	-	José	Lezama	Lima	(from	Oppiario	Licario)	
	
History	gives	contradictory	signals	about	the	value		
of	remembering	in	the	much	longer	span	of	a		
collective	history.	There	is	simply	too	much	injustice	
	in	the	world.	And	too	much	remembering...		
To	make	peace	is	to	forget.	To	reconcile,		
it	is	necessary	that	memory	be	faulty	and	limited.			
-	Susan	Sontag	(from	Regarding	the	Pain	of	Others)	
	
Remembering	is	an	ethical	act,	has	ethical	value	in	and	of	itself.		
Memory	is,	achingly,	the	only	relation	we	can	have		
with	the	dead.	So	the	belief	that	remembering	
	is	an	ethical	act	is	deep	in	our	natures	as	humans.				
-	Susan	Sontag	(from	Regarding	the	Pain	of	Others)	
	
You	know,	I	have	the	impression	once	again		
of	hearing	the	noises	and	murmurs	of	all	those	ghosts		
crushed	(blottis)	in	the	middle	of	their	works,		
in	the	last	refuge	left	for	them	on	Earth.			-	Anne-Marie	Miéville	
	
Let	the	atrocious	images	haunt	us.	Even	if	they	are	only	tokens,		
and	cannot	possibly	encompass	most	of	the	reality	to	which	they	refer,	
	they	still	perform	a	vital	function.	The	images	say:	
	“This	is	what	human	beings	are	capable	of	doing	–	may	volunteer	to	do,		
enthusiastically,	self-righteously.	Don’t	forget.			
-	Susan	Sontag	(from	Regarding	the	Pain	of	Others)	
	
She’s	right,	Richie,	let	him	sleep	for	a	short	time.		
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Not	too	long	a	time,	just	long	enough	to	get	back	his	dream.	-	Self-fictionalized	Nicholas	Ray	(from	We	Can’t	Go	Home	Again)		
Father,	what’s	the	good	method	to	know	
	if	someone	is	respectable?			
-	You	must	ask	him,	what	have	you	read?		
And	if	he	responds:	Homer,	Shakespeare,	Balzac,		
the	man	is	not	respectable.	On	the	contrary	
	if	he	responds:	what	do	you	understand	by	reading,		
then	there	is	hope.		-	Jean-Luc	Godard	(from	Liberté	et	Patrie)	
	
	
-	So,	what’s	your	opinion	on	modern	art?	
It’s	hard	to	put	into	words,	I	just	know	what	I	care	for,		
and	what	I	don’t,	like	this…		
I	don’t	know	how	to	pronounce	it,	“Mira”?		
-	Miró.	
-	Miró.	I	don’t	know	why	but	I…	I	just	adore	it.		
A	feeling	it	gives.	I	know	that	sounds	terribly	vague.		
-	No,	actually	it	confirms	something	I’ve	always	wondered		
about	modern	art,	abstract	art.	
-	What	is	that?	
-	That	perhaps	it’s	just	picking	up	where	religious	art	left	off,		
somehow	trying	to	show	you	divinity.		
The	modern	artist	just	pairs	it	down	to		
the	basic	elements	of	shape	and	color.		
But	when	you	look	at	that	Miró,	you	feel	it	just	the	same.		
-	Why	that’s	lovely,	Raymond.	-	From	Todd	Haynes’	Far	from	Heaven		
		 Before	this	intertitle	series	is	considered	in	tension	with	other	materials	clustered	around	its	plaques,	some	key	thematic	developments	must	be	observed.	Three	main	overlapping	conversations	roam	in	the	dark	as	intertwined	voices	competing	for	attention.	Those	three	main	themes	relate	to	the	status	of	the	individual	before	the	state,	before	space-time,	and	before	art	in	the	age	of	the	
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advanced	spectacle	as	shows.	Those	three	considerations	in	turn	hinge	on	the	possibility	of	a	certain	exercise	of	dream	and	memory,	compromised	by	the	accelerating	dispersion	of	shows.	Spectacular	domination	in	the	twentieth	century	relied	on	control	of	the	camera	as	the	guardian	of	a	unified	narrative.	As	Jameson	posits	as	one	of	his	four	maxims	in	A	Singular	Modernity,	“[m]odernity	is	not	a	concept,	philosophical	or	otherwise,	but	a	narrative	category”	(40).	Debord	conceived	of	spectacular	citizens	as	passive	contemplators	of	a	unitary	spectacle	that	monopolized	all	narratives	of	human	relations	around	pseudo-needs.	This	unified	spectacle	must	thus	be	understood	as	an	optimistic	force	in	the	sense	that	it	still	believed	that	a	claim	to	authenticity	could	be	constructed	around	commodities.	Indeed,	it	believed	that	it	could	retain	the	exclusive	function	of	inventing	the	overarching	narratives	that	justify	the	need	for	commodities	and	which	discipline	workers	and	consumers	around	a	singular	and	coherent	falsification	of	social	interactions.	In	his	1988	follow-up	book	Comments	on	the	Society	of	the	Spectacle,	Debord	characterizes	spectacular	power	as	“fundamentally	unitary,	so	concentrated	by	the	very	weight	of	things,	and	entirely	despotic	in	spirit”	(6).	In	this	book,	he	returns	to	a	distinction	he	had	made	in	1967,	between	the	concentrated	spectacle	and	the	diffuse	spectacle	to	posit	that	the	state	of	things	is	such	in	1988	that	a	third	form	must	be	proposed:	the	integrated	spectacle.	This	distinction	sets	him	on	a	path	that	leads	to	a	state	of	spectacular	politics	the	current	extreme	of	which	he	never	could	have	imagined	but	which	my	auxiliary	concept	of	show	attempts	to	capture,	and	which	Tuoto’s	film	stages	with	remarkable	force.			
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The	concentrated	spectacle,	Debord	asserts	in	1967,	is	the	bureaucratic	spectacle.	He	associates	it	with	the	Eastern	bloc	and	with	Fascism.	It	is	in	the	hands	of	totalitarian	bureaucracies	built	around	dictatorial	personalities	and	is	the	spectacle	of	centralized	control	by	the	police	state	and	is	primarily	based	on	violence	and	terror.	The	diffuse	spectacle,	on	the	other	hand,	is	the	spectacle	of	advanced	capitalism	in	the	West	and	operates	on	seduction	rather	than	terror.	It	marks	the	moment	when	“wage-earners	[are	willing]	to	apply	their	freedom	of	choice	to	the	vast	range	of	new	commodities	now	on	offer	[and]	represent[s]	the	Americanisation	of	the	world	(Comments	8).	The	diffuse	spectacle	is	thus	no	longer	unitary	but	fragmented	among	competing	commodities	and,	emanating	from	diverse,	competing	and	even	conflicting	centers,	it	manages	to	infiltrate	and	mediate	all	aspects	of	reality.	If	the	concentrated	spectacle	was	the	trademark	of	Russia	and	eastern	Germany,	and	the	diffuse	spectacle	that	of	the	United	States,	Debord	warns	in	1988	of	the	emergence	of	integrated	spectacle	in	France	and	Italy	as	one	that	is	able	to	“show	itself	simultaneously	as	concentrated	and	diffuse”:	[a]s	regards	concentration,	the	controlling	center	has	now	become	occult	never	to	be	occupied	by	a	known	leader,	or	clear	ideology.	And	on	the	diffuse	side,	the	spectacle	has	never	before	put	its	mark	to	such	a	degree	on	almost	the	full	range	of	socially	produced	behavior	and	objects.	For	the	final	sense	of	the	integrated	spectacle	is	this	–	that	it	has	integrated	itself	into	reality	to	the	same	extent	as	it	was	describing	it,	and	that	it	was	reconstructing	it	as	it	was	describing	it	(Comments	9).		
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This	is	an	important	update,	for	it	describes	the	fundamentals	of	the	show	as	I	propose	it	in	this	study:	de-centered,	conflictive,	fragmentary,	sensuous,	and	dispersed	into	all	social	scripts.	However,	Debord’s	theory	fails	to	capture	the	full	extent	to	which	shows	are	now	fully	in	the	hands	of	obedient	re-enactors	as	dispersive	social	scripts	whereby	workers	now	have	to	work	for	their	domination	in	somnambular	“active	passivity,”	where	the	creation	of	shows	has	now	been	delegated	to	these	workers	who	must	create	and	perpetuate	the	images	of	their	own	subjugation.	At	the	most	advanced,	this	process	that	Nello	Barile	identifies	with	the	centrality	of	User	Generated	Content	that	characterizes	social	media	and	calls	“cognitive	exploitation	of	the	users”	as	a	form	of	total	exploitation	of	consumers’	creativity	and	psychological	and	social	lives	(151-2).		In	the	trilogy	of	the	spectacle,	Now	captures	the	psychogeographic	dimension	of	the	spectacle	and	demonstrates	a	comprehensive	method	of	demarcational	countering.	Furthermore,	it	posits	a	tension	against	the	pedagogically	skeptical	attitude	of	Debord	toward	the	channels	of	culture.	However,	Álvarez’s	film	must	to	some	degree	be	positioned	within	the	realm	of	Cuba’s	form	of	imported	concentrated	spectacle.	This	condition	was	perhaps	somehow	mitigated	by	formal	freedom	within	ideological	adherence,	an	allowance	that	Russian	cinema	did	not	retain,	as	well	as	by	the	fact	that	the	spectacle	that	Now	counters,	namely	that	of	the	United	States,	constitutes	the	epitome	of	the	diffuse.	Therefore,	even	if	Cuban	cinema	can	be	claimed	to	originate	from	the	concentrated	spectacle	with	mitigations,	it	certainly	does	understand	the	diffuse	spectacle,	an	awareness	evident	
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in	Now,	where	the	very	variety	of	material	sources	that	the	montage	demands	constitutes	a	demonstration	of	the	multi-centered	and	commodity-plural	source	of	spectacular	intrusion.	But	neither	Álvarez	nor	Debord	is	able	to	capture	a	stage	in	spectacular	development	beyond	the	integration	of	concentrated	and	diffuse.	This	third	stage,	which	characterizes	the	spectacle	of	our	day,	is	that	of	the	dispersive	
spectacle	as	shows.	This	stage	of	dispersion	constitutes	one	the	chief	theses	of	Não	
Me	Fale	Sobre	Recomeços.		We	have	come	to	a	point	where	the	question	is	no	longer	whether	the	spectacle	can	master	a	unified,	albeit	falsified,	narrative	of	reality	adequate	to	the	demands	of	the	commodity	economy.	This	narrative	of	falsification	is	certainly	one	of	intrusions	and	justified	pseudo-needs,	but	it	is	unitary	nonetheless,	for	even	in	the	conflicting	nature	of	the	diffuse	spectacle,	all	clashing	commodities,	however	adamantly	they	may	claim	to	be	the	only	one,	and	however	varied	and	competing	their	sources,	still	manage	to	respond	to	a	more	or	less	consistent	ideological	chore.	At	this	point,	it	becomes	clear	why	so	many	voices	in	Tuoto’s	film	speak	in	astronomical	metaphors.	The	passage	from	the	twentieth-century	first	concentrated,	then	diffuse,	and	ultimately	integrated,	spectacle,	to	the	twenty-first-century	dispersive	shows	I	propose	is	best	conceptualized	in	terms	of	stellar	mechanics.	The	concentrated	show	operates	as	an	elementary	universe	in	which	a	strong	and	uncontested	center	of	gravity	maintains	a	firm	hold	on	its	stars	(its	images),	which	can	only	expand	so	far.	The	diffused	show	appears	as	a	universe	of	multiple	centers	of	stellar	expansion:	no	single	center	of	gravity	can	be	traced	and	
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expansive	trajectories	may	clash	and	intersect,	yet	gravitation	continues	to	exert	a	traceable	hold	on	its	images	and	one	can	suspect	that,	though	multiple,	all	gravitations	and	expansions	ultimately	lead	to	the	same	destination.	The	integrated	spectacle	retains	a	strong	main	center	of	gravity,	though	that	center	is	hidden,	untraceable	or	appears	empty	under	the	illusion	of	multiple	centers:	here,	the	reach	of	images	from	the	central	source	combines	the	force	of	centrality	with	the	expansive	capacity	of	multiplicity.		The	dispersive	spectacle,	as	I	propose	it,	marks	the	transition	of	spectacle	to	shows	and	corresponds	with	the	exact	moment	when	the	force	of	stellar	expansion	from	multiple	centers	enters	in	frank	completion	with	that	of	gravitational	control.	In	other	words,	it	refers	to	the	condition	of	the	most	advanced	spectacle	where	image	production	has	been	delegated	to	so	many	centers	so	far	from	the	original	point	of	Big	Bang	that	the	spectacle	enters	a	point	of	dilemma:	on	the	one	hand,	its	image-stars,	liberated	from	the	restraining	force	of	gravitation,	have	never	been	able	to	penetrate	space	so	far,	so	deeply,	and	so	intimately,	to	the	most	remote	little	corner	of	social	life.	The	spectacle	becomes	autonomous	and	its	dominant	class	collaborate	in	its	perpetuation	and	distribution.	On	the	other	hand,	this	loss	of	gravitational	control	comes	at	a	great	risk	for	the	spectacle,	for	it	stands	in	a	space	of	tension	in	which	the	force	of	expansion	could,	at	any	moment,	beat	that	of	gravitation,	and	shows	might	escape	out	of	control,	as	discussed	in	section	6.2	on	the	thirdworldizing	imagery	of	Katrina.	One	camera	is	each	hand	is	the	great	danger	facing	the	spectacle	in	the	time	of	the	shows:	how	far	can	the	dispersive	forces	of	
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expansion	push	away	before	they	finally	and	permanently	break	loose	from	their	gravitational	centers,	“[b]reak	away	once	and	for	all	[and	let]	the	wagon	run	away	free,”	as	Felipe	Vieira	claims	in	Glauber	Rocha’s	Terra	em	Transe,	appropriated	into	Tuoto’s	film.		The	overwhelming	abundance	of	images	in	chaotic	circulation,	the	untraceable	multitude	of	centers,	the	difficulty	to	trace	reference	and	veracity	has	created	a	fundamental	break	between	spectacle	and	material	reference,	and	shows	are	now	autonomous.	They	no	longer	claim	to	refer	or	represent	a	prior	material	reality,	or	even	to	dream	one	for	the	future,	however	false.	To	kill	a	man	to	defend	an	idea	is	to	kill	a	man,	not	to	defend	an	idea,	Castellion	is	quoted	in	the	first	seconds	of	the	film,	and	then	we	are	left	floating	in	complete	silence	as	we	are	shown	the	most	monstrous	form	of	dehumanization	in	the	footage	of	tortured	war	prisoners,	naked	and	hooded,	on	hands	and	knees	(0:00:11):	to	kill	a	man	does	nothing	for	an	idea,	but	the	spectacle	stands	alone,	its	loose	images	circling	the	world,	free	and	devoid	of	ideas,	as	the	vacuum	of	silence	underscores	in	the	film.	And	yet	they	circulate	full	of	power,	because	the	validity	of	the	spectacle	need	no	longer	be	traced	to	an	idea,	to	a	gravitational	center,	or	to	a	reference:	the	show	marks	the	age	of	the	self-referential	spectacle,	where	any	one	image	refers	to	another	in	an	endless	deferment	of	reference,	like	the	elusive	gringos	of	El	Norte,	and	where	none	refers	to	anything	beyond	the	gloss	and	glitter	of	the	runaway	stars.	The	self-referential	spectacle	leaves	us	with	a	tragic	choice:	either	we	believe	because	the	spectacle	says	it,	or	we	don’t	believe	because	the	spectacle	cannot	say	anything	anymore	–	if	we	
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believe,	we	are	deceived	often;	if	we	no	longer	believe,	no	image	can	bear	witness	to	the	horrors	of	human	misery	any	more:	we	are,	indeed,	“lost	in	the	immensity	of	the	universe”	(Godard,	in	Tuoto	0:15:04),	the	“human	species	has	burst	into	pieces,	dispersed,	still	continues	to	disperse	among	the	stars”	(Godard,	in	Tuoto	0:17:18).	The	chimeric	mirage	of	the	spectacle	moves	us	–	not	just	emotionally	but	
physically,	as	it	moved	Enrique	and	Rosa	to	El	Norte.	It	creates	maps	and	psychogeographies	with	imaginary	demarcations,	forbidden	paths,	and	inscriptions	of	time	and	nostalgia,	future	and	modernity.	Ultimately,	it	is	designed	to	trigger	motion	towards	work	and	commodity,	as	“our	species	cannot	tolerate	the	past	[and]	many	of	us	equally	hate	the	present,	and	we	only	have	one	direction:	the	future,	which	takes	us	farther	and	farther	away	from	the	concept	of	Motherland,	of	home”	(Godard,	in	Tuoto	0:17:26).	While	the	falsification	of	the	cartographies	of	home	has	been	part	of	the	spectacle	from	its	inception,	and	indeed	of	modernity	as	its	way	of	
territorializing	epistemologies,	the	shows,	in	their	rapid	dispersion	from	gravitation	centers	and	material	reference,	begin	to	push	beyond	the	mere	falsification	of	time	and	space	at	the	service	of	the	capitalist	consortium,	while	we	lose	control	of	our	behavior:				
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Once	upon	a	time	we	had	a	home,	a	
motive	for	an	exodus.	Our	story	will	be	
told	by	Hollywood:		“Spanish	woman,	where	are	they	going?”	“Home.”	“Home?”	“What	you	call	Yellowstone	Country.”	“What	about	the	children?”	“They	are	Cheyenne.”		From	Cheyenne	Autumn	(John	Ford,	1964,	in	Tuoto	0:14:26)	
	
	
	
DIRECT	TRANSITION	 	
	
We	now	float,	suspended	virtually	
above	invented	geographies:	
	Lara	Croft,	of	Tomb	Raider,	floating	above	the	mountains	(in	Tuoto	0:14:50)		[Shostavokich’s	“24	Preludes	and	Fugues,	Op.	87:	No.	1	in	C	Major”	plays]	
	
	
	DARK	PAUSE	TRANSITION		[“24	Preludes	and	Fugues”	continues]	 	
	
We	are	lost	in	space,	with	no	center	to	
gravitate	back	to:	
	[“24	Preludes	and	Fugues	pauses”]	
	
We	are	all	lost	in	the	immensity	of	the	
universe.	We	have	lost	our	birth	country,	
we	have	nowhere	to	go,	or,	even	worse,	too	
many	places	where	we	can	turn	ourselves	
in.	(Jean-Luc	Godard,	in	Tuoto	0	:15	:03)	
	
	
	DARK	PAUSE	TRANSITION	[“24	Preludes	and	Fugues	resumes”]	 	
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The	only	force	of	congregation	is	the	
juxtaposing	place	of	the	spectacle,	
which	drowns	us	in	its	sensuous	
stimuli.	We	are	there	physically,	but	
we	still	watch	through	the	camera	lens	
of	our	phones:		Muted	footage	of	pop	music	show,	piano	continues:		Lights,	beams,	spectators	standing,	their	hand	up,	filming	with	their	phones.		(in	Tuoto	0:15:14)	
	
	
	
DARK	PAUSE	TRANSITION	 	
	
We	no	longer	possess	a	compass;	our	
cardinal	points	have	been	pulled	from	
under	our	feet:	
	
When	people	used	to	live	on	one	single	
planet,	they	knew	where	they	used	to	be.	
They	had	a	measuring	criterion,	they	had	
their	index	finger	to	determine	the	
direction	of	winds.	But	currently,	even	
when	we	think	we	know	where	we	are,	we	
are	lost.	Or	there	is	no	way	back	to	go	back	
home,	or	we	don’t	have	a	Motherland	that	
is	worth	recovering.		(Jean-Luc	Godard,	in	Tuoto	0:15:29)	
	
	
	
DARK	PAUSE	TRANSITION	 	
	
Spectacular	noise	fills	the	void:		Again,	footage	of	pop	music	show,	this	time	with	sound:	Zedd	signing	Stay	the	
Night	(2012):	Lights,	beams,	spectators	standing,	their	hand	up,	filming	with	their	phones.		(in	Tuoto	0:15:58)	
	
	
	
	…	
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We	are	only	workers	and	stop	being	
as	soon	as	the	logotype	is	ripped	off	
our	helmets:		Mr.	Aziz	fires	Peter	Parker	from	his	pizza	delivery	job,	and	makes	it	effective	by	ripping	off	the	business	logo	sticker	off	his	helmet.	From	Spider-Man	2	(Sam	Raimi,	2004,	in	Tuoto	0:17:04)		
	
	DIRECT	TRANSITION	 	
	
Stars	abandoned,	propelled	to	the	
future	that	loses	us:	
	
We	don’t	have	a	home	any	more.	The	
human	species	has	burst	into	pieces,	
dispersed,	still	continues	to	disperse	
among	the	stars.	Our	species	as	a	whole	
cannot	tolerate	the	past.	Many	among	us	
equally	hate	the	present,	and	we	only	
have	one	direction:	the	future,	which	
takes	us	farther	and	farther	away	from	
the	concept	of	Motherland,	of	home.	(Jean-Luc	Godard,	in	Tuoto	0	:17	:17)		[Shostakovich’s	“The	Guidefly	Suite,	Op.	97a”	begins,	overlapping	the	end	of	the	quote]		
	
	
DARK	PAUSE	TRANSITION	[“The	Guidefly	Suite”	continues	to	play]	 		
Our	whole	world	map	has	become	
visual	reality:	we	are	far	most	lost	
than	mere	fictional	characters	–	we	
are	directed	like	human	games:	
	GTA	V	character	flies	over	La	Puerta,	Vespucci	Canals	and	Breach,	into	the	Pacific	Ocean,	and	then	re-emerges	to	the	skyline	of	the	video	game’s	fictional	city	of	Los	Santos.		(in	Tuoto	0:17:45)		[The	Guidefly	Suite	plays	through]	
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DARK	PAUSE	TRANSITION	[The	Guidefly	Suite	continues	to	play]	 	
We	are	lost	vagabonds,	but	our	
roaming	is	not	one	of	freedom.	We	
are	lost.		
	
Our	species	is	made	up	as	a	whole	of	
incurable	vagabonds.	We	reject	all	ties,	
all	we	can	hold	on	to.	This	is	undoubtedly	
going	to	continue	until	the	inevitable	day		
when	we	understand	that	we	are	not	
free,	as	we	think,	but	lost.	(Jean-Luc	Godard,	in	Tuoto	0	:18	:23)	
	
		
	 The	dialectics	of	montage	for	this	passage	are	best	observed	when	the	proposed	readings	of	each	piece	are	isolated	into	what	can	be	visualized	in	poetic	form:	on	the	filmic	screen,	direct	transitions	will	be	rendered	as	continuation	of	verse,	dark	pauses	as	verse	breaks,	“24	Preludes	and	Fugues”	will	be	articulated	as	“nostalgia,”	both	in	verse	and	as	pause	between	verses,	and	“The	Guidefly	Suite”	will	be	written	as	“flying.”		
Once	upon	a	time	we	had	a	home,	a	motive	for	an	exodus.	Our	story	will	be	told	by	
Hollywood.	We	now	float,	suspended	virtually	above	invented	geographies:	nostalgia…	
	
Nostalgia	…		
We	are	lost	in	space,	with	no	center	to	gravitate	back	to.		
Nostalgia	…		
The	only	force	of	congregation	is	the	juxtaposing	place	of	the	spectacle,	which	drowns	
us	in	its	sensuous	stimuli.	We	are	there	physically,	but	we	still	watch	through	the	
camera	lens	of	our	phones:	nostalgia…	
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We	no	longer	possess	a	compass;	our	cardinal	points	have	been	pulled	from	under	our	
feet.	
	
Spectacular	noise	fills	the	void:	Stay	the	night!	
	
…		
	
We	are	only	workers	and	stop	being	as	soon	as	the	logotype	is	ripped	off	our	helmets.	
Stars	abandoned,	propelled	to	the	future	that	loses	us:	flying…	
	
Flying…	
	
Our	whole	world	map	has	become	visual	reality:	we	are	far	most	lost	than	mere	
fictional	characters	–	we	are	directed	like	human	games:	flying…	
	
Flying…	
	
We	are	lost	vagabonds,	but	our	roaming	is	not	one	of	freedom.	We	are	lost.		
	
	 In	a	“world	of	two	worlds,”	society	is	split	between	“those	who	are	ready	to	manifest	their	disgrace,	and	those	for	whom	that	public	demonstration	furnishes	the	dose	of	moral	comfort	to	their	domination”	(Godard,	in	Tuoto	0:10:10).	This	is	the	nature	of	the	split	between	Third	and	First	worlds,	respectively.	A	world	that	should	be	turning	to	the	streets	together	in	protest,	marches	instead	to	the	shopping	mall	to	celebrate	the	opening	of	Brazil’s	first	Apple	store:	“The	store	in	Brazil	is	finally	open!,”	announces	the	reporter,	“all	those	who	spent	the	night	in	line,	commemorating	and	happy,	have	received	their	t-shirt,	their	little	boxes,”	he	adds	as	the	public	chants:	“Apple,	Apple,	Apple!”	(0:48:53).	Like	Ethan,	convinced	in	the	interactive	video	game	Heavy	Rain	that	he	is	the	origami	killer,	we	have	lost	control	
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of	our	behavior	and	have	become,	just	like	Ethan,	operable	by	on-screen	instructions:	
	
	Fig.	10		Scene	from	Heavy	Rain	(in	Tuoto	0:25:42)		 Beyond	social	behavior,	how	will	we	construct	memory	among	the	overwhelming	masses	of	the	shows?	How	will	we	order	the	images,	how	will	we	fix	them	on	a	hierarchy?	And,	above	all,	how	will	we	distinguish	between	the	need	to	remember	as	“an	ethical	act”	and	to	forget	for	the	sake	of	peace,	as	Sontag	ponders	as	quoted	in	Não	Me	Fale?	(0:21:46,	0:22:31).	We	may	have	lost	control	of	our	collective	memory,	and	spectacular	images	may	no	longer	help	us	not	forget	the	atrocious	acts	of	which	we	have	been	capable	(Sontag,	in	Tuoto	0:24:57).	It	is	only	when	we	try	to	remember	with	our	ancestral	memory	where	we	have	been	and	why	
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that	we	fully	understand	just	how	lost	we	are	(Godard,	in	Tuoto	0:18:24).	But	the	spectacle	does	not	guarantee	that	the	unclassifiable	collage	of	images	it	will	leave	behind	will	allow	us	to	trace	back	our	wanderings.	Our	personas	continue	to	turn	into	obedient	self-fictionalizations,	like	the	protagonists	in	Nicholas	Ray’s	We	Can’t	
Go	Home	Again	(in	Tuoto	0:23:37).	As	sensuous	ideological	beings,	the	spectacle	captures	us	by	the	senses.	The	countering	of	this	spectacular	possession	of	the	senses	could	hinge	on	the	reappropriation	of	our	synesthesias,	overwhelmed	by	its	overpowering	shows:		Nature	is	a	temple	in	which	living	pillars	Sometimes	let	confused	words	out;	Man	passes	there	through	forests	and	symbols	Which	watch	him	with	familiar	looks.	…	Like	long	echoes	fusing	in	the	distance	In	a	deep	and	tenebrous	unity,	Vast	as	night	and	as	daylight,	Perfumes,	sounds,	and	colors	correspond.	(Baudelaire,	in	Tuoto	0:06:46).		But	perhaps	most	disquieting	of	all	in	the	realm	of	the	senses	is	the	spectacularization	of	art	in	an	era	in	which	the	spectacle	seeks	to	monopolize	the	invention	of	“a	possible	world,	or	of	a	fragment	of	a	possible	world”	with	which	artistic	thought	begins	(Godard	and	Miéville,	in	Tuoto	0:07:40),	cars	are	called	
Picasso	(in	Tuoto	1:02:45),	and	protests	against	the	institutions	of	art,	like	Maximo	Caminero’s	2014	smashing	of	Ai	Weiwei’s	$1,000,000	vase	become	a	spectacle	in	and	of	themselves	(in	Tuoto	0:30:44).	Has	abstract	art	merely	taken	up	where	
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religious	art	left	off,	as	Raymond	Deagan	posits	in	Far	From	Heaven	(in	Tuoto	0:32:17).	Or,	more	importantly,	has	the	spectacle	terminally	appropriated	the	forces	of	religion,	with	their	sensorial	trance,	their	fetishes,	and	their	cartographies	of	hell,	heaven,	promised	lands	and	North	as	God?			6.5	An	abrasive	sense	of	nostalgia	roams	Tuoto’s	montage	from	beginning	to	end.	A	theory	of	the	advanced	spectacle,	or	of	late	modernity,	must	face	the	issue	of	nostalgia	in	the	most	adamant	terms,	for	nostalgia	will	increasingly	come	to	define	the	experience	of	life	in	these	times.	It	is	not	just	nostalgia	as	pastiche,	as	the	last	resort	of	a	society	that	has	lost	all	sense	of	historicity,	as	Jameson	proposes,	but	a	condition	that	reaches	deep	down	the	foundation	of	modern	thought.	For	the	truth	is	that	nostalgia	has	always	been	the	by-product	of	modernity.	Both	in	the	sense	of	the	modernist	reaction	to	modernity,	and	as	a	general	state	of	consciousness	before	industrialization,	modernity	has	put	in	motion	a	history	of	nostalgia,	from	romanticism	and	naturalism	to	the	twenty-first-century	culture	of	retro.		Indeed,	modernity	would	have	been	unbearable	without	the	possibility	of	nostalgic	escapades.	As	time	and	space	accelerate	in	compression,	nostalgia	will	only	grow.	At	a	time	where	fades	and	fashions,	social	relations	and	images,	last	but	a	fleeting	second,	a	constant	state	of	desperate	yet	resigned	nostalgia	will	set	in.	We	will	find	ourselves	missing	anything	and	everything	within	seconds.	Above	all,	we	will	find	ourselves	missing	not	just	the	lost	ephemerals	but	the	very	condition	of	a	slower-passing	time.	Jameson	discusses	the	condition	of	postmodern	nostalgia,	both	
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on	the	front	of	architecture,	which	“randomly	and	without	principle	but	with	gusto	cannibalizes	all	the	architectural	styles	of	the	past”	(18-9)	and	of	film,	to	which	he	devotes	his	chapter	“Nostalgia	for	the	present.”	Particularly	in	relation	to	nostalgia	films,	Jameson	notes	that	“[n]ostalgia	films	restructure	the	whole	issue	of	the	pastiche	and	project	it	onto	a	collective	and	social	level,	where	the	desperate	attempt	to	appropriate	a	missing	past	in	now	reflected	through	the	iron	law	of	fashion	change	and	the	emergent	ideology	of	the	generation.”	(19).	With	regards	to	nostalgia,	Não	Me	Fale	is,	precisely,	a	meta-nostalgic	film	that	tackles	the	development	of	nostalgia	well	beyond	what	Jameson	could	have	theorized	in	the	1980s.		In	the	age	of	accelerating	time-space,	where	the	transfer	of	time	into	space	itself	also	accelerates,	nostalgia	becomes	a	psychogeographical	matter.	What	is	indexed	as	a	longing	for	travel,	geographic	travel	that	is,	is	often	really	a	longing	for	
time	travel,	for	travel	back	in	time.	This	is	where	the	psychogeographies	of	“First”	and	“Third”	world	enter	as	commodities,	for	they	provide	the	possibility	of	travel	to	some	imagined	past	eternally	present	in	geography,	whether	it	be	1950s	Cuba	or	indigenous	Peru.	Latin	America	is	certainly	willing	to	sell	this	product	by	lending	itself	to	the	necessary	(self-)artemizations72.	Self-artemization	can	only	be	
																																																								72	The	dynamics	of	artemic	subjugation	are,	however,	complex,	and	the	roles	of	artemized	object,	the	narratives	of	self-artemization,	or	the	gaze	of	the	actaeonic	eye	are	as	mobile	and	de-centered	as	is	the	spectacle	at	large.	In	a	very	interesting	article	in	this	respect	entitled	“Rio	de	Janeiro:	Spectacularization	and	Subjectivities	in	Globo’s	City,”	Szaniecki	considers	the	Brazilian	city	a	particular	epitome	of	the	accumulation	of	spectacles	described	by	Debord:	“[t]he	city	has	become	‘global’	as	it	has	become	kind	of	a	‘property’	of	the	Globo	group…:	real	life	further	and	further	removed	into	the	realm	of	representations”	(121).			
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understood	under	the	terms	of	this	dissertation’s	update	on	Debord’s	theory	of	the	spectacles	as	show.	Indeed,	one	of	the	main	characteristics	of	the	show	not	quite	developed	in	Debord’s	original	theory	is	that	of	“assumed	script”	and	perpetuation	of	the	shows	by	spectators	in	somnambular	pseudo-active	passivity.	Thus,	the	fictional	“Third	World”	sleepwalks	the	accelerating	nostalgias	of	advanced	modernity.		But	nostalgia	is	not	merely	a	marginally	harmful	by-product	of	the	modern	experience.	It	is	a	force	of	extreme	danger	that	pulsates	beneath	some	of	the	most	severe	threats	to	humanity.	Nostalgia	is,	after	all,	the	longing	for	an	idealized	past.	And	a	longing	for	an	idealized	“pure”	past	is	the	driving	force	of	fascism,	whether	it	be	nostalgia	for	a	pre-migration	purity	of	race,	or	of	“moral	values.”	Tuoto’s	film	enters	head-on	into	this	dark	side	of	nostalgia	through	his	footage	of	repression	and	torture.	It	is	this	nuanced	exploration	of	the	tragedy	of	an	ever-accelerating	nostalgia	that	makes	Não	Me	Fale	such	an	eloquent	examination	of	the	spectacle	in	the	twenty-first	century.			6.6	It	is	not	just	montage	and	religion	that	the	spectacle	has	appropriated	and	turned	into	(the	media	substitute	of)	everyday	life.	In	its	own	way,	the	spectacle	has	colonized	a	key	process	in	the	construction	of	knowledge,	namely:	the	imagination	of	constellations.	The	concept	of	constellations,	as	intended	here,	was	introduced	in	1925	(	though	first	published	1928)	by	Walter	Benjamin	in	the	“Epistemo-Critical	Prologue”	to	Ursprung	des	deutschen	Trauerspiels	(translated	as	The	Origin	of	
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German	Tragic	Drama	in	1977)	and	seeks	to	describe	by	analogy	the	way	in	which	the	idea	“belongs	to	a	fundamentally	different	world	from	that	which	it	apprehends”	and	thus	“[t]he	question	of	whether	it	comprehends	what	it	apprehends	…	cannot	be	regarded	as	a	criterion	of	its	existence…	Ideas	are	to	objects	as	constellations	are	to	stars”	(Benjamin	34).	The	concept	is	further	explained	by	Ian	Buchanan	as	the	fact	that	“ideas	are	no	more	present	in	the	world	than	constellations	actually	exist	in	the	heavens,	but	like	constellations	they	enable	us	to	perceive	relations	between	objects.”	Stars	do	stand	in	a	certain	position	in	the	natural	world,	Buchanan	further	explains,	thus	lending	themselves	to	being	viewed	and	interconnected	in	certain	ways,	but	the	principles	under	which	we	name	those	constellations	belong	to	the	realm	of	history	and	myth.	Constellations	are,	thus,	simultaneously	paradoxically	objective	and	subjective.		The	particular	imagetic	cartographies	which	emerge	from	the	seemingly	chaotic	and	vertiginous	montaging	of	images	around	us	constellates	the	most	diverse	materials	into	fleeting	and	not-so-fleeting	constellations.	As	Moraes	asserts,	one	of	the	ideas	that	drive	Não	Me	Fale	is	“the	universalization	of	different	registers	[whereby]	the	film	joins	together	…	audios	of	different	artists	and	origins,	just	like	the	dislocated	images	which,	together,	form	a	narrative	with	dramatic	revelations,	with	a	beginning,	a	middle,	and	an	end.”	Just	as	is	the	case	with	constellations,	where	stars	of	uneven	sizes	and	at	vastly	different	distances	appear	equally	projected	on	the	levelling	surface	of	the	celestial	sphere,	so	do	images	and	realities,	events	and	representations	of	events,	virtue	and	trash,	appear	equalized	on	the	screen	of	the	
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spectacle,	with	its	established	narratives	of	center	and	periphery,	gravitational	unity	and	unbridgeable	difference.	Countering	the	spectacle	in	the	current	age	amounts	to	the	permanent	meta-reflection	on	those	proposed	constellations	and	the	constant	questioning	of	constellative	narratives	of	unity,	belonging	and	difference.	The	spectacle	chains	and	constellates	together	what	it	wishes	in	fictions	of	(dis-)unity,	and	so	should	its	resistance.	But	the	spectacle	will	always	seek	to	hide	the	artifice	in	its	creations,	as	well	as	epistemological	systems	will	try	to	hide	the	fictional	nature	of	their	arbitrary	compartments	and	geographies.	Countering	the	spectacle	thus	calls	for	a	Now-style	play	against	territorial	blockades	so	that	the	metaphors	of	montaged,	constellative	constructions	of	reality	and	experience	can	be	elevated	back	to	the	skies,	as	a	form	of	relativist	utilitarianism:	if	all	epistemological	constellations	are	ultimately	(at	least	partly)	arbitrary,	we	are	free	to	choose	strategically	upon	the	principle	of	practical	political	usefulness.	In	some	of	our	counter-constellations,	we	might	find	that	some	stars	north	of	the	Rio	Grande	constellate	together	with	those	south.	If	anything,	just	to	see	what	silences	are	overcome	with	this	constellative	arrangement,	where	we	are	suddenly	free	to	think	that	there	is	no	constellation	named	“South,”	and	El	Norte	tampoco	existe.			
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EPILOGUE:	THE	SHOW	MUST	NOT	GO	ON:	
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The	theoretical	trilogy	proposed	in	chapter	6	carries	us	through	the	theoretical	history	of	the	spectacle	through	2016.	However,	some	key	developments	since	the	early	2000s	are	still	evolving	and	present	major	potential	implications	for	a	theory	of	the	spectacle	as	we	move	forward.	Some	of	these	implications	involve	unprecedented	risks	facing	the	capitalist	spectacular	consortium	and	unique	opportunities	for	resistance.	Others	put	in	question	terminological	practices	deeply	rooted	in	U.S.	–	Latin	America	thought.	Specifically,	this	epilogue	examines	the	still-developing	matters	related	to	patterns	of	victimization,	understandings	of	ideology,	narratives	of	difference	and	similarity,	curational	control	by	the	“First	World”	of	its	representational	imagery,	the	employment	of	geotags,	and	the	epistemological	history	of	poverty.			1.	Possibly	the	most	immediate	implication	of	a	demarcational	investigation	of	established	inter-worlds	ideologies	is	the	necessary	problematization	of	the	mechanics	of	victimization	so	vitally	fundamental	to	any	postcolonial	enterprise	or	revolutionary	project.	This	is	a	delicate	operation,	as	those	involved	in	an	emancipatory	struggle	are	not	likely	to	wish	to	see	their	victimhood	questioned	or	probed.	A	revolutionary	project	often	begins	its	process	of	symbolic	construction	by	identifying	clear	oppositional	terms	of	victimizer	and	victimized,	oppressor	and	slave,	neometropolis	and	neocolony,	in	order	to	be	able	to	imagine	itself	and	then	possibly	territorialize	the	resulting	epistemological	forms	that	serve	that	ideology	onto	land	and	bodies,	geographies	and	race.	In	order	for	these	oppositional	terms	to	
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retain	the	popular	appeal	required	by	the	revolutionary	enterprise,	they	may	be	reluctant	to	admit	dialectical	tension,	let	alone	critically-constructive	permanent	destabilization.	However,	no	matter	how	ardently	one	supports	the	emancipatory	undertakings	of	the	imaginary	Third	World,	one	must	stop	to	examine	the	epistemological	systems	upon	which	one	builds	those	undertakings	for	signs	of	spectacular	intrusion.	I	have	discussed	the	many	risks	of	the	unchallenged	use	of	the	established	development	discourse	and	its	related	psychogeographical	tags,	including	falsification	of	time;	eurocentrism;	racialized	projections	on	land;	the	hindering	of	the	imagination	of	solidarities	and	historical	protagonism;	actaeonic	control	of	the	circulation	of	spectacular	images	to	preserve	projectional	
artemization,	among	many	other	dangers.	In	light	of	that	discussion,	it	becomes	evident	that	revolutionary	narratives	of	victimhood	that	rest	unquestioningly	on	the	show	of	First	and	Third	World	are	fundamentally	compromised	and	may	contribute	more	to	the	spectacular	status	quo	than	to	their	cause	by	silencing	the	oppressed	in	the	North	and	blurring	the	responsibilities	of	the	oppressors	in	the	South.	Latin	American	victimization	must	be	put	under	the	glass	of	a	critique	of	ideology.	This	does	not	mean	that	Latin	America	has	not	been,	and	continues	to	be,	victimized	and	exploited	by	forces	that,	in	their	flowing	tides,	often	recognize	strong	and	violent	centers	in	the	North.	It	means	that	the	order	of	worlds	and	its	associated	narratives	of	victimhood	must	be	examined	for	the	possibility	of	solidarities	encompassing	the	North	and	consortiums	comprising	the	South;	for	psychogeographies	whose	imaginations	of	South	and	North	respond	to	complex	
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processes	of	displacement	and	anxious	dislocation;	for	projections	of	ideologically-necessary	epistemologies	onto	land,	with	time	included,	and	the	resulting	obstruction	of	historical	consciousness	and	appropriation;	for	imposed	patterns	of	spectacular	gaze,	framing,	exposure	and	circulation	at	the	service	of	the	commodity	economy.	Commodity	fetishism	operates	on	the	perpetual	dissatisfaction	of	desire:	it	is	the	perpetual	postponement	of	desire	onto	the	next	chimerical	mirage	as	a	matter	of	economic	method.	The	show	of	worlds	organizes	temporalized	demarcations	of	land	so	that	all	the	world	remains	perpetually	in	pursuit	of	the	dream	of	firstworldness,	which	in	turn	is	the	dream	of	modernity	and	capitalist	development.	But	this	First	World,	staged	as	a	universal	shop	window,	as	the	object	of	this	ever-deferring	desire,	is	but	an	equally	ever-fleeting	illusion	–	it	can	never	be	seized,	it	can	only	be	desired.	The	biggest	affirmation	of	truth	may	indeed	be	a	question,	and	“¿dónde	están	los	gringos?”	is	possibly	the	biggest	truth	told	in	El	
Norte.		On	the	other	hand,	simplistic	geographicized	narratives	of	victimhood	benefit	the	“floating-signifier”	type	of	revolutionary	model	so	often	seen	in	Latin	America,	for	they	allow	the	shifting	occupants	of	“empty-and-refill	revolutions”	to	hide	behind	a	stable	differential	opposition	(“Empire”)	and	conceal	the	“Third	World’s”	internal	consortiums	as	well	as	their	projects’	adoption	of	capitalism’s	material-progressivist	desires.	This	meta-reflection	on	victimhood	would	constitute	an	essential	task	of	a	demarcational	critique	of	ideology	and	could	be	articulated	in	terms	of	one	key	question:	how	do	“the	victimizer”	and	“the	victimized”	imagine	
	 312	
each	other	and	what	are	the	mechanics	and	deeper	political	purposes	of	those	imaginations?	Those	inter-worlds	imaginations	have	become	exceedingly	complex	in	the	age	of	the	advanced	spectacle.		Once	oppressed	solidarities	have	been	recognized	in	the	imaginary	First	
World	as	a	continuum	with	those	in	the	imaginary	Third	World,	as	seen	in	Now,	
consortiums	must	be	traced	in	a	similar	fashion.	Without	a	consideration	of	Latin	America’s	own	internal	consortiums,	the	thought	model	for	U.S.	–	Latin	American	relations	remains	an	unbalanced	binary	of	non-national	or	hemispheric	solidarities	against	one	national	consortium,	under	which	model	the	United	States	continues	to	be	the	center	and	comparisons	may	become	untenable,	as	Kutzinski	claims.	This	is	one	problem	with	Leary’s	perspective:	while	it	considers	the	full	existence	in	the	United	States	of	a	Third	World	that	is	not	just	pockets	of	underdevelopment	but	a	nation-wide	condition,	it	fails	to	see	“the	First	World	in	Latin	America,”	so	to	speak.	It	thus	fails	to	escape	a	U.S.-centric	models,	something	Leary	himself	explicitly	admits:		In	[my]	book,	admittedly,	the	United	States	is	very	much	at	the	center;	I	am	investigating	underdevelopment’s	representation	in	the	place	where	it	is	said	not	to	exist,	the	United	States.	A	Cultural	History	of	Underdevelopment	thus	redefines	this	ostensibly	empirical	economic	category	as	a	comparative	concept,	the	product	of	a	century	of	inter-American	cultural	contact	that	defies	the	easy	distinctions	we	will	make	between	the	“developed”	north	and	
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the	“underdeveloped”	south,	and	between	nationalism	and	transnationalism	(16).			Indeed,	Leary’s	inquiry	focuses	on	the	United	States	and	its	projectional	mechanics,	but	it	neglects	to	consider	a	bilateral	operation	of	those	projections.	This	“other	direction”	is	not	just	Latin	America	projecting	an	enemy	or	a	modern	ideal	in	the	First	World	as	a	simplistic	whole.	On	the	spectacular	level,	the	First	World	constructs	its	development	discourse	by	framing	out	of	a	great	number	of	its	circulating	images	of	non-whiteness	and	poverty,	while	framing	the	Latin	American	identity	exclusively	on	those.	But	considering	racist,	Eurocentric	and	modernity-anxious	manipulations	of	imaginations	of	national	identity	a	practice	exclusive	to	the	U.S.	restitutes	the	exceptionalist	U.S.-centric	model.	The	truth	is	that	Latin	America	practices,	with	varying	intensity	and	“success”	throughout	the	continent,	analogous	imaginary	framing	in	order	to	silence	its	non-modern-European	conditions.	It	could	be	contended	that	Latin	America	does	so	as	part	of	a	tradition	of	“copying,”	imitating	or	following	the	United	States.	That,	again,	would	restitute	U.S.-exceptionalism,	so	it	must	be	challenged:	a	demarcational	critique	must	close	door	after	door	to	U.S.	exceptionalism,	however	it	attempts	to	reorganize	itself.	In	order	to	dismount	and	disrupt	the	show	of	worlds,	the	imaginary	First	World	must	be	systematically	denied	its	firstworldness	time	and	again.	As	Debord	posits,	“the	spectacle’s	negation	of	life	[must]	be	negated	in	its	turn”(87)	since	[f]or	the	society	of	the	spectacle	to	be	effectively	destroyed,	what	is	needed	are	people	setting	a	practical	force	in	motion.	A	critical	theory	of	the	
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spectacle	cannot	be	true	unless	it	joins	forces	with	the	practical	movement	of	negation	within	society;	and	this	negation,	which	constitutes	the	resumption	of	revolutionary	class	struggle,	cannot	for	its	part	achieve	self-consciousness	unless	it	develops	the	critique	of	the	spectacle,	a	critique	that	embodies	the	theory	of	negation’s	real	conditions	–	the	practical	conditions	of	present-day	oppression	–	and	that	also,	inversely,	reveals	the	secret	of	negation’s	potential	…	Critical	theory	has	to	be	communicated	in	its	own	language	–	the	language	of	contradiction,	dialectical	in	form	as	wee	as	in	content	…	Not	a	negation	of	style,	but	the	style	of	negation	(143-4).		In	closing	all	doors	to	the	construction	of	U.S.	exceptionalism,	we	are	commanded	to	no	longer	considering	the	Latin	American	condition	and	the	U.S.	condition	on	grounds	of	axiomatic	difference	but	as	continuums	upon	which	a	largely	arbitrary	grid	of	demarcations	has	been	deposited.	And	some	of	the	spectacular	mechanics	by	which	the	First	World	in	general,	and	the	U.S.	in	particular,	builds	its	firstworldness	have	been	at	play	since	the	dawn	of	Latin	American	identity,	from	the	anxieties	of	Europeanism,	to	the	fear	of	racial	instability,	to	the	insecurities	of	white-passing	in	the	construction	of	Cuban	national	identity	examined	in	fictions	like	Cirilo	Villaverde’s	Cecilia	Valdés.	After	all,	Latin	America	is	the	birthplace	of	a	man	who	once	wondered:	Will	we	ever	be	able	to	exterminate	the	Indians?	For	the	savages	of	the	Americas	I	feel	an	invincible	disgust	I	cannot	remedy.	Those	scoundrels	are	no	more	than	disgusting	Indians	whom	I	would	immediately	send	to	hang	if	
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they	reappeared.	Lautaro	and	Capolicán	are	lousy	Indians,	because	that’s	what	they	all	are.	Incapable	of	progress,	their	extermination	is	providential	and	usefulness,	sublime	and	grand.	They	must	be	exterminated	and	not	forgive	even	the	little	ones,	for	they	too	already	have	in	them	an	instinctive	hate	of	the	civilized	man	(Domingo	Sarmiento,	President	of	Argentina,	published	in	El	Nacional,	November	25,	1876,	quoted	in	Finchelstein	279),				and	affirmed	that	between	Europeans	and	African	Arabs,	there	isn’t	and	there	never	will	be	any	possible	cultural	fusion	or	assimilation;	one	or	the	other	people	will	have	to	disappear,	retreat	or	dissolve;	and	I	love	civilization	too	much	to	not	wish	from	this	moment	the	definitive	triumph	in	Africa	of	the	civilized	peoples	(Sarmiento,	in	his	Viajes	por	Europa,	Africa	y	Norteamérica,	1845-1847,	291).		Nava	did	not	only	keep	out	of	frame	the	poor	Americans	of	color	in	El	Norte,	but	also	the	Sarmientos	of	El	Sur.	Álvarez	does	fully	underscore	the	silent	“American	non-gringos”	and	relates	them	to	the	La	hora	call	along	with	other	Latin	American	peoples	toward	the	Cuban	end	of	history,	but	does	not	consider	Latin	American	
consortiums,	which	have	the	potential	to	put	the	model	of	revolutionary	victimization	further	in	crisis.	That	said,	if	the	racist	and	Eurocentric	ideological	imperatives	are	common	to	the	full	length	of	the	Americas,	something	else	must	have	been	at	play	that	determined	the	United	Sates’	ability	to	impose	its	First	World	self-imagination	over	Latin	America’s	thirdworldization:	that	is	something	that	only	the	spectacle	can	explain.	Without	ignoring	the	economic	fundamental	substrate	and	
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the	differing	experience	of	British	and	Spanish,	Portuguese	or	French	colonizations,	on	the	spectacular	level	and	in	symbolic	excess	on	that	material	substrate,	that	difference	is	control	of	the	camera	–	more	precisely:	control	of	the	actaeonic	eye.	That	control	is	not	a	mere	derivation	of	economic	advantage,	for	other	relatively	wealthy	nations	in	the	world	lack	the	spectacular	machine	of	the	United	States,	with	its	ability	to	disseminate	its	self-imaginations	all	over	the	world.	And,	to	some	degree,	the	spectacularization	of	Europe	or	Asia	takes	place	through	the	U.S.	spectacular	camera.	Finally,	if	at	any	point	the	economic	substrate	could	have	been	deemed	to	hold	material	support	for	a	claim	to	even	U.S.	development	along	the	nation-state	order,	that	allegeable	support	has	eroded	beyond	tenability	as	a	result	of	the	acceleration	of	globalization	in	recent	decades,	as	Buck-Morss	observes	in	“Global	Wars.”			2.	Resistance	to	a	demarcational	critique	of	ideology	in	the	context	of	U.S.	–	Latin	America	relations	might	come	from	Latin	America	itself,	as	it	complicates	its	narratives	of	victimization.	To	a	large	extent,	this	is	true	of	all	“ideological	withdrawal.”	As	Slavoj	Žižek	points	out	in	The	Pervert’s	Guide	to	Ideology,		according	to	our	common	sense,	we	think	that	ideology	is	something	blurring,	confusing	our	straight	view;	ideology	should	be	glasses,	which	distort	our	view,	and	the	critique	of	ideology	should	be	the	opposite,	like	you	take	off	the	glasses	so	that	you	can	finally	see	the	way	things	really	are.	This,	precisely,	and	here	the	pessimism	of	the	film,	…	this	precisely	is	the	ultimate	
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illusion:	ideology	is	not	simply	imposed	on	ourselves;	ideology	is	our	spontaneous	relationship	to	our	social	world,	how	we	perceive	its	meaning	and	so	on	and	so	on,	we	in	a	way	enjoy	our	ideology.	To	step	out	of	ideology,	it	hurts,	it’s	a	painful	experience,	you	must	force	yourself	to	do	it.	This	is	rendered	in	a	wonderful	way	with	a	further	scene	in	the	film	where	John	Nada	tries	to	force	his	best	friend	John	Armitage	to	also	put	the	glasses	on.	And	it’s	the	weirdest	scene	in	the	film,	the	fight	takes	eight,	nine	minutes,	it	may	appear	irrational	[because]why	does	this	guy	reject	so	violently	to	put	the	glasses	on?	It	is	as	if	he	is	well	aware	that	spontaneously	he	lives	in	a	lie,	that	the	glasses	will	make	him	see	the	truth,	but	that	this	truth	can	be	painful,	can	shatter	many	of	your	illusions.	It	is	a	paradox	we	have	to	accept:	the	extreme	violence	of	liberation	(03:37-05:47).		This	is	a	rather	long	quote,	but	one	which	I	think	is	essential	to	understanding	resistance	to	the	critique	of	ideology,	to	which	demarcational	inquiries	are	no	exception.	It	is	not	just	about	the	comfort	of	the	ideologies	that	support	a	certain	paradigm	of	victimhood,	but,	as	Žižek	states,	the	loss	of	the	illusion:	the	fantasy	of	a	First	World,	the	mirage	of	an	“ideal”	democracy,	a	perfect	modern	state	and	a	commodity	paradise	at	the	expense	of	repressive	exclusions	that	continues	to	elude,	like	a	vanishing	mirage,	so	that	even	those	who	never	leave	their	countries	for	El	Norte	still	experience	Rosa’s	“¿dónde	están	los	gringos?”	predicament.	In	this	sense,	it	is	truly	fascinating	that	the	word	spectacle	in	the	plural	form	can	mean	“eyeglasses.”	
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While	discussing	the	model	for	Glasnost	under	the	Soviet	Union’s	Gorbachev	in	Global	Civil	Wars,	Susan	Buck-Morss	observed	that	“the	model	of	Glasnost	was	the	proposal	for	a	third	way,	a	democratic	form	of	socialism	to	replace	the	Communist	Party’s	monopoly	in	power.	This	was	the	most	reasonable	direction	that	history	could	have	taken,	but	despite	Hegel’s	assertion	to	the	contrary,	reason	is	not	the	victor	in	history”	(21:21	–	21:41).	Ideology,	of	course,	does	not	primarily	respond	to	reason.	We	are	sensuous	ideological	beings.	With	this	idea,	I	intend	to	capture	the	manner	in	which	ideologies	are	pleasurable	lies,	as	Žižek	refers	to	them,	over	which	reason	does	not	necessarily	triumph.	They	respond	to	the	senses	first,	then	to	reason.	They	owe	themselves	to	emotions	and	aesthetics	first,	and	any	unreason	or	contradiction	in	them	will	be	overlooked	or	forgiven.			Harvey	dedicates	the	twentieth	chapter	of	The	Condition	of	Postmodernity	to	this	status	of	the	spectacular	political	subject	when	he	considers	the	manner	in	which	Ronald	Reagan	was	re-elected,	and	maintained	extremely	high	public	regard,	in	spite	of	all	polls	showing	that	the	majority	of	US	electorate	opposed	his	stances	on	almost	every	front	and	a	number	of	senior	members	of	his	administration	had	been	accused	and/or	found	guilty	of	serious	wrongdoing.	Let	us	not	forget	that	Reagan	was,	first,	a	Hollywood	actor.	As	Harvey	simply	puts	it,	“the	triumph	of	aesthetics	over	ethics	could	not	be	plainer”	(329)73.	Against	all	of	modernity’s	claims	to	
																																																								73	In	his	chapter	“Guy	Debord,	Donald	Trump,	and	the	Politics	of	the	Spectacle,”	Douglas	Kellner	proposes	the	concept	of	media	spectacle	and	traces	the	combined	operation	of	the	media	and	U.S.	
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rationality,	the	modern	spectacular	citizen	is	deeply	irrational.	This	primacy	of	aesthetics	over	reason	is	why	Debord’s	theory	is	so	well	suited	for	a	critique	of	modernity,	as	it	constitutes	“an	aesthetic	criticism	of	capitalism”	(Frayssé	71).	Politics	can	thus	not	be	fully	discerned	by	the	methods	of	science:	the	literary	and	cultural	studies	must	be	summoned	to	untangle	the	ways	of	the	spectacle,	to	shed	light	on	its	epistemological	dogmas	and	narratives,	to	which	the	show	of	two	worlds	is	not	an	exception.		The	spectacle	is	thus	the	chief	means	of	sensuous	transmission	of	ideology.	All	territorializations	of	epistemological	orders	onto	land	and	bodies	too	are	
sensuous	operations,	hence	their	affinity	with	the	means	of	the	spectacle.	And	any	counter-ideological	effort,	including	a	demarcational	critique,	must	thus	speak	that	
sensuous	language	of	the	spectacle.	As	Debord	states,	“[t]o	analyze	the	spectacle	means	talking	its	language	to	some	degree”	(15).	El	Norte	greatly	succeeds	at	
sensuous	communication	of	ideology,	albeit	one	that	merely	reinforces	what	it	claims	to	reprimand.	La	hora	de	los	hornos	fails	the	sensuous	demands	of	ideological	communication	with	its	encyclopedic	tone.	It	is	for	this	reason	that	Leary’s	archival	study	on	the	“erotics	of	the	male	revolutionary	hero	in	U.S.	mass	culture”	(22)	is	so	important.	Now	succeeds	admirably	in	this	respect,	not	only	in	establishing	a	
demarcational	perspective	on	the	United	States	to	disrupt	its	show	of	development	and	modernity	despite	circulatory	blockades,	but	also	in	its	extremely	high																																																									politics	to	the	mid-1990s,	“the	era	of	O.J.	Simpson,	the	Clinton	sex	scandals,	and	the	rise	of	cable	news	networks”	(2).	But	the	prototype	to	Trump	was	really	Reagan,	as	Harvey	points	out,	one	decade	before.		
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sensuous	appeal	as	a	music	montage.	It	is	not	for	nothing	that	that	format	would	later	become	the	epitome	of	sensuous	pop:	the	music	video.	Álvarez’s	film	demonstrates	with	unique	clarity	that	“[d]étournement	…	is	the	fluid	language	of	anti-ideology”	(Debord	146).		
	3.	As	opposed	to	a	mere	fear	of	difference,	“fear	of	the	other”	operates	as	a	tension	between	fear	of	difference	and	anxieties	of	sameness.	Although	focused	on	a	different	time	period,	Christina	Lee’s	book	The	anxiety	of	sameness	in	early	modern	
Spain	is	extremely	enlightening	in	this	respect.	Lee’s	book	explores	early	modern	Spain’s	phobic	obsession	with	“racial	passers”	and,	in	general,	forms	of	“social	passing”	that	challenged	the	stability	of	established	systems	of	difference	and	exposed	the	permeable	nature	of	those	social	and	racial	demarcations.	As	Conversos	and	Moriscos	sought	social	mobility,	“pure	Christians”	faced	increased	
demarcational	pressure	as	their	ability	to	differentiate	themselves	from	“the	others”	was	put	in	crisis	by	“ethnic	usurpers.”	Through	a	careful	analysis	of	a	diverse	range	of	texts,	Lee	explores	what	the	book	synopsis	perfectly	summarizes	as	the	fact	that	while	conspicuous	sociocultural	and	ethnic	difference	was	certainly	perturbing	and	unsettling,	in	some	ways	it	was	not	as	threatening	to	the	dominant	Spanish	identity	as	the	potential	discovery	of	the	arbitrariness	that	separated	them	from	the	undesirables	of	society	–	and	therefore	the	recognition	of	fundamental	sameness.”	
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In	her	chapter	entitled	“The	Unmasking	of	Conversos,”	Lee	references	Franciso	de	Quevedo’s	famous	seventeenth-century	sonnet	“A	un	hombre	de	gran	nariz,”	in	which	the	poet	mocks	Converso	Luis	de	Góngora’s	“Jewish	nose,”	and	points	out	that	“Quevedo	could	not	accept	the	idea	that	Góngora	stood	next	to	him	on	level	ground,”	eventually	accomplishing	“his	fantasy	of	purging	Góngora	out	of	his	social	space	when	he	purchased	the	house	in	which	Góngora	lived	and	forced	the	latter	to	move	back	to	his	native	Córdoba”	(136),	a	despicable	act	that	is	too	reminiscent	of	modern-day	deportation.	Indeed,	often	what	triggers	demarcational	apprehension	is	not	the	racialized	other	per	se,	but	the	impossibility	to	draw	clear	lines.	In	the	tradition	of	English	liberalism	in	which	Achebe	placed	Conrad,	this	translates	not	so	much	as	the	overt	racist,	but	as	the	compassionate	“firstworlders”	who	embrace	the	racial	other	as	long	as	they,	the	firstworlders,	are	able	to	remain	unambiguously	distinct	from	the	“inferior”	individual	to	whom	they	offers	their	forgiving	compassion.	This	compassionate	liberal	is	even	able	to	travel	and	meet	the	other	in	their	space	as	long	as	everything	remains	in	its	place,	which	often	means	an	
actaeonic	activist	whose	atalaya	remains	fully	sealed	through	his	adventurous	incursions	into	the	“savage”	demarcation	and	a	circulatory	system	that	limits	or	punishes	the	northward	migration	of	Artemis.		In	light	of	this,	current	political	calls	to	build	a	wall	along	the	U.S.	–	Mexico	border	should	be	regarded	less	as	a	hate	of	the	Mexican	other	per	se,	and	more	as	a	monumental	act	of	Saussurean	intervention.	What	that	wall	represents	is	the	spectacular	territorialization	of	the	epistemological	difference	between	“First	
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World”	and	“Third	World”	at	a	time	when	that	differentiation	is	less	tenable	than	ever.	It	is	the	manual	execution	of	a	brick-and-mortar	version	of	differential	opposition	as	described	by	Ferdinand	de	Saussure	in	his	Course	in	General	
Linguistics,	whereby	in	order	to	determine	the	value	of	a	word,	“one	must	also	compare	it	with	similar	values,	with	other	words	that	stand	in	opposition	to	it.	Its	content	is	really	fixed	only	by	the	concurrence	of	everything	that	exists	outside	of	it”	(115).	He	then	goes	on	to	illustrate	the	difference	between	signification	and	value	by	means	of	his	famous	mouton-sheep-mutton	example,	underscoring	how	different	languages	draw	the	demarcational	line	of	value	differently.	It	is	in	the	Saussurean	sense	of	competition	for	value	in	differential	opposition	that	we	must	view	U.S.	-	Latin	America	inter-worlds’	“intimacy,”	not	just	a	product	‘of	political	domination	and	xenophobic	aggression,”	as	Jeff	Karem	proposes,	“but	of	anxious,	often	panicked	competition”	(cited	in	Leary	4).	This	in	turn	implies	that	“the	U.S.	fantasy	of	exceptional	development	is	an	expression,	not	of	security	from	one’s	peripheries,	but	of	the	periphery’s	constant,	intimate	presence”	(Leary	4).	A	demarcational	critique	of	ideology	is	interested	in	the	very	places	of	demarcation:	where	the	arbitrarily	line	is	made	to	fall,	what	political	aims	that	particular	place	of	demarcation	might	serve,	and	how	to	destabilize	it.	However,	demarcational	critique	cannot	hope	for	the	annihilation	of	all	demarcations,	as	it	might	simultaneously	negate	and	believe	in	the	possibility	of	some	kind	of	meaning,	however	unstable.				
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4.	The	“sameness	anxiety”	discussed	in	the	previous	section,	as	the	impossibility	to	fully	maintain	established	narratives	of	difference,	can	be	traced	historically	over	a	century,	as	Leary	does.	And	yet,	the	instability	of	demarcational	orders	has	enormously	accelerated	in	the	stage	of	the	advanced	spectacle.	This	acceleration	responds	to	both	the	general	increase	in	the	circulation	of	images,	which	accompanies	the	acceleration	of	time	and	space	into	each	other,	but	also	to	singular	events	that	have	further	accelerated	the	process.	Late	spectacular	society	affords	the	
consortiums	endless	opportunities	for	sensuous	ideological	imposition,	from	an	ever-widening	circulation	of	framed	images	to	its	somnambular	shows	to	the	ease	of	travel	that	Actaeons	increasingly	enjoy.	And	yet	the	advance	of	the	spectacle	comes	with	enormous	danger:	the	more	freely	images	circulate,	the	more	“democratized”	the	camera	becomes,	and	the	less	regulated	spectator-assumed	shows	are,	the	more	the	spectacle	risks	the	loss	of	actaeonic	control.	If	they	are	ever	able	to	minimally	rise	over	ideological	domination,	indiscreet	Actaeons	and	even	Artemises	can	now	steal	pathetized	images	of	the	First	World	and	circulate	them	almost	immediately.	In	addition	to	the	gradual	process	of	loss	of	actaeonic	power	that	comes	with	democratization,	two	key	moments	can	be	identified	in	the	spectacular	history	of	the	United	States	that	have	become	turning	points	with	the	potential	to	upend	the	
demarcational	status	quo.	One	of	these	events	was	September	11,	2001,	when		nine	men,	armed	with	paper	cutters,	the	most	low-tech	form	of	weapon	imaginable,	managed	to	stage	the	self-destruction	of	U.S.	power	on	morning	television.	This	iconoclastic	act	destroyed	the	image	of	U.S.	invulnerability	
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and	the	icons	of	its	power	…	Now	this	act	had	an	effect	similar	to	the	fall	of	the	Berlin	Wall	in	that	it	exposed	the	imaginary	effects	of	hegemonic	power	(24:38	-	25:20)	On	the	spectacular	level,	the	events	of	this	day	constituted	the	most	violent	form	of	forced	artemization	of	an	Actaeon	caught	by	surprise.	As	strong	as	the	shock	effect	of	September	11	may	have	been	on	television	screen,	2001	was	still	newsreel	era:	the	spectacle	still	retained	a	considerable	degree	of	control	of	camera	and	distribution	despite	de	magnitude	of	the	counter-spectacular	attack.			The	second	such	event	marks	a	dramatic	turning	point	in	the	spectacular	history	of	the	United	States	and	the	beginning	of	a	process	of	loss	of	control	over	the	country’s	spectacular	self-framing	privileges	and	anti-artemization	defenses.	This	event	is	Hurricane	Katrina	and	is	thoroughly	discussed	by	Leary.	Taking	place	in	2005,	this	was	the	first	First-World-artemizing	event	of	the	mobile	phone	camera	era.	From	this	event	onward,	the	pathetizing	camera	was	at	anyone’s	disposal,	and	the	internet	guaranteed	fast	uncurated	dissemination.	One	of	the	main	controversies	of	the	time,	Leary	explains,	was	the	use	of	the	term	“refugee”	to	refer	to	displaced	New	Orleanians,	“a	term	reserved	in	colloquial	American	English	for	displaced	people	from	the	global	South”	and	which	“carried	an	implicit	racial	meaning”	because	“[s]ince	most	were	African	Americans	in	an	historically	impoverished	region	of	the	United	States,	the	comparison	to	the	third-world	refugee	was	widely	regarded	as	a	slur”	(203).	Katrina,	with	its	flow	of	artemized	images	of	the	United	States	at	home	and	abroad,	represented	for	the	country	a	major	
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spectacular	crisis	and	lay	bare	the	many	and	constant	demarcational	framings	needed	to	maintain	the	First	World	imaginary:	“here,	the	word	[“refugee”]	emphasized	the	exclusion	of	Black	southerners	from	the	privileged,	self-reliant	“nation	of	futurity”	to	which	others,	safe	in	the	suburban	cul-de-sacs	and	coastal	cities,	belonged	without	controversy”	(Leary	204).	Refugees	were	supposed	to	be	located	somewhere	else,	underdeveloped	and	abroad.	Leary	further	observes	that			[t]hese	examples	might	suggest	to	a	skeptical	reader	that	“we”	in	the	United	States	are	not	so	different	from	“them”	in	Honduras,	Haiti,	or	any	other	“deprived	and	backward”	country	of	our	collective	national	fantasies.	New	Orleans,	after	all,	has	been	closer	to	Port-of-Prince	and	Havana	than	to	Washington,	D.C.	…	[and]	this	was	the	reason,	in	the	1960s	and	1970s,	why	radical	college	activists	of	color	claimed	the	label	of	“third-world	students”	and	why	the	Black	Power	Movement	located	itself	within	a	third-world	context	(205).		Katrina	was	followed	by	several	“crises	of	U.S.	firstworldness”	marked	by	a	rapidly	spreading	growth	and	accessibility	of	handheld	cameras,	including	the	Occupy	Wall	Street	movement	and	Black	Lives	Matter	movement,	which	highlighted	the	daily	ways	in	which	militarized	U.S.	police	turns	against	Americans,	so	that	its	own	citizens	are	too	the	victims	of	the	capitalist	imperialistic	military	apparatus,	thus	blocking	a	demarcational	defense	of	even	U.S.	First	Worldness	and	Third-World	
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victimization	under	a	military,	if	not	economic,	argument.74	Santiago	Álvarez,	however,	was	able	to	steal	this	kind	of	artemizing	images	decades	before	the	advent	of	smartphones	and	YouTube	and	precociously	put	them	in	a	format	that	appealed	to	the	sensuous	ideological	being.		Ultimately,	what	is	at	stake	in	this	discussion	is	the	(im)possibility	for	processes	of	appropriation	to	empty	derogatory	terms	not	just	of	sensuous	popular	reference	but,	just	as	importantly,	of	the	unconscious	history	that	hides	in	them.	As	Leary	argues,	the	inauguration	of	the	term	“Third	World”	in	the	context	of	socialist	decolonization	in	the	inter-war-period	posed	a	challenge	to	the	imaginative	geographies	of	backwardness	and	“cultural	belatedness”	that	preceded	it,	but	failed	to	erase	that	history,	obscuring	it	instead:		[l]ike	“development”	and	“underdevelopment,”	the	third	world’s	historical	specificity	as	a	progressive	political	project	tends	to	obscure	this	longer	history.	Indeed,	underdevelopment	and	other	terms	of	geographic	and	temporal	difference	in	widespread	use	–	“refugee,”	“third	world,”	and	“banana	republic”	–	inevitably	recapitulate	older	cultural	geographies	even	as	they	invent	new	forms	for	them	(203,	my	emphasis).		It	is	important	to	notice	that	Leary	observed	these	terms	as	narratives	of	difference.	One	must	add	to	that	observation	that	those	geographic	and	temporal	narratives	of	
																																																								74	The	disruption	of	the	First-World	location	of	the	military	consortiums	by	exposing	internal	U.S.	
solidarities	as	victims	of	the	same	military	force	as	foreign	peoples	also	helps	block	the	First	World’s	extremely	dangerous	shows	of	patriotism.		
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difference	are	marked	by	the	process	of	psychogeographic	stasis	I	have	described	in	this	study,	whereby	time	is	emptied	onto	space	and	locked	there	in	the	form	of	an	immediately	visible	international	palimpsest	of	politico-economic	stages.	The	term	“Banana	Republic,”	in	particular,	lands	notions	of	belated	time	onto	spatial	demarcation	as	well	and	climatic	determinism.	The	spectacular	tropicalizations	of	a	racialized,	pre-modern	geographic-specific	“Third	World”	has	a	long	history.	Leary	observed	how	human	geography	pioneer	Ellsworth	Huntington,	carried	out	a	“scientific”	study	of	the	poverty	of	the	tropics:	Dispensing	with	the	aestheticism	of	travel	writers	taken	by	the	tropics’	natural	beauty,	Huntington	interpreted	the	poverty	of	the	global	South	as	a	consequence,	not	of	its	racial	inferiority,	but	of	its	climate.	A	century	later,	David	Lande’s	best-selling	The	Wealth	and	Poverty	of	Nations:	Why	Some	Are	
So	Rich	and	Some	So	Poor	began	to	answer	its	subtitle’s	question	in	much	the	same	way.	Huntington	reframed	familiar	racist	claims	about	“indolence”	and	“industry”	as	scientific	consequences	of	climatic	factors	(45).			 The	tropicality	discourse	thus	emerges	as	a	pseudoscientific	reinscription	of	racial	determinism	upon	a	Eurocentric	world	grid.	It	is	therefore	not	possible	to	save	terms	like	“Third	World,”	“Banana	Republic”	and	notions	like	tropicality	from	their	racist	Eurocentric	spectacular	charged:	they	are	beyond	the	possibility	of	appropriation.	First-World-building	fantasy	notions	like	“gringo”	must	too	be	rejected	for	the	differential	oppositional	version	of	the	same	problems.	“Gringo’s”	
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flip	side	term	“yankee”	(in	Spanish)	mirrors	the	issues	of	its	counterpart	and	lies	at	the	center	of	the	discursive	problems	of	La	hora	de	los	hornos.	A	demarcational	critique	of	capitalist	spectacular	ideology	must	in	particular	reject	the	tropicalization	of	places	like	Latin	America	for	those	come	very	specifically	charged	in	the	shows	of	modernity:	as	Leary	and	others	have	observed,	they	relate	to	capitalist	worker	discipline	in	terms	of	First-World	industriousness	and	Third-World	racialized	“languidness	and	indolence.”		We	must	remember	that	the	spectacle	has	for	its	chief	purpose	the	colonization	of	social	relation	and	their	underlying	ideologies	in	order	to	discipline	subjects	for	work	and	spectacularly	punish	and	condemns	foreignized	tropical	laziness.			5.	Finally,	it	might	be	useful	to	add	a	brief	note	as	to	the	implications	of	a	
demarcational	critique	of	capitalist	and	postcolonial	ideology	for	an	epistemological	history	of	poverty.	As	Martin	Ravallion	observes	in	The	Economics	of	
Poverty:	History,	Measurement,	and	Policy,	premodern	notions	of	poverty	were	not	widely	considered	in	the	realm	of	the	secular	world,	and,	while	economic	justice	was	based	on	Aristotelean	ideas	of	meritocracy,	economic	inequalities	were	not	deemed	a	concern,	much	less	a	governmental	concern	(18).	Instead,	poverty	served	a	teleological	purpose	in	relation	to	religious	duty	and	the	practice	of	virtue,	whereby	“many	theologies	have	extolled	charity	as	a	personal	virtue	…	and	[l]ocal	religious	organizations	have	long	been	charged	with	this	beneficence	role”	(Ravallion	19).	Even	in	the	early	modern	era,	but	prior	to	the	late	eighteenth	century,	poverty	was	
	 329	
regarded	as	a	“social	good,”	a	necessary	part	of	a	country’s	economy	(Ravallion	19).	Mercantilism,	the	dominant	economic	theory	in	the	sixteenth	to	eighteenth	centuries,	was	deeply	involved	in	a	view	of	poverty	as	a	disciplinary	motivation	for	work	and	a	mechanism	to	control	wages	(Ravallion	19-23).	Distributive	justice,	with	its	accessory	problematization	of	poverty	as	a	“constraint	on	development”	rather	than	a	“precondition	for	it,”	and	the	responsibility	of	governments	and	policy	for	its	reduction,	is	a	modern-era	notion	(Ravallion	19-23).		While	the	advent	of	the	Industrial	Revolution	and	the	Enlightenment	ideas	of	“liberté,	egalité,	fraternité”	had	little	immediate	effect	on	perceptions	of	poverty	or	of	poverty	as	a	political	issue,	the	rejection	of	the	established	notion	of	poverty	as	a	politically	inevitable	necessary	evil	begin	to	be	rejected	during	the	second	half	of	the	eighteenth	century,	with	its	resulting	attribution	of	poverty	reduction	to	institutions	of	government	(Ravallion	40).	For	much	of	the	eighteenth	century,	debates	around	poverty	centered	on	issues	related	to	taxes	and	private	property	in	relation	to	policy,	with	some	positions	more	progressive	than	others	(Ravallion	40-45).	The	debate	on	England’s	Poor	Laws	intensified	in	the	early	nineteenth	century,	as	“[b]y	1818	the	required	tax	rate	(known	as	the	“poor	rate”)	rad	risen	to	six	times	its	level	in	the	mid-eighteenth	century”	(Ravallion	52).	The	“long-standing	model	of	poverty	as	being	caused	by	moral	failings	appears	to	have	receded	(though	it	was	never		to	vanish)”	by	the	early	twentieth	century	“in	favor	of	a	model	that	identified	shocks	and	impersonal	economic	forces	interacting	with	initial	inequalities	as	the	main	
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causes	of	poverty”	(Ravallion	73).	This	turning	point	in	popular	perceptions	of	poverty		was	informed	by	the	new	social	research	on	the	dimensions	and	causes	of	poverty,	helped	by	greater	public	exposure	to	that	research	through	the	mass	media,	now	reaching	a	more	literate	population.	There	were	still	efforts	made	to	alter	behavior,	but	they	were	directed	more	at	the	application	of	new	scientific	knowledge,	notably	in	curbing	disease”	(Ravallion	73).		The	1950s	witnessed	a	dramatic	change	in	both	perceptions	of	poverty	and	progress	to	reduce	it	globally.		Economic,	political	and	philosophical	thought	in	the	1960s	and	1970s	“saw	a	renewed	questioning	of	the	classical	utilitarian	paradigm	as	a	basis	of	public	action	against	poverty	and	inequality”	(Ravallion	80-82).	Susan	Buck-Morss	summarizes	thought	on	global	poverty	during	the	second	half	of	the	twentieth	century	until	today	in	what	can	be	broken	into	two	main	periods:	1- Stagist	Theory,	epitomized	by	Walt	Whitman	Rostow’s	1960	The	Stages	of	
Economic	Growth,	in	which	all	nation-states	were	expected	to	pass	through	five	stages	“as	they	advanced	toward	the	uncritically	accepted	goal	of	a	modern	national	economy”;	2- 	The	Dependency	Theory,	which	counters	stagism	by	postulating	that	the	poverty	of	peripheral	countries	was	not	due	to	their	isolation	and	disintegration	from	the	centers,	but	of	the	position	those	countries	occupy	within	full	integration	in	the	global	economic	system.	Thus,	thinkers	like	Raúl	Previsch,	Andre	Gunder	Frank,	Emmanuel	Wallerstein,	Fernando	Enrique	
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Cardozo,	Walter	Rodney,	and	Theotônio	dos	Santos,	will	propose	that	the	poverty	of	peripheral	nations	is	necessary	for,	and	the	origin	of,	the	wealth	of	central	nations,	which	have	built	their	prosperity	from	the	extraction	of	resources	from	the	peripheries.		Where	would	a	demarcational	view	of	world	inequality	(“the	worlds”)	fit	in	this	very	brief	epistemological	history	of	poverty?	In	short,	a	demarcational	perspective	would	inscribe	itself	within	dependency	theory	but	would	propose	to	destabilize	the	notions	of	center	and	periphery.	Where	dependency	theory	will	assert	that	rich	nations	at	the	center	need	nations	on	the	periphery	to	be	poor	upon	a	neocolonial	model	of	resource	“transfer,”	a	demarcational	view	would	propose	that	“center”	and	“periphery”	be	problematized	as	shifting,	unstable,	non-national,	and	spectacular.	The	above	history	could	be	summarized	very	roughly	in	this	way:		
• Pre-	/	Early-modern	teleological	thought:	poverty	is	not	a	policy	matter	but	a	necessary	misfortune	that	allows	societies	to	practice	religious	virtue;	
• Early-modern	mercantilistic	view:	poverty,	or	the	danger	thereof,	motivates	workers	and	keeps	wages	under	“control”;	
• Early	Industrial/Enlightenment	moralistic	perspective:	poverty	is	the	result	of	a	behavioral	failure	that	must	be	corrected;	
• Stagist	notion:	time	is	territorialized	on	land	and	nations	stand	at	various	stages	on	the	development	race:	some	are	ahead	of	others,	others	are	behind.	Nations	must	complete	these	stages	to	development	in	the	manner	of	a	vital	cycle;	
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• Dependency	theory:	the	wealth	of	central	nations	requires	the	poverty	of	peripheral	nations;	
• Demarcational	critique:	the	wealth	of	central	societies	requires	the	poverty	of	peripheral	nations,	but:	are	periphery	and	center	stably	and	specifically	where	they	are	said	to	be?	Could	center/periphery	be	non-national,	flowing,	fleeting,	shapeless,	ever-shifting?	Could	there	be	multiple	contradictory	centers	and	peripheries?	Could	the	dependency	status	of	one	society	(national	or	not)	register	a	pendular	intersectional	polyvalence	or	irreducible	paradoxical	tension?	Can	dependency	theory	speak	without	naming	a	single	nation-state	entity,	as	an	exercise	in	epistemological	meta-conscience?	Who	benefits	from	status-quo	simplistic	demarcations	of	center	and	periphery	stabilized	by	force	as	a	function	of	spectacular	media?	What	ideological	narratives	and	epistemological	orders	are	charged	onto	those	psychogeographies?	What	is	the	symbolic	or	imaginary	dimension	of	dependency	theory	in	the	era	of	the	spectacle	fully	assumed	and	self-perpetuating	as	somnambular	shows?	The	last	stage	in	this	epistemological	history	of	poverty,	that	of	demarcational	critique,	is	thus	not	entirely	a	new	stage	but	a	meta-reflective	twist	on	dependency	theory,	one	that	seeks	to	problematize	some	of	its	core	postulates.			
			
	 333	
					
	
GLOSSARY		
OF	THEORETICAL	TERMS	AND	CONCEPTS	
													
	 334	
The	following	glossary	lists	a	number	of	new	theoretical	terms	introduced	in	this	dissertation	in	support	of	a	proposed	“demarcational	critique	of	the	spectacle.”	Although	some	of	these	concepts,	such	as	those	of	“show”	and	“social	script,”	are	based	on	preexisting	notions,	they	will	appear	in	this	glossary	because	they	have	been	updated	or	adapted	significantly	enough	to	warrant	a	new	definition	in	the	context	of	this	study.	The	terms	included	in	this	glossary	will	be	defined	as	they	come	up	in	the	course	of	the	argumentation;	these	definitions	seek	to	provide	a	more	detailed	and	deliberate	explanation	of	the	concept	and	will	appear	in	bold	
italics	throughout	the	dissertation	to	remind	the	reader	of	this	section	in	case	of	doubt.			Three	concepts	are	included	in	this	glossary	that	are	not	a	novel	introduction	of	this	dissertation.	Those	are	the	concepts	of	“augmented	survival,”	“irreversible	time,”	and	“pseudo-cyclical	time,”	which	come	directly	from	Guy	Debord’s	theory	of	the	spectacle.	I	have	included	them	here	because	they	are	central	to	my	elaborations,	but	readers	might	want	to	check	on	them	as	they	come	up.	They	are	preceded	by	an	
*asterisk.							
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Anti-cyclonic	time:	Anti-cyclonic	time	refers	to	the	subversion	of	spectacular	time	and	describes	time	that	stands	after	the	end	of	history	as	irreversible	time	that	has	been	appropriated	by	all	people,	accelerated	to	its	end,	and	that	needs	to	worry	about	nothing	more	than	the	forces	of	nature.	The	term	“anti-cyclonic”	derives	from	Álvarez’s	special	newsreel	Ciclón,	and	attempts	to	capture	the	film’s	insight	into	a	post-revolutionary	Cuba	whereby	the	workers’	government,	having	emancipated	from	the	pseudo-cyclical	time	that	Debord	describes	as	characterizing	spectacular	society,	have	returned	to	the	authentic	referent	of	their	experience	of	time.	This	experience	stands	in	opposition	to	a	spectacular	experience	of	time	in	which	the	dominance	of	an	ever-expanding	flow	of	commodities	rests	on	the	equally	fast-growing	creation	of	pseudo-needs	that	justify	these	commodities,	while	the	disciplinary	forces	of	the	production	system	impose	false	cycles	of	life	built	around	the	repetitive	routines	of	work	and	consumption.	Anti-cyclonic	time	should	not	be	understood	in	the	“romantic”	terms	of	a	“return	to	nature”	but	more	simply	as	the	re-capture	of	the	pre-modern	experience	of	laborers’	time,	now	universalized.	During	ancient	times,	cyclic	time	was	the	static	time	of	the	workers,	while	land	masters	were	protagonists	of	the	irreversible	time	of	history	through	their	conquests	and	battles.	If	now	is	the	time	for	the	apprehension	of	history,	i.e.,	for	the	irruption	into	protagonism	of	all	the	people	in	irreversible	time	so	as	to	accelerate	it	to	its	completion	and	to	the	fulfillment	of	history,	what	follows	is	an	experience	of	time	that,	having	realized	the	goal	of	the	revolution,	needs	no	longer	worry	about	
irreversible	time	and,	having	overcome	spectacular	domination	of	time,	need	no	
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longer	worry	about	augmented	survival	and	the	satisfaction	of	the	excesses	of	pseudo-needs.	Thus,	the	only	referent	to	the	cycles	of	time	would	be	the	authentic	demands	of	the	cycles	of	nature	by	all	and	for	all.		
	
Actaeonic	eye:	The	gaze	that	artemizes	“foreign”	spaces	(see	Artemization).			
Artemization:	The	dynamics	of	spectacular	power	whereby	one	term	in	an	imaginary	binary	is	forced	to	pose	in	a	shameful	situation	without	the	possibility	of	framing	itself.	The	pathetization	of	geographical	spaces	by	way	of	denying	the	object	of	gaze	the	possibility	of	self-framing	is	central	to	the	construction	of	the	show	of	
worlds	for	it	allows	the	term	in	control	of	the	camera	to	project	its	undesired	traits	on	the	Other	in	a	situation	of	unequal	gaze	dynamics.				
	
Atalaya:	Spanish	for	“watch	tower.”	The	concept	of	atalaya	refers	to	the	degree	to	which	an	inter-worlds	narrator	maintains	narratives	of	difference:	does	the	narrator	observe	underdevelopment	from	a	watch	tower	elevated	far	above	the	problems	it	presents,	as	a	closed	capsule	that	penetrates	the	other	world	as	a	complete	Other,	without	recognizing	itself	in	it,	and	without	conceding	any	degree	of	
sameness	with	regards	to	that	underdevelopment?	A	filmmaker	from	the	“First	World”	penetrating	the	“Third	World,”	for	instance,	can	thus	be	said	to	maintain	a	“sealed	atalaya”	when	he	or	she	registers	the	underdevelopment	of	the	alleged	“Third	World”	as	if	that	reality	were	in	no	way	part	of	the	filmmaker’s	world	but	a	
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fully	external	condition,	simply	witnessed,	with	disdain	or	compassion.	A	sealed	
atalaya	characterizes	a	highly	Actaeonic	narrative	eye,	for	it	forces	the	other	to	pose	in	disgrace	for	an	audience	that	wishes	to	watch	but	is	unwilling	to	recognize	itself	in	that	disgrace.	Aside	from	any	weaknesses	one	might	wish	to	identify	in	his	work,	Patrick	Leary’s	A	Cultural	History	of	Underdevelopment	is	an	example	of	a	non-fictional	atalaya	that	appears	to	shatter	as	he	recognizes	the	continuum	of	underdevelopment	into	the	United	States	:	the	glass	that	encapsulates	an	observer	and	maintains	his	or	her	difference	from	the	object	of	gaze	is	broken	and	the	realities	watched	invade	the	observer’s	world.	The	measure	of	a	narrative	atalaya’s	impermeability,	from	sealed	to	shattered,	is	then	a	key	indicator	of	the	force	of	the	
Actaeonic	eye	for	a	particular	text.		
	
	*Augmented	survival	(from	Guy	Debord’s	Theory	of	the	Spectacle):	Augmented	survival	refers	to	the	form	of	existence	characteristic	of	capitalism,	in	which	the	commodity	economy	creates	pseudo-needs	for	products	that	supplant	genuine,	biological	and	authentically	social	needs.	The	drive	for	the	satisfaction	of	these	invented	needs	constitutes	an	“augmented	survival	in	which	daily	lived	experience	embodies	no	free	choices	and	is	subject,	no	longer	to	the	natural	order,	but	to	a	pseudo-nature	constructed	by	means	of	alienated	labor”	(Debord	110-111).	The	understanding	of	authenticity	that	sustains	Debord’s	theory	of	the	spectacle	is	rooted	in	the	degeneration	of	needs	and	their	relation	to	value.	Debord	points	out	that	pre-spectacular	“economic	necessity	…	was	the	unchanging	basis	of	earlier	
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societies”	(33).	By	authentic	economic	necessity	he	refers	to	primary	needs,	which	are	now	“met	in	a	most	summary	manner”	and	are	replaced	by	a	“ceaseless	manufacture	of	pseudo-needs”	all	of	which	derive	from	the	single	factor	that	is	the	drive	of	an	unrestrained	autonomous	economy	to	develop	endlessly	and	exponentially.		
	
Consortiums:	see	Solidarities	(and	consortiums).		
Demarcational	criticism:	Defined	in	the	most	succinct	terms,	demarcational	criticism	is	a	methodological	practice	that,	in	the	context	of	the	postcolonial	discourses,	refuses	to	take	for	granted	the	geographical	distributions	of	neoempire	and	neocolony,	development	and	underdevelopment,	First	and	Third	Worlds.	As	a	test	of	stability	of	assumed	demarcations,	demarcational	criticism	does	not	seek	to	resolve	the	question	of	conceptual	and	territorial	boundaries,	but	rather	to	counter	the	unproblematized	acceptance	of	one	demarcational	status	quo	as	natural	and	absolute,	rather	drawing	attention	to	the	arbitrariness	of	demarcations	and	the	effect	of	one	or	another	demarcational	setting	on	the	possibilities	of	knowledge.	In	this	sense,	demarcational	criticism	proposes	that	epistemological	categories	and	permitted	departments	and	territorial	demarcations	constitute	mutual	reflections,	as	a	circular	system	where	conceptual	imaginaries	and	their	geographized	projections	reinforce	and	condition	each	other.	The	focus	of	demarcational	criticism	is	thus	on	how	and	where	demarcations	are	established	as	a	necessary	inquiry	
	 339	
before	any	relevant	analysis	takes	place.	Furthermore,	demarcational	criticism	seeks	to	offer	alternative	demarcations	(“de-marcations”)	that	oppose	conventional	departamentalizations	and	distributions	as	a	matter	of	method.		Evident	in	the	construction	of	revolutionary	meaning	in	Santiago	Álvarez’s	Now	with	particular	force	and	clarity,	demarcational	criticism	is	however	not	constrained	to	postcolonial	studies.	In	the	field	of	gender	studies,	it	would	challenge	the	stability	of	gender	boundaries,	seeking	instead	an	analysis	through	varying	forms	of	fluid	gender	and	transversal	notions	of	gender;	in	the	field	of	race	studies,	it	would	question	the	hegemony	of	racial	boundaries	and	the	stability	of	the	entire	racial	identification	system,	methodically	running	against	established	demarcations	as	a	prerequisite	for	analysis,	as	well	as	observing	to	what	degrees	specific	analyses	presume	or	subvert	established	demarcations.	As	such,	demarcational	criticism	is	an	analytic	method	as	well	one	of	textual	analysis.	As	a	method	of	textual	analysis,	demarcational	criticism	focuses	on	the	underlying	system	of	assumed	or	challenged	demarcations	at	the	foundation	of	texts	understood	in	the	widest	sense.	Because	demarcations	create	the	illusion	of	differences,	demarcational	criticism	could	also	be	defined	as	the	methodological	questioning	of	difference.		Demarcational	criticism	does	not	attempt	to	impose	an	alternative	demarcation	but	rather	to	institute	permanent	awareness	of	the	relative	and	arbitrary	nature	of	demarcational	systems.	Because	it	understands	physical	demarcations	as	the	embodiment	(territorialization	or	geographization)	of	epistemological	categories	and	vice	versa,	it	is	a	form	of	meta-epistemological	conscience	that	operates	as	the	
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methodological	distrust	of	distributive	assumptions	(dogmatic	understandings	of	“what	belongs	where”	or	how	location	of	a	psychogeographic	grid	determines	perceived	nature	or	condition).	As	it	highlights	the	transposition	of	conceptual	imaginaries	to	territory,	it	seeks	to	expose	the	political	charges	inserted	in	received	demarcational	matrixes,	and	intends	to	visualize	the	realities,	or	aspects	thereof,	that	may	be	hidden	or	silenced	under	any	one	demarcational	arrangement.		Demarcational	criticism	operates	on	the	premise	that	systems	of	meaning	are	fluid	and	continuous	and	only	artificially	stabilized,	and	that	any	attempts	to	stabilize	a	fluid	system	involves	an	act	of	political	violence.	Therefore,	political	interest	can	be	assumed	in	any	stabilizing	intervention	on	systems	of	meaning,	and	ideologies	can	be	understood	to	rely	on	forcefully	paralyzed	systems	of	meaning	that	allow	the	articulation	of	certain	thoughts	but	not	others.		In	the	specific	field	of	postcolonial	studies,	demarcational	criticism	would	refuse	to	engage	in	analysis	or	practice	where	the	territorial-epistemological	locations	of	center	and	periphery	are	deemed	as	an	assumed	given,	and	ponders	questions	such	as:	Where	are	the	center	and	the	periphery?	What	are	some	alternative	locations	that	are	not	stable,	i.e.,	fluid	and	non-national?	What	are	the	analytical	advantages	and	disadvantages	of	one	demarcation	of	Worlds	versus	another?	What	interests	could	inadvertently	benefit	from	one	demarcation	or	another?	Is	it	possible	to	construct	a	“dislodged	form	of	postcolonial	discourse	that	constantly	shifts	from	one	demarcational	possibility	to	another?	Is	it	possible	that	a	postcolonial	analysis	or	action	that	rests	uncritically	on	the	conventionally	understood	geographical	
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distributions	of	First	and	Third	World	might	end	up	reinforcing	or	validating	the	condition	it	is	trying	to	counter	or	denounce?	How	can	an	analysis	be	constructed	that	understands	First	and	Third	Worlds	as	dialectical	tensions	rather	than	mutually	exclusive	demarcations?		
	
Denunciative	fallacy:	A	claim	that	seems	to	merely	denounce	a	problem	that	precedes	it	but	ends	up	participating	in	the	creation	or	manipulation	of	that	problem.	In	the	context	of	inter-worlds	imagination,	a	common	denunciative	fallacy	consists	in	denouncing	the	injustice	of	Latin	American	underdevelopment	by	“First	World”	narrators:	while	this	denouncement	does	indeed	register	a	condition	that	precedes	it,	it	also	contributes	to	the	invention	of	this	underdevelopment	as	a	geographically	stable	reality	that	exists	outside	the	imagined	First	World.	Denunciative	fallacies	afford	observers	such	as	El	Norte’s	director	Gregory	Nava	a	compassionate	attitude	towards	“Third	World	underdevelopment”	while	contributing	to	the	mechanics	of	anxious	projection	of	that	underdevelopment	by	the	United	States	as	described	by	Patrick	Leary.			
Dispersive	spectacle:	see	Primary	show.	
	
Ethno-themed	texts:	A	collective	term	to	describe	fictional	and	documentary	texts	that	contain	ethnographic	observations	not	made	by	professional	ethnographers.	The	notion	of	ethno-themed	texts	attempts	to	capture	the	fact	that	texts	by	inter-
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worlds	travelers	(writers,	filmmakers,	tourists)	who	are	not	trained	ethnographers	may	still	seek	to	communicate	an	ethnographic	experience	or	argument	and	can	be	thusly	received	by	audiences.	Ethno-themed	texts	may	originate	in	a	concrete	experience	by	the	author,	such	as	Santiago	Álvarez’s	Greyhound	bus	incident	that	engendered	Now,	or	in	a	more	conceptual	consideration	of	political	matters,	such	as	Nava’s	claim	that	the	U.S.-Mexico	border,	where	he	grew	up,	is	“the	only	place	in	the	world	where	an	industrialized	first-world	nation	shares	the	border	with	a	third-world	country.”	Among	the	different	kinds	of	ethno-themed	texts,	this	dissertation	makes	the	following	distinction:			
• Folk-ethnography:	“a	form	of	people	watching	that	allows	individuals	informally	to	gather	evidence	in	social	interactions	that	supports	their	own	viewpoints	or	transforms	their	common-sense	understanding	of	social	life	(Anderson,	Elijah,	cited	in	Harrison	4).	
• Pop	ethnography:	While	“folk	ethnography”	concerns	the	first-hand	experience	whereby	“racially,	ethnically	and	socially	diverse	peoples	spend	casual	and	purposeful	time	together,	coming	to	know	one	another”	(Anderson	xv),	“pop	ethnography”	refers	to	ethnographic	knowledge	or	imaginations	extracted,	consciously	or	not,	from	non-academic	texts,	from	Hollywood	film	to	activist	documentaries.		
• Ethno-journalism:	news	reports	in	the	press	that	contain	an	ethnographic	dimension;	
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Ethno-journalism:	see	Ethno-themed	texts.	
	
Folk	ethnography:	see	Ethno-themed	texts.	
	
Framing-motion	détournement:	A	specific	form	of	détournement	which	appropriates	materials	in	their	multiple	partialities.	A	technique	central	to	Álvarez’s	
Now,	but	also	present	in	his	other	films,	notably	LBJ	(1968),	framing	motion	is	executed	by	means	of	a	nervous	camera75	that	captures	shifting	partialities	of	an	appropriated	piece,	moving	quickly	from	one	partiality	to	another,	or	from	a	partially	to	the	sudden	revelation	of	a	key	detail	left	out	of	the	previous	frame	range	or	to	the	whole	piece.	In	his	comparative	study	of	Esfir	Shub’s	and	Álvarez’s	works,	Malitsky	refers	to	this	creation	of	internal	motion	in	a	still	image	and	its	techniques	in	LBJ	as	an	animation	of	the	photographs	“by	panning,	tilting,	and	zooming	in	and	out”	(27).			This	technique	proposes	a	meta-reflection	on	artifice	of	totality	and	demarcation.	This	meta-reflection	assumes	that	the	flow	of	spectacular	images	does	not	necessarily	follow	a	natural	or	immanent	order	and	that	a	sense	of	order	is	deliberately	instituted	in	the	spectacle	by	decisions	in	terms	of	both	the	sequencing	
																																																								75	Álvarez	himself	calls	it	“nervous	editing”	(Chanan	19),	a	style	of	montage	which	D’Argenio	compares	to	the	techniques	of	advertising,	which	she	claims	Álvarez	borrows.	She	defines	this	form	of	montage	as	“the	fast	editing	of	images	consecutively	appearing	on	the	screen”(137).		
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of	pieces	and	what	pieces	are	left	in	and	out	of	frame.	In	this	sense,	the	mass	of	images	that	constitutes	the	spectacle	is	originally	shapelessly	fluid	and	fragmentary:	one	of	the	functions	of	the	spectacle	is	to	construct	arbitrary	meanings	by	purposefully	framing	partialities	as	natural	wholes,	or	by	filling	in	gaps	and	silences	to	construct	the	fiction	of	fluency,	continuity	and	sequence.	By	nervously	shifting	from	one	partial	framing	to	another,	framing	motion	draws	attention	to	these	processes	by	exposing	the	many	possible	partialities	that	can	be	extracted	from	an	image	(such	as	the	camera	shifting	quickly	from	one	portion	of	the	Life	magazine	cover	to	another	before	showing	the	full	cover	in	Now).	Thus,	the	technique	effectively	exposes	the	mode	of	enunciation	as	the	function	of	the	camera	in	creating	competing	demarcations	out	of	arbitrary	ranges	and	portions	of	a	mass	of	image.	As	a	technique	of	détournement,	motion	framing	intervenes	the	apparent	stable	boundaries	of	spectacular	images	(still	photos)	and	inserts	movement	in	the	form	of	the	infinite	re-significations	that	that	image	would	allow	by	simply	altering	the	frame	range	to	include	or	hide	elements.	Thus,	images	are	not	only	détoured	by	their	appropriation	into	a	new	milieu,	but	also	by	their	decomposition	into	the	infinite	possible	framing	demarcations	potentially	contained	in	them,	which	amounts	to	the	
détournement	not	just	the	image	out	of	its	original	environment	but	also	to	the	internal	détournement	of	the	image’s	hidden	alternative	partialities/totalities	out	of	the	stable	frame	initially	proposed.	In	this	sense,	framing	motion	is	a	key	method	of	demarcational	critique	inasmuch	as	it	disputes	the	naturalness	and	stability	of	assumed	demarcations	and	proposes	the	consideration	of	alterative	demarcations.	
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As	a	critical	demarcational	tool,	it	combines	the	operations	of	détournement	(appropriation	and	re-purposing)	and	deviance	or	dérive	(psychogeographical	play).				
Geographic	stasis:	Geographic	stasis	describes	the	claim	that	certain	realities,	such	as	poverty	or	development,	can	be	assigned	to	fixed	geographical	demarcations,	such	as	“Latin	America,”	“Haiti,”	or	“southern	Buenos	Aires,”	instead	of	regarding	these	realities	as	multi-national,	uneven	and	shifting	in	time.	Thus,	geographic	stasis	refers	to	the	understanding	of	fluid	and	non-national	conditions	such	as	modernity	and	underdevelopment	as	categories	that	can	be	anchored	in	stable	territorial	or	nation-state	demarcations.	An	example	of	geographic	stasis	is	the	claim	that	the	United	States,	simply	and	as	a	whole,	constitutes	a	“developed	country,”	a	view	that	hides	internal	inequalities	in	the	country.	In	this	sense,	“stasis”	describes	an	arrest	or	stoppage	of	realities,	such	as	underdevelopment,	which	are	naturally	in	motion	and	run	across	borders	so	that	these	forces	are	artificially	stabilized	and	presented	as	fixed	in	a	geographic	demarcation.		One	additional	complication	of	geographic	stasis	is	that	the	conditions	fixed	on	geographical	categories	are	also	attached	to	notions	of	time	as	a	line	of	progress.	Thus,	a	certain	country	is	understood	to	be	underdeveloped	and,	as	such,	claimed	to	be	“backwards”	with	regards	to	other	countries,	as	if	that	country	were	necessarily	to	move	“forward”	through	stages	to	“catch	up”	with	developed	nations.	As	a	result	of	this,	geographical	categories	do	not	only	become	the	territorialization	of	conditions	that	are	not	necessarily	and	always	national	(“underdevelopment	is	
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evenly	in	this	country”)	but	they	also	become	a	moment	in	history:	“this	country	is	evenly	underdeveloped	and	is	therefore	in	the	past	with	regards	to	this	other	modern	nation,”	or	“underdevelopment	is	the	past	and	that	underdevelopment	of	the	past	is	evenly	located	in	this	country.”		Because	categories	such	as	modernity	and	development	are	also	understood	as	stages	in	the	fictional	line	of	progress,	geographical	stasis	thus	describes	the	process	by	which	the	history	of	underdevelopment	is	extrapolated	as	the	geography	of	underdevelopment,	as	all	stages	on	the	timeline	of	development	appear	simultaneously	in	different	assigned	geographical	demarcations:	we	can	look	over	a	map	and	see	“the	future	in	modern	U.S.A.	and	we	can	travel	to	the	past	in	Central	America,	which	is	still	lagging.”	The	largest-scale	geographical	demarcation	is	that	between	First	and	Third	World.	In	this	sense,	geographical	stasis	describes	a	fundamental	mechanism	of	the	territorial	grounding	of	epistemological	categories,	that	is:	rigid	epistemological	categories,	such	as	“advanced,”	“poor,”	and	“modern,”	which	are	constructed,	reinforced	and	naturalized	by	their	projection	onto	physical	territory	and	its	demarcations.	When	geographic	stasis	carries	with	it	the	epistemological	forms	of	time,	as	is	the	case	with	stagist	models,	it	executes	a	transfer	of	time	onto	space	that	empties	the	former	by	locking	it	into	the	latter:	time	is,	at	least	partially,	understood	as	space:	“the	past	is	in	Africa,”	“the	future	is	in	North	America.”	In	this	respect,	geographic	stasis	could	well	be	referred	to	as	“tempogeographical	stasis.”		
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Geographization:	(and	territorialization):	The	projection	of	epistemological	categories,	including	those	of	time,	by	means	spatial	allusion	and	geographical	metaphors.	Often,	epistemological	categories,	including	those	of	time,	are	constructed	by	means	of	spatial	metaphors:	a	“field	of	study,”	“an	area	of	study,”	“time	running	on	a	line,”	or	“moving	in	time.”	“Field,”	“area,’	“run	on	a	line,”	and	“move,”	are	primarily	descriptors	of	space	and	motion	of	space.	The	related	concepts	of	geographization	and	territorialization	describe	this	habit	of	organizing	knowledge	by	means	of	metaphors	of	space	and	motion	on	space.	Territorialization	refers	to	this	practice	in	general	terms:	any	epistemological	order	that	supports	itself	through	metaphors	of	space	and	motion	in	general	(“area	of	studies,”	“fields	of	specialization,”	“forking	of	ways	in	thought,”	etc.).	In	the	specific	cases	in	which	the	metaphors	of	space	upon	which	an	epistemological	order	supports	itself	are	geographic	categories	(names	of	countries	and	continents	following	nation-state	lines),	I	call	this	territorialization	“geographization.”	Processes	of	geographization	thus	lie	at	the	foundation	of	geopolitical	discourses.				
Historicized	détournement:	“Historicized	détournement”	refers	to	a	technique	of	
détournement	that	exposes	previous	appropriations	incorporated	historically	into	the	piece	now	being	appropriated.	Unlike	restitutional	détournement,	historicized	
détournement	does	not	seek	to	restitute	an	appropriated	piece	to	an	alleged	original	and	superior	significance.	Quite	on	the	contrary,	historicized	détournement	seeks	to	emphasize	a	previous	stage	of	détournement	already	forming	part	of	the	material	
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being	detoured.	It	thus	consists	of	the	intentional	decomposition	of	material	into	its	historical	intertextualities	and	the	exposure	of	this	intertextual	history	as	part	of	the	
force	of	the	current	act	of	détournement.	This	is	the	case	of	Álvarez’s	appropriation	of	Horne’s	Now,	which	in	turn	had	appropriated	Hava	Nagila,	and	which	the	Cuban	director’s	film	exposes	by	means	of	a	cold	opening.				
	
Imaginary	First	and	Third	Worlds:	This	dissertation	will	claim	that	the	conditions	associated	with	the	“First	World”	and	the	“Third	World”	as	cultural	categories,	such	as	“modernity”	and	“underdevelopment,”	are	not	evenly	located	in	the	countries	and	continents	with	which	those	two	“worlds”	are	often	associated.	Calling	these	two	terms	“imaginary”	is	a	way	of	recognizing	the	widespread	use	of	the	terms	while	making	it	clear	that	those	“worlds”	are	a	construction	and	the	product	of	
geographization		Thus,	the	characterization	of	“First”	or	“Third”	worlds	as	“imagined”	constitutes	an	attempt	to	simultaneously	recognize	the	frequent	occurrence	of	those	categories	in	cultural	and	political	studies	while	destabilizing	or	negating	the	categories	in	their	uncritical	assumption	of	a	stable,	geographical	location	of	development	and	underdevelopment.	Calling	the	“First”	and	Third”	worlds	“imaginary”	is	thus	no	different	than	putting	quotation	marks	around	them	to	express	my	skepticism	about	them.	My	choice	of	calling	those	“worlds”	“imagined”	at	certain	times,	instead	of	using	quotation	marks,	seeks	to	emphasize,	at	that	particular	moment,	the	way	in	which	one	world	imagines	the	other	is	deeply	influenced	by	the	capitalist	spectacle.		
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Imaginary	First	World	see	Imaginary	First	and	Third	Worlds.	
	
Imaginary	Third	World	see	Imaginary	First	and	Third	Worlds.	
	
Inter-worlds	text:	Any	text,	fictional	or	documentary,	visual,	written	or	oral,	with	or	without	ethnographic	intent,	in	which	the	so-called	First	World	imagines,	remembers,	(re-)stages,	“represents,”	or	“documents”	the	so-called	Third	World	and	vice	versa.	The	focus	and	object	of	this	dissertation,	and	its	proposed	demarcational	critique,	centers	on	the	ways	in	which	the	so-called	“underdeveloped	Third	World”	imagines	the	so-called	“developed	First	World”	and	vice	versa,	as	well	as	the	construction,	function,	implications,	power	dynamics	and	subversion	of	this	mutual	process	of	imagination.		
	
*Irreversible	time	(from	Guy	Debord’s	Theory	of	the	Spectacle):	The	two	related	concepts	of	irreversible	time	and	pseudo-cyclical	time	refer	to	experiences	of	time	through	social	classes	before	and	after	the	advent	of	capitalism	and	the	implications	of	these	experiences	for	the	possibility	of	appropriation	of	historical	time.	Prior	to	the	rise	of	the	capitalist	form	of	production,	peasants	lived	in	a	form	of	cyclical	time	that	remained	anchored	to	the	land	and	followed	the	yearly	agricultural	cycles	of	weather	and	nature.	This	cyclical	experience	of	time,	albeit	relatively	authentic	when	compared	to	that	of	a	spectacular	capitalist	society,	afforded	them	no	
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possibility	for	historical	protagonism.	Their	labor,	however,	produced	for	the	masters	a	surplus	of	historical	time	that	afforded	them	the	freedom	to	embark	on	battles	of	conquest,	expanding	kingdoms	(or	losing	them),	in	other	words,	making	irreversible	history,	i.e.,	history	that	produced	permanent	changes	and	gains	independently	from	the	ever-repeating	cycles	of	agricultural	labor.	Pseudo-cyclical	time	is	the	capitalist	spectacular	update	of	cyclical	time,	whereby	the	ancient	cycles	of	nature	in	relation	to	labor	are	refurbished	by	cycles	detached	from	authentic	needs	and	instead	tied	to	the	pseudo-need	of	commodity	placement	in	the	form	of	recurring	holidays,	sports,	television	and	clothing	seasons,	work	shifts,	etc.	I	propose	that	one	idea	that	underlies	anti-capitalist	revolutionary	projects,	including	that	of	Cuba,	is	that	of	anti-cyclonic	time,	defined	as	an	experience	of	time	that	needs	to	worry	about	nothing	more	than	the	forces	of	nature	for	irreversible	time	has	been	accelerated	to	its	end	and	needs	must	be	re-attached	to	the	authentic	needs	of	all,	as	exemplified	in	the	“Ten	million	sugar	harvest”	newsreel	discussed	in	chapter	2.		
	
Performance	(spectacular	performance):	Shows,	both	primary	and	dispersive,	constitute	social	performances	that	serve	the	mandate	of	the	spectacle.	As	a	matter	of	fact,	one	can	summarize	the	distinction	between	spectacle	and	show	in	that	the	show	is	a	concrete	performance	of	the	spectacle.	We	will	understand	that	performance	“entails	the	presentation	or	‘reactualization’	of	symbolic	systems	through	both	living	and	mediated	bodies”	and	is	pervasive	“as	a	central	element	of	
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social	and	cultural	life,	including	…	sacred	rituals	and	practices	of	everyday	life,	…	popular	entertainments,	microconstructions	of	ethnicity,	race,	class,	sex,	and	gender,	world	fairs	and	heritage	festivals,	nonverbal	communication,	play	and	sports	…	-potentially	any	instance	of	expressive	behavior	or	cultural	enactment”	(McKenzie	1).	While	all	shows	are	performances,	not	all	performances	are	necessarily	shows	in	the	narrow	sense	utilized	in	this	study,	but	one	can	choose	to	refer	to	shows	as	performances	in	order	to	highlight	their	performative	dimension,	that	is,	the	degree	to	which	the	spectacle	influences	and	scripts	everyday	social	performances	and	rituals.		
	
Pop	ethnography:	see	Ethno-themed	texts.	
	
Preemptive	restitution:	A	preemptive	restitution	designates	a	particular	case	of	restitution	whereby	a	warning	is	issued	that	a	certain	material	is	known	to	be	commonly	appropriated	against	an	oppressed	class.	Such	is	the	case	when	Lena	Horne	calls	in	her	song	Now!	for	everyone	to	love	their	brother,	but	“[j]ust	don’t	take	it	literal,	mister	/	No	one	wants	to	grab	your	sister,”	in	clear	allusion	to	the	fear	of	black	men	abusing	white	women.		
	
Primary	show:	A	“primary	show”	is	a	spectacular	performance	that	takes	place	in	
the	media.	It	refers	to	representations	of	social	relations	on	primary	media,	such	as	television	or	advertisement,	that	seek	to	place	a	commodity	as	indispensable	for	the	
	 352	
imitation	of	those	social	relations	by	spectators.	For	instance,	a	film	or	poster	photo	might	show	friends	socializing	over	a	cup	of	coffee	of	a	certain	brand:	this	is	a	primary	show	that	installs	the	commodity	of	a	certain	brand	of	coffee	as	an	indispensable	component	of	interactions	with	friends.	Social	relations,	such	as	friendship	in	this	case,	are	thus	mediated	by	images	(television	and	advertise)	and	commodities	(this	brand	of	coffee)	in	the	way	described	by	Debord.				The	way	in	which	that	primary	show	seeks	to	install	the	product	is	thus	by	inviting	spectators	to	imitate	it.	These	imitations	are	“secondary	shows.”	The	primary	show	is	a	performance	that	seeks	to	spread	beyond	screens	and	billboards	to	be	assumed	and	imitated	by	spectators	in	order	to	replace	their	pre-spectacular	social	interactions	with	social	scripts	that	discipline	their	behavior	as	workers	and	consumers	and	justifies	production.	The	notion	of	a	“primary	show”	stands	in	opposition	to	the	“dispersive	spectacle,”	defined	as	the	adopted	“off-screen”	imitative	reproduction	of	primary	shows	by	spectators	in	society	beyond	its	media	input.	The	spectacle	thus	begins	with	a	primary	show	and	disperses	as	secondary	shows	carried	out	by	spectacular	audiences.		
	
*Pseudo-cyclical	time	(from	Guy	Debord’s	Theory	of	the	Spectacle):	see	
Irreversible	time.		
	
Restitutional	détournement:	The	re-appropriation	of	material	under	the	claim	that,	in	its	original	context,	it	served	more	equitable	or	humane	goals	than	those	
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from	which	it	is	détoured	now.	This	would	be	the	case	of	quotes,	or	legal	or	religious	texts	that	have	been	re-purposed	to	justify	oppression.	If	a	text	has	been	“stolen”	and	re-contextualized	to	justify	abuse,	a	restitutional	détournement	“steals	it	back”	in	order	to	restitute	its	alleged	original	intent.	This	is	the	case	in	Lena	Horne’s	song	
Now!,	when	she	calls	for	the	quoted	words	of	Washington,	Lincoln,	and	Jefferson	to	be	restituted	to	the	sense	of	action	and	praxis	Horne	will	claim	their	authors	intended	them	to	have.		
	
Secondary	show:	see	Primary	show.		
	
Self-deprecatory	fallacy:	The	act	of	“critically’	ascribing	to	oneself	certain	traits	as	negative	when	one	knows	that	those	traits	are	ultimately	well-regarded	defects	against	a	certain	value	system.	This	practice	is	deeply	connected	to	that	of	
denunciative	fallacy	in	that	it	masks	the	fact	that	a	denunciation	of	an	issue	that	fails	to	remain	critical	about	its	geographic	assumptions	(“underdevelopment	is	in	this	continent”)	helps	to	construct	the	issue.	The	term	“gringo”	constitutes	an	example	of	a	self-deprecatory	fallacy.	U.S.	activist	texts	may	use	it	in	a	self-critical	tone	that	sounds	as	though	the	term	denounces	the	United	States’	abusive	relationship	against	Latin	America	standing	in	a	position	of	inferiority.	However,	the	term	still	retains	a	sense	of	superiority	based	on	the	fact	that	the	traits	associated	with	“gringo,”	such	as	futuristic	modernity,	power	and	strength,	wealth,	and	development,	are	positively	marked	with	regards	to	the	reigning	principles	of	the	
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capitalist	spectacle	with	such	force	that	the	appropriation	of	the	term	becomes	problematic	if	not	impossible	even	for	those	explicitly	opposing	the	values	of	the	system.		
	
Sensuous	ideological	being:	The	notion	of	“sensuous	ideological	being”	simply	emphasizes	the	fact	that	spectacular	capitalist	workers,	as	political	subjects,	respond	more	readily	to	ideological	input	by	way	of	emotion	than	by	way	of	reason.	The	shaping	of	ideology	through	emotional	aesthetics	constitutes	the	foundational	principle	of	the	spectacle.	The	highly	pedagogical,	encyclopedically	“reasoned”	tone	of	La	hora	de	los	hornos	lacks	this	visceral	element.	In	Now,	Santiago	Álvarez	is	able	to	counter	the	spectacle	in	its	own	emotional	language	with	a	music	video	of	high	pop	appeal,	a	style	that	would	soon	become	one	of	the	trademarks	of	the	spectacle.		As	Buck-Morss	observes,	“despite	Hegel’s	assertion	to	the	contrary,	reason	is	not	the	victor	in	history.”	Žižek	warns	us	in	The	Pervert’s	Guide	to	Ideology76	that	“we	enjoy	our	ideology”	and	speaks	of	the	comfort,	not	pain,	of	the	ideological	lens:	if	anything,	what	is	painful	is	to	abandon	it,	something	spectacularized	masses	can	hardly	be	guided	into	doing	by	reason,	for	the	ideology	of	the	capitalist	spectacle	is	aesthetically	and	emotionally	attractive.		
	
																																																								76	Directed	by	Sophie	Fiennes.		
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Show	(versus	Spectacle):	A	show	is	a	concrete	instance	of	the	spectacle,	a	derivative	(not	opposing)	concept	of	Debord’s	spectacle	that	exposes	the	performative	obedience	that	characterizes	the	spread	of	spectacular	domination	over	society.	If	the	spectacle	requires	spectators,	the	show	requires	actors.	As	concrete	re-enactments	of	the	spectacle,	shows	include	concrete	instances	of	social	interaction	as	diverse	as	family	relations,	sports,	bureaucracy,	religion,	food	consumption,	tourism,	and	nationality	and	development/civilization,	as	well	as	actualizations	of	social	and	government	institutions	as	varied	as	education	and	marriage.	The	show	is:		
• Spectacular:	shows	originate	in,	and	respond	to,	the	language	of	the	spectacle,	which	in	turn	“is	composed	of	signs	of	the	dominant	organization	of	production	–	signs	which	are	at	the	same	time	the	ultimate	end-products	of	that	organization”	(Debord,	Spectacle	13,	his	emphasis).	As	the	spectacle	colonizes	both	work	and	free	time	(or,	rather,	work	and	free	time	activities	become	shows),	shows	replicate	the	forms	of	production	while	at	the	same	time	standing	as	their	goal:	shows	lie	at	both	the	origin	and	the	end	of	the	economic	mode;		
• Somnambular:	shows	are	the	strangely	active	condition	of	passivity.	The	spectacle	is	contemplation	that	puts	spectators	to	sleep	and	then	gets	them	to	sleepwalk	in	shows;		
• Assumed:	shows	are	the	adopted	re-enactment	of	the	spectacle	so	that	the	spectacle	has	now	put	its	spectators	to	work	for	it;	
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• Para-mediatic:	primary	shows	enter	with	the	flow	of	media	to	be	exponentially	imitated	as	dispersive	shows.	
• Symbolically	excessive	(augmented	survival):	Shows	may	retain	a	reference	to	a	material	substrate	that	is	transcended	and	magnified	by	symbolic	excess,	so	that	the	execution	of	shows	does	little	for	the	satisfaction	of	material	human	needs	and	most	for	the	accomplishment	of	pseudo-needs:	“[t]he	phenomenon	of	separation	is	part	and	parcel	of	the	unity	of	the	world,	of	a	global	social	praxis	that	has	split	up	into	reality	on	the	one	hand	and	image	on	the	other	(Debord,	Spectacle	13).	It	is	what	Debord	calls	“augmented	survival	in	which	daily	lived	experience	embodies	no	free	choices	and	is	subject,	no	longer	to	the	natural	order,	but	to	a	pseudo-nature	constructed	by	means	of	alienated	labor”	(110-111);	
• Disciplinary-falsified:	shows	establish	falsified	versions	of	social	relations	that	serve	the	purpose	of	disciplining	the	public	as	workers	and	consumers;	
• Commodity-scripted:	the	social	scripts	that	the	spectacle	institutes	as	shows	are	built	around	commodities	for	sale.	Thus,	shows	can	be	understood	as	the	behavioral	set	of	instructions	that	accompany	commodities	(both	hard	and	soft)	as	their	user’s	guide;	
• Exponentially	dispersive:	Highly	mimetic	shows	appear	primarily	as	part	of	the	media	and	are	then	adopted	by	spectators-turned-actors	as	dispersive	
shows	that	spread	through	society	on	their	own:	the	spectacle	no	longer	needs	to	do	all	the	work,	as	workers	are	now	laden	with	the	job	of	
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maintaining	their	own	spectacular	domination,	even	(especially)	in	their	free	time,	and	while	paying	for	performing	the	work;	
• Dishistorical,	static,	geographized	and	displacing:	Shows	displace	history	onto	geography	as	they	create	the	illusion	that	the	form	of	the	economy	of	one	particular	historical	moment	is	ever-existing	and	absolute.	Instead,	all	the	stages	of	economic	progress	appear	simultaneously	in	different	geographic	distributions	as	a	static	cartography	of	the	road	to	capitalist	success,	for	which	the	First	World	/	Third	World	divide	is	the	largest-scale	and	most	fundamental	differential	opposition;	
• Unitary,	segmental	and	performative:	As	social	scripts	tied	around	a	commodity,	shows	constitute	discreet	scenes	in	the	sense	of	Tomkins’	script	theory.	If	the	concept	of	the	show	attempts	to	describe	a	Marxist	theory	of	social	performance,	it	is	crucial	to	understand	that	“a	highly	concentrated	capitalism	has	begun	selling	‘fully	equipped’	blocks	of	time,	each	of	which	is	a	complete	commodity	combining	a	variety	of	other	commodities”	(Debord,	
Spectacle	111).					
Show	of	(Two)	Worlds:	The	“show	of	two	worlds”	is	the	concrete	spectacular	actualization	of	geographical	stasis,	that	is,	of	an	oversimplification	of	the	stages	of	development	grounded	in	an	oversimplification	of	political	geography	that	maintains	First	and	Third	World	as	categories	unproblematically	identified	with	stable	geographical	boundaries.	This	world-scale	show	encompasses	the	social	
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scripts,	performances,	stereotypes	(traits	imposed	on	the	Other),	and	other	spectacular	images	that	support	the	geographical	stasis	through	which	it	seems	possible	to	locate	social,	economic,	political	or	aesthetic	(under)development	easily	along	nation-state	or	continental	lines.	The	opposite	to	the	show	of	worlds	involves	a	demarcational	view	of	these	realities	so	that	the	realities	associated	with	First	and	Third	World	are	treated	as	fluid,	transnational	and	dialectical.	In	current	usage,	the	First/Third	World	binary	comes	to	enact	respectively	the	heroic	and	anti-heroic	paradigms	of	the	capitalist	mode	of	production	on	the	stage	of	the	spectacle.		
	
Social	script:	As	a	central	notion	to	the	concept	of	the	show,	and	within	Debord’s	theory	of	the	spectacle,	I	will	propose	to	define	“social	script”	as	a	patterned	series	of	social	behaviors	related	to	a	scene	more	or	less	heavily	defined	by	the	needs	of	commodity	placement.	In	a	society	where	social	relations	are	mediated	by	commodities	as	image-objects,	these	commodities	justify	the	consumers’	need	for	them	in	relation	to	social	narratives	(or	narratives	of	pseudo-social	relations	which	Debord	would	call	“falsified”)	that	are	instituted	through	advertising,	entertainment	cinema	and	other	forms	of	propaganda,	and	include	food	and	fashion	consumption,	tourism,	and	the	consumption	of	various	forms	of	entertainment:	“[i]n	all	its	specific	manifestations	…	the	spectacle	epitomizes	the	prevailing	model	of	social	life	[and]	…	is	the	omnipresent	celebration	of	a	choice	already	made	in	the	sphere	of	production	…	[It]	serves	as	a	total	justification	for	the	conditions	and	aims	of	the	existing	system	[and]	…	ensures	the	permanent	presence	of	that	justification,	for	it	governs	almost	all	
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time	spent	outside	the	production	process	itself”	(Debord,	Spectacle	13,	his	emphases).	Spectacular	forms	of	social	relation	peddled	through	media	and	imitated	by	the	public	carry	embedded	in	them	the	pseudo-needs	for	products	that	act	as	indispensable	props	for	said	forms	of	relations:	“[m]edia	stars	are	spectacular	representations	of	living	human	beings,	distilling	the	essence	of	the	spectacle’s	banality	into	images	of	possible	roles”	(38).			The	notion	of	social	script	I	propose	in	many	ways	resembles	understandings	of	behavioral	scripts	laid	out	in	social	psychology,	in	particular	Tomkins’	“Script	Theory”	as	one	that	utilizes	“what	appears	to	be	a	dramaturgic	model	for	the	study	of	personality”	and	in	which	“the	scene,	a	happening	with	a	perceived	beginning	and	end,	is	the	basic	unit	of	analysis.	The	whole	connected	set	of	scenes	lived	in	sequence	is	called	the	plot	of	a	life.	The	script,	in	contrast,	does	not	deal	with	all	the	scenes	of	the	plot	of	a	life,	but	rather	with	the	individual’s	rules	for	predicting,	interpreting,	responding	to,	and	controlling”	a	set	of	scenes	(217).	The	concept	of	social	script	in	the	context	of	the	present	considerations	on	the	show	adds	to	Tomkins’	model	one	decisive	layer,	namely	that	as	the	spectacle	becomes	show	and	passive	contemplators	become	obedient	actors,	the	spectacle	exerts	ever-growing	control	on	these	social	plots	and	scripts	as	it	completes	its	colonization	of	social	life.			This	notion	of	“spectacularized	social	scripts”	operates	in	tension	between	cultural	differences,	on	one	side,	and	the	uniforming	force	of	the	global	commodity,	on	the	
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other.	This	is,	however,	a	weakening	tension	in	light	of	economic	and	cultural	globalization:	“[t]he	spectacle	has	its	roots	in	the	fertile	field	of	the	economy,	and	it	is	the	produce	of	that	field	which	must	in	the	end	come	to	dominate	the	spectacular	market,	whatever	ideological	or	police-state	barriers	of	a	protectionist	kind	may	be	set	up	by	local	spectacles	with	dreams	of	autarky”	(Debord,	Spectacle	38).	By	no	means	am	I	positing	that	cultural	differences	do	not	have	a	bearing	on	social	scripts,	but	rather	that	the	growing	dominion	of	a	world-scale	spectacle	that	expresses	global	economic	systems	and	commodities	must	inevitably	produce	increasing	degrees	of	social	uniformity	across	national	borders.				The	notion	of	social	script	can	thus	be	a	useful	theoretical	tool	for	a	more	nuanced	apprehension	of	the	behavioral	dimension	of	the	show	in	social	relations	understood	as	spectacle-influenced	performances.	Furthermore,	the	notion	of	a	social	script	facilitates	a	less	rigid	consideration	of	uneven	spectacle	penetration	in	social	life,	where	certain	social	events	in	certain	places	may	be	less	driven	(or	colonized)	by	spectacular	scripts	than	others.	Accordingly,	we	can	speak	of	highly	or	minimally	spectacularized	social	scripts	depending	on	how	much	those	revolve	around	the	demands	of	commodity	placement	as	image.		
	
Solidarities	(and	consortiums):	The	related	notions	of	solidarities	and	consortiums	seek	to	offer	a	non-national	alternative	to	the	postcolonial	binary	of	empire	and	(neo-)colony	in	the	context	of	a	demarcational	critique	of	the	
	 361	
discourses	of	development	and	First/Third	Worlds.	These	are	solidarities	of	men	and	women	oppressed	and	manipulated	into	capitalist	discipline	as	workers	and	consumers	in	spectacular	somnambulism,	against	the	multiple	capitalist	spectacular	consortiums	that	dominate	their	lives	and	ways	of	organizing	knowledge	and	consciousness.	While	empire	and	(neo-)colony	claim	geographic	stability	along	the	nation-state	epistemological	order	in	simple	differential	opposition,	solidarities	and	consortiums	are	non-national,	fluid,	ever-shifting,	multiple,	multi-faced,	multi-centered,	concentric,	intersectional,	contradictory	and	dialectical.			
Territorialization:	see	Geographization.		
	
Third	World:	see	First	and	Third	Worlds.	
	
Trans-World:	This	adjective	refers	to	the	particular	form	of	transnational	fraternities	that	transcend	the	boundaries	of	the	imagined	First	and	Third	World	/	Empire	and	Colony,	especially	when	such	a	fraternity	challenges	the	conventional	notions	of	the	geographic	stability	of	development	and	underdevelopment.								
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